

Philosophical Debates at Paris in the
Early Fourteenth Century

Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters

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Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century

Edited by

Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender
and Theo Kobusch



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INTRODUCTION

Stephen F. Brown – Theo Kobusch

Significant developments took place in the Arts and Theology faculties of the University of Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century. In 1255, members of the faculty of Arts, after decades of debate, were authorized to teach Aristotle's works. The understanding and defense of the Philosopher's teachings by his commentator, Averroes, on many issues, such as the eternity of the world and the unicity of the human intellect, caused serious conflicts at the university. These debates led to the condemnations in 1270 and 1277 of many theses taught in the Arts faculty. Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia were the main targets of the condemnations. However, Thomas Aquinas's support for certain philosophical positions was also challenged. Henry of Ghent played a major role among the theologians consulted by the Bishop of Paris, prior to his 1277 condemnation of 219 propositions. Henry represented very strongly the Augustinian tradition that was challenged by those, who like Aquinas, saw positive merits in Aristotle's philosophy as a stimulus for furthering the Christian understanding of the world. In the theological arena, Aquinas was challenged by some who like himself were more sympathetic toward the Aristotelian philosophy. Godfrey of Fontaines was very supportive of many of Aquinas's philosophical positions. He criticized, however, Aquinas's view of theology as a science, since Godfrey claimed that science in the proper sense of the term demands evidence and believers have no compelling evidence when they assent to mysteries of faith, such as the Trinity of persons in God or the Incarnation. Theology, for him, could not be a science in Aristotle's strict meaning of 'science', and he judged Aquinas, or at least some of his followers, to be making a false claim in speaking of theology as a science. Still, Godfrey admitted that there was never such a divorce between reason and faith that reason could not provide supporting or confirming arguments for the faith.

The next century at the University of Paris, on which this volume centers its attention, was marked by less tension. Though Averroes still raised some conflict, his commentaries were respected as strong representations of Aristotle's original teachings and he retained respect as the

Philosopher's commentator. Theology as a scientific discipline generally followed two paths. One of them started with the articles of the Creed and used necessary philosophical arguments to draw conclusions that extended the domain of faith through deduction. The other used a wider range of philosophical arguments, including probable ones, that could bring support and confirmation to the articles of the Creed that were principally accepted on faith. The use of philosophy, and particularly of the philosophy of Aristotle, was thus more acceptable. More and more-detailed commentaries on Aristotle's works appeared. Philosophical debates manifested a greater familiarity with different views and interpretations. In the thirteenth century, there was a saying that no one gets gray hair in the Arts faculty: it was a preparatory faculty, and students and teachers quickly moved on to their main fields of study: theology, law or medicine. In the fourteenth century, members of the university community, like Walter Burley, made commentaries on Aristotle's texts in 1301 and different commentaries on these same works in 1335. In this period, in both the Arts and Theology faculties, there also seems to have been a greater ease with philosophical debate and a more comfortable sense of the whole of Aristotle's teachings, whether a teacher agreed with them or not.

As we focus our attention in the present volume on the early fourteenth century at Paris, it is worth keeping in mind two things. First, it is mainly the late thirteenth-century teachings of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines that framed the debate for many issues treated in this new era. Secondly, it is important to realize that it is mainly due to the innovative power of six significant philosophers and theologians that the University of Paris had in this period a new golden age. To begin, we have Meister Eckhart coming to Paris in 1302. In the same year, we also find Duns Scotus there, who was probably present at Meister Eckhart's famous disputation with the Franciscan Gonsalvus of Spain on the relationship between intellect and will. At about the same time, the thought of Hervaeus Natalis, one of Scotus's earliest critics, reaches its maturity. Even though in his writings he presents himself as a rigid Thomist, the independent traits in his thinking cannot be ignored. Hervaeus's *Commentary on the Sentences* goes back to his lectures at the University of Paris in 1301/02. From about the same time we have his *Defensio* of Thomas Aquinas and his far-reaching criticism of Henry of Ghent's ontology. From 1308 on, Hervaeus was also a fervent critic of Durandus of St.-Pourçain, whose *Commentary on the Sentences* was disseminated around 1307 against his own will

in the form of a *Lectura* of the first redaction. If we add to this list Walter Burley, who was constantly moving between Paris and Oxford, and also the outstanding Franciscan Petrus Aureoli (Peter Auriol), we have assembled the circle of the six great personalities who significantly changed the intellectual outlook of the University of Paris.

This group of independent and critical philosophers and theologians working in Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century was, as we have said, very innovative. To get an impression of the vitality of intellectual life at Paris at that time, it is a good idea, as Chris Schabel proposes in his paper on “Auriol’s Rubrics: Citations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol’s *Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum*”, to investigate his various relations with and references to other philosophers and theologians. The result is a unique panorama which displays not only Auriol’s connections with the great thinkers of the past (Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and others), but also his involvement in the controversies with his contemporaries (Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus, *et alii*) and those who will receive only some minor attention here (such as Henry of Harclay, Alexander of Alexandria, Radulphus Brito, and Thomas Wylton).

With “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century”, Stephen D. Dumont digs into the scholarly problems surrounding the position and influence of Godfrey of Fontaines’s treatment of the intension and remission of forms. Dumont offers a detailed solution to the many unresolved questions regarding Godfrey’s teaching. Providing a broader context for studying Godfrey’s *Quodlibet I*, q. 11 and *Ordinary Question 18*, and examining the treatments of Godfrey’s position by dozens of early fourteenth-century authors (including Duns Scotus, Thomas of Bailly, Thomas Wylton and Walter Burley), Dumont unlocks many doors which remained closed after earlier research regarding this problem.

Timothy Noone’s study, “Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus’s Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction”, examines the texts of James of Ascoli, Thomas Wylton, and William of Alnwick dealing with Scotus’s famous distinction. Although viewing this distinction as intermediary between a real and a rational distinction from its earliest times, these authors spent a great deal of effort attempting to explain how it is a real distinction.

Another contribution in this volume is dedicated to Meister Eckhart. Wouter Goris, in “The Unpleasantness with the Agent Intellect in Meister Eckhart”, chooses Romans 8:22 and Aquinas’s interpretation

of this text as a starting point for analyzing Eckhart's understanding of the idea that the perfection of the universe is brought about in man and of the role of the agent intellect in this process. Thereby, Goris links us to the discussion of the agent intellect back in the era of the condemnations of 1277.

One of the most controversial issues discussed at the beginning of the fourteenth century was the problem of the beatific vision, viewed as the essence of eternal life. After John Quidort of Paris had raised the question anew at the end of the thirteenth century and Hervaeus Natalis and John of Pouilly had criticized him in this regard, both Durandus and Peter Auriol dedicated considerable portions of their works to this issue. In "Durandus of St.-Pourçain and Peter Auriol on the Act of Beatific Enjoyment", Severin Kitanov moves Durandus out of the Thomist context in which he is often found, and sets up the critique that the Franciscan Peter Auriol brought to bear on his view of beatific enjoyment. Durandus had argued that the immediate object of heavenly enjoyment is the act of attaining the direct vision of God, an act which procures 'quietness' to the will and which constitutes real enjoyment; thus God would be the 'distant', that is the mediated object of celestial enjoyment. Auriol, on the other hand, contended that the immediate object of heavenly enjoyment can never consist in an intellectual act of vision, but only in an act of the will, whose immediate object is God Himself. He thus links us back to the earlier debate, mentioned above, of Meister Eckhart and Gonsalvus of Spain on the relationship between the intellect and the will.

The debate on beatific vision continued well into the second decade of the fourteenth century. Beginning with the *Quodlibet* questions of Godfrey of Fontaines, Lauge Nielsen, in his "Parisian Discussions of the Beatific Vision after the Council of Vienne", moves on to examine the teachings of Thomas Wylton, Sibert of Beka, Peter Auriol and Raymondus Bequini. In this study, he shows the religious and philosophical reasons that motivated these authors to spend so much energy on such a seemingly speculative subject as the beatific vision. In the background of this controversy one finds the problem of the will introduced by the Franciscan authors, in particular the problem of the inscrutable divine will that, according to Wylton, is the only cause of the beatific vision. This idea is quite similar, according to Nielsen, to Auriol's doctrine that various elements are included in the beatific vision in a way quite similar to our common empirical cognition which is rich, but indistinct. It is

this latter point in particular that is criticized by the Parisian Master of Theology (1319–1321), Raymundus Bequini.

Epistemological issues were not only dealt with in the context of the beatific vision. Human cognition here on earth was also an issue intensively discussed at the University of Paris in the early fourteenth century. Thomas Aquinas had distinguished four elements in the process of cognition: the object that is known, the act of knowing that object, the species or that by means of which the object is known, and the intention or end product of the cognitive act. Debates on all of these elements ensued, and in the early fourteenth century a specific study on intentions and their relation to the act of cognition, to the known thing and to the intelligible species developed, reaching a climax in Hervaeus Natalis's *Treatise on Second Intentions*, written around 1310. Judith Dijs's essay, "Intentions in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century", presents in detail the subtle portrayals of what is meant by 'intention' by Radulphus Brito and their refutations by Hervaeus Natalis.

Georg Koridze, in "*Primae et Secundae Intentiones*. Einige Grundzüge der Intentionalitätslehre des Hervaeus Natalis", presents a detailed study of Hervaeus's *De secundis intentionibus* (and some passages from *Quodlibet III*, q. 8). *Intentio* is examined in its broad meaning that includes intentions of the intellect and intentions of the will. Koridze also examines the long and varied tradition of discussions of *intentiones* from the time of Hervaeus to Franz Brentano, attending specifically to the distinction between formal and objective concepts and examining the various contributions concerning the knowing subject and the known object to discussions of intention.

Fabrizio Amerini's paper on "Realism and Intentionality: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureoli, and William Ockham in Discussion" examines the validity of the labels 'realism', 'conceptualism' and 'nominalism' as applied to the positions of Peter Auriol and William of Ockham. He evaluates the criticism that Hervaeus Natalis brought against the semantic theory of Peter Auriol. He claims that this theory was very much inherited from Henry of Ghent. In particular, Amerini points out that Auriol's criticism of Hervaeus's theory of intentions must not be misinterpreted as a clash between conceptualism and realism, as scholars like Dominik Perler have suggested, but both theories contain elements of conceptualism and realism which, if distinguished carefully, expose the subtle differences between Hervaeus's and Auriol's notions of intentionality.

John P. Doyle returns to Hervaeus's doctrine of intentions in his essay, "Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: Its Direction and some Aftermath". He points out that the modern Husserlian expression 'intentionality' was already used in its Latin form *intentionalitas* by Hervaeus, and further notes that for Hervaeus the direction of intentionality as such is not from knower to known but from the known to the knower. This view is in full accord with the medieval notion of cognition as a perfection of something originating in the cognized thing. Though Hervaeus deviates from Peter Auriol and the philosophical tradition as far as first intentions are concerned, which for Hervaeus include golden mountains, chimerae or goatstags, the difference between Hervaeus and Auriol seems to be only a minor one, according to Doyle. This leads him into a detailed study of Hervaeus's texts, with a follow-up examination of his influence on the writings of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuits and Thomists, as well as explaining his presence in the writings of Franz Brentano.

As these examples have already made clear, the main focuses of the Parisian Masters in the first two decades of the fourteenth century were to a great extent on cognition and ontology. One of the issues pertaining to the latter was the nature of the categories, in particular that of the category of relation. Thomas Dewender, in his "Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-Pourçain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli", stresses the importance of theories of relations for medieval discussions of the Trinity and notes in particular the role that subsistent relations play in the Trinitarian doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. In this contribution, he studies the different teachings concerning relations offered by the Dominicans Durandus of St.-Pourçain and Hervaeus Natalis and the critique brought against them by the Franciscan Peter Auriol. The latter tries to find a middle position between these two opponents with his doctrine of the conceptual character of relations, since relations have at least potential being in extramental reality.

Isabel Iribarren likewise draws attention to the importance of Durandus. In "The Christological Thought of Durandus of St.-Pourçain in the Context of an Emergent Thomism", she underscores the necessary distinction in Durandus's use of the substance-accident model for explaining the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. This model, she claims, allows Durandus to avoid the strongly-criticized habitus theory. She further argues that Pierre de la Palud ignored these clarifications when he evaluated Durandus's teaching, and on this issue Pierre distorted matters, thus providing partial support for the Thomist censure of Durandus in 1317.

Peter Aureoli's ontology is also in the background—as Sven Knebel argues in his “Aureol and the Ambiguities of the Distinction of Reason”—of the difference between the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* and the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. This technical distinction originated in the fifteenth century, but underwent a reformulation in the seventeenth century by the Theatine Friar Zaccaria Pasquaglio and the Scotist Bartholomeus Mastrius. The former distinction, also called a *distinctio cum fundamento in re*, has its foundation in the thing, but is nevertheless a distinction of *rationes* in the realm of ‘objective being’—a strong reminiscence of Aureoli's theory. A similar observation holds for the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, which also recalls Aureoli's doctrine of the one *ratio* of a thing which may cause various concepts in the cognizing soul.

It is also Peter Auriol, together with Durandus and Hervaeus, who shakes further the foundations of Scotus's ontology and paves the way for many fourteenth-century achievements. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, in her “Singularité et Individualité selon Pierre Auriol”, points out that Auriol's criticism of Scotus's concept of *natura communis* leads to a new notion of individuality and, as a complement, of singularity. Scotus's notion of a real indifferent general nature leads to absurdities according to Auriol. In Auriol's judgment, such a notion can only be an objective concept, whereas the extramental things are always individual and singular. Singular things do not allow for any similar things besides themselves and do not form parts of a whole. The author notes that one can obviously find an anticipation of Ockham's doctrine at this point.

Another outstanding and highly influential figure in early fourteenth-century Paris was, of course, Duns Scotus. In his essay on “Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles in the Divine Intellect”, Tobias Hoffmann deals with another much debated issue in Scotus's philosophy, namely his teachings on the eidetic origin of created reality. These teachings present his doctrine concerning the possibles and their relation to God's intellect. Hoffmann argues for an interpretation of the latter issue that is different from the presentation of this matter by other scholars, such as Simo Knuuttila.

Scotus considered the scientific character of theology many times in his various commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In his essay, “Scotus at Paris on the Criteria for Scientific Knowledge”, Steven Marrone examines the variations in Scotus's treatments of the conditions surrounding Aristotle's requirements for science properly speaking and their application to the case of theology. Marrone finds many differences in the tones and the accounts first given by Scotus in Oxford

and in the presentations he later offered in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*. He also speculates on the causes for these notable differences.

The first focus of Stephen F. Brown, in his contribution, is on the critique that Durandus of St.-Pourçain brought against the tradition of declarative theology which uses probable arguments to support truths such as the Trinity and Incarnation. Such arguments cannot cause assent to these supernatural truths, so they cannot be considered properly scientific arguments, which by their very nature provide evidence that commands assent. In his “Declarative Theology after Durandus: Its Re-presentation and Defense by Peter Aureoli”, the author resets the focus and shows how Peter Auriol denied that declarative theology aimed at demonstrations or assent-causing arguments. Rather the aim of what Auriol calls declarative theology is to bring understanding to the truths that are principally assented to because of faith.

“Intuition, Abstraction and the Possibility of a Science of God: Durandus of St.-Pourçain, Gerard of Bologna and William of Ockham”, presented by David Piché, recounts Durandus’s denial, in the first redaction of the prologue to his *Lectura* or *Commentary on the Sentences*, of the claim that traditional declarative theology can be science. Science, for Durandus, is based on evidence and we have no evidence regarding truths like the Trinity or the Incarnation. Although Gerard of Bologna declares that Durandus’s argument is not demonstrative, he grants that we do not have intuitive or abstractive cognition of God that would justify a strict claim of science for theology. It is within this framework that Piché presents William of Ockham’s treatment of theology as a response to the problem raised by Durandus, even though Ockham might not be responding specifically to either Durandus or Gerard.

“On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St.-Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect”, the contribution of Russell L. Friedman, is a study of the often-called ‘common position’ that there cannot be more than one act in the intellect (or will) at any one time. This position, defended by Durandus, as well as by other Dominicans, such as Hervaeus Natalis and John of Paris, was attacked by Thomas Wylton. The challenges by Wylton show a number of the applications of Durandus’s teaching on simultaneous acts and the ramifications of this doctrine for certain issues in theology and philosophy.

Although late thirteenth-century Parisian masters dealt with the nature and signification of terms, early fourteenth-century authors

extended this study to the nature, signification and verification of propositions. In his study, “Le signifié propositionnel selon Jean Duns Scot et Gauthier Burley”, Laurent Cesalli examines the origins of the new trend in the writings of John Duns Scotus and the influence Scotus had on the theory developed by Walter Burley. He compares both thinkers on issues such as the nature and the signification of propositions and what makes them true. In this context, Cesalli offers a new interpretation of Burley’s notion of *propositio in re*, which he sees as an anticipation of modern concepts developed by Brentano and Twardowski.

In his article entitled “Walter Burley’s *Propositio in re* and the Systematization of the *Ordo Significationis*”, Stephan Meier-Oeser traces the development throughout five of Burley’s works of his realistic approach to propositions. Beginning with his simple contention that a mental proposition is composed of things, Walter later develops a further distinction between a subjective mental proposition and an objective mental proposition. Only the latter is a *propositio in re*, composed of extramental things. He was attacked by Henry Harclay and others, but in all five works he holds essentially the same position in his effort to establish that ‘S is P’ only is true if S *really* is p.

This collection of essays, papers originally delivered at conferences in Bonn and Boston, show in a detailed way the tone and nature of philosophical and theological issues and arguments at the University of Paris in the early fourteenth century. They touch on a large number of authors and a broad spectrum of subjects, but from this broad presentation, it is quite evident from their continual appearance in the overall discourse that the intellectual framework of these discussions had been set by the earlier Parisian generation of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. It is likewise just as evident, from their repeated presence throughout this volume, that the principal contributors to the new intellectual energy in early fourteenth-century discussions at Paris are Meister Eckhart, John Duns Scotus, Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus of St.-Pourçain, Walter Burley and Petrus Aureoli. Generally speaking, Parisian bachelors and masters seem more at ease with Aristotle’s philosophy in this new era, an ease brought on by deep familiarity with his texts and those of his principal commentator. There is also a greater sense of confidence that faith and reason are compatible and less of a hesitancy to confront philosophical challenges and alternatives. The university as a “community of masters and students” has gone by this time beyond the limits of a school with a unique

master or teacher and has achieved its communal strength. Six names might stick out as indicating special contributors, but, speaking more realistically, it is the university as an institution that achieved special greatness at this time and fostered the individual eminence of these six and the many others whose names appear here less significantly.

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HISTORICAL CONTEXT

AURIOL'S RUBRICS:
CITATIONS OF UNIVERSITY THEOLOGIAN IN PETER AURIOL'S
SCRIPTUM IN PRIMUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM

Chris Schabel (Nicosia)*

Peter Auriol's *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum* holds a special place in the intellectual history of the fourteenth century.¹ Its size alone sets it apart from most other works of its type. The edition of the *Scriptum* published in Rome in 1596 comes to 2252 columns of text, which in the critical edition will probably take up between 4000 and 5000 pages. The work is also unusual in that, for the most part, it pre-dates the author's main lectures on the *Sentences*, which were given at Paris

* Special thanks to William Owen Duba and Russell Lance Friedman.

¹ First printed as *Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Primum Librum Sententiarum pars prima et secunda*, ed. C. Sarnano, Romae 1596, followed by versions of books II–IV as *Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Secundum, Tertium et Quartum Libros Sententiarum et Quodlibeti tomus secundus*, Roma 1605. Further studies on or editions of parts of the *Scriptum* include *Peter Aureoli, Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, ed. E. Buytaert, 2 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY 1952–1956 (Prologue and distinctions 1–8 from ms. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borghese 329); C. Schabel, “Peter Aureol on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents. *Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum*, distinctions 38–39”, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 65 (1995), pp. 63–212; R.L. Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum. The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325*, PhD Dissertation, University of Iowa, Iowa City 1997, pp. 365–496; K.H. Tachau, “The Preparation of a Critical Edition of Pierre Auriol's *Sentences* Lectures”, in *Editori di Quaracchi 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive*, ed. A. Cacciotti – B. Faes de Mottoni, Roma 1997, pp. 205–216, and in the same volume L.O. Nielsen, “The Critical Edition of Peter Aureoli's Scholastic Works”, pp. 217–225; C. Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's *Sentences* Commentary”, *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 117–161; L.O. Nielsen, “Peter Auriol's Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the *Sentences*”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden – Boston – Köln 2002, pp. 149–219. As will be discussed, the *Scriptum* text is now being placed on R.L. Friedman's *The Peter Auriol Homepage*: <http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html>. For other redactions of Auriol's book I, and for book IV, see Nielsen, “Peter Auriol's Way with Words” and the literature cited there by S.F. Brown, A. Maier, and F. Pelster. For book II, see Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace...”. For book III, E. Buytaert, “Aureoli's Unpublished *Reportatio* III, Dist. 3, q. 1–2”, *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955), pp. 159–174; V. Heynck, “Die Kommentare des Petrus Aureoli zum dritten Sentenzenbuch”, *Franziskanische Studien* 51 (1969), pp. 1–77; and W.O. Duba, “The Immaculate Conception in the Works of Peter Auriol”, *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 5–34.

in 1316–1318. Although it may have something to do with Auriol's earlier teaching in Bologna and/or Toulouse, it appears to be mainly a written work from start to finish. Perhaps for this reason it is almost unique for its time in yet another way: Auriol's *Scriptum* on the first book of the *Sentences* abounds in explicit citations of other university theologians, in many cases still alive and active. Indeed, the Franciscan Francis Meyronnes, one of the first of Auriol's Parisian successors to use Auriol's *Scriptum* rather than his Parisian *Reportatio*, referred to the *Scriptum* as an important source for the views of other theologians.²

It would be interesting to conjecture that Auriol's practice of putting references to recent figures and contemporaries in the rubrics has something to do with the development around that time of similar marginalia, which Damasus Trapp has in some cases attributed to the authors themselves.³ Trapp's examples are from works of members of his own order, the Augustinian Hermits, all of which postdate Auriol's *Scriptum*. Other examples of similar marginalia could be given from some Franciscans at Paris in the 1320s, such as the anonymous author of manuscript Vienna, ÖNB 1439. Oxford Franciscans such as Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, active in the 1320s and 1330s, also employed the technique, and it has been suggested that they popularized it for later Parisians like Gregory of Rimini. However, not only did all of these Augustinians and Franciscans write after Auriol, but they knew Auriol's works quite well. Auriol's practice of putting citations in the text itself was not approached by the Augustinians until after 1360, most notably with John Hiltalinger of Basel—although in the period after Hiltalinger it ceases. Still, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe was putting detailed references into the text in the 1320s, and it is significant that his main opponent was Auriol himself. Indeed, only Auriol and Baconthorpe rival Hiltalinger's level of precision: Auriol sometimes gives this kind of citation: "Thomas's opinion in the *Prima pars*, question 13, article 7, and in the *Scriptum*, book I, distinction 26, question 2, article 1", and occasionally he offers in the text such additional details

² S.F. Brown, "Walter Burley, Peter Aureoli and Gregory of Rimini", in *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume III. Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. Marenbon, London – New York 1998, pp. 368–385, at p. 381.

³ See especially D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Book Lore", *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 146–274, but also some of his other articles, such as "Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations", *Augustiniana* 4 (1954), pp. 412–449.

as “the solution to the third argument”. In the text of his *Reportatio*, in manuscript form, Baconthorpe has references such as “Auriol, book I, distinction 2, question 2, article 2, proposition 3”, although most of his citations are not so precise. As far as I know, Auriol is the first to do this systematically in a work of this sort, although theologians like John of Pouilly and Durand of St.-Pourçain were already headed in that direction around 1310. Perhaps the *correctoria* literature provides other examples, but this is another matter altogether. Even if Auriol is not the main catalyst in this trend, he at least shows that authors in the 1310s were perfectly capable of citing their contemporaries by name and even by work, which supports Trapp's theory.⁴

More importantly for present purposes, Peter Auriol's practice allows us to learn who the most important theologians of the university era were, in the mind of a Franciscan writing in the 1310s. Since this volume is especially devoted to the first quarter of the fourteenth century, Auriol's citations in his *Scriptum* are therefore rather significant.

I. CITATIONS IN THE SARNANO EDITION AND IN THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *SCRIPTUM*

There is a substantial obstacle to overcome in analyzing Auriol's citations: the early modern edition by Cardinal Costantino Sarnano. The mere existence of what appears at first to be a masterful edition served as a hindrance to those who might otherwise have gone to look at the manuscript tradition of Auriol's *Scriptum*. If such a useful tool was already available, why bother with the unprinted witnesses? In fact, recent studies have shown that the printed edition is in the best cases

⁴ On citation practice in the fourteenth century, see also W.J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, Princeton, NJ 1987, pp. 254–255; P.J.J.M. Bakker – C. Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, pp. 425–464; C. Schabel, “Haec Ille. Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism”, in *The Origins of European Scholarship*, ed. I. Taifacos, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 163–175. On ÖNB 1439, see R.L. Friedman – C. Schabel, “The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320's. MS Wien, Palatinus 1439”, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 63 (1996), pp. 357–372. For examples of John Pouilly's direct and occasionally detailed citations in the text, see his *Quodlibet* IV, q. 10, in T. Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV*, pars I, Roma 1935, pp. 55*–104*.

a mediocre witness to Auriol's text, and at worst it is inferior to all of the eleven complete and three somewhat complete manuscripts.⁵

More importantly, although Sarnano's edition is full of citations of every kind, most readers would naturally assume that the references were inserted by the sixteenth-century editor, since such added citations can often be found in early modern editions. In support of this is the fact that in some instances theologians active after Auriol are cited, something that would hardly be possible had the references been original to Auriol himself. Thus the *Scriptum* edition has single citations of William of Ockham, Marsilius of Inghen, and John Capreolus, and two citations each of Thomas of Strasbourg and of Heilmannus. In any case Sarnano's use of italics for these references would have aroused further suspicion. In cases of patristic and Averroistic citations, Sarnano was even in the habit of putting part of them in the margins. In reality, with most references to Augustine and Averroes, for example, the full citation was given by Auriol in the text itself, but this was lost on the readers of the Sarnano edition. Could Sarnano have also fiddled with Auriol's citations of university theologians?

The answer is, of course, a resounding yes. This paper is based on the results of a count of all of the citations in Auriol's rubrics and their collation against the 1596 edition. This was accomplished in the following way: as part of the Peter Auriol editing project, the Institute for Church History of the University of Copenhagen funded the electronic transcription of the entire *Scriptum* from the printed edition. In order to use the *Scriptum* for the *Reportatio's apparatus fontium* and for better cross-referencing, I have gone through and collated much of manuscript BAV Borghese 329—which Eligius Buytaert used for the Prologue and distinctions 1–8—against the electronic transcription of the Rome edition, in order to improve the text. Russell Friedman is currently reworking this raw material and gradually publishing an improved text of the *Scriptum* on *The Peter Auriol Homepage*. Of course, neither the Buytaert edition nor the Borghese manuscript is perfect, so after the publication of Auriol's *Reportatio in primum* work will begin on the critical edition of the *Scriptum*. Where previous editions exist,

⁵ Schabel, "Peter Aureol on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents", pp. 82–85; Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum*, pp. 365–370; Schabel, "Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace...", pp. 158–159.

we have made use of them, although with a few exceptions even these texts are being recollated for the electronic version.⁶

As I have implied, Auriol's citations of university theologians are found in his rubrics. I have ignored any other citations inside the body of the text, except for his references to his own works, either his first work, *De principiis philosophicis* (or *physicis* or *naturae*), or his future commentaries on books II–IV of the *Sentences*; these will be discussed below. In any case Auriol's other references inside the body of the text almost always refer to authors writing before 1200. For some of these citations, namely those of the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics* together with Averroes's commentaries, William Duba has already begun an analysis.⁷ References in the rubrics, on the other hand, almost always refer to university theologians.

Table A is a chart of Auriol's *Scriptum* citations, according to the manuscripts and according to the 1596 edition (two works cited together are counted as one citation). The individual citations according to the manuscripts and edition are included in an appendix to this article, which will facilitate historical analyses of doctrinal debates. In this introduction I concentrate on the names and numbers.

Immediately one is struck by the large number of explicit citations of recent and living theologians: over 600, more than one per folio in most manuscripts. It is also noteworthy that less than one fifth of these references are to anonymous scholars, which is perhaps the percentage of textual references indicated by words such as "some claim" that one might find in the works of a modern scholar. One is also surprised by the fact that the Rome edition has 72 more anonymous citations than Auriol intended. In addition, more than two dozen other citations in the Sarnano edition were changed from one theologian to another. Thus about one hundred of Sarnano's references, one sixth of the total, do not come from Auriol himself. This is not counting the scores of occasions on which Sarnano merely gets the details of the citations wrong. Some of the differences between the correct citations in the manuscripts and the erroneous references in Sarnano's edition can certainly be attributed to simple paleographical mistakes, either those of Sarnano's exemplar

⁶ See *The Peter Auriol Homepage*: <http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html>.

⁷ W.O. Duba, "Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in Peter Auriol's *Commentary on the Sentences*", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), pp. 549–572; id., "Aristotelian Traditions in Franciscan Thought. Matter and Potency According to Scotus and Auriol", in *The Origins of European Scholarship*, pp. 147–161.

Table A: Auriol's Citations of University Theologians

University Theologian	Mss	Edition	Notes
John Duns Scotus, OFM	133	121	(see analysis)
Thomas Aquinas, OP	122	111	(see analysis)
Henry of Ghent	54	53	<i>Quodl.</i> : 22; <i>Summa</i> : 8
Hervaeus Natalis, OP	51	24	(see analysis)
Durand of St.-Pourçain, OP	47	32	<i>Scriptum</i> : 9; <i>I Sent.</i> : 1
William of Ware, OFM	26	16	<i>Scriptum</i> : 3; <i>I Sent.</i> : 1
Godfrey of Fontaines	19	18	<i>Quodl.</i> : 14; <i>QQ. Ord.</i> : 1
Bonaventure, OFM	12	11	<i>I Sent.</i> : 1 (and Sequaces)
Richard of Middleton, OFM	10	6/4	(see analysis)
Gerard of Bologna, OCarm	10	7	<i>Quodl.</i> : 7
Henry of Harclay (Anglicus)	8	2	<i>Scriptum</i> : 3; <i>I Sent.</i> : 1
Alexander of Alexandria, OFM	6	2	(see analysis)
Thomas Wylton (Anglicus)	5	0	(see analysis)
Giles of Rome, OESA	5	5	
Bernard of Auvergne, OP	4/6	1/3	<i>Contra Henricum</i> : 4 <i>Contra Godofredum</i> : 1
Alexander of Hales, OFM	3	4	
Peter of Auvergne	2	1	dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1; dist. 27, q. 2, art. 1
Praepositinus	2	0	
John of Paris, OP	1	1	Prol., q. 3, art. 1
Peter John Olivi, OFM	1	0	dist. 5, art. 1
Radulphus Brito	1	0	dist. 23, art. 1
William de la Mare, OFM	1	0	dist. 35, q. 4, art. 1 (and Sequaces)
Others unnamed	121	193	
Post Auriol	0	8	
Totals	646	616	

or of Sarnano himself, or both. Thus, thirteen references to Hervaeus Natalis in the manuscripts became citations of Henry of Ghent, and one Henry citation was in turn given to Hervaeus. This is probably what happened in the case of two references to the little-known (in 1596) Alexander of Alexandria which became citations of Alexander of Hales, and two references to Henry of Harclay which were changed to Henry of Ghent. Likewise, two references to William of Ware, "Garr<onis>," became citations of Gerard of Bologna.

In the above cases, the errors were probably unintentional, but in many other instances Sarnano appears to have simply decided to ignore citations. A dozen or so citations each of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Scotus were made anonymous in the Rome edition (and a handful

of Scotus references were actually added). Given the large number of citations of Thomas and Scotus, and the numerous false attributions to Henry of Ghent, these changes are not so important. In the case of others, however, the Rome edition does great damage to our knowledge of who the major players were at the time. William of Ware lost some ten references for no apparent reason (although he also gained a couple), and Durand of St.-Pourçain lost fifteen, in both cases a substantial portion of their references. Richard of Mediavilla lost five citations, half of his total. Hervaeus Natalis not only lost thirteen citations to Henry of Ghent, but another dozen or so became anonymous in the printed version. So in the Rome edition Henry of Ghent has more than twice the number of Hervaeus Natalis's citations, when in reality Auriol cited them almost an equal number of times. Several theologians who were only cited once or twice were completely ignored in the Rome edition, but three scholastics in particular suffered: Alexander of Alexandria was cited eight times by Auriol, but Sarnano reported only two references; Auriol referred to Bernard of Auvergne four times, but only one is recorded by Sarnano—although on two other occasions a reference to “B<ernardus>” is erroneously written “R” in the manuscripts and expanded to “Riccardus” in the edition; and, most important, all of Thomas Wylton's references were erased in the 1596 printing.

Sarnano's errors and decisions had the effect of deemphasizing the “minor” authors before Scotus and the authors active between Scotus and Auriol's own time. If we group together the “big six” who were the most famous in the early modern period and remain so today, that is Aquinas, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome—who is not very important for Auriol—and Scotus, we find that the manuscripts have 345 citations and the Rome edition has 319, a reduction of only about seven percent. Combining all others, however, we have 180 references in the manuscripts and 104 in the edition, so that some 42 percent of the references are lost. The frequency of error and change seems to increase from the beginning to end, so that there are few problems in the Prologue and many in later distinctions. It is possibly the case that Sarnano employed different exemplars in different places, and the quality of the text varies.⁸ Nevertheless, the conclusion is

⁸ The text of the *Scriptum* preserved in the Sarnano witness (ms. Sarnano, Biblioteca Comunale, E. 101) is very closely related to the Rome edition, but that manuscript's text ceases after distinction 27; Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace...”, pp. 158–159.

that the Rome edition, generally untrustworthy as a witness to Auriol's text, is also very problematic for the scholar wishing to determine whom Auriol considered to be the big guns.

II. AURIOL'S INTERLOCUTORS

Having dispensed with the Sarnano edition, let us examine what the citations that Auriol intended can tell us about his *Scriptum* and his intellectual milieu. It should be pointed out from the beginning that Auriol's citations probably do not accurately reflect the positive influences on his thought. Just as a scholar today may plagiarize someone else's work for several pages before turning to attack him and, for the first time, actually cite him, this was undoubtedly happening in the fourteenth century. For example, I have found that Francis of Marchia exerted quite a positive influence on several scholars on the topic of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, but he was never cited in the context.⁹ Nevertheless, I think Auriol's citations give us a clear picture of his era. For one thing, historians have long recognized that Auriol was a highly original thinker: he was likely to disagree in some way with just about everyone, and so he had less reason than most theologians to make himself look more original than he actually was by covering up his sources. Thus, while it is true that Auriol rarely says, "I agree with Scotus on this matter", it is also true that where Auriol does agree, he probably cites Scotus anyway to say that the Subtle Doctor had erred in some small or large way.

Another potential problem with using Auriol's citations as a gauge of the general importance of other theologians is that even in the golden era of scholasticism, mendicant theologians tended to keep to their own. This is especially true of the main mendicant orders, who could boast so many prominent thinkers. Although the manuscripts of the *Sentences* commentaries of most theologians in this era do not contain many explicit references to contemporaries or recent predecessors either in the text or in the margin, the few that do contain them reflect this trend. The following table lists the citations in book I of the Parisian *Sentences* commentaries dating to 1316–1330 that display many such explicit references (A = Auriol's *Scriptum*; B = anonymous

⁹ C. Schabel, *Theology at Paris 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, Aldershot 2000, pp. 189–220, 268–269, 325–328.

OFM, ca. 1324; C = Gerard Odonis, OFM; D = John Baconthorpe, O.Carm.; E = Dionysius de Borgo San Sepolcro, OESA; F = Gerard of Siena, OESA; G = Michael of Massa, OESA; H = Bernard Lombardi, OP; I = Landulph Caracciolo, OFM; + = many references; – = less than; * = lectio incerta).¹⁰

Table B: *I Sentences* citation lists 1316–1330

University Theologian	A OFM	B OFM	C OFM	D O.Carm.	E	F OESA	G	H OP	I OFM
Scotus, OFM	133	89	13	39	14	61	95	12	24
Aquinas, OP	122	20	9	19	25	31	64	+	22
Henry of Ghent	54	45	7	26	41	36	46	8	24
Hervaeus, OP	51	1	3	6	19	0	10	26	1
Durand, OP	47	0	0	3	61	12	24	60	1
Ware, OFM	26	4	0	3–	5	1	7	0	4
Godfrey	19	11	1	5	6	9	22	0	12
Bonaventure, OFM	12	2	0	3–	2	1	0	0	0
Middleton, OFM	10	0	0	3–	2	0	0	0	1
Gerard, OCarm	10	3*	0	7	0	1	0	0	0
Harclay	8	1	0	3–	0	0	3	3	0
Alexandria, OFM	6	2*	0	3–	0	0	0	0	0
Wylton	5	0	0	6	0	0	1	0	0
Giles, OESA	5	4	0	5	173	+	60	3	2
Bernard of Auvergne, OP	4/6	1*	0	3–	0	0	1	0	0
Hales, OFM	3	1*	6	3–	1?	0	0	0	0
Peter of Auvergne	2	1*	1	2–	5	0	0	0	0
Praepositinus	2	0	0	2–	0	0	0	0	0
John of Paris, OP	1	0	0	2–	1	0	0	0	0
Olivi, OFM	1	0	0	2–	0	0	0	0	0
Radulphus	1	0	0	2–	0	0	2	0	0
de la Mare, OFM	1	0	0	2–	0	0	0	0	0
Auriol, OFM	N/A	103	6	25	N/A	29	116	22	298
Caracciolo, OFM	N/A	21	0	2–	N/A	3	5	0	N/A
Marchia, OFM	N/A	1	3	2–	N/A	0	4	0	N/A

¹⁰ The table was calculated from manuscripts for Baconthorpe, Landulph Caracciolo and Bernard Lombardi. For the Augustinians, I used D. Trapp, “The *Quaestiones* of Dionysius de Burgo O.S.A.”, *Augustinianum* 3 (1963), pp. 63–78 (Dionysius); D. Trapp, “Notes on Some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa († 1337)”, *Augustinianum* 5 (1965), pp. 58–133 (Massa); D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology...”, p. 161 (Gerard); for the anonymous Franciscan, Friedman – Schabel, “The Vitality of Franciscan Theology at Paris in the 1320’s”; for Odonis, C. Schabel, “The *Sentences* Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 46 (2004), pp. 115–161.

Table B: (*cont.*)

University Theologian	A OFM	B OFM	C OFM	D O.Carm.	E	F OESA	G	H OP	I OFM
Meyronnes, OFM	N/A	1	0	2–	N/A	0	1	0	N/A
Guy Terrina, OCarm.	N/A	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
Walsingham, OCarm.	N/A	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
Albertus, OP	0	0	1	2–	3	0	0	0	0
J. Viterbo, OESA	0	0	0	2–	7	0	5	0	0
Alex. Elpidio, OESA	0	0	0	2–	5	0	0	0	0
Tarentasia	0	0	0	2–	3	0	0	0	0
Gerard Siena, OESA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	108	N/A	0
Robert Cowton, OFM	0	0	0	2–	10	0	8	0	0
Bernard of Trilia, OP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

As the example of Bernard Lombardi (H) in Table B shows, Dominicans of the 1310s and 1320s would usually read and cite other Dominicans, although mostly they did not cite anyone at all; in the case of divine foreknowledge, they appear to have ignored everyone else completely. Franciscans did the same, although perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, as the anonymous Franciscan of ÖNB 1439 (B) from the 1320s demonstrates: about half of the theologians he cites are Franciscans, who take up over 70 percent of the citations. This was also true of the Augustinians and Carmelites, although they did not have the traditions of the Friars Preacher and the Friars Minor. For example, in book I of his *Reportatio*, Baconthorpe has six or more marginal citations of nine university theologians, and three of them are Carmelites. For the Augustinian Dionysius de Borgo San Sepolcro, of the ten scholars cited eight or more times, three are Augustinians. We must take into account the fact that, like the secular theologians, the Carmelites and Augustinians lacked the system of book production of the Dominicans and Franciscans, and so they were not able to disseminate their views as widely. Even so, their emphasis on their own orders is out of proportion to the overall significance of their own theologians. Perhaps secular theologians would be the best gauge, but we do not have any example of a comprehensive theological work dating from the 1310s or 1320s, such as a *Sentences* commentary, that was penned by a secular theologian. Taken together, however, the eight *Sentences* commentaries above give a good idea of who was important in the first quarter of the fourteenth century: Hervaeus, Durand, and finally Auriol himself joined the ranks of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Scotus; Giles of Rome faded

outside his own order; Godfrey retained some importance, and Ware was known to most theologians. Of other theologians active between 1300 and 1325, the seculars Henry of Harclay and Thomas Wylton, the Franciscans Landulph Caracciolo, Robert Cowton, and Francis of Marchia, and the Carmelite Gerard of Bologna had relatively broad readership.

Auriol is probably not immune to the problem of insularity, but I think his citations reflect the relative importance of theologians across the spectrum better than anyone else's. His originality, especially his frequent departure from the tradition of his own order—three of the top five authors cited are Dominicans—makes him more neutral. The fact that the *Scriptum* is a written work intended for a broad audience and apparently not simply based on lectures to other Franciscans is further support for the value of Auriol's citations, as perhaps is the fact that most of the *Scriptum* was composed outside of Paris.

Auriol cites 22 authors active after 1200, but only two of them wrote before 1250, Praepositinus and Alexander of Hales. All of these authors were active at Paris, although Auriol's main source for Scotus, called a *Scriptum*, seems to be the *Ordinatio* based on his Oxford lectures. Of the 20 Parisian authors writing after 1250, the citations break down as follows: seven are Franciscans, cited a total of 191 times; five are Dominicans, cited 225 times; six are seculars, cited 89 times, and the Carmelites and Augustinians have one each, cited ten and five times respectively. Eliminating those with fewer than five citations, we have five Franciscans, four Dominicans, four seculars, and one each for the Carmelites and Augustinians. This is probably an accurate portrayal of the relative importance of these theologians in about 1315. For the Augustinians before that time, only Giles of Rome had a significant impact outside his order, and the same is the case for the Carmelite Gerard of Bologna. The number of citations is heavily influenced by the preponderance of references to Scotus and Aquinas, of course.

If we look at Auriol's citations by type of work cited, we have nine *Sentences* commentaries, cited 111 times; six figures' *Quodlibeta* for 63 citations; three *Summae* cited 108 times, two *Metaphysics* commentaries referred to once each; and a total of five references to three other modern works. However, a great number of other explicit references to theologians where no work is specified refer to the corresponding distinction in *Sentences* commentaries, so the *Sentences* commentaries dominate even more than it appears. Two of the three *Summae* are works from the mid-thirteenth century, by Aquinas, who has 100 of the

108 citations, so the significance of this genre of theological literature in Auriol's own time is exaggerated in this statistic. After Aquinas, *Quodlibeta* are much more important than *Summae*, of which only Henry of Ghent's is cited; even for Henry of Ghent, the *Quodlibeta* are cited almost three times as often as the *Summa* (22 vs. 8). It should be noted that Auriol cites explicitly the *Sentences* commentary of only one secular, Henry of Harclay, unless when citing Radulphus Brito Auriol is referring to his *Sentences* commentary as well. Likewise, Auriol only cites the *Quodlibeta* of the Carmelite Gerard of Bologna, whose *Sentences* commentary does not survive. Perhaps Auriol used Giles of Rome's *Sentences* commentary, although this is never stated explicitly. Without the support of the Franciscans' and Dominicans' publishing machinery, the seculars, Carmelites, and Augustinians had to make their names as masters of theology. It is perhaps surprising that other sorts of Disputed and Ordinary questions play almost no role in Auriol's *Scriptum*. There is only one reference to *Ordinary Questions*, in this case by Godfrey of Fontaines, as opposed to 14 to his *Quodlibeta*, in the context of the latitude of forms.¹¹ In sum, excluding Aquinas's *Summae*, well over 90 percent of the citations are to *Sentences* commentaries and *Quodlibeta*. Except for one explicit citation of Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary, Auriol refers to every other such work at least once as a *Scriptum*. In fact, of the 111 references, 88 are to a *Scriptum*. Unfortunately this suggests that Auriol is using the term generically.

If we look at chronology, we have a balanced spread: for authors active before Aquinas, including Bonaventure, we have 17 citations; for Aquinas, 122; between Aquinas and Scotus, including William of Ware, 125; for Scotus, 133; and for authors after Scotus, including Henry of Harclay and Gerard of Bologna, 130. If we concentrate on numbers of theologians, for the top 14 in terms of citations, about half wrote before 1300 and half after 1300, and William of Ware and Giles of Rome were still active after 1300. In fact, three of the top five theologians in terms of citations wrote after 1300. Thus it appears that for Auriol, recent theologians were very significant and had to be taken into consideration.

¹¹ Cardinal Sarnano changed Godfrey's *Quaestiones Ordinariae* reference to the *Quodlibeta*, but after several other scholars' attempts, Stephen D. Dumont, "Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century", in this volume, pp. 39–125, has finally straightened things out.

Table C: Auriol's Citations of Aquinas and Scotus

Aquinas (122 total):		Scotus (133 total):	
<i>Summa theologiae</i> :	92	<i>Sentences</i> commentary:	33
Prima pars:	85	<i>Scriptum</i> I:	16
Prima secundae:	4	I <i>Sentences</i> :	13
Secunda secundae:	3	III <i>Sentences</i> :	1
<i>Scriptum</i> :	34	IV <i>Sentences</i> :	3
<i>Summa contra gentiles</i> :	8	<i>Quodlibet</i> :	3
		<i>Metaphysics</i> com.:	1*

* (dist. 2, q. 1, art. 1)

For figures up to Scotus's time, I will just note in passing some additional details.

Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary is still a major source outside the Dominican Order in Auriol's day. It is always called a *Scriptum*, whereas of Auriol's 29 explicit citations of Scotus's commentary on book I, only 16 refer to a *Scriptum*. Aquinas's commentary is in fact a *Scriptum*, but does this mean that Auriol is using Scotus's *Scriptum* in all 29 cases or only in 16 of them, or perhaps none at all? More work has to be done to determine whether Auriol used primarily Scotus's *Ordinatio*, which apparently stems from Oxford lectures given just before 1300, or Parisian *Reportationes* (as did many Parisian scholars), or both.

Auriol's rubrics provide other interesting information. Three of the earlier Franciscans are described as having *Sequaces*: Bonaventure, Scotus, and, perhaps surprisingly, William de la Mare, although Aquinas's opinion is often explained or defended by others, according to Auriol. Of the eleven citations of Richard, i.e., of Mediavilla, one refers to I *Sentences* and another to the *Scriptum*. A twelfth citation refers to the *Scriptum* of Richard "Anglicus". There is, of course, a question as to whether Richard of Mediavilla is Richard of Middleton, of England. In Auriol's dist. 35, q. 2, art. 3, Richard's *Scriptum* is cited; then in q. 3, art. 2, Richard Anglicus's *Scriptum* is mentioned; and finally in q. 4, art. 2, there is a simple reference to Richard. It would seem that all three refer to the same Richard's *Scriptum*. Unfortunately, the reference to Richard Anglicus is included with a citation of Henry of Ghent, and although the position Auriol describes does not disagree with what Richard of Middleton says on the matter, there is no verbatim match.¹²

¹² Richardus de Mediavilla, *Super quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. 35, ed. Brixiae 1591, pp. 299a–307a.

Nevertheless, Rega Wood and R. James Long have ruled out Richard Rufus and probably Fishacre as holding the opinion in question, while Girard Etzkorn and Richard Schenk have strong doubts about Knapwell's even being a possibility. There are a couple of other English Richards, but they do not seem to have a *Sentences* commentary that would have circulated. On the other hand, Jacob Schmutz, who has worked on the issue treated in the context of the passage, says he would "bet all [his] money on Richard of Middleton". If so, it reconfirms Franz Pelster's demonstration that Richard of Mediavilla was from England, although his vernacular name should be Richard of Menneville, rather than Middleton.¹³ The fact that only once is "Anglicus" spelled out does not affect the situation, since a simple Henry is always Henry of Ghent, although on rare occasions "Gandavus" is used instead. Both Henry and Richard perhaps needed to be distinguished from Henry of Harclay (Anglicus) and Richard of St Victor at times. This was the case between Alexander of Hales and Alexander of Alexandria, as we shall see.

The important names of those active in the two decades before Auriol are—aside from Scotus—Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of St.-Pourçain, William of Ware, Gerard of Bologna, Henry of Harclay, Alexander of Alexandria, and Thomas Wylton. Although Auriol thought these theologians to be very important, they have been neglected by historians of theology and philosophy. The significance of Hervaeus and Durand was recognized in the early modern period, of course, when several editions of their works were printed. But their role has been downplayed since then, and even though their main theological works survive in many manuscripts, little critical editing work has been done. Auriol considered Hervaeus and Durand extremely important, referring to them 51 and 47 times respectively. Auriol cites no less than four of Hervaeus's works, as in Table D.

¹³ Personal communications and S. Piron, "Franciscan *Quodlibeta* in Southern *Studia* and at Paris, 1280–1300", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 1: The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2006, pp. 403–438, at p. 417.

Table D: Auriol's Citations of Hervaeus Natalis's Works

<i>Scriptum</i> :	22
<i>Quodlibeta</i> :	16
<i>De verbo</i> :	1 (dist. 9, q. 1, art. 1)
<i>De secundis intentionibus</i> :	1 (dist. 23, art. 1)

Again, one assumes that the citations that do not refer explicitly to any particular work are mostly for the *Scriptum*. This is certainly true for Durand, since the only work cited is the *Sentences* commentary, nine of the ten references calling it the *Scriptum*.

The other names have suffered even more neglect, both in the early modern period and today. It is understandable that the works of the seculars Harclay and Wylton and those of the Carmelite Gerard do not survive in a large number of manuscripts, although paradoxically a substantial amount of their works have been edited recently and they are finally getting the attention they deserve. Auriol's sole source for Harclay is the *Sentences* commentary; of the eight citations, four are to the *Sentences* commentary, three of them calling it a *Scriptum*. No Carmelite commentary even survives from before Auriol's time, so it is no surprise that Auriol cites Gerard of Bologna's *Quodlibeta* on seven occasions.

With William of Ware and Alexander of Alexandria the situation is puzzling. The number of manuscript witnesses for both of these theologians is quite large, yet little work has been done. Auriol knew his fellow Franciscan William of Ware, with 26 citations, via the *Sentences* commentary, although this is only made explicit on four occasions, three of which mention the *Scriptum*.¹⁴ Although Auriol has just six

¹⁴ For Harclay, M. Henninger is leading the way with the edition and translation of the *Ordinary Questions*, and William Duba, Russell Friedman, and I have been working with the *Sentences* commentary. For the substantial recent scholarship on Wylton, by R. Andrews, S.D. Dumont, G.J. Etzkorn, E. Jung, L. Nielsen, T. Noone, and herself, see C. Trifogli, "The *Quodlibet* of Thomas Wylton", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2007, pp. 231–266. For Gerard, see the recent PhD dissertations of the Carmelites Hubert Borde and Simon Nolan, building on the work of B. Xiberta, P. de Vooght, S.F. Brown, and myself. For Ware (and in general for *Sentences* commentaries 1250–1320), see the literature cited in R.L. Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Text Case of Predestination", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, pp. 41–128, at pp. 63–65, to which one should add Friedman's edition of several questions in "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues

citations of his confrère Alexander of Alexandria, three different works are mentioned: the *Scriptum*, the *Quodlibeta*, and the *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*. Each of these gets one reference, so the remaining three citations are probably to the *Sentences* commentary. Understandably, Sarnano often confused Alexander with Alexander of Hales. Auriol does not always distinguish. In dist. 8, q. 1, art. 1, I am merely guessing that the simple “Alexander” is Hales. In dist. 12 and dist. 13, however, Auriol is forced to distinguish between “Alexander de Ales” and “Alexander de Alexandria,” as in dist. 19. In dist. 12, Auriol has to write “Antiquus,” because in dist. 13 he is going to refer to “Alexandria”. The *Scriptum* of the next “Alexander” referred to in dist. 13 is therefore of Alexandria. It was not necessary for Auriol to write “de Alexandria” for the *Metaphysics* commentary (dist. 30) or the *Quodlibet* (dist. 35), but in the former case he did so anyway. Auriol’s guiding rule, then, is intelligibility in his citations, usually referring to specific works or toponymics only where confusion was possible.

III. DATING THE COMPOSITION OF THE *SCRIPTUM* BY CITATIONS

A glance at Auriol’s citations of figures after Scotus and of his own internal cross-references may give us some clues about the composition of the *Scriptum*. Scotus of course died in 1308, and Harclay’s written commentary, based on lectures given just after 1300, dates from late in the first decade. The eight references to Hervaeus’s *Quodlibeta* where numbers are provided refer to I, II, and III, dating to 1307–09. His *Scriptum* was put into final form around 1309 or slightly later. Durand’s *Scriptum* is cited too, and it is known that Durand did not consider his first redaction, completed circa 1308, to be authorized. If we are to take the “Scriptum” term seriously, then, it would seem that Auriol had access to Durand’s second redaction, which dates from 1310–12. But since no manuscripts of book I of this redaction are known to survive, we have to rely on Peter of Palude to reconstruct parts of the text; and since in any case Durand often made little or no changes between one

I. Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries”, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168, here pp. 99–112, and in R.L. Friedman – C. Schabel, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues IV. English Theology ca. 1300: William of Ware and Richard of Bromwich”, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 75 (2004), pp. 121–160, at pp. 127–146.

redaction and the other, it will be difficult to determine what Auriol used, although in one instance he employed the first redaction.¹⁵

The secular theologian Radulphus Brito is cited in dist. 23, immediately before a citation of Hervaeus Natalis's *De secundis intentionibus*. It is unclear what work of Radulphus Auriol refers to, but in an article published in 1980 Jan Pinborg published Radulphus's *Questions on Porphyry* that had to do with universals and also a question from his *De anima* commentary, followed by the section of Hervaeus's *De secundis intentionibus* that attacks Radulphus, and then Auriol's own attack on both Radulphus and Hervaeus in dist. 23 of the *Scriptum*. If Auriol is not using dist. 23 of Radulphus's own *Sentences* commentary, based on lectures given at Paris in 1308–09, surviving in only one manuscript, and recently printed by de Rijk, Auriol's text must follow Hervaeus's, which must follow Radulphus's *Questions on Porphyry*. Unfortunately, Pinborg merely dates the Hervaeus text to between 1309 and 1316, that is, when Auriol was finishing up his *Scriptum*.¹⁶

Alexander of Alexandria's definitive version of his *Sentences* commentary, the one no doubt Auriol used, was probably completed around 1307–08 when he was regent master and held his *Quodlibet*, which survives in several manuscripts. His popular *Metaphysics* commentary, printed in Venice in 1572, is extant in seven complete manuscript witnesses and fragments, according to Lohr, but he gives no date. Probably we can do little better than ca. 1308, since in 1309 he was a provincial

¹⁵ For Hervaeus's dates, see R.L. Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2*, pp. 401–491, at pp. 431–449. For Durand's redactions and their reception in Palude, Auriol, and others, see C. Schabel – R.L. Friedman – I. Balcoyiannopoulou, "Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), pp. 183–300, and R.L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol versus Durand of St.-Pourçain on Intellectual Cognition", forthcoming.

¹⁶ J. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito on Universals", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 35 (1980), pp. 56–142; L.M. de Rijk, *Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica. Volume II: De intentionibus. A Critical Edition, with a Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate to ca. 1350*, Leiden 2005, pp. 643–650, with further pertinent texts from Radulphus on pp. 651–693 and others elsewhere; an edition of Radulphus's dist. 38–39 is in M. Rossini – C. Schabel, "Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists. Texts on Future Contingents by Alexander of Alexandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), pp. 237–338, at pp. 299–304.

minister, in 1313 he was elected Minister General of the Franciscans, and he died the following year.¹⁷

With the notable exception of Thomas Wylton, as we shall see, all of Auriol's sources are either firmly dated to 1309 at the latest or could be so dated. If we allow for Durand's second redaction, we can comfortably say that Auriol's sources have a *terminus ante quem* of 1312, although we might be able to go back as far as 1310. This is quite consistent with what Auriol does *not* cite in his *Scriptum*. He does not cite Gerard of Bologna's *Summa*, authored between 1313 and his death in 1317. Franciscans knew this work, because the anonymous author of ÖNB 1439 undoubtedly refers to this work when the marginalia read "Ge in *Summa*" in q. 16. The Carmelite Guy Terrena's *Quodlibeta*, dating from 1313, are not cited. Neither does Auriol cite Peter of Palude, an important Parisian Dominican active in these same years. Hervaeus's later *Quodlibeta* are ignored here, as are all of Durand's. All this fits in quite well with the theory that Auriol's *Scriptum* was substantially complete before he arrived to teach in Paris in the fall of 1316, having worked elsewhere up until then, and not having had access to the latest works.

But it was probably not all complete. In dist. 40 Auriol refers to Thomas Wylton, and he goes on to cite him again in dist. 41, 42, 43, and 45. These are five rapid citations in the different contexts of divine predestination, power, and will. It is possible that Auriol had access to sections or all of Wylton's *Sentences* commentary, which survives in mere fragments and was composed around 1310. It seems unlikely, however, that Auriol would have waited 40 distinctions before attacking—five times—a man who, as Lauge Nielsen has shown, just happened to become one of Auriol's main adversaries during his stay in Paris. It seems, rather, that Auriol arrived in Paris in 1316 with the remaining few distinctions left to complete and found Wylton's ideas as they were expressed in disputes in late 1315 and 1316. Vat. Borgh. 329, the copy

¹⁷ On Alexander, see L. Veuthey, *Alexandre d'Alexandrie, maître de l'Université de Paris et ministre général des Frères Mineurs*, Paris 1932. F. Amerini has been working on the *Metaphysics* commentary, printed in Venice in 1572; see, e.g., his "Alessandro di Alessandria sulla natura degli accidenti", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), pp. 179–235, with critical edition on pp. 224–227. A critical edition of book I of his *Sentences* commentary, qq. 3–4 of dist. 35, is in Rossini – Schabel, "Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists", pp. 284–298. On the *Quodlibet*, see W.O. Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus" in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*. Vol. 2, pp. 569–649, at pp. 579–582.

of the *Scriptum* made for Pope John XXII, was completed in May 1317, so perhaps the scribe, John of Frisia, had already begun to copy the early distinctions while Auriol was finishing the work.¹⁸

Perhaps Auriol's own internal citations back this up:

Table E: Internal References to Other Books in the *Scriptum*
(by *Scriptum* Distinction)

Book II	Book III	Book IV
	dist. 2, q. 3, art. 2	
dist. 3, q. 1, art. 1		
dist. 3, q. 1, art. 4		
	dist. 4, q. 1, art. 1	
dist. 8, q. 1, resp. ad obiecta		
dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3		
dist. 9, q. 1, art. 1		
dist. 9, q. 2, art. 2		
dist. 10, art. 5		
dist. 13, art. 2		
dist. 17, q. 3, resp. ad obiecta		
dist. 17, q. 3, resp. ad obiecta (2nd)		
dist. 29, art. 3		
		dist. 30, q. 1, art. 1
dist. 30, q. 1, art. 3		
dist. 30, q. 1, resp. ad obiecta	dist. 30, q. 1, resp. ad obiecta	dist. 30, q. 1, resp. ad obiecta
dist. 31, art. 1		
dist. 31, art. 1 (2nd)		
dist. 32, art. 1		
dist. 33, art. 3		
dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2		
dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2 (2nd)		
dist. 35, q. 4, art. 1		
dist. 35, q. 4, art. 3		
dist. 36, q. 1, art. 3		

¹⁸ On Wylton's *Sentences* commentary, see S.D. Dumont, "New Questions by Thomas Wylton", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 9 (1998), pp. 341–379. For Wylton, Auriol, and the composition of the *Scriptum*, see L.O. Nielsen's studies "Auriol's Way with Words", "The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 35–98, and "Parisian Discussions of the Beatific Vision after the Council of Vienne" in this volume.

Table E (*cont.*)

Book II	Book III	Book IV
dist. 36, q. 2, art. 2		dist. 36, q. 2, art. 2
dist. 36, q. 2, art. 3		
dist. 37, art. 2		
dist. 42, q. 1, art. 1		
dist. 42, q. 1, art. 3		
dist. 42, q. 1, art. 3 (2nd)		
dist. 42, q. 1, art. 3 (3rd)		
dist. 42, q. 2, art. 1		
		dist. 42, q. 2, art. 2
dist. 43, art. 3		dist. 43, art. 3
		dist. 44, art. 2
dist. 44, art. 3		
dist. 44, art. 3 (2nd)		
		dist. 45, art. 1
		dist. 46, art. 2
33	3	8

References to *De principiis physycis* (or *philosophicis*):

dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4: tractatu
 dist. 2, q. 1, art. 4: tractatu
 dist. 3, q. 1, art. 1: secundo tractatu
 dist. 5, art. 4: tertio tractatu
 dist. 8, q. 1, art. 2: tractatu
 dist. 13, art. 2: tertio tractatu
 dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2: tertio tractatu
 dist. 37, art. 2: tractatu

Of the eight references to his earlier treatise *De principiis physycis*, most occur in the earlier distinctions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, and 13, as we would expect given relative dating. Nevertheless, this may be related to the issues discussed in the early distinctions, and in any case two citations do occur later in dist. 35 and 37, so we can determine little from this. On the other hand, Auriol cites other books of his *Sentences* commentary at least 44 times, and these may be more instructive. Most of the references, 33 to be exact, are to book II, 22 coming from dist. 30 and afterwards, although they cease at dist. 44. Citations of book IV, however, are more prevalent at the very end. Of the eight citations I have found, five come from dist. 42–46 at the very end of the book, one from dist. 36, and two from dist. 30. Distinction 30 is huge, and also contains the lone citation to book III after dist. 4. It is tempting to suggest that Auriol originally planned to compose a written commentary on book I of the *Sentences*. When his work was interrupted

by his being assigned to lecture on the *Sentences* at Paris, however, he had to think in terms of lecturing on the other books. When he arrived in Paris he learned he would lecture next not on book II, but on book IV, as was the usual practice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Besides being one of the most influential works of philosophical theology of the later Middle Ages in its own right, Auriol's *Scriptum* is a good guide to the *status quaestionis* on many issues in philosophy and theology and also to the major contemporary players in the first half of the first quarter of the fourteenth century, the focus of this volume. Many medieval (and modern) scholars have, accordingly, taken Francis of Meyronnes's advice and used Auriol's *Scriptum in primum* to present not only Auriol's own views, but those of his predecessors and senior contemporaries. In the 1340s, the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini, one of the most influential scholastics of the late Middle Ages, both dealt with Auriol's positions directly and quoted him verbatim when presenting the views of others.¹⁹ In the early fifteenth century the *defensor Thomae* par excellence, John Capreolus, in his own book I cited Auriol (and his *Scriptum in primum*) more than all other university scholars combined (besides Aquinas), and his lengthy verbatim quotations as often as not refer not to Auriol's own position but to that of one of Auriol's predecessors.²⁰ Considering that it was in this quarter of the fourteenth century that Augustinian and Carmelite

¹⁹ See Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura in I et II libros Sententiarum*, ed. A.D. Trapp et al., 6 vols., Berlin – New York 1979–1984. In his book I, Rimini cites Auriol 137 times, 48 times in book II, for 185 total. Others: Scotus 219 + 51 = 270; Ockham 168 + 41 = 209; Aquinas 75 + 56 = 131; Giles 54 + 23 = 77; Wodeham 48 + 18 = 66; Walter Burley 33 + 25 = 58; Henry of Ghent 28 + 8 = 36; Fitzralph 5 + 30 = 35; Durand 12 + 5 = 17. The rest, 29 theologians, have ten or fewer. Of the 39 theologians cited, only 9 were active in the thirteenth century, and of the ca. 1200 references, almost 80% are to fourteenth-century figures.

²⁰ See Ioannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. C. Paban – T. Pègues, Tours 1900–1908, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967. A count of Capreolus's citations in book I has 179 for Auriol and 152 for the others, including 44 for Scotus, 41 for Rimini, 15 for Durand, 10 for Henry of Ghent, and 9 for Wodeham. These same figures dominate the other books as well, except that Auriol has fewer, Rimini is only cited in books I–II since Rimini's books I–II were the only ones existing, and Peter of Palude's famous book IV receives heavy attention in Capreolus's own book IV. Overall, Auriol 295; Durand 189; Scotus 187; Rimini 81; Henry 27; Palude and Wodeham 19. Including Capreolus's citations of 17 others, the total comes to 870 references.

theology began to reach maturity, and that the monastic orders had a real impact in the universities, we should be open to the possibility that this era was as important in philosophical theology as the second half of the thirteenth century. It is generally recognized that in natural and political philosophy the period after Scotus equalled or surpassed the previous decades, and maybe this is also the case in other divisions. Thus, almost 80% of Rimini's references and over 90% of Capreolus's citations in his defense of Aquinas are to theologians active between 1300 and 1350, most of them at Paris. Perhaps, then, Scotus's death in 1308 was not "The End of the Great Era" in scholasticism, but rather the beginning.

APPENDIX

AURIOL'S RUBRICS IN THE MANUSCRIPTS VS. THE PRINTED EDITION

Citations are usually given from ms. Vat. Borghese 329, followed by the parallel citations from the Rome 1596 edition in square brackets where there are significant differences. (Note that 'Thomas' and 'Bonaventura' almost always become 'Sanctus' in the edition.) Question titles are taken from the rubrics in the manuscripts. Due to lack of space, article numbers (e.g., **Art. 2**) are provided without titles. For a detailed summary of the contents, see Buytaert's edition, vol. I, pp. 13–124.

(1) Prologue, q. 1: *utrum ex studio theologiae et solo naturali ingenio aliquis habitus acquiratur alius a fide.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae, parte I, art. 1 [... parte I, q. 1, art. 2]; Opinio Guarrae in Scripto, q. 3 [Opinio Varronis, I Sent., q. 3]; Opinio quorundam aliorum; Opinio Godefridi III Quolibet, q. 10 et IV Quolibet, q. 19; Opinio Scoti, libro III, dist. 24 [... libro III, dist. 24, q. unica].*

(2) Prologue, q. 2: *utrum dari possit a Deo lumen aliquod viatori, virtute cuius theologiae veritates scientificè cognoscantur.* **Introduction:** *Rationes pro lumine Henrici [Nothing]; Rationes pro notitia abstractiva Scoti; Rationes pro Godefrido contra lumen Henrici; Rationes quorundam contra abstractivam Scoti.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Henrici, Quodlibet XII, q. 2, et in Summa, q. <2> [... Summa q. 2, art. 1]; Opinio Godefridi, Quodlibet III, q. 10, et Quodlibet IV, q. 19.* **Art. 2:** *Opinio Scoti, in Quodlibet, q. 6, 7, et 14; Impugnatio Hervaei contra Scotum, I Quodlibet, q. 5 [... Quodlibet II, q. 5]; Defensio Scoti contra Hervaeum.* **Art. 3:** *Opinio Scoti; Opinio Scoti; Gerardus, Quodlibet II, q. 6 [... Quolibet, q. 9].*

(3) **Prologue, q. 3:** *utrum theologicus habitus sit practicus vel speculativus*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici [...in Summa, art. 8, q. 3]; Opinio Guarrae, I suo [Opinio Varronis, in I Sent., q. 1]; Opinio Henrici Anglici in Scripto I suo [...in Summa sua, q. 3, art. 8]; Opinio Scoti...in I Scripto [...in I Sent., q. 4 et 5]; Opinio Scoti...in I Scripto [...I Sent., q. 4 et 5]; Opinio Godefridi, IX Quodlibet, q. 1; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 1, art. 4; Opinio aliorum; Opiniones Aegidii...et Ioannis Parisiensis [Opinio Aegidii in I Sent. in prooemio...et Ioannis Parisiensis]. **Art. 2:** Secundum Scotum [Contra Scotum, in prologo I Sent., q. 4 et 5]; Scotus; Contra Scotum; Contra Scotum; Contra Scotum; Contra Scotum.

(4) **Prologue, q. 4:** *utrum habitus ex theologico studio acquisitus sit unus vel plures*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici, Quolibeto IX, q. IV; Opinio Scoti [...in prologo I Sent., q. 4 et 5]; Opinio Bernardi in impugnationibus Henrici Quolibeto IX, q. 4 [add. mg. Bernardus antiquissimus auctor de Lucemburgo]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 1, art. 3; Opinio Henrici Anglici in I suo, q. 3 [...I Quolibet, q. 3]; Opinio Scoti...in prologo, q. 3 [...in prologo I Sent., q. 3]; Opinio; Opinio Godefridi XIII Quolibeto, q. 1 [...Quolibet XX, q. 1].

(5) **Prologue, q. 5:** *utrum habitus theologicus habeat pro subiecto Deum sub ratione deitatis*. **Introduction:** Nothing [S. Thomas, parte I, q. 1, art. 3, et est opinio Capreoli in prologo I Sent., q. 4, conclusione 6]; Nothing [Opinio Thomae de Argentina, q. 1 prologi]; Nothing [Opinio Heilmanni Vunnenbergher, praeceptoris Marsilii Inghen]; Nothing [Opinio Scoti in prologo I Sent., q. 3]. **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti...I libro, q. 3 [...in prologo I libri Sent., q. 1, art. 2]; Contra Scotum. **Art. 3:** Opinio Bonaventurae [...in prologo I Sent., q. 1]; Opinio Thomae...parte I, q. 1, art. 3; Opinio quorundam [Sanctus Thomas in prologo I Sent., q. 1, art. 4]; Opinio Aegidii [...I Sent., q. 3 prologi]; Opinio quorundam [Opinio quorundam...Thomas de Argentina, prima q. prologi]; Opinio quorundam [Opinio quorundam...Heilmannus ut supra]; Opinio Scoti [...3 q. prologi]

(6) **dist. 1, q. 1:** *utrum beatus frui possit essentia praescindendo ipsam conceptibiliter a personis*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Gerardi, Quolibet II, q. 1 [Opinio Varronis, Quolibeto XI, q. 1]; Opinio quorundam; Opinio Scoti, dist. 1, q. 2.

(7) **dist. 1, q. 2:** *utrum fruitio sit unicus et simplex actus voluntatis*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Durandi, libro I, dist. 1, q. 1; Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 1 [...Scripto I]; Opinio Petri de Alvernia; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 1, q. 3]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, Prima Secundae, q. 10, 11, 12 [...Prima Secundae, q. 31 per totam]. **Art. 3:** Contra opinionem Thomae...Prima Secundae, q. 13, 15, et 16 [...Prima Secundae, q. 13, 15].

(8) dist. 1, q. 3: *utrum appetitus fruatur de necessitate ultimo fine per intellectum apprehenso.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti et Thomae [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 1, q. 5, et S. Thomae, Prima Secundae, q. 11, art. 2]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, Prima Secundae, q. 10, art. 1 et 2, et Godefridi, II Quodlibet, q. 1; Modus dicendi Gerardi, Quodlibet I, q. 20; Opinio Scoti, libro I, dist. 1, q. 4 [...I Sent., dist. 1, q. 4].

(9) dist. 2, q. 1: *utrum Deus includatur infra conceptum entis quem habet viator.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Communis...Gerardus, Quolibet I, q. 1, et Hervaeus, Quolibet [Opinio Communis...Gerardus, Quolibet I, q. 1]; Opinio Scoti in qq. Metaphysicae et in I suo, dist. 3 [Opinio Scoti in qq. IV libri Metaphysicae et in I Sent., dist. 3, art. 3].

(10) dist. 2, q. 2: *utrum esse Dei sit aliquid per se notum.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici [...in Summa sua, q. 2, art. 22]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti, libro I, dist. 3 [...libro I, dist. 3, q. 2]; Contra opinionem Scoti. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, I parte, q. 12, art. 4; Opinio communis; Opinio Scoti; Opinio Gerardi, I Quodlibet, q. 4 [...q. 7]. **Art. 5:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 2, art. 1, et in Scripto I [Opinio S. Thomae, parte I, q. 2, art. 1]; Modus Hervaei...Scripto I, dist. 3 [Articulus Henrici...in sua Summa, q. 1 et 2, art. 22]; secundum opinionem Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 3 [...in I, dist. <3>, q. 2]; Scotus.

(11) dist. 2, q. 3: *utrum secundum regulam Scripturarum in uno Deo sit trinitas personarum, vere et proprie accipiendo personam.* **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 28, art. 3, in solutione primi argumenti; Modus Hervaei in Scripto I, dist. 2 [Modus Henrici Quolib. I, q. 1]; Modus dicendi quorundam; Opinio multorum, scilicet Gerardi Quolibet I, q. 5, et Hervaei in Scripto ubi supra et in Quolibet suo, et plurium aliorum [...Quolibet I, q. 1, et Henrici ubi supra Quolibeto I...]; Modus dicendi Scoti, dist. 3 libri I.

(12) dist. 3, q. 1: *utrum unitas Dei possit ex creaturis demonstrative concludi.* **Art. 2:** secundum opinionem Hervaei, Quodlibet III, q. 1 [secundum opinionem Henrici, Quodlibet III, q. 1]; Iste Doctor <Hervaeus> [Iste doctor <Henricus>]. **Art. 4:** Contra Scotum et Hervaeum [Contra Scotum, I Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, et Henricum, Quolibeto IV, q. ultima]; Opinio Hervaei in suo Quolibet [...Quolibet V, q. 11].

(13) dist. 3, q. 2: *utrum per rationem vestigii in creaturis reperti possit declarari trinitas personarum.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 45, art. 7, et in Scripto I [...parte I, q. 45, art. 7]; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 3 [...libro I, dist. 3]; Opiniones quorundam. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae in Scripto et in Summa ubi supra [Opinio S. Thomae in Summa ubi

supra]. **Art. 4:** *Opinio Thomae...Scoti...Gerardi* [Opinio S. Thomae, I parte, q. 44, art. 7].

(14) **dist. 3, q. 3:** *utrum per rationem imaginis possit demonstrari quod sit trinitas personarum in Deo.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio doctorum.* **Art. 2:** *Opinio Scoti, Scripto I [...libro I, dist. 2, q. 3 et 4 secundae partis].*

(15) **dist. 4, q. 1:** *utrum haec sit concedenda: 'Deus genuit Deum', vel sua opposita, scilicet 'Deus non genuit Deum'.* **Art. 2:** *Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 19, art. 4, in solutione tertiae rationis; Opinio Varronis.* **Art. 3:** *Opinio Thomae ubi supra.*

(16) **dist. 4, q. 2:** *utrum in solo Deo praedicetur abstractum de concreto, vel e converso.* **Art. 2:** *Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 3, art. 3; Opinio Hervaei exponentis Thomam, Scripto I, dist. 3, et in Quolibet suo [Opinio Henrici in sua Summa, tomo 2, q. 7]; Opinio quorundam aliorum; Opinio Scoti [...in II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1].*

(17) **dist. 5:** *utrum essentia in divinis aliquo modo generet aut generetur.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Petri Iohannis <Olivi> [Opinio Scoti, libro I, dist. 5, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici, Guarrae, Durandi [Opinio Varronis, Quolib. VI, q. 1, et lib. I Sent., dist. 5, q. 3, Gerardi, lib. I, dist. 5]; Opinio Scoti [...in I Sent., dist. 5, q. 1]; Opinio Hervaei [Opinio Henrici in sua Summa, art. 54, q. 2, tomo 2]; Opinio quorundam aliorum.*

(18) **dist. 6:** *utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate vel necessitate vel natura.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Godefridi [...I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1]; Opinio Scoti et sequacium [...et sequentium, lib. I Sent., dist. 6, q. 1].*

(19) **dist. 7, q. 1:** *utrum posse Filium generare sit aliqua potentia productiva quae existat in Patre.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 7, et parte I, q. 41, art. 5 [Opinio S. Thomae, I parte, q. 41, art. 5]; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 13, et Henrici [Opinio Scoti in I Sent., dist. 13, et Henrici in Summa, art. 37, q. 7]; Opinio Bonaventurae et Guarrae [Opinio S. Bonaventurae et Varronis]; Opinio propria Henrici; Opinio quorundam aliorum; Opinio Durandi et Thomae secundum eum.*

(20) **dist. 7, q. 2:** *utrum possint esse plures filii in divinis.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 7 [...I Sent., dist. 7, art. 2]; Opinio Henrici [...Quod. VI, q. 1]; Opinio Guarrae, Scripto I [Opinio Varronis, I Sent., q. 42]; Opinio aliorum.* **Art. 2:** *Opinio Scoti in suo Quodlibet, q. 2 [Opinio Scoti in I Quodlibetorum, q. 2]; Opinio Hervaei in suo Quolibet, contra Scotum [Opinio Hervaei in I Quolibet, q. 2, contra Scotum]; Defensio Scoti contra Hervaeum; Opinio Scoti.*

(21) **dist. 8, q. 1:** *utrum in omni alio citra Deum differant essentia et esse.* **Art. 1:** *Opinio...Thomae et Aegidii et plurium aliorum*

[Opinio...S. Thomae, I parte Summae, q. 3, art. 4, et Aegidii, I Sent., dist. 8, q. 2, et in II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici [Opinio Henrici in sua Summa, q. 3, art. 21]; Opinio Guarrae [Opinio Varronis in I Sent., q. 45]; Opinio Godefridi et Alexandri <Hales>. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae [...I parte, q. 3, art. 4]; Opinio quorundam.

(22) dist. 8, q. 2: *utrum solus Deus sit proprie incommutabilis.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti in Scripto I, dist. 38, q. 2 [...in I Sent., dist. 38]; Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 8 [...I Sent., dist. 8, q. 3, art. 2]. **Art. 3:** Secundum Scotum; Secundum Hervaeum et multos alios [Secundum Henricum De aeternitate mundi, q. 4]. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae, 8 dist., q. 5, et parte I, q. 9, art. 2 [Opinio S. Thomae, I parte, q. 9, art. 8]; Opinio Guarrae, Scripto I, dist. 8 [Opinio Varronis, in I Sent., q. 49]; Opinio aliorum.

(23) dist. 8, q. 3: *utrum pluralitas attributorum repugnet divinae simplicitati.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 2 [...lib. I, dist. 5, q. 1, art. 1]; Opinio Godefridi, III Quodlibet, q. 1 [...Quolibet VII, q. 1]; Additio Hervaei [...Quolib. III, q. 3]; Opinio Gandavi, V Quodlibet, q. 1 [Opinio Varronis, I Sent., dist. 16, q. unica]; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 8, et Guarrae [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 4:** ...Gerardi et Hervaei et Durandi; Secundum opinionem Scoti.

(24) dist. 8, q. 4: *utrum in Deo sit aliquis modus compositionis.* **Art. 1:** Contra Thomam et communiter loquentes.

(25) dist. 9, q. 1: *utrum possit evidenti ratione probari quod in Deo sit generatio activa vel passiva.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Godofredi, I Quolibeto, q. 6, et IV, q. 18; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 3 [...in I, dist. 3]; Opinio Durandi, Scripto I, dist. 27; [...lib. I, dist. 27]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 34, art. 1, et Hervaei in tractatu De verbo, et in suo Quolibeto, et Riccardi (*lege Bernardi*) in impugnationibus contra Henricum; Contra Godofredum et Scotum; Contra Durandum; Contra Thomam, Hervaeum, et Riccardum (*lege Bernardum*). **Art. 2:** Opinio communis.

(26) dist. 9, q. 2: *utrum Filii generatio mensuretur aeternitate.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 10, art. 1. **Art. 3:** Opinio quorundam.

(27) dist. 10: *utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat ut amor.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici, VI Quolibet, q. 1 [...Quolibeta XI, q. 1]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 37, art. 1; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. 10 [...libro I, dist. 10]; Opinio Durandi, Scripto I, dist. 10 [...libro I, dist. 10]. **Art. 2:** Contra Henricum; Contra Thomam; Contra Scotum; Contra Durandum. **Art. 4:** Opinio Durandi et quorundam aliorum [...libro I Sent., dist. 10, et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 7, q. unica, et dist. 10, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici [...Quolibet VI, q. 1, et Quolibet II, q. 6]. **Art. 5:** Opiniones diversorum [Opinio diversorum].

(28) dist. 11: *utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et a Filio.*
Art. 2: Opinio quorundam; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 36, art. 2, et Godofredi III Quolibet, q. 3, et plurium aliorum [*om.* 'q. 3']; Opinio Henrici, Quolibet V, q. 9, et Scoti [...Quodlibet V, q. 9, et Scoti, I Sent., dist. 11, q. 2].

(29) dist. 12: *utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat uniformiter a Filio et a Patre.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici [...Quolibet V, q. 9]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 1, q. 2, et in 2 dist. I, q. 1]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti et aliorum quorundam [...I Sent., dist. 12, q. unica, et aliorum quorundam]; Opinio Alexandri antiqui et Henrici et Thomae, I parte, q. 37, art. 4, in solutione primi argumenti [Opinio Henrici in Summa, art. 54, et S. Thomae, I parte, q. 37, art. 4, in solutione primo argumento (!), et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio quorundam. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae ubi supra.

(30) dist. 13: *utrum generatio et spiratio sint productiones alterius rationis.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 37, art. 2, in solutione ultimi argumenti, et q. 28, art. 3, in solutione ultimi argumenti; Declaratio eiusdem opinionis secundum Hervaeum, Scripto I [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Aegidii [...Quolibet I, q. 16]; Opinio Alexandri de Alexandria [Opinio Alexandri de Ales, I parte, q. 43, memb. 4]; Opinio Godofredi, Quolibet III, q. 3; Opinio Henrici, V Quolibet, q. 1; Opinio Bonaventurae et Scoti et Garronis [Opinio S. Bonaventurae, I Sent., dist. 13, q. 3, et Scoti, I Sent., dist. 13, q. unica, et Varronis, I Sent., q. 52]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti, et Alexandri <de Alexandria>, et Durandi in Scriptis suis [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 13, q. unica; Alexandri, in I parte Summa, q. 43, memb. I, art. 1; Durandi, I Sent., dist. 13, q. 2]; Opinio Hervaei, I Scripto suo [Opinio Hervaei, Quolibet VI, q. 7].

(31) dist. 14: *utrum processio temporalis sit proprietas Spiritus Sancti.* **Art. 1:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 43, art. 3, et Hervaei, Scripto I, et Durandi [Opinio S. Thomae, parte I, q. 18, art. 3, et aliorum]; Opinio Bonaventurae [...I Sent., dist. 14, art. 2, q. 1]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Bonaventurae [...I Sent., dist. 14, q. 2]; Opinio Alexandri de Alexandria [...dist. 14, q. 2]; Opinio Hervaei, Scripto I [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Durandi, Scripto suo [...I Sent., dist. 14, q. 2].

(32) dist. 15: *utrum cuilibet personae divinae conveniat invisibiliter mitti aut mittere.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 43, art. 1 et 2. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 43, art. 5, et Durandi [Opinio S. Thomae, parte I, q. 43, art. 5]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti et multorum aliorum [...I Sent., dist. 14 et 15, q. unica, et multorum aliorum]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 43, art. 8 [Opinio aliorum]; Opinio Bonaventurae [...I Sent., dist. 15, q. 3].

(33) dist. 16: *utrum Spiritus Sanctus visibiliter fuerit missus.* No citations.

(34) dist. 17, q. 1: *utrum caritas sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima vel ipsamet persona Spiritus Sancti.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti, Scripto I [...I Sent., dist. 17, q. 2]; Opinio Thomae, Prima Secundae, q. 110, art. 1 [...q. 10, art. 1]; Opinio Garronis [Opinio Varronis, q. 69]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, Secunda Secundae, q. 23, art. 2; Opinio diversorum; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 17, q. 2]; Opinio Hervaei [...Quolibeto V, q. 2]. **Art. 4:** Opinio Garronis et Godofredi, VII Quolibet, q. 4 [Opinio Varronis, I Sent., dist. 18; Goff., Quolibet IX, q. 5]; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 17, q. 2]; Opinio alia rationabilis secundum Scotum [...in I Sent., dist. 17, q. 2]; Opinio Hervaei [...Quolibet III, q. 7]

(35) dist. 17, q. 2: *utrum caritas possit augeri.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, Secunda Secundae, q. 24, art. 5; Opinio Godofredi in Quaestionibus ordinariis [Opinio Goffredi, Quolibet VII, q. 7]; Opinio Simplicis et plurium aliorum [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Henrici, Quolibet IV, q. 15; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto et in Quolibet [Opinio Hervaei, Quolibeto VII, q. 17]; Opinio Bonaventurae, Ricardi, Scoti. [Opinio aliorum]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, Secunda Secundae, q. 24, art. 7, et Hervaei in Scripto [Opinio S. Thomae, Secunda Secundae, q. 24, art. 7, et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Henrici, V Quolibet, q. 22; Opinio Bonaventurae et sequacium aliorum [...sequentium aliorum, I Sent., dist. 17, q. 4]. **Art. 4:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio communis.

(36) dist. 18: *utrum donum sit proprietas constitutiva Spiritus Sancti.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 38, art. 1 et 2; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto suo, dist. 10 [Opinio Hervaei, Quolibeto VI, q. 7]; Opinio Durandi in Scripto suo [...in I Sent., dist. 18, q. 1]; Opinio Scoti [Opinio aliorum].

(37) dist. 19, q. 1: *utrum una persona sit in alia immansive et per circumincessionem.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 42, art. 3 [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Henrici in Summa, Garronis [...in Summa, dist. 19, q. 2, et Varronis, libro I, dist. 19]; Opinio Durandi in Scripto suo [...in I, dist. 19, q. 3]; Opinio Scoti, Scripto suo [...libro I, dist. 19, q. 2].

(38) dist. 19, q. 2: *utrum personae divinae sint omnino aequales.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 42, art. 1, et Hervaei in Scripto suo [...in I Sent., dist. 19]; Opinio Scoti [Opinio quorundam]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 19, q. 1]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 4:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 5:** Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist.

19, q. 1]. **Art. 6:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 42, art. 1; *Opinio Durandi* [*Opinio aliorum*].

(39) dist. 19, q. 3: *utrum veritas secundum suam formalem rationem sit in anima vel in rebus*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio* + *lac. mss.* [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 16, art. 1; *Opinio Godofredi*, *Quolibet* II, q. 6; *Opinio Hervaei et Durandi in Scriptis suis* [*Opinio Hervaei*, *Quolibeto* III, q. 1, et *Durandi*, I Sent., dist. 19, q. 6]; *Opinio Alexandri de Ales et Alexandri de Alexandria* [*Opinio Alexandri de Alexandria*, I Sent. dist. 19, et *Alexandri de Ales*, I parte, q. 15].

(40) dist. 20: *utrum potentia generandi sub omnipotentia includatur*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Aegidii* [...I Sent., q. 19]; *Opinio Bonaventurae* [...I Sent., dist. 7, q. 2]; *Opinio Durandi* [...I Sent., dist. 7, q. 3]; *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 13, art. 3 [...parte I, q. 2, argumento 3]; *Opinio quorundam*; *Opinio Scoti* [...I Sent., dist. 20, q. unica]. **Art. 2:** *Opinio Garronis* [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio aliorum*; *Opinio Hervaei* [...*Quolibet* IV, q. 5].

(41) dist. 21: *utrum dictiones exclusivae vel exceptivae admittantur in divinis*. **Art. 2:** *Opinio quorundam*; *Opinio aliorum*; *Opinio aliorum*. **Art. 3:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 31, art. 4, et *Hervaei in Scripto* [...parte I, q. 31, art. 4, et *aliorum*]; *Opinio aliorum* [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio Scoti* [...I Sent., dist. 21, q. unica].

(42) dist. 22: *utrum Deus possit proprie aliquo nomine designari*. **Art. 2:** *Opinio Thomae*, I parte, q. 12, art. 12 [...q. 12, art. 4]; *Opinio Scoti* [*Opinio Thomae*, I parte, q. 13, art. 5]; *Opinio Scoti* [...I Sent., dist. 3, q. 2]; *Opinio Girardi*, *Quolibet* I, q. 1 [*Opinio Varronis*, *Quolibet* I, q. 2]; *Opinio Henrici in Summa* [...in *Summa* et *Quolibeta* V, q. 1]; *Opinio Scoti* [...I Sent., dist. 22, q. unica].

(43) dist. 23: *utrum nomen personae significet in divinis aliquid primae aut secundae intentionis*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Radulphi et quorundam aliorum* [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio Hervaei in tractatu De secundis intentionibus et Quolibeto suo* [*Opinio Hervaei*, *Quolibeto* I, q. 9]; *Opinio aliorum quorundam*. **Art. 3:** *Opinio Henrici in Summa* [*Opinio Henrici in Quolibet* V et VI]; *Opinio Scoti in Scripto* [...in libro Sent., dist. 23, q. unica]; *Opinio Garronis* [*Opinio quorundam aliorum*].

(44) dist. 24: *utrum numerus sit proprie et formaliter in divinis*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Henrici*, IV *Quolibeto*, q. 6 [...q. 2]; *Opinio Bernardi in impugnationibus Henrici* IV *Quolibeto*, q. 6 [*Quaere de impugnationibus...*]; *Opinio Hervaei*, *Quolibet* II, q. 11 [*Opinio Hervaei*, *Quolibet* 2, q. 2]; *Opinio Henrici Anglici* [*Opinio quorundam aliorum*]; *Opinio aliorum*;

Opinio aliorum; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 2:** Opinio Hervaei in Quolibet II, q. 11, et Henrici <de Gandavo> ubi supra et plurium aliorum [Opinio Henrici, Quolibeto II, q. 11, et plurium aliorum]; Opinio Scoti et Henrici Anglici in Scriptis suis [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 24, q. unica, et Henrici in Quolibetis, Quolibeta V et VI]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 30, art. 3, et Hervaei et Durandi [...I parte, q. 30, art. 3, et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Hervaei in speciali in Scripto suo et in II Quolibet, q. 11 [Nothing]. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae ubi supra [...I Sent., dist. 24, q. 1, art. 2, et I parte, q. 30, art. 3]; Opinio Scoti et Bonaventurae [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 24, q. unica, et S. Bonaventurae, I Sent., dist. 24, q. primo (!), art. 1]; Opinio aliorum.

(45) dist. 25: *utrum significatum personae sit aliquid commune tribus et plurificetur in eis.* **Art. 1:** Modus dicendi antiquus; Opinio aliorum antiqua [Opinio aliorum antiquorum]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 29, art. 4, et 30, art. 4; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto, dist. 23 [...in I Sent., dist. 23, et in Quolibetis, Quolibeto X, q. 4]; Opinio Durandi in Scripto, dist. 23 [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 3, q. 2].

(46) dist. 26: *utrum personae divinae constituentur proprietatibus relativis in esse suppositali et personali, et eisdem suppositaliter distinguantur.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Praepositini [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio erronea quorundam; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 26, q. 1]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 40, art. 2; Opinio Hervaei... Scripto I, dist. 26 [...I Sent., dist. 26, q. 1]; Opinio aliorum [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 3, q. 2]; Opinio aliorum; Opinio aliorum; Opinio aliorum et declinat ad eam Hervaeus, dist. 23 [...illam Hervaei dist. 23]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 26, q. 1]. **Art. 4:** Opinio communis; Opinio singularis quorundam.

(47) dist. 27, q. 1: *utrum generare et paternitas vel generari et filiatio sint eadem realiter in divinis.* **Art. 1:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio Scoti, libro IV, dist. 13 [...IV Sent., dist. 13]; Contra id quod opinatur Thomas, parte I [Contra id quod opponit S. Thomas, parte I, q. 28, art. 3, ad 1]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti in IV, dist. 13, et plurium aliorum; Opinio communis. **Art. 3:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 3, q. 2]; Opinio Henrici [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 41, art. 1, in solutione argumenti secundi. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 40, art. 1 et 4, et Garronis [...art. 1 et 4, et aliorum]; Opinio Bonaventurae, lib. I, dist. 27, q. 2 [...lib. I, dist. 28, q. 2]; Contra opinionem Thomae, parte I, q. 28, art. 1, et Hervaei et Durandi et plurium aliorum [...parte I, q. 28, art. 1, et plurium aliorum].

(48) dist. 27, q. 2: *utrum verbum creatum et increatum emanet ut intellectio actualis vel sicut obiectum positum in esse formato.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Durandi et quorundam aliorum [Opinio quorundam explicatur]; Opinio Petri de Alvernia [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Thomae, Hervaei, Bernardi [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 27, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Graecorum; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 35, art. 1 et 2 [...q. 31, art. 1 et 7]; Opinio Durandi [Opinio aliorum]; Opinio Durandi [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 34, art. 1, licet oppositum dicat in Scripto [...parte I, q. 24, art. 1]; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Scoti, Scripto I, dist. praesenti [...I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2]; Opinio Scoti et aliorum quorundam [...I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2, et aliorum quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 34, art. 4, in solutione argumenti primi, et Garronis [*om.* 'et Garronis']; Opinio aliorum; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Scoti [...I. Sent., dist. 27, q. 2].

(49) dist. 28: *utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas constitutiva Patris.* **Art. 1:** Opinio aliquorum; Opinio aliorum; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Durandi et Hervaei [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 2:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio Hervaei [Opinio aliorum]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 28, q. 2]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 3:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio aliorum [Nothing]; Opinio Henrici [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 28, q. 2]. **Art. 4:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 33, art. 4, in solutione argumenti primi; Opinio Hervaei et Durandi [Opinio Durandi, I Sent., dist. 28, q. 2, et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 28, q. 3].

(50) dist. 29: *utrum nomen principii significet notionem distinctam.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Praepositini [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 32, art. 2 [...q. 22, art. 2]; Opinio Scoti [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 32 [...q. 32, art. 1]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 29, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici Anglici, Scripto I, dist. 29 [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 29, q. 1]. **Art. 4:** Opinio communis; Opinio Henrici Anglici [Opinio quorundam aliorum].

(51) dist. 30, q. 1: *utrum relatio sit in re extra absque operatione intellectus.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 13, art. 7, et Scripto I, dist. 26, q. 2, art. 1 [...q. 13, art. 1...dist. 27...]; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto, dist. 30, et in I Quolibet q. 10, et in II Quolibet, q. 7 [Opinio Hervaei in I Quolibet, q. 10, et in II Quolibet, q. 7]; Opinio Henrici, IX Quolibeto, q. 3 [Opinio Hervaei, Quolibeto IX, q. 3]; Opinio aliorum [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Alexandri de Alexandria in Scripto super

Metaphysicam [Opinio Henrici, Quolibeto V, q. 6]; Opinio Durandi, Scripto I, dist. 33 [...I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1]; Opinio Scoti et Garronis et plurium aliorum [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 33, q. unica]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici, Scoti, et plurium aliorum [Opinio quorumdam]; Opinio Hervaei, I Quolibet, q. 9 [...Quolibet I, q. 14]; Opinio aliorum.

(52) dist. 30, q. 2: *utrum Deus referatur ex tempore relatione reali ad creaturam.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 13, art. 7, et in Scripto I, dist. 30, q. 3 [...q. 23, art. 7, et libro I, dist. 30, q. 3]; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto [Opinio quorumdam aliorum]; Opinio Durandi in Scripto, dist. 30 [...I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1]; Opinio Henrici, IX Quolibet, q. 1, et Garronis [...IX Quolibeto, q. 1, et aliorum]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 30, q. 2]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Henrici, IX Quolibet, q. 1, et Garronis [...Quolibet IX, q. 1, et quorumdam aliorum]; Opinio communis; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 31, q. unica]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici, IX Quolibet, q. 1 [...Quolibet III, q. 1]; Opinio Garronis [Opinio aliorum].

(53) dist. 31: *utrum aequalitas et similitudo sint reales relationes in Deo, vel rationis, aut sint nulla relatio.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 31, q. unica]; Opinio Durandi [Opinio quorumdam aliorum]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 31, q. 1]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 31, q. 1]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 31, q. 1]; Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 31, q. 1, art. 1, et in Summa, parte I, q. 42, et plurium aliorum [...I Sent....].

(54) dist. 32: *utrum sit concedendum quod Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, et in Summa, q. 37, art. 2 [Nothing]; Opinio Hervaei in Scripto [Opinio Henrici, Quolibet II, q. 2]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 32, q. 1]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae in Scripto, dist. 32, q. 2, art. 1 [...I Sent., dist. 32, q. 5, art. 1]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 32, q. 2]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici prima et Scoti secunda [Opinio quorumdam].

(55) dist. 33: *utrum proprietates personales sint ipsae personae ac divina essentia.* **Art. 1:** Cum opinione Porretani. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 33, et in Summa, q. 28, art. 2 [...et in I parte Summae, q. 28, art. 2]; Opinio Scoti et sequacium multorum [...I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1]; Opinio Hervaei et Girardi [Opinio quorumdam aliorum].

(56) dist. 34: *utrum nomina essentialia debeant appropriari divinis personis.* No citations.

(57) dist. 35, q. 1: *utrum intelligere secundum suam rationem formalem vere et proprie sit in Deo.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Godofredi, Quolibeto IV, q. 18, et Alexandri in Quolibet [...Quolibeto IV, q. 18, et quo-

rumdam aliorum]; *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 85, art. 2, et hoc contra Godofredum [*om.* 'et hoc contra Godofredum']; *Opinio Scoti*, Scripto I, dist. 3, et in Quolibet [...I Sent., dist. 3, et in Quolibeta, q. 7]; *Opinio quorundam*; *Contra opiniones omnes* [*Opinio communis*]. **Art. 2:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 14, art. 1, et in Scripto [*om.* 'et in Scripto']; *Opinio Scoti* [*Opinio aliorum*]; *Opinio Hervaei* in Scripto defendentis Thomam [*Opinio quorundam aliorum*]. **Art. 3:** *Contra opinionem Gandavi* in Summa, art. 36 et 38 [*Contra opinionem Scoti*, S. Thomae, et aliorum]; *Contra id quod dicunt Scotus et Thomas et alii plerique* [*om.* 'dicunt']; *Plerique imaginantur*.

(58) dist. 35, q. 2: *utrum obiectum adaequatum intellectionis divinae sit essentia Dei vel ens universale*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio modernorum doctorum* [*Opinio quorundam aliorum*]. **Art. 3:** *Opinio communis*; *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 14 [...q. 13]; *Opinio Ricardi* in Scripto suo I [*Opinio quorundam aliorum*]; *Opinio Scoti et plurium aliorum* [Nothing]; *Opinio aliorum*; *Opinio aliorum*. **Art. 4:** *Opinio Thomae* in suo I Scripto [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio Scoti*, I suo [...I Sent., dist. 35].

(59) dist. 35, q. 3: *utrum omnes creaturae secundum suas proprias rationes quidditativas sint vita in Deo et in eius verbo*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae* in Scripto I et in libro I *Contra gentiles*, capitulo 1, et plurium aliorum [*Opinio S. Thomae*, liber I *Contra gentiles*, cap. 50, et plurium aliorum]. **Art. 2:** *Opinio Garronis* [*Opinio quorundam*]; *Opinio Henrici*, VIII Quolibeta, q. 1, et Ricardi Anglici in Scripto suo [*Opinio Hervaei*, Quolibeta VIII, q. 1]; *Opinio Scoti et Henrici Anglici* [*Opinio Scoti*, I Sent., dist. 35]; *Opinio Thomae*, I libro *Contra gentiles*, capitulo 54, et in I parte, q. 14, art. 6 [*om.* 'I libro']. **Art. 3:** *Opinio Thomae* in Scripto et in Summa [*Opinio quorundam*].

(60) dist. 35, q. 4: *utrum Deus cognoscat singularia cognitione certa*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 86, art. 1, et libro II *Contra gentiles*, capitulo 28 [...q. 8...capitulo 27]; *Opinio Willielmi de Marra* et sequacium suorum [*Opinio aliorum*]. **Art. 2:** *Impugnatio Thomae contra praedicta*, libro I *Contra gentiles*, capitulo 65, et Riccardi et Scoti [...et Riccardi, I Sent., dist. 36, q. 1, et Scoti, I Sent., dist. 2, q. 1]. **Art. 3:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 14, art. 11, et in Scripto I [...parte I, q. 14, art. 11]. **Art. 4:** *Opinio quorundam*; *Opinio quorundam*; *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 14, art. 7; *Opinio Thomae*, I parte, q. 14, art. 7 et 9.

(61) dist. 36, q. 1: *utrum omnia sint praesentia aeternaliter Deo secundum aliquod esse vel existentiae vel essentiae, aut saltem ut cognita obiecta*. **Art. 1:** *Opinio Thomae*, parte I, q. 14, art. 13, et libro I *Contra*

gentiles, capitulo 66 [...libro II...]; Opinio Durandi praedictam opinionem exponentis; Opinio Scoti et Garronis [Opinio aliorum]; Contra Thomam...contra Garronem [...Varronem]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Henrici [Nothing]; Opinio Riccardi et Garronis et plurium aliorum [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 3:** Opinio communis.

(62) dist. 36, q. 2: *utrum ideae sint in Deo*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Garronis [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, Gandavi, et plurium aliorum [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Scoti, libro I, dist. 36 (Opinio Durandi *mg. infra*²; Paris, BNF, lat. 15363: Opinio Thomae) [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 36, q. unica]; Opinio Henrici [...Quolibeto II, q. 1]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 15, art. 2; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 36, q. unica]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 15, art. 3; Opinio Henrici, VII Quolibeto, q. 1; Opinio Scoti et aliorum multorum [Opinio Scoti, ubi supra, et aliorum]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici in Summa, art. 1, q. 2 et 3; Opinio *lac. mss.* [Opinio aliorum]; Contra Opinionem Durandi in Scripto I [Contra opinionem Durandi supra].

(63) dist. 37: *utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, potentiam, et praesentiam*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae in Scripto I et parte I, q. 8, art. 1 et 2 [Opinio S. Thomae, Prima Secundae, q. 8, art. 1 et 2]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 37, q. unica]; Opinio Riccardi [...in I Sent., dist. 37, q. 3]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 37, q. 2]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae et Durandi [...I parte, q. 8, art. 3, et Durandi in I Sent., dist. 37, q. 2]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1]; Modus quorundam [Opinio quorundam]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae [...parte I, q. 8, art. 4]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 37, q. 1]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 37, q. 2]; Opinio aliorum.

(64) dist. 38: *utrum Deus sit praescius contingentium futurorum*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 14, art. 13, et in Scripto I et libro I Contra gentiles [...I parte, q. 14, art. 13 et quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Henrici VIII Quolibeta, q. 2, et Scoti [...Scoti libro I Sent., dist. 38, q. unica]; Opinio Scoti in speciali [Opinio Scoti, I Sent., dist. 38, q. unica]; Opinio aliorum; Contra...interpretationem Durandi. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae in I Scripto [Opinio aliquorum]; Opinio Henrici et Scoti [...in dist. 39, q. 1]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 3:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 39, q. 5].

(65) dist. 39: *utrum immutabilitas divinae praescientiae excludat contingentiam rerum et e converso*. **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 14, art. 13; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., d 39, q. 5]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, Scripto I, dist. 38, et parte I, q. 14, art. 13 [...I Sent....]; Opinio Scoti in I suo [...I Sent., dist. 39, q. 5]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae

ubi supra; Opinio Bonaventurae [...5 (!) Sent. dist. 38, q. 1]; Opinio Riccardi in I suo [...I Sent., dist. 39, art. 1, q. 6]; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 39, q. 5]; Opinio Henrici Anglici [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Durandi [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio multorum. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae in Scripto I [Opinio quorundam].

(66) dist. 40: *utrum praedestinati immutabiliter salventur.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, I parte, q. 23, et in Scripto [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Riccardi [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae in Scripto et parte I, q. 23 [Opinio S. Thomae, pars I, q. 23]; Opinio Riccardi [...in I Sent., dist. 39, art. 2, q. 1]; Opinio Durandi [...in I Sent., dist. 39, q. 3]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 116 [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, libro III Contra gentiles, capitulo 11; Opinio Henrici, VI Quolibet, q. 10 [...q. 4]; Opinio astrologorum [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 4:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 23; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 116, art. 4 [...q. 126, art. 4]; Opinio Thomae, I parte, q. 23, art. 6 [...q. 23]; Opinio Scoti [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 10, q. 1]; Opinio Thomae Anglici [Opinio quorundam aliorum].

(67) dist. 41: *utrum praedestinationis et reprobationis divinae sit aliqua causa vel meritum ex parte praedestinati vel reprobati.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Origenis [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio aliorum; Opinio Henrici, VI Quodlibeto, q. 18; Opinio Thomae Anglici [Opinio quorundam aliorum]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 23, art. 5; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 41, q. unica]. **Art. 2:** Opinio aliquorum; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 23, art. 7.

(68) dist. 42, q. 1: *utrum sit ponenda in Deo activa potentia executiva actionum quae sunt ad extra.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae Anglici [Opinio quorundam]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 25, art. 1, et in Scripto [...parte I, q. 25, art. 1]; Opinio Scoti in IV suo et plurium aliorum [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici et Scoti [Opinio quorundam].

(69) dist. 42, q. 2: *utrum Deus vere et proprie sit omnipotens.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 42, q. unica]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti [...ubi supra]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 25, art. 3. **Art. 3:** Opinio Henrici, VI Quolibet, q. 3; Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 42, q. unica].

(70) dist. 43: *utrum potentia Dei activa sit infinita intensive seu virtualiter et in vigore.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Ricardi [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 6, art. 1; Opinio Scoti [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 2, q. 1]; Opinio Thomae Anglici [Opinio Ocham, Quol. II, q. 2, et omnium Averroistarum]. **Art. 3:**

Opinio Thomae, libro I Contra gentiles, capitulo 43, et parte I, q. 45, art. 5 [...art. 2]; Opinio Scoti in Scripto I [...I Sent., dist. 2, q. 2]; Opinio quorundam aliorum; Opinio Durandi [...I Sent., dist. 43, q. 1].

(71) **dist. 44:** *utrum rerum universitatem Deus potuerit facere meliorem.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Avicennae et Algazelis et alioquorum Catholicorum [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio aliorum. **Art. 4:** Opinio Henrici, VIII Quolibet, q. 8, et Godofredi, XI Quolibet, q. 3 [...Godfredi, XV Quolibet, q. 3]; Opinio Thomae in Scripto et Bernardi in impugnatoribus praedictorum doctorum et aliorum quorundam [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 5:** Opinio Thomae, I parte, q. 25, art. 6, et in Scripto [...I parte, q. 35, art. 2].

(72) **dist. 45:** *utrum in Deo voluntas sit id ipsum secundum rem et rationem quod divina essentia, nullo penitus addito intrinsece et formaliter, sed tantum extrinsece et per modum connotati.* **Art. 2:** Expositio praedicti modi secundum Thomam Anglicum [Nothing].

(73) **dist. 46:** *utrum ratio voluntatis vere et proprie sit in Deo.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Henrici, art. 45 in Summa sua et art. 46 [Opinio quorundam]; Opinio Scoti in I suo [...I Sent., dist. 46, q. unica]. **Art. 2:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 20 [...q. 20, art. 1]; Opinio Henrici in Summa, art. 47, q. 2.

(74) **dist. 47:** *utrum voluntas Dei efficax semper et immutabiliter impleatur.* **Art. 1:** Opinio Thomae, parte I, q. 19, art. 3, et Scoti in I suo, dist. 40 [...Scoti in I Sent., dist. 41, q. unica]; Opinio aliorum quorundam. **Art. 2:** Opinio Scoti [...I Sent., dist. 47, q. unica]; Opinio Thomae in Scripto [...in I Sent., dist. 47, art. 1, art. 1]. **Art. 3:** Opinio quorundam; Opinio Durandi [Opinio quorundam aliorum]. **Art. 4:** Thomas, parte prima, q. 19, art. 10.

(75) **dist. 48:** *utrum humana voluntas ex hoc solo sit recta quod conformatur voluntati divinae.* **Art. 1:** Opinio communiter loquentium; Contra id quod dicunt Scotus et Durandus [...ut supra]. **Art. 3:** Thomas, parte I, q. 1, art. 1.

GODFREY OF FONTAINES AND THE SUCCESSION THEORY OF FORMS AT PARIS IN THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY

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The position and influence of Godfrey of Fontaines on the topic of intension and remission of forms have long proved difficult to ascertain. Medieval sources are nearly unanimous in identifying Godfrey as a prominent source for the unusual but very influential account of intension and remission known as the ‘succession of forms’. Modern scholars, on the other hand, have repeatedly concluded that Godfrey’s writings contain no express endorsement of this theory. Indeed, some have even concluded that, to the extent Godfrey mentions the theory at all, he rejects it. This disparity between the medieval and modern readings of Godfrey is usually traced to a misunderstanding of, or extrapolation from, his admittedly difficult texts on the topic by his contemporaries, especially Duns Scotus. This, however, appears incorrect. A full examination of the medieval testimony on Godfrey’s views, particularly among the early fourteenth-century discussions on intension and remission at Paris, shows not only that Godfrey held a traditional version of the succession theory but where he held it.

I. INTENSION AND REMISSION

Intension and remission of forms concerns the problem of a change of degree within a given kind of quality, such as the shading of a color, the increase or decrease of heat, or the strengthening and weakening

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of moral or cognitive habits. Already recognized by the commentators as problematic for Aristotle, the topic of intension and remission was given considerable expansion in the Middle Ages, particularly in the fourteenth century, where it became a locus for highly original results in physical theory. Most notable was its role in the development of a mathematical account of change by the so-called Merton Calculators at Oxford in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.¹

At the beginning of the fourteenth century two main, competing accounts of intension and remission had emerged. The first was the 'addition theory' in the innovative form advanced by Duns Scotus.² This was in fact an older view favored among thirteenth-century Franciscans, which Scotus himself expressly admitted in his Parisian *Sentences* to taking from Bonaventure but then developed considerably.³ In Scotus's version of the addition theory, qualities subject to increase and decrease, such as colors and habits, were construed as forms composed of homogeneous, quantitative parts or degrees (*gradus*) that could be added or subtracted without changing the species of the quality. According to Scotus, intensification of a color, such as white, occurs by adding another degree or quantity of whiteness to the pre-existing degree, just as the augmentation of corporeal magnitude occurs by adding further quantity to what already exists. Scotus's version of the addition theory would ultimately prevail as the standard account of intension and remission, and its quantitative construction of qualitative change is generally seen as a major break with Aristotle that opened the way to the mathematical analysis of motion undertaken by the Oxford Calculators.⁴

¹ On this whole development, see above all E.D. Sylla, "Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms. The Oxford Calculators", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 40 (1974), pp. 223–283 and ead., *The Oxford Calculators and the Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350. Physics and Measurement by Latitudes*, New York 1991.

² For an analysis of Scotus's position, see R. Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus. The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision*, Oxford 1998, pp. 171–192. For the main texts of Scotus at issue, see note 39 below.

³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 4 (ms. Wien, ÖNB lat. 1453), f. 57va: "Licet enim prima opinio sit subtilior et ista grossior, tamen teneo cum Bonaventura, iuxta imaginationem meam magis quam prima". In the edition of the *Reportatio* I-A by Wolter and Bychkov (see note 39 below) on p. 507, n. 160, the text reads *tenet* for *teneo*. See Bonaventura, *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, p. 2, art. un., q. 2, ed. PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1882, vol. 1, pp. 311–312.

⁴ Not all are convinced of Scotus's importance for the developments of the Calculators. See Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus*, pp. 191–192, note 56.

Our concern, however, lies with the alternative theory, which was given its most extensive articulation and defense by Walter Burley in his famous *Tractatus secundus de causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus* written at Paris in the early 1320s, about the time of his promotion there to master of theology.⁵ This second account is generally labelled the ‘succession of forms theory’, but it is perhaps better understood as the replacement theory. Like the addition theory, the succession theory holds that the intensification of a quality occurs by a new, advening grade or degree of the form. Unlike the addition theory, however, which explains the increase by the conjunction of this new grade with the previous grade, so that the accumulated total of persisting grades or degrees comprises the increased intensity of the form, the succession theory holds that the new grade is itself the more intense form which then replaces the previous, less intense grade. That is, according to the succession theory, at each instant of intensification a less intense instance of a quality is destroyed and replaced with a wholly new, numerically distinct instance of the quality that is the more intense degree. Alteration on this account thus consists of a continuous process of corruption and generation in which individual instances of a form, each corresponding to its various degrees of intensity, are successively and totally replaced from one instant to the next. In his *Tractatus secundus*, Burley formulates his classic version of the succession theory in three claims, the most distinctive of which is the second:

I hold three conclusions. The first is that in every motion with respect to a form something new is acquired which is either a form or a part of a form. The second is that throughout the entire motion the whole preceding form from which there is an essential motion is corrupted and a totally new form, of which nothing existed before, is acquired. The third is that no form undergoes intension and remission, but the subject of the form undergoes intension and remission with respect to the form, so that the form is that according to which the subject undergoes intension and remission.⁶

⁵ H. Shapiro, “Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms”, *Speculum* 34 (1959), pp. 413–427; A. Maier, “Zu Walter Burleys Traktat *De intensione et remissione formarum*”, *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 293–321, reprinted in the 1968 edition of *Zwei Grundprobleme...*, pp. 315–352; E. Sylva, *The Oxford Calculators...*, pp. 95–111 with partial transcription on pp. 521–542; L.M. de Rijk, “Burley’s So-Called *Tractatus Primus*, with an Edition of the Additional *Quaestio Utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio*”, *Vivarium* 34 (1996), pp. 161–191.

⁶ Gualterus de Burley, *De intensione et remissione formarum*, c. 4, ed. Venetiis 1496, f. 10va: “Et pono tres conclusiones. Prima est quod in omni motu ad formam acquiritur

Burley says that he was not the first to hold this view, but imputes it to a number of authorities, including Avicenna and Albert the Great. Furthermore, he claims that it was widely held among his contemporaries. Of these, Burley explicitly names Godfrey of Fontaines: “Huius opinionis fuit Magister Godofredus, et multi alii”.⁷ As noted, Burley was not alone in assigning this position to Godfrey. Scotus had already done so in personal annotations to his *Sentences*, and, as we shall presently see, there is hardly a mention of the succession theory in the fourteenth century that does not expressly tie it to Godfrey. Modern scholars, however, have struggled to find a clear basis in the writings of Godfrey for this widespread, medieval attribution. Where did Godfrey’s contemporaries think he held this theory? And who were the ‘many others’ to whom Burley refers?

II. GODFREY ON INTENSION AND REMISSION

Studies of Godfrey of Fontaines on intension and remission have focused largely on his two most express treatments of the topic: *Quodlibet* II, q. 10, which addresses the standard scholastic question of whether charity can be increased, and his later *Ordinary Question* 18, which concerns the intensification of virtue.⁸ A third text, *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, which discusses change in the Eucharist, also has been seen as relevant

aliquid novum quod est forma vel pars formae. Secunda est quod per omnem motum corrumpitur tota forma praecedens a qua est per se motus, et acquiritur una forma totaliter nova, cuius nihil praefuit. Tertia est quod nulla forma intenditur nec remittitur, sed subiectum formae intenditur et remittitur secundum formam, ita quod forma est illud secundum quod subiectum intenditur vel remittitur”.

⁷ Gualterus de Burley, *De intensione et remissione formarum*, c. 4, ed. Venetiis 1496, f. 11rb.

⁸ Godfrey’s *Ordinary Question* entitled *De intensione virtutum*, which is unedited, is preserved in two manuscripts: B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek (Bibliothèque de la Ville) 491, ff. 226ra–227vb and V = Città del Vaticano, Borghese 122, ff. 159rb–160vb. For a description of these two manuscripts, see J. Hoffmans – A. Pelzer, “Les manuscrits des Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines”, in *Les Philosophes Belges*, vol. 14, Louvain 1937, pp. 143–321, at p. 297 and p. 282 respectively. This question occurs as 17 in B, as 7 in V, but then is listed as 18 in the table of Godfrey’s questions contained in ms. Vat. Borghese 164 (cf. Hoffmans – Pelzer, “Les manuscrits...”, pp. 260–261). Maier follows the numbering in V and cites the question as 7, while Wippel and others use the numbering of the table in Borgh. 164 and refer to it as 18, which is now the accepted designation. See J.F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines. Disputed Questions 9, 10 and 12”, *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), pp. 351–372 and id., *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-century Philosophy*, Washington, DC 1981, pp. xxx–xxxiii.

and has been examined in detail. Whatever the interpretative difficulties or ambiguities these texts may present, Godfrey is absolutely clear and unwavering on one point: the specific form of a quality in itself does not undergo any intension or remission but does so only insofar as it is individuated in a subject. Godfrey's position followed from his fundamental conviction that all specific forms, including those of qualities admitting more and less, are in their nature indivisible, invariable, and lacking in degrees. In this connection, Godfrey applied the topical authorities of the *Liber sex principiorum*, that "form consists in a simple and unchangeable essence", and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VIII, 3, that "forms are like numbers", to all specific forms, even those subject to intension and remission.⁹ On this core point, Godfrey stood in partial opposition to Aquinas, who allowed variation within the specific form for certain kinds of qualities, including the important cases of habits and dispositions, and in total opposition to Henry of Ghent, who held that in all intension and remission there was variation on the side of the specific form, which in such cases was not simple but a divisible extension (*latitudo*).¹⁰

⁹ *Liber sex principiorum* I, 1, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges – Paris 1966 (Aristoteles Latinus, I/6–7), p. 35,1–2: "Forma vero est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens"; Aristoteles, *Metaph.* VIII, 3, 1043b32–44a11; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* in J. Hamesse, *Les auctoritates Aristotelis*, Louvain 1974, p. 182, n. 204: "Definitiones et formae rerum comparantur numero, quia sicut in numero addita unitate vel ablata non manet eadem species numeri, sed alia et alia, sic ablata vel addita aliqua definitione vel forma non manent eadem species sed variantur".

¹⁰ For Aquinas's position, see *Summa theol.*, I–II, q. 52, art. 1 and *De virt.*, q. 5, art. 3. In brief, Aquinas constructs a two part solution. He says that intension and remission can be considered from the point of view of either the specific form itself (*secundum ipsam formam*) or the subject participating in the form (*secundum quod subiectum participat formam*). Certain qualities are indivisible in their essence and thus cannot undergo intension and remission in the former respect but only in the latter. Other qualities, such as health or motion, admit of variation within the species and thus undergo intension and remission in the former respect as well. Godfrey accepts only the first part and rejects this second part of Aquinas's solution. Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* II, q. 10, ed. M. de Wulf – A. Pelzer, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefridus de Fontaines*, Louvain 1904 (*Les Philosophes Belges*, II), p. 144: "... augmentum formae potest intelligi [...] secundum ipsam formam [...] vel [...] secundum quod subiectum ipsam formam participat [...]. Et secundum primum modum quidem non fit augmentum...". See note 11 below. Henry's discussion is contained in his *Quodl.* IV, q. 15 "Utrum forma substantialis recipiat magis et minus", ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 123v–130r, which contains an extensive rejection of the first part of Aquinas's solution. For an analysis of Henry's important question, see J.-L. Solère, "Les degrés de forme selon Henri de Gand (*Quodl.* IV, q. 15)", in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, ed. G. Guldentops – C. Steel, Leuven 2003, pp. 127–155.

Godfrey's first text on intension and remission, *Quodlibet* II, q. 10, is a direct and complex response to these positions of Aquinas and Henry. Against both, Godfrey upholds his unqualified conviction that since all specific forms are indivisible and invariable, they cannot in themselves admit of more or less. Any variation in a form at this level would be a change not in degree but in species.

Quia ergo quaelibet forma specifica est forma secundum se una, secundum aliquid fixum et stans indivisibile sortitur huiusmodi unitatem specificam, et quaecumque ad illud attingunt sub illa specie continentur. Quae autem recedunt ab illo vel in plus vel in minus ad aliam speciem pertinent perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Et ideo nulla forma specifica secundum se potest recipere magis et minus.¹¹

It follows that since qualities cannot change in degree according to their specific natures (*secundum rationem speciei*), as they are indivisible, then they must change insofar as they are individuals (*secundum rationem individuorum*). Godfrey pushes this reasoning even further, adding that the being of an individual quality is itself also simple. From this he concludes that a change of degree in an individual quality will also be a change of the individual itself (*transmutatio ipsius individui*), even while its species remains the same. As we shall see, scholars take this latter refinement to be crucial and yet are divided on its meaning.

Quare cum non possit attendi magis et minus in qualitatibus secundum rationem speciei, quia in indivisibili consistit, oportet quod attendatur secundum rationem individuorum. Et quia etiam esse individui in quantum individuum est simplex est, si fiat transmutatio in individuo secundum magis et minus, fit etiam transmutatio ipsius individui, manente etiam specie eadem.¹²

¹¹ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* II, q. 10, ed. de Wulf – Pelzer, p. 140. Godfrey is here actually quoting from the first part of Aquinas's response in *Summa theol.*, I–II, q. 52, art. 1, which asserts that some qualities are indivisible and invariable. In those cases, Aquinas maintains that intension and remission do not arise from any change in the specific form itself but from the greater or lesser participation in the form by the subject. Godfrey thus endorses this part of Aquinas's account, but extends it uncompromisingly to all cases. Cf. Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, I–II, q. 52, art. 1: "...considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem".

¹² Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* II, q. 10, ed. de Wulf – Pelzer, p. 145.

This same, basic solution forms the main response in the later *Ordinary Question* 18. Godfrey argues that intension and remission can only belong to something which is in some way variable. As before, he strictly maintains that the species in itself is invariable and fixed. Therefore, a specific form does not undergo intension and remission in itself but only insofar as it is contracted to an individual.

Ad quaestionem igitur aliter est dicendum, scilicet quod nulla forma secundum suum esse specificum secundum se et absolute consideratum recipit magis et minus vel perfectius et imperfectius, quia ista intensio et remissio non convenit alicui nisi secundum quod aliquo modo est variabile. Sed natura speciei secundum se considerata absolute sive abstracte est secundum se invariabilis, et variatio et mutatio non contingit circa ipsam nisi per accidens, prout est contracta in individuo. Ergo nulla forma sive natura specifica secundum se et absolute sive abstracte considerata suscipit maius et minus, sed hoc convenit ei solum secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum.¹³

Quodlibet II, q. 10 and *Ordinary Question* 18 do differ in important respects. Most noticeably, in the former Godfrey explains the individual's intension and remission in the traditional terms of subject's greater or lesser participation in a form. In the latter, he abandons this explanation in favor of a new analysis based on a distinction between the specific and material parts of an individual form. But neither this difference nor others between the two questions appreciably alter the judgment of most scholars concerning the basic solution found in both: it does not contain an obvious, or even implied, statement of the succession theory.

Modern scholarship has visited Godfrey of Fontaines on the issue of the intension and remission at least four times in detail. The first was Anneliese Maier's pioneering study, *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie. Das Problem der intensiven Grösse*, which went through editions in 1939, 1951, and finally in 1968 with corrections and additions.¹⁴ After examining both *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 and *Ordinary Question* 18, Maier concluded that they did not explicitly contain the succession theory as attributed by Scotus and Burley, but she left open

¹³ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quaestio ordinaria* 18 (V, f. 160rb; B, f. 227ra), but omitting variants from V.

¹⁴ A. Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie*, 3rd rev. ed., Roma 1968, pp. 36–43.

the possibility that Godfrey could have subscribed to it elsewhere.¹⁵ Maier's final judgment on the matter came in an addendum in the 1968 edition of *Zwei Grundprobleme*. It addressed the publication in 1959 of the critical edition of Scotus's *Ordinatio* text on intension and remission, in which the editors gave numerous citations to substantiate Scotus's personal attribution to Godfrey of the succession theory. They cited in particular Godfrey's above passage of *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 in which he describes intension and remission as 'a change of the individual itself' (*transmutatio ipsius individui*).¹⁶ Addressing this text, Maier thought it possible that Scotus and his later followers had this passage in mind when attributing the succession theory to Godfrey, but she did not think that it expressly contained the doctrine. According to Maier, neither here nor in related texts did Godfrey himself plainly say that he understood *transmutatio* to mean generation and corruption of distinct individuals. Maier saw the general problem of interpreting Godfrey on this point to be that he only was concerned with establishing the fact that certain forms could undergo intension and remission, but did not yet himself address how it occurred.¹⁷

About ten years later, John Wippel revisited the whole question and undertook what remains the most detailed examination of *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 and *Ordinary Question* 18.¹⁸ Ultimately Wippel concluded that

[T]here is little reason to believe, in light of his own texts, at any rate, that he [Godfrey] would admit that the preceding quality is totally destroyed and succeeded by a new one that is totally different.... It is not impossible, of course, that he did defend the succession theory of qualities in some other discussion that has not been preserved for us. But the evidence contained in his surviving texts does not warrant us concluding that he ever did so.¹⁹

Like Maier, Wippel did not see Godfrey's phrase *transmutatio ipsius individui* in *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 as implying the successive corruption and generation of individual instances of a qualitative form in intension and remission. By it Godfrey simply meant that intension and remis-

¹⁵ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme*..., pp. 43 and 66.

¹⁶ See the *apparatus fontium* to lines 11–13 at Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 198, ed. Vat. V, p. 234.

¹⁷ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme*..., pp. 354–355, which is an addendum to page 66.

¹⁸ J.F. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension and Remission of Accidental Forms", *Franciscan Studies* 39 (1979), pp. 316–355.

¹⁹ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 355.

sion occurred in the form insofar as it is individuated in a subject.²⁰ Moreover, Wippel noted that the one place where Godfrey clearly advances an argument for the succession theory is in the initial objections to *Ordinary Question* 18. But the initial position of the argument and Godfrey's lack of endorsement of it in his ensuing determination indicate that it was a view to which he was *opposed*.²¹ As for the regular medieval attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey, Wippel conceded that Scotus certainly imputed this view to Godfrey. In this, however, Wippel sees Scotus as having misinterpreted some admittedly difficult passages of Godfrey, a reading mildly supported by the suggestion that Scotus was not always accurate in his representation of contemporary views.²²

Writing at the same time as Wippel, Edith Sylla undertook an examination of Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, which discussed accidental change in the Eucharist, an important locus for medieval treatment of quantity.²³ Sylla found that in explaining quantitative change in the Eucharist, Godfrey denied that a single accident of quality persisted but that such change consisted in a succession of really different accidents (*nec etiam unum accidens sed accidens aliud et aliud*). She concluded that it was on the basis of this question that Scotus and others imputed to Godfrey a successive theory in qualitative change.²⁴ Sylla supported her conclusion by showing that Scotus quoted from *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 in his own report of Godfrey's view on intension and remission of qualities and that Henry of Harclay explicitly cited Godfrey's same *quodlibet* in this connection.²⁵ Thus, Sylla rejected Maier's assessment and thought that she had finally found the textual source in Godfrey for the medieval attribution to him of the succession theory.

²⁰ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 351, note 86; p. 353, note 90.

²¹ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 346, note 77; p. 352, note 88.

²² Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", pp. 350, 352, and note 85.

²³ E.D. Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion with respect to Quantity of the Eucharist", in *Studi sul xiv secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. A. Maierù – A.P. Bagliani, Roma 1981, pp. 105–141, at pp. 122–131. At issue is Godfrey, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, "Utrum ad hoc quod quantitas remanens possit transmutari oporteat praeter quantitatem determinatam ponere aliam quantitatem indeterminatam" (ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1932/35 (Les Philosophes Belges, V), pp. 12–22), which is discussed below.

²⁴ Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion...", p. 124: "I think it is clear that Godfrey's contemporaries ascribed the succession of forms theory to him on the basis of his *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3".

²⁵ Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion...", pp. 124–125 and 130.

Although Wippel and Sylla had reached their conclusions independently, they apparently exchanged their studies prior to publication. At the end of his article, Wippel took special account of Sylla's results. While Wippel conceded that Scotus had quoted from Godfrey's question on the Eucharist and on that basis attributed to him a succession theory of quantitative change, he denied that Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 contained an explicit statement of the theory. In particular, Wippel argued that Godfrey's apparent statement that quantitative change in the Eucharist involved succession of different accidents (*accidens aliud et aliud*) could not refer to the corruption and generation of successive individual forms, since Godfrey immediately ruled out such an interpretation (*non sic... quod sit corruptum et iterum regeneratum*). As mentioned, Wippel took Scotus to have here misunderstood Godfrey's admittedly ambiguous text. Moreover, Wippel argued, even if Scotus's interpretation of Godfrey on quantitative change were correct, this did not entail, as Scotus appears to have inferred, that Godfrey held the same for qualitative alteration.²⁶ Sylla, for her part, similarly took Wippel's replies into account at the end of her study. In a final footnote, Sylla seemed to pull back slightly from her initial conclusions in the face of Wippel's response.²⁷

The view that Godfrey's writings do not expressly contain the succession theory has been challenged by the most recent study on the matter. Jean Celeyrette and Jean-Luc Solère have re-examined the question by appealing to a broader range of Godfrey's texts on accidental change and by reading them for the first time in light of prior statements of the succession theory.²⁸ Turning to the central passage from

²⁶ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", pp. 346–354.

²⁷ Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion...", p. 141, note 114. In this final footnote, Sylla might seem to retreat from her judgment in the body of her article by now holding that in *Quodl.* XI, q. 3 Godfrey was not explicitly or completely committed to a succession view of quantity. In reaction to Wippel, she states: "I interpret Godfrey's *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, as consistent with a succession theory for quantities, but I do not claim that it advocates the succession theory in as explicit a way as does Walter Burley subsequently [...]. Since the evidence of Godfrey's *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, alone does not show that Godfrey had a strong commitment to the succession theory..." In correspondence, however, Sylla has indicated that she did not intend these remarks to retract her then and present conviction that Godfrey's *Quodl.* XI, q. 3 contains a succession view of quantitative change and that on this point she differed from Maier, as is plain from the body of her article.

²⁸ J. Celeyrette – J.-L. Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines et la théorie de la succession dans l'intensification des formes", in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, ed. P. Bakker, Turnhout 2002, pp. 79–112.

Quodlibet II, q. 10, where Godfrey describes intension and remission as a *transmutatio ipsius individui*, Celeyrette and Solère find contrary to Maier and Wippel a statement of the succession account. At issue in this passage, as we have seen, is Godfrey's principle that no quality can change according to its species but only insofar as it is individuated in a subject, to which he then adds that the being of an individual is also itself simple. From this he infers that a change of degree in an individuated form must be a change of the individual itself (*transmutatio ipsius individui*). According to Celeyrette and Solère, Godfrey is here reasoning that since a quality can only change degrees insofar as it exists as individuated in a subject, and since that individual instance of the form itself exists as simple and indivisible, a change in the degree of a quality must be a change of the individual instance of that quality.²⁹ But this is just the succession theory.

As we have seen, neither Maier nor Wippel see in the phrase *transmutatio ipsius individui* any explicit reference to a theory of successive generation and corruption of individual forms. Wippel in particular denies that the text of *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 asserts any *numerical* change in the form undergoing intension and remission, as the succession theory maintains.³⁰ In reply, Celeyrette and Solère argue that Godfrey's language in the passage must be read in light of the received formulation of the theory. As Burley's remark indicates, the succession theory did not begin with Godfrey but was much older. Celeyrette and Solère cite as an example Roland of Cremona, who, in the same context of the increase and decrease of charity, asserts in terms similar to Godfrey that charity is intensified according to numerically distinct instances of the form: "Caritas intenditur, sed non manet eadem in numero quae prius erat". Roland specifies, as does Godfrey, that such intensification is not a *motus* but a *mutatio*.³¹ According to Celeyrette and Solère, the succession theory expressed in this form was reported up through the middle of the thirteenth-century.³² Thus, the passage in *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 would have been recognizable to Godfrey's contemporaries as belonging to a tradition of the theory of succession of forms.

²⁹ Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 93–94.

³⁰ See note 20 above.

³¹ Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 94–95. In notes 58–62, they cite Roland of Cremona's *Summa*, q. 150 from *Summae magistri Rolandi Cremonensis O. P. Liber tertius*, ed. A. Cortesi, Bergamo 1962, pp. 450–452.

³² Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 103–104.

Celeyrette and Solère specifically address other objections of Maier and Wippel. First, they take as inconclusive Wippel's argument that since Godfrey included a proof for the succession theory among the initial objections of his *Ordinary Question* 18, he considered it contrary to his own view. They observe that *Ordinary Question* 18, which appears to be abbreviated, contains no replies to the initial objections, and thus no firm judgment can be made whether they run contrary to Godfrey's own opinion or not.³³ Celeyrette and Solère also reject Wippel's claim that *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 does not contain a succession theory of quantity. When Godfrey there says that a change of quantity in the Eucharist involves different accidents (*nec etiam unum accidens sed accidens aliud et aliud*) but without generation and corruption (*non sic... quod sit corruptum et iterum regeneratum*), he does not mean, as Wippel argues, to exclude the succession account. Rather, according to Celeyrette and Solère, Godfrey only means to deny that such succession is discontinuous, as if some interval or rest occurred between the corruption of the prior form and generation of the ensuing instance (*non sic est aliud et aliud quod aliquando habeat esse interruptum*), thus destroying its character as a process or change.³⁴

Such then is the outcome of more than sixty years of scholarly examination of Godfrey's texts on intension and remission: a divided judgment, with a significant part concluding that Godfrey did not hold the succession theory. But then how was it that Godfrey's contemporaries were so unanimous in attributing this theory to him? And where did they think they found it? It is to this less examined body of evidence that we now turn, beginning with Scotus himself.

III. DUNS SCOTUS'S INTERPRETATION OF GODFREY OF FONTAINES

Scotus would appear to be the first to attribute the succession theory to Godfrey by name. Scotus's attribution should be taken seriously for several reasons. First, Scotus was very familiar with Godfrey's views and writings. In the first book of the *Ordinatio* Scotus refers to Godfrey by name eleven times in his personal revisions to his own working copy and cites or quotes specific *Quodlibets* of Godfrey five times: V, q. 3;

³³ Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 105–106.

³⁴ Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 109–111.

VII, q. 3; VII, q. 4; VII, q. 11 and IX, q. 19.³⁵ Scotus also appears to have known Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions*, since the first is the target of Scotus's first Parisian *Collatio* against the unity of prudence.³⁶ Contrary to suggestion, Scotus is a careful reporter of opinions. He typically devotes a separate article or even a separate question to the exposition and analysis of a contemporary opinion. As will be evident, Scotus seems to have taken particular care in reporting Godfrey's views on intension and remission. Finally and significantly, Scotus delivered his lectures on the *Sentences* at Paris over the course of 1302–1304, when Godfrey was still active at the University.³⁷ These lectures, of

³⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, n. 16, ed. Vat. III, pp. 7–8: “De cognitione Dei ‘si est’ et ‘quid est’ (Godefridus VII, 11 improbat Henricum de distinctione ‘si est’, et quod possibilis sit cognitio ‘quid est’); dist. 3, n. 347, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. III, p. 209, 10–11: “Eandem conclusionem cum dicta opinione tenet Godefridus, *Quodlibet* IX quaestione 19”; dist. 3, n. 361, ed. Vat. III, p. 219: “Hic de actione intellectus agentis, Godefridus”; dist. 3, n. 429, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. III, p. 262, 16: “Iuxta secundam rationem contra Godefridum: videtur contra ipsum, quomodo animal phantasiatur absque sensatione exteriore?”; dist. 10, n. 59, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. IV, p. 364, 12–14: “Godefridi (sicut habetur hic distinctione 13) opinio dicit quod per modum voluntatis ‘quia praesupposita alia productione producit’”; dist. 13, n. 16, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. V, pp. 71, 17–72, 16: “Godefridus VII 4: ‘Contra: essentia stat cum oppositis, ergo distinguitur ab utraque’”; dist. 17, n. 209, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. V, p. 241, 26–27: “Contra Godefridum sunt duae rationes...”; dist. 17, n. 226, ed. Vat. V, p. 249: “Ad argumentum pro opinione Godefridi respondeo: per se terminus ‘a quo’ est privatio gradus inducendi”; dist. 28, n. 28, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. VI, p. 122, 13–14: “Godefridus V, 3: Notio notificat, personae distinguuntur per relationes originis; ergo quae pertinent ad originem, sunt notiones”; n. 52, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. VI, p. 138, 18–19: “Dupliciter: adaequate, immediate. Primo modo: secundum intensionem sic (ratio, exemplum, corollarium ‘Contra Godefridum’), secundum extensionem non”; dist. 28, n. 107, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 161, 25–162, at l. 25: “Godefridus VII, 3: ‘Perfectio naturae divinae requirit ut pluribus modis a pluribus habeatur...’; questione 4: ‘Ordo debet esse in actibus perfectis...’”. Scotus also cites Godfrey's *Quodl.* XIII, q. 3 in his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* VII, q. 12, n. 27, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* IV, St. Bonaventure, NY 1997, p. 203: “Quaere in Godefrido XIII quaest. 3”. In addition to these citations in his own hand, manuscript ‘A’, which was corrected against Scotus's working copy of his *Ordinatio*, is replete with numerous annotations indicating where Scotus has Godfrey's *Quodlibeta* under consideration. See “De *Ordinatione* I. Duns Scoti disquisitio historio-critica”, ed. Vat. I, pp. 15*–28*. Thus, in the judgment of Scotus's editors, *op. cit.*, 170*: “Eius [sc. Godefridi] opus praecipuum, si non unicum, nempe XIV *Quodlibet*, Duns Scotus abs dubio prae oculis habet”.

³⁶ See my “A Note on Thomas Wylton and Ripoll 95”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 47 (2005), pp. 117–123.

³⁷ In 1304 Scotus and Godfrey both participated in the *principium* of Giles of Ligny, the Franciscan master two years prior to Scotus at Paris and future provincial of France. In the dispute, Scotus was the bachelor taking the role of *respondens* in which he opposed Godfrey's denial of habits in the will. Giles's *principium* has been inserted into Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis* at III, dist. 18, qq. 2–3, ed. Vivès XXIII, pp. 391–400. Godfrey is

course, would have included his treatment of intension and remission. If Scotus had completely misrepresented Godfrey's view on this point at Paris, one might expect to find a repudiation from his students and supporters, or even from Godfrey himself, who is thought to have disputed his *Quodlibet* XV in the ensuing year.³⁸ There is no evidence of this, however. To the contrary, as we shall see, the response at Paris to Scotus's criticism was not to deny that Godfrey held the view but to defend it. We can conclude, therefore, that Scotus made the attribution to Godfrey personally, on the basis of examination of his works, and, at Paris, without objection from Godfrey's students or even from Godfrey himself.

Scotus himself takes up intension and remission in the standard location fixed by Lombard, distinction 17 on charity in the first book of the *Sentences*.³⁹ In line with his usual procedure, Scotus devotes separate questions to different opinions on how charity is increased before coming to his own view of the addition theory. The lead question is a dedicated refutation of the succession theory, and it is entitled "Whether [in the increase of charity] the entire preexisting charity is corrupted, so that no numerically identical reality remains in the greater and lesser charity". Scotus explains this view as follows, noting in the parallel text

mentioned three times at nn. 11 and 13 (pp. 397b and 399a). See C. Balić, "Henricus de Harclei et Ioannes Duns Scotus" in *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson*, Toronto – Paris 1959, pp. 97–101 containing corrections to the printed edition.

³⁸ On the date of Godfrey's *Quodl.* XV, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, pp. xxvi–xxviii; id., "Godfrey of Fontaines' *Quodlibet* XIV on Justice as a General Virtue. Is it really a *Quodlibet*?" in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 1: The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2006, pp. 287–344, at pp. 343–344.

³⁹ Scotus has treatments of intension and remission corresponding to each of his versions of the *Sentences*: *Lectura*, I, dist. 17, p. 2, qq. 1–5, ed. Vat. XVII, pp. 221–260, and *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, p. 2, qq. 1–2, ed. Vat. V, pp. 233–264. The Parisian *Sentences* exist in two different *reportationes*, an 'A' and 'B' version. The former, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, qq. 1–5, is contained in ms. Wien, ÖNB lat. 1453, ff. 52ra–59va and in a preliminary edition by A.B. Wolter and O. Bychkov, *John Duns Scotus. The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture, Reportatio I-A*, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004, pp. 481–524. For the 'B' version, see note 43 below. The *Ordinatio* treatment is incomplete and contains numerous additions and annotations by Scotus, indicating that it was still in a state of composition and revision. It is nonetheless important since these additions and annotations contain Scotus's explicit attributions to Godfrey. In addition to his *Sentences*, Scotus takes up intension and remission in *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* VIII, qq. 2–3, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* IV, St. Bonaventure, NY 1997, pp. 413–488, which, judging from its highly elliptical style and lengthy, final addition, exists only in draft form.

of the *Lectura* that the position holds not just for the infused quality of charity, but for all forms subject to intension and remission.⁴⁰

Here it is said that nothing of the prior existing charity remains numerically the same in the charity that has been increased, but the whole of what existed before is corrupted, and another individual more perfect than that is generated.⁴¹

In the margin opposite this passage, nearly all manuscripts of the *Ordinatio*, including the one corrected against Scotus's personal copy, contain the annotation *opinio Godefridi*.⁴² Similarly, all manuscripts of the *Lectura* and the oldest copy of the *Reportatio Parisiensis* contain the same annotation.⁴³ Moreover, in the Parisian commentary, Scotus is clear that he is not reporting a generic view but that of a specific individual: "Hic dicit unus doctor".⁴⁴ As we shall presently see, these annotations were based on the a direct attribution from the hand of Scotus himself. Completing his exposition of the view, Scotus proceeds to give what he takes to be the main argument for the opinion:

An argument is given for this: since the terms of motion are incompatible (from *Physics* V), the terms of the motion or change whereby charity is increased will be incompatible. Consequently, that which is the *terminus ad quem* [i.e., the greater charity] is absolutely incompatible with the

⁴⁰ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 17, n. 127, ed. Vat. XVII, pp. 221–222: "Ad hoc dicunt aliqui quod caritas minor non manet quando augmentatur caritas, et universaliter dicunt quod in intensione vel remissione cuiuslibet formae forma praeexistens corrumpitur in adventu posterioris".

⁴¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 198, ed. Vat. V, p. 234: "Hic dicitur quod nihil caritatis praeexistentis manet idem numero in caritate aucta, sed totum quod praefuit corrumpitur, et aliud individuum perfectius illo generatur".

⁴² See the *apparatus criticus* to line 11 at *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 198, ed. Vat. V, p. 234, which reads: "Opinio Godefridi in marg. A¹ et multi codd.". Manuscript 'A' is Assisi, Biblioteca del Convento di S. Francesco (Biblioteca Comunale) 137, which is corrected from Scotus's own working copy, and the superscript '1' indicates the annotation is in the same hand as the text and not a later insertion.

⁴³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 17, n. 127, ed. Vat. XVII, p. 221, *apparatus criticus* to l. 21. The 'B' version of this question is *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-B, dist. 17, q. 3. It is contained in ms. Worcester, Cathedral Library F.69, f. 34va–b, which is dated 1302. Here the question title is (f. 34va): "Utrum praesupposito quod caritas potest augeri, an caritas praecedens cum caritas augetur non expellatur nova adveniente in augmento". Opposite the title in the margin and in the same hand as the scribe is the annotation "*Tertia quaestio. God<efridus>*".

⁴⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 1, n. 77, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 482.

terminus a quo [i.e., the lesser charity]. Therefore, the *terminus ad quem* includes nothing numerically identical [with the *terminus a quo*].⁴⁵

This reasoning, which I shall designate the *termini* argument, became the principal proof for the succession theory and was specifically identified with Godfrey. It argues for the strict enforcement of the requirement in *Physics* V that any real change must be between opposites. Since the change from a lesser to greater degree of a form is real, the degrees must be opposed. They cannot therefore exist together, and so must be numerically distinct.

Scotus expressly attributes this above argument to Godfrey in his reply, which manuscripts attest Scotus recorded on a separate sheet (*cedula*) in his own hand (*Scotus extra manu sua*) designated for insertion into the initial draft of the *Ordinatio*: “Ad argumentum pro opinione Godefridi respondeo”.⁴⁶ Moreover, in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, Scotus carefully distinguishes this *termini* argument from the two ensuing confirmations, which he says are his own: “Huic opinioni addo duas rationes”.⁴⁷ Thus, there can be no doubt that Scotus attributes both the succession theory and its main supporting argument to Godfrey.

Scotus repeats this attribution in a second, personal annotation recorded in the manuscripts immediately prior to the one above.⁴⁸ There, citing Godfrey by name, Scotus sketches two objections against the succession theory: “Contra Godefridum sunt duae rationes”. The first argues that motion would not be continuous, and the second that a warm body would have to be simultaneously warmed by many, separate ‘heats’ because the part of the body further from the agent instilling the heat is less intense in that form than the part closer

⁴⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 199, ed. Vat. V, p. 235: “Ad hoc ponitur ratio, quia termini motus sunt impossibiles (ex V *Physicorum*), ergo huius motus vel mutationis—quo caritas augetur—termini erunt impossibiles; ergo illud quod est terminus ‘ad quem’, simpliciter est impossibile termino ‘a quo’; igitur non includit idem numero”.

⁴⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 226, ed. Vat. V, p. 249: “Scotus extra manu sua (A’). Ad argumentum pro opinione Godefridi respondeo: per se terminus ‘a quo’ est privatio gradus inducendi”. See editors’ remarks on p. 242, notes 4 and 12.

⁴⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 1, n. 78, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 482.

⁴⁸ The Vatican edition does not present Scotus’s annotations and revisions to this question in the order in which they actually occur in the manuscripts, where they are found at the end as additions to be inserted. See ed. Vat. V, p. 242, notes 4 and 12.

to it.⁴⁹ Both of these objections presuppose that each degree of a quality is a separate instance of a form and so are obviously directed against the succession theory. This is confirmed by their occurrence in a more developed form in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*.⁵⁰ Thus, in two separate annotations from his own hand, Scotus attributes the succession theory to Godfrey specifically.

Finally, Scotus further implicates Godfrey by referring to his unmistakable position on quantitative change in the Eucharist, as Sylla had noted.⁵¹ After setting out the succession theory, Scotus proceeds to raise six objections against it, the last of which focuses on the *termini* argument itself. There Scotus objects that if the *termini* argument implies a succession theory for qualities, then it must also hold for quantity, since an increase of the latter is no less real than of the former. It seems absurd, however, that when quantity is increased, the previous existing amount would be destroyed.⁵²

In a lengthy aside, Scotus claims that the one advancing the *termini* argument in support of the succession theory would concede the conclusion of this objection—that the theory applies to quantity as well as quality—but then notes that the author nevertheless raised two difficulties for this conclusion concerning the Eucharist, which Scotus reports together with the author's own solutions to them. As Sylla and Wippel noted, both of these difficulties and their solutions are found in Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3. That is, Scotus sees further confirmation of Godfrey's acceptance of the succession theory, and of the *termini* argument in particular, in his treatment of quantity in the Eucharist, a connection later thinkers will make regularly and explicitly.

As we have seen, scholars have found this last claim of Scotus to be problematic. While not disputing that Scotus had in view Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, Maier and Wippel have denied that it in fact contained any clear assertion of the succession theory, as Scotus alleged. This led Wippel in particular to call into doubt the accuracy of Scotus's

⁴⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 209, Adnotatio Duns Scoti, ed. Vat. V, pp. 241,27–242,16: “Contra Godefridum sunt duae rationes, una quod in alteratione nulla sit mutatio continuans (quia cuius ut subiecti?), alia quod mobile simul erit calidum multis caloribus, quia in motu pars remotior a movente non est aequae intensa in forma cum propinqua”.

⁵⁰ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, nn. 92–93, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, pp. 486–487.

⁵¹ See note 23 above.

⁵² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 17, n. 215, ed. Vat. V, p. 246.

understanding of Godfrey's question. Scotus's reading of this text as a basis for imputing the succession theory to Godfrey accordingly warrants closer examination.

Scotus submits Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 to a detailed analysis in *Sentences* IV, dist. 12, q. 4, which concerns accidental change in the Eucharist. As cross-references in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* make clear, Scotus was himself explicit that this latter question concerning the Eucharist was to be connected with the prior one concerning charity on the specific issue of the succession theory.⁵³ The *Ordinatio* version contains Scotus's most thorough examination of Godfrey's text and position, forming a veritable commentary on it.⁵⁴ Scotus quotes verbatim or closely paraphrases nearly the entire second half of Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, which is the section concerning change in the Eucharist.⁵⁵ He meticulously parses Godfrey's arguments paragraph by paragraph (*Hoc modo arguit ipse...*; [*H*]oc improbat ipse...; *Contra hanc... innuit tres rationes...*; *Et respondet ad ista...*, etc.), carefully noting when he is quoting Godfrey himself (*[A]rguit ipse, sicut potest elici ex verbis suis...*), when he is supplying arguments of his own (*[A]rguo pro ista conclusione...*), when he is making a judgment about Godfrey's argument (*In isto verbo ultimo videtur stare responsio sua...*), and when he is offering explanations (*Et quasi non sufficiat haec responsio, subdit...*).⁵⁶ If Scotus misunderstood or misrepresented Godfrey's position, it was not for lack of minute attention to the text itself or of care in reporting it.

At issue in Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 is quantitative change in the Eucharist, which presented a special difficulty. In the Eucharist, the underlying substances of bread and wine cannot be the subjects of their associated accidents, since they no longer exist, having been changed into the body and blood of Christ. While in the Eucharist quantity

⁵³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 1, n. 97, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 488: “Sed isti respondent ad hoc, sicut patet in IV libro”; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV, dist. 12, q. 5, ed. Vivès XXIV, p. 173b: “Quantum vero ad illas formas accidentales, dixi contra illam opinionem distinctione 17 primi, et tum promisi hic aliquid de materia illa tangere”. See also note 64 below.

⁵⁴ Cf. Sylla, “Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion...”, p. 128.

⁵⁵ The following passages from Godfrey's *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 18–21 are quoted or closely paraphrased by Scotus in *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, nn. 3–7, ed. Vivès XVII, pp. 616a–619a: 18,38–41 = 616b; 19,4–8 = 616b; 19,19–31 = 617b–618a; 19,33–20,4 = 617b; 20,5–16 = 616a–b; 20,17–23 = 617b; 20,24–29 = 618a; 20,30–21,2 = 618a–b; 21,3–25 = 618b–619a.

⁵⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, nn. 3–7, ed. Vivès XVII, pp. 616a–619a.

was commonly taken to function as a subject for other accidents, such as color or taste, quantity itself seemed to lack a subject, existing in separation as a result of the miracle of transubstantiation.⁵⁷ A difficulty was to explain the various accidental alterations in the Eucharist apparently caused by natural agents, such as changes of place, color or taste, given that, on Aristotle's physics, a persisting, underlying subject was one of the three principles of natural motion.⁵⁸ While changes in place or quality could be explained by appealing to quantity as a subject, as it was the primary accident, change in quantity itself, such as accompanied expansion and contraction (*rarefactio et condensatio*), seemed to lack any subject. At issue, then, is the following. Given that in the Eucharist quantity itself exists without a subject as the result of the miraculous action of divine power, do subsequent natural processes, such as heating and cooling, effect quantitative change, or is an additional miracle, such as creation, required. This is the formal rubric in *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4 under which Scotus examines Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3.⁵⁹

According to Scotus's analysis, Godfrey holds two main conclusions, both of which Scotus rejects. The first is that in quantitative change the same quantity does not remain. Rather, there are wholly different quantities in succession (*omnino alia et alia quantitas*), so that no part of the prior quantity remains in the posterior, and no part of the posterior previously existed in the prior.⁶⁰ This is, of course, an exact statement of the succession theory for the case of quantity, which Scotus understands Godfrey to be upholding here in a perfectly general way and not as an exception arising from the special conditions of the Eucharist.⁶¹ The second conclusion, which Scotus says Godfrey concedes

⁵⁷ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 8, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 619b: "...secundum communem opinionem, quodlibet accidens est ibi (sc. in Eucharistia) in quantitate..."

⁵⁸ Aristoteles, *Phys.* I, 7, 190b8–191a2.

⁵⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 3, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 615b: "De primo quaero, an omnis transmutatio, quae potest causari ab agente creato circa accidentia in Eucharistia manente, necessario requirat eandem quantitatem manere?"

⁶⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 3, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 616a: "Hic est una opinio, quae dicit quod non solum possibile est hic quantitatem non manere eandem, sed quod est omnino alia et alia quantitas in rarefactione et condensatione specierum, ita scilicet omnino quod nihil prioris remanet in posteriori, nec pars aliqua posterioris praefuit in priori".

⁶¹ As the parallel text in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* makes clear, in saying that the quantities are *omnino alia et alia*, Scotus intends to say that the prior quantity is corrupted at the onset of the posterior, which is the succession theory. Cf. Ioannes Duns

as consequent of the first, is that natural agents can cause a change of quantity in the Eucharist without an underlying subject.⁶² Scholars do not question that Scotus was correct in attributing this latter position to Godfrey, on which point he is in fact quite clear.⁶³ It is Scotus's basis for the first conclusion that they have found problematic.

To support his attribution of the first conclusion to Godfrey, Scotus gives the *termini* argument. As he expressly remarks in the parallel text of the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, this is the same proof that he had previously given to support his earlier claim that Godfrey upheld a succession view of augmentation in charity and qualities more generally.⁶⁴ This, of course, is to be expected, since, as just indicated, Scotus asserted in his question on charity that Godfrey conceded the *termini* argument to hold for qualities as well as quantity. As formulated for quantity, Scotus argues that, according to Aristotle, the terms of motion are incompatible. Consequently, nothing of the prior term can remain in the posterior, and hence they are wholly different quantities.⁶⁵ The glaring difficulty is that this argument as Scotus presents it does not occur in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, unlike those that he produces in support of Godfrey's second conclusion. This has no doubt contributed to the

Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV, dist. 12, q. 5, ed. Vivès XXIV, p. 168a–b: “Sed dicitur hic quod ita est de facto, ut non maneat eadem quantitas, nec secundum partem, nec secundum totum, in rarefactione et condensatione specierum in Eucharistia, sed quod totaliter desinat esse quantitas prior et nova induci incipiat; licet enim rarefactio sit motus in qualitate, maior tamen quantitas concomitatur rarefactionem specierum quam earum condensationem, et quantitas rarefacta magis et minus est *omnino alia et alia, quia prior corrumpitur in adventu secundae posterioris*”.

⁶² *Ibid.*: “Et ex hac conclusione concedit ad propositum aliam, scilicet quod hic est motus sine subiecto etiam ab agente creato, ut satis patet ad sensum, quia ignis potest rarefacere istas species, sicut si essent in subiecto”.

⁶³ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 19–20: “Et est dicendum quod oportet ponere motum sine mobili in proposito [...]; [...] sicut secundum eam fieret transmutatio si esset in subiecto, poterit etiam fieri huiusmodi transmutatio in illa existente sine subiecto; [...] ideo ratione huius dicitur motus esse sine mobili in proposito; [...] absque alio novo miraculo remanet haec vis ut post minorem consimiliter fiat ab agente modo naturali et sine creatione maior sine subiecto”.

⁶⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV, dist. 12, q. 5, ed. Vivès XXIV, p. 168b: “Pro hac opinione potest adduci ratio istius Doctoris facta in augmentatione charitatis, et est ista: termini motus sunt impossibiles; sed quicumque gradus quantitatis possunt esse termini motus; igitur universaliter gradus maior in quantitate et minor sunt impossibiles, et unus est alius ab alio”.

⁶⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 3, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 616b: “Pro prima conclusione arguitur sic: Terminos motus oportet esse impossibiles, patet, 5 *Physic.* ergo nihil unius termini manet in alio, sicut impossibile non est in suo impossibili”.

impression that Scotus is reading the succession theory into Godfrey's text.⁶⁶

It is important to note that Scotus does not assert that the *termini* argument occurs literally in Godfrey's question. In the *Ordinatio* Scotus introduces it with the impersonal *arguitur* rather than with *arguit ipse*, which he is here using to signal a quotation. Moreover, as noted, Scotus is clear in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* that he is importing the argument from his earlier discussion on charity. Nonetheless, Scotus does see the *termini* argument at work in Godfrey's position. As he immediately proceeds to explain in detail, Scotus thinks that it underlies Godfrey's express rejection of a competing account of accidental change that avoids the succession theory and solves the problem of motion in the Eucharist.

Scotus accurately reports that Godfrey considers an alternative theory of motion according to which one and the same accident, whether a quantity or a quality, would really remain throughout a change (*manet unum et idem accidens secundum rem*), and vary only in degrees (*variatio secundum gradus*). On this view, the essence of the accidental form would function as the persisting subject and its greater and lesser degrees as the *termini* of change. Godfrey entertains this view as a putative solution to the problem of quantitative change in the Eucharist, since no subject beyond the form itself of quantity would then be required.⁶⁷ But, as Scotus also accurately reports, Godfrey himself emphatically rejects this account (*hoc improbat ipse*). Godfrey does so on the grounds that the subject and terms of change must be really distinct, while the degrees of an accidental form cannot be really distinct from the essence of the form itself. Thus, it is impossible, as this alternative account intends,

⁶⁶ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 349: "Curiously, the textual interdependencies between Scotus's exposition and Godfrey's *Quodlibet* 11, q. 3 are much more evident with respect to the second conclusion than the first".

⁶⁷ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 18–19: "Nunc autem difficile videtur ponere transmutationem sive motum sine mobili vel transmutabili. Quamvis enim ponendo fieri mutationem secundum accidentia, sicut aliqui videntur intelligere, posset faciliter poni quod quantitas mutaretur secundum maius et minus, et etiam qualitas secundum magis et minus, absque alio subiecto. [...] nam si intelligatur quod in tota transmutatione dictorum accidentium manet unum et idem accidens secundum rem et essentiam invariatur, fit autem variatio circa illud secundum gradus praedictos, tunc dicitur quod ex quo accidens secundum rem manet, non autem secundum huiusmodi gradus, quod ista essentia accidentis erit pro subiecto et dicti gradus erunt pro terminis". Scotus summarizes this at Vivès XVII, p. 616b: "Si etiam poneretur hic, quod quantitas aliqua hic maneret eadem, sed termini mutationis essent maius et minus in ipsa quantitate, hoc improbat ipse...".

for an accidental form to vary according to degree and not according to essence.⁶⁸ Scotus reports Godfrey's refutation nearly verbatim, carefully noting that he has applied it to quantity, whereas Godfrey has formulated it in terms of the quality white.⁶⁹

After reporting Godfrey's refutation, Scotus identifies what he takes to be its underlying assumptions. According to Scotus, the whole force of Godfrey's above reasoning rests on the claim that the subject of change must be really distinct from either term—a point on which Godfrey is indeed explicit—and that this in turn presupposes that the subject can remain under either term, while neither term can remain with the other, owing to their opposition.⁷⁰ That is, Scotus takes Godfrey's rejection of the alternative view to rely ultimately on the incompatibility of the terms of change, since it is their mutual incompatibility that shows their real distinction from their subject.⁷¹ Given that the terms of change at issue are *degrees* of a quality or quantity, Scotus thus finds in Godfrey's refutation an assertion that such *degrees* are incompatible *termini*. But this is nothing more than a statement of the *termini* argument and, consequently, an admission of the succession theory.

Thus, Scotus seems to base what he calls Godfrey's first conclusion, that the terms of quantitative change are wholly different quantities (*omnino alia et alia*), on his clear rejection of the alternative view that

⁶⁸ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 19,3–8: "Sed quia, ut alibi tactus est, videtur quod impossibile est sic fieri talium mutationem, quia tamen subiectum motus et terminos realiter differre oportet, album autem secundum essentiam et magis album et minus album non differunt realiter, non potest dici quod fiat variatio secundum minus album et magis album quin fiat variatio secundum ipsam essentiam albedinis, cum magis album et minus album non sunt nisi id ipsum essentialiter quod album".

⁶⁹ Scotus reports Godfrey's refutation (see previous note) at *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 4, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 616b: "...hoc improbat ipse, quia subiectum motus et terminos oportet realiter differre. Sed quantitas illa et maius et minus in quantitate non differunt realiter; non enim potest dici quod fiat variatio secundum maius et minus quin fiat variatio secundum essentiam quantitatis, cum maius et minus non sit nisi ipsum quantum essentialiter. Hoc modo arguit ipse quod non potest albedo manere eadem in transmutatione et variari magis et minus".

⁷⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 3, ed. Vivès XVII, pp. 616b–617a: "Et stat virtus huius rationis in hoc, quod subiectum realiter distinguitur ab utroque termino, et in hoc specialiter, quod subiectum manet sub utroque termino; neuter autem terminus manet cum alio, cum sint oppositi".

⁷¹ Elsewhere Godfrey is clear that this is his reasoning, which text Scotus seems to be quoting in the previous note. See Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XIV, q. 5, ed. Hoffmans, p. 410: "Per hoc enim Philosophus primo *Physicorum*, scilicet ex impossibilitate terminorum motus sive transmutationis, probat quod illud quod stat unum et idem secundum rem cum utroque termino ab utroque realiter est diversum".

one and the same accident (*unum et idem accidens secundum rem*) really persists in accidental change. Scotus adduces the *termini* argument, because he thinks it is the reasoning underlying Godfrey's refutation of this alternative view. Scotus, however, had more direct evidence for his interpretation in a series of objections that Godfrey immediately raises to his above refutation. These objections certainly played a role in Scotus's reading, since, as indicated, he cited them in his parallel question on charity as evidence that Godfrey held the succession theory for qualities. Scotus here examines both Godfrey's objections and his replies in some detail.

The first objection argues, contrary to Godfrey's intended conclusion, that quantitative change in the Eucharist could not result from natural causes but only from a miraculous act of creation. This follows because, as Godfrey has just argued, the term of this change, the greater quantity, is really distinct from the preceding, lesser quantity (*maior quantitas est alia secundum rem a minore*). But here the greater quantity cannot be brought from potency to act out of a material subject, as is the case in natural agents, since in the Eucharist there is no underlying subject of quantitative change. Creation, however, is simply the production of something without any material subject.⁷²

The second objection reasons on similar grounds that any quantitative modification of the host would entail that the body of Christ ceased to be present under the accidents of the bread. The body of Christ is taken to remain so long as the accidents that had previously inhered in the bread prior to transubstantiation remain. But, again, the greater quantity is really different from the prior, lesser quantity (*maior quantitas est alia a minori secundum rem*). Thus, if there is any increase in quantity after consecration, the body of Christ will cease to be present in the Eucharist, because the lesser quantity that was in the bread will no longer exist (*tunc non est quantitas quae afficit substantiam panis*).⁷³

⁷² Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 19: "Item cum maior quantitas est alia secundum rem a minore et non siteducta de potentia materiae quia non habet subiectum, tale autem ens dicitur creari, tunc in ista transmutatione minus fieret maius non naturali transmutatione sed per creationem".

⁷³ *Ibid.*: "Item cum sub speciebus sacramenti dicatur esse corpus Christi sacramentaliter quamdiu manent species quae substantiam panis affecerunt, si sic fit variatio quantitatis quod maior quantitas est alia a minori secundum rem, tunc non est quantitas quae afficit substantiam panis, et sic desinet ibi esse corpus Christi sacramentaliter; quod tamen non ponitur".

In these objections Scotus clearly saw what he described as Godfrey's first conclusion: the terms of quantitative change are completely distinct quantities, so that nothing of the prior quantity is found in the latter (*est omnino alia et alia quantitas... ita scilicet omnino quod nihil prioris remanet in posteriori*). The texts themselves of the objections literally suggest such a conclusion, since the major premise in both is that the terms of change are really distinct quantities (*maior quantitas est alia a minori secundum rem*). As just noted, this is very explicit in the second objection, which plainly asserts that, on this theory of change, the prior quantity ceases to exist (*tunc non est quantitas quae afficit substantiam panis*).

Scotus also no doubt took the reasoning of the objections to require that the posterior term of change be completely new and contain nothing of the prior term. This is especially clear in the first objection concerning creation, which all medievals understood to be an absolute production of something new into existence, of which nothing existed before. Unless this objection were grossly equivocating on the commonly accepted notion of creation, it must be presuming that the posterior quantity is a totally new and wholly distinct quantity from the prior one. Otherwise, the reasoning of the objection would not be cogent, even on the denial of an underlying subject, because it would then be assuming the prior quantity to persist in some way in the posterior. But the terminus of creation, by definition, cannot contain anything that previously existed. Scotus himself takes the reasoning of these objections to require such a reading, since he glosses 'really distinct from' in their common premise as 'completely new': "*sed per te quantitas est omnino nova vel alia quam prius*".⁷⁴

Moreover, it is clear from his replies to these objections that Godfrey accepts their common assumption that terms of quantitative change are really distinct. For instance, in answering the second objection concerning the presence of the body of Christ, Godfrey does not resolve the difficulty by denying that the previous quantity ceases to exist. Instead, he answers that such a change is not sufficient for the presence of the body of Christ to cease. For this to occur, a change is required that would result in accidents inconsistent with the presence of bread and

⁷⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 6, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 618b,8–9.

wine, if they had persisted. Godfrey's response leaves totally intact the description of quantitative change assumed in the objection.⁷⁵

Despite all his assiduous analysis, Scotus's interpretation would still seem liable to the textual objection made by Wippel. Although Godfrey admittedly asserts that there is not one but different accidents (*nec etiam unum accidens sed accidens aliud et aliud*) in change, he immediately denies that they are successively corrupted and generated, as the succession theory holds (*non sic... quod sit corruptum et iterum regeneratum*).⁷⁶ Scotus is fully aware of this passage, since he quotes it nearly verbatim, but he does not see it as inconsistent with his reading of Godfrey.

The passage at issue forms part of Godfrey's response to the most obvious objection confronting his central claim of motion without a subject. The difficulty is posed immediately after his refutation of the alternative view that the same accidental form remains throughout a change.⁷⁷ Godfrey's refutation implies that in the Eucharist there is a succession of one form after another (*nunc est alia forma quam prius*) but without any subject. Such succession alone is not sufficient for motion, since then there would be a transition—existing differently than before (*aliter se habens quam prius*)—but paradoxically nothing undergoing the transition.⁷⁸ In other words, the charge being leveled is that Godfrey's position of motion without a mobile subject simply contradicts Aristotle's fundamental conception of motion itself as the "actuality of the mobile insofar as it is mobile" (*motus est actus mobilis inquantum mobile*) and more generally the definition of change as "existing differently now than before" (*mutari est aliter se habere nunc quam prius*), which was universally taken to entail a subject.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 21,3–14.

⁷⁶ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", pp. 349–350.

⁷⁷ Scotus raises the ensuing difficulty as a separate objection in *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV, dist. 12, q. 5, n. 4, ed. Vivès XXIV, p. 168b,20–31.

⁷⁸ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 19: "... licet sit invenire aliam formam nunc quam prius, hoc tamen non videtur sufficere ad motum; quia licet verum sit quod nunc est alia forma quam prius, non est tamen aliquid unum secundum rem nunc aliter se habens quam prius. Difficile ergo videtur in sacramento altaris ponere motum rarefactionis et condensationis, cum non ponamus quantitati aliquod subiectum".

⁷⁹ This is Scotus's principal objection against Godfrey in *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 1, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 615a: "... tam motus quam mutatio necessario requirit subiectum et praesupponit. Patet ex definitione motus, 3 *Physicorum*: 'Motus est actus entis in potentia', et 'est actus mobilis, inquantum mobile'. Patet etiam ex definitione mutationis, 6 *Physicorum*: 'Mutari est aliter se habere nunc quam prius'. Sed transmutatio, quae

Godfrey replies that while motion in the complete sense as defined by Aristotle requires a mobile subject, the essential element of motion is the continuous passage or 'flow' of the form—the *fluxus formae*—and this can occur without a subject.⁸⁰ Godfrey accordingly explains that even if there is not one and the same mobile subject existing differently now than before (*non sit unum subiectum aliter se habens*), contrary to Aristotle's definition of change, and even if there is not one and the same but wholly different accidents throughout the change (*nec etiam unum accidens sed accidens aliud et aliud*), contrary to the above alternative view, motion can nonetheless still exist in its principal aspect as a flow or process. Godfrey stipulates—and this is the passage mentioned by Wippel—that these accidents cannot be so different that there is an interruption in their existence (*aliquando habeat esse interruptum*), such as occurs when an accident is corrupted and a similar one is generated again.⁸¹ As a related discussion of accidents indicates, Godfrey has in mind here the case where, for example, a given subject is hot in the morning, cold at midday, and then hot again in the evening. There are two different accidents of heat, but there is a break in their existence (*eius esse vel entitas actualis interrumpatur*) such that the later does not follow immediately upon the earlier.⁸² The transition from the one to the

potest causari ab agente creato, vel est motus vel mutatio; ergo necessario praesupponit subiectum, et hoc manens idem sub utroque termino, et hoc est de ratione subiecti". For the definitions, see Aristoteles, *Phys.* III, 1, 201a27–29, com. 9 (Aristoteles Latinus, VII/1, p. 100,7–9); VI, 5, 235b7–8, com. 40 (Aristoteles Latinus, VII/1, p. 233,6–7).

⁸⁰ Motion taken as a *fluxus formae* is a technical notion and is contrasted with that of *forma fluens*. The distinction had its origin in Averroes and basically refers to motion as a process distinct from the mobile body, in the former sense, versus the partial realizations of the terminal form in the body, in the latter. On the meaning and origin of the terms, see C. Trifogli, *Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden – Boston – Köln 2000, pp. 47–51, especially p. 50, note 26 and J. McGinnis, "A Medieval Arabic Analysis of Motion at an Instant. The Avicennan Sources to the *forma fluens/fluxus formae* Debate", *British Journal for the History of Science* 39 (2006), pp. 189–205.

⁸¹ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 20: "Licet ergo sub quantitate non sit aliquid unum et idem secundum rem aliter se habens nunc et prius secundum aliquam formam, et sic non sit motus secundum completam rationem sibi secundum cursum naturae convenientem, quia tamen ad essentiam motus principaliter pertinet ipse fluxus formae vel ipsa forma secundum esse suum in fieri, et hoc in proposito invenitur. Ideo licet non sit unum subiectum aliter se habens nec etiam unum accidens, sed accidens aliud et aliud, quia tamen illud accidens non sic est aliud et aliud quod aliquando habeat esse interruptum, sic quod secundum se sit corruptum et iterum regeneratum aliud consimile, nec sic quod unum sit alteri contrarium".

⁸² Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* VI, q. 5, ed. M. de Wulf – J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefrid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1914 (Les Philosophes Belges, III), p. 131: "Sed quia ad hoc quod aliquod accidens diversificetur secundum

other therefore is not a single, continuous motion. Similarly, Godfrey says that these distinct accidents cannot differ as contraries, for then they would not belong to the same species.⁸³ In other words, Godfrey holds that quantitative change consists in a succession of distinct accidents, but these cannot be so distinct as to violate the continuity of the movement. Thus, so long as these different accidents share the same specific nature and have a continuous existence (*in continuo esse*), that is, exist in succession without interruption, the essential feature of motion as a *fluxus formae* is preserved, even in the absence of a mobile subject.⁸⁴

Scotus quotes this entire passage and construes it as Godfrey's basic response to the objections that he himself raised to his own position, particularly the first concerning creation.⁸⁵ To that objection Godfrey replied that quantitative alteration in the Eucharist has a *terminus a quo*, which is the lesser degree of quantity, and a *terminus ad quem*, which is the greater degree. The motion or change is the flow of the form of quantity, namely, its incomplete existence between these two terms, according to a succession of nearly infinite degrees. Accordingly, Godfrey answers, the greater quantity is not the outcome of creation, even though it is produced without a material subject, since creation in the proper sense would additionally require it to lack any connection or relation (*habitus*) to a previously existing quantity.⁸⁶ Put in

materiam et dicatur esse corruptum et regeneratum aliud et aliud secundum materiam, sufficit quod eius esse vel entitas actualis interrumpatur, non obstante quod maneat eadem materia vel idem subiectum—unde si aliquid sit calidum in mane et frigidum in meridie et iterum calidum in vespere, constat quod est alia et alia calidas secundum essentiam..." and *Quodl.* VI, q. 2, ed. de Wulf – Hoffmans, pp. 110–111: "Quia enim unitas talium [sc. quorum esse consistit in fieri et successione] in sua ratione includit durationis continuitatem, eorum interruptio repugnat unitati talium, et ideo cum, motu aliquo desinente, non possit habere continuitatem cum illo qui postea habet esse, quia interruptio facta est et intercidit tempus medium..."

⁸³ See text at note 81 above.

⁸⁴ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 20, continuing from note 81: "...sed sic [sc. aliud et aliud] quod est unius rationis secundum formam et speciem et in esse continuo, id est sine interruptione licet secundum quoddam fieri successivum conservatur, hoc non impedit quin possit dici habere rationem motus".

⁸⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 6, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 618b, quoting Godfrey's text in notes 81 and 84 above: "Et respondet ad ista, quod quia in ista transmutatione non sic est aliud et aliud, quod quandoque habeat esse interruptum, neque sic quod secundum se sit corruptum, neque regeneratum aliud simile, neque quod unum sit alteri contrarium; sed est unius rationis secundum formam et speciem, et in esse continuo et sine interruptione; ideo non impeditur, quin possit hic poni ratio motus".

⁸⁶ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 20–21: "Ad aliud dicendum quod sicut in potentia subiecti erat ut ab agente creato post minorem

more general terms, Godfrey is simply making the standard point that creation cannot be a motion. The present case of quantitative change in the Eucharist meets the requirements for motion taken as a *fluxus formae*, since it is a continuous flow of a form between two determinate terms at rest.

Scotus connects the above two passages by applying Godfrey's definition of motion as a *fluxus formae* to his response to the objection from creation. According to Scotus, Godfrey's fundamental explanation of why quantitative change in the Eucharist arises naturally and not from miraculous creation is that the new, posterior quantity has a relation (*habitus*) to a preexisting quantity. Applying Godfrey's account of motion as a *fluxus formae* to this reply, Scotus identifies this relation precisely as the uninterrupted succession (*succedit sibi sine interruptione*) of the posterior to the prior degree, so that the existence of the one follows immediately upon the other.⁸⁷ Scotus's analysis here shows that he took full account of the text cited by Wippel but did not at all

quantitatem introduceretur maior sine creatione, et hoc in ipso subiecto, ita etiam in quantitate a subiecto separata [...] remanet haec vis, ut post minorem consimiliter fiat ab agente modo naturali et sine creatione maior [...]. Et est ibi terminus a quo minor quantitas secundum aliquem gradum a quo incipit motus, terminus ad quem quantitas maior secundum alium determinatum gradum ad quem stat huiusmodi transmutatio. Motus autem vel transmutatio est fluxus quantitatis indeterminatae inter istos gradus determinatos habens esse inter illos secundum gradus quasi infinitos et indeterminatos inter medios non existentes in actu simpliciter sed secundum successionem et in actu permixto potentiae. Sed si fieret aliqua quantitas sic secundum se quod nec de potentia subiecti educeretur nec haberet habitudinem ad quantitatem praeexistentem, illa proprie crearetur”.

⁸⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 12, q. 4, n. 6, ed. Vivès XVII, p. 618b, quoting Godfrey's text in notes 84 and 86 above: “Et hoc posset applicari ad primum, quia scilicet ideo non est creatio, quia non est productio alicujus novi ‘secundum esse interruptum, sed tantum esse alicujus secundum formam et speciem, secundum quoddam fieri successivum conservatum’. Tamen ad primum dicit, quod ‘sicut in potentia subiecti erat, ut ab agente creato post minorem quantitatem introduceretur maior sine creatione, ita in quantitate separata manet haec vis, ut post minorem fiat ab agente naturali maior, et sine creatione, ita quod terminus a quo est minor quantitas secundum gradum, a quo incipit motus; terminus autem ad quem est maior secundum alium gradum, ad quem stat transmutatio. Motus autem est fluxus quantitatis indeterminatae inter istos terminos certos, habens esse inter illos secundum gradus quasi infinitos; sed si fieret aliqua alia quantitas sic, quod non haberet habitudinem ad quantitatem praeexistentem, illa proprie crearetur’. In isto verbo ultimo videtur stare responsio sua, quod scilicet ideo non est creatio, quia quantitas nova, quae inducitur, habet talem habitudinem ad quantitatem praeexistentem, quod succedit sibi sine interruptione per fluxum secundum gradus in forma quantitatis, quasi infinitos”. Cf. n. 16 (p. 623b): “Aliud addit in responsione, quod ‘si quantitas ista non haberet habitudinem ad quantitatem priorem, vel praeexistentem, tunc proprie crearetur’ [...] haec habitudo non est nisi quaedam successio immediata esse istius ad esse illius...”.

see it as conflicting with the succession theory. When Godfrey stipulates that the different accidents whose flow constitutes motion as a *fluxus formae* cannot be corrupted and then regenerated in a similar form, Scotus takes the main point to be that their succession must be, as Godfrey himself says, uninterrupted, that is, immediate and continuous. For Scotus, therefore, this text explains how for Godfrey the posterior term can be wholly new and completely different from the prior term and yet their succession still constitutes a natural motion because it is continuous.⁸⁸

To summarize, Scotus attributes the succession theory to Godfrey of Fontaines, for both qualities in the context of charity and quantities in the context of the Eucharist. Scotus makes the attribution by name, in annotations and revisions from his own hand, and in his lectures given at Paris while Godfrey was still active. The textual basis for Scotus's attribution is clear for the case of quantity. It is Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, which Scotus quotes and analyzes in painstaking detail. Scotus found evidence of the succession theory in Godfrey's rejection of an alternative view that the same accidental form persists in change, in his express statements that the terms of change are really and wholly distinct, and in a series of objections raised by Godfrey himself that state or presuppose that the prior quantity ceases to exist. Godfrey's statement that the different accidents involved in change are not corrupted and then regenerated was not read by Scotus to be a disclaimer of the succession theory but a stipulation that their succession must be continuous and uninterrupted.

On the other hand, the textual basis in Godfrey for Scotus's attribution in the case of qualities is not clear. Unlike for quantity, Scotus does not engage in a lengthy analysis of a corresponding quodlibetal question by Godfrey concerning charity but merely advances the *termini* argument in favor of the position. Nor does it seem likely, as suggested by Sylla, that Scotus understood Godfrey to have first held the succession for quantity and then extended it to quality or that Scotus himself extrapolated from Godfrey's treatment of quantity and inferred that it must also have applied to quality in the absence of any express text. To the contrary, Scotus clearly depicts Godfrey as first holding the theory for charity and qualities and then as conceding its

⁸⁸ The interpretation of this passage by Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 110–111, fundamentally agrees with that of Scotus.

extension to the seemingly more difficult case of quantity and solving the problematic consequences for the Eucharist. Moreover, Scotus is explicit that the principal argument for the succession theory—the *termini* argument—does not occur in Godfrey's discussion of quantity in the Eucharist and that he is supplying it from the question on charity. Hence, from Scotus's presentation it seems that Godfrey originally and principally adopted the theory for the case of quality.

Scotus can therefore be no further help in locating the ultimate basis of the attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey. For this, Scotus's account must be supplemented by the ensuing identifications, reports, attacks, and defenses of Godfrey's position in the fourteenth century.

IV. MEDIEVAL CITATIONS OF GODFREY ON THE SUCCESSION THEORY

A. *Henry of Harclay*

The earliest thinker after Scotus to have explicitly attributed the succession theory to Godfrey was the English secular master and Chancellor of Oxford, Henry of Harclay.⁸⁹ At issue is Harclay's commentary on the *Sentences*, rather than, as Sylla had originally surmised, a separate disputed question on intension and remission.⁹⁰ This is important to note since Harclay's *Sentences* were read at Paris in the early fourteenth century, certainly prior to 1310, and perhaps contemporaneous with Scotus's period there.⁹¹ They therefore represent a reaction contemporary or very nearly contemporary with Godfrey himself. Unlike his

⁸⁹ On Harclay see the still fundamental study, F. Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford und seine Quästionen", in *Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle*, Roma 1924, vol. 1, pp. 307–356 and M. Henninger, *Henry of Harclay. Ordinary Questions*, 2 vols., Oxford 2007.

⁹⁰ Sylla ("Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion...", p. 124, note 56 and p. 130, note 82) relied principally on a question on intension and remission in ms. Troyes, Bibl. Mun. 501, ff. 82va–83rb, which, together with several others, are identified as Harclay's in the margin of the manuscript. These questions were first noticed by F. Pelster "Theologisch und philosophisch bedeutsame Quästionen des W. von Macclesfield O.P., H. von Harclay und anonymen Autoren der englischen Hochscholastik in Cod. 501 Troyes", *Scholastik* 28 (1953), pp. 229–230. Comparison shows, however, that this question is simply a truncated excerpt from his *Sentences* commentary, as had been already indicated by C. Balić in "Adnotationes ad nonnullas quaestiones circa *Ordinationem* I. Duns Scoti", ed. Vat. IV, pp. 8*–9*.

⁹¹ On the identification, dating, and location of Harclay's *Sentences* see C. Balić, "Henricus de Harclay et Ioannes Duns Scotus" in *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson*,

later *Ordinary Questions* disputed at Oxford that show an independent and anti-realist cast of mind, Harclay's *Sentences* are heavily indebted to Scotus, so much so that they were long thought to be a version of Scotus's commentary.⁹² Accordingly, Harclay's treatment of the succession theory in his question on the increase of charity closely tracks Scotus's own for its organization and for much of its argumentation.⁹³ Despite its dependency on Scotus, Harclay's discussion nonetheless adds some important details.

First, as Sylla had noted, Harclay explicitly states, where Scotus does not, that the related discussion on the Eucharist comes from Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3. Following Scotus, Harclay reports the objection against the succession theory based on quantity and the difficulties that it engenders for the Eucharist. In doing so, Harclay specifies that Godfrey himself answered these difficulties: "Sed ipse respondet ad illa XI Quolibet quaestione tertia". That is, Harclay is asserting that Godfrey, as author of these responses, is the author of the opinion. In Harclay's original *Sentences*, unlike in the excerpted form cited by Sylla, this attribution occurs in the body of the text itself and not in the margins, indicating Harclay himself rather than an annotator as its source. Consequently, as with Scotus, we have in Harclay a personal, named attribution of the theory to Godfrey in a text contemporary with Godfrey himself. Moreover, Harclay cites Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 a second time in a section of the question not included in the excerpted version. As we shall see presently, this latter citation identifies a second argument by Godfrey in support of the succession theory.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, Harclay supplements Scotus's account by reporting additional arguments for the succession theory, thus providing further evidence for locating the basis of the theory in Godfrey. Two of these are notable because they will prove to have identifiable origins in Godfrey. The first, which is the third

Toronto – Paris 1959, pp. 93–121, pp. 701–702 and "Adnotationes", ed. Vat. IV, pp. 1*–39*.

⁹² In the census of manuscripts to the first volume of the Vatican edition of Scotus's works, Harclay's commentary is still listed as version 'E' of Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis*. See "De *Ordinatione* I. Duns Scoti. Disquisitio historico-critica", ed. Vat. I, p. 145* g. The shift in Harclay's outlook away from Scotus in his Parisian *Sentences* to a more independent, less realist view in his Oxford *Quaestiones* has long been recognized. For an example, see M. Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's *Quaestio* on Relation in his *Sentences* Commentary. An Edition", in *Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S. J.*, ed. W.J. Carroll – J.J. Furlong, New York 1994, pp. 237–254.

⁹³ See text 1 in the Appendix.

in Harclay's question, argues that the different degrees of intensity cannot be numerically the same form. This follows from the principle that distinct motions cannot have numerically the same term, which derives from Aristotle's criteria for the unity of motion. Assume that the whiteness inhering in some body becomes more intense in the morning and then, after a pause, becomes still more intense in the evening. The two intensifications are wholly distinct and discontinuous motions, since they are separated by a period of rest. They must therefore have numerically distinct forms as terms. But the terms of the two motions are degrees of intensity, which consequently cannot be numerically the same form. Thus, in intensification the numerically same form cannot remain. Harclay's other additional argument, which is the last in his series, is that locomotion is related to place (*ubi*) as alteration is to the form acquired. But in locomotion the mobile body is in each instant at a numerically different and distinct place. Accordingly, there must be in alteration a new form at every instant.

While Harclay does not here identify the source of the first of these two additional proofs, although this will emerge in due course, he explicitly attributes the second to Godfrey. In his response to that argument, Harclay denies the relevant similarity between locomotion and alteration, citing an assertion of Godfrey himself (*sicut ipsemet Doctor dicit*). As read by Harclay, Godfrey maintains that in locomotion there is succession only according to the parts of the mobile body. It is for this reason, says Harclay, that in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 Godfrey admitted motion without a subject for alteration but denied it for locomotion (*propter illud dictum, ipse dicit XI Quolibet quaestione tertia*).⁹⁴ In other words, Harclay is alleging an inconsistency between Godfrey's analysis of local movement in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 and the argument for the succession theory based on the similarity between locomotion and alteration. Harclay's refutation clearly presupposes that Godfrey subscribed to original locomotion argument. That *ipsemet Doctor* refers to Godfrey is, of course, clear from Harclay's ensuing, second reference to *Quodlibet* XI.

⁹⁴ Harclay has in mind *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 21,15–25, especially: "...ordo et successio partium in motu alicuius mobilis dicitur esse ex ordine et successione partium mobilis in motu locali qui est secundum ubi [...]. Unde talis motus causatur ex ordine et successione partium ipsius mobilis non inter se, sed in habitudine ad aliud spatium alterius corporis. Sed sic non est in motu secundum quantitatem...".

Thus, Harclay, like Scotus, has personally and by name attributed the succession theory to Godfrey by explicitly citing his *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3. Moreover, Harclay has cited two additional arguments, one based on the principle that distinct motions cannot terminate at the same form and a second based on the similarity of alteration to locomotion. While these will prove to be very important details, Harclay has not provided any explicit references to Godfrey beyond *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3. For this, it is necessary to turn to the next generation of theologians at Paris.

B. Franciscans at Paris

The influence of Scotus on fourteenth-century Franciscan thought was decisive. Whether disciples or critics, subsequent theologians in the Order adopted Scotus's organization, choice of topics, and general framework of concepts and distinctions. The treatment of intension and remission was no exception. Maier had already cited a number of Franciscan writers who followed Scotus in naming Godfrey as the main proponent of the succession theory, implying that this explained the widespread attribution of the view to him.⁹⁵ While this is in part true, thinkers subsequent to Scotus did not simply reproduce his text on this point. They added important clarifications and evidence, including the first citation of the text other than *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 where Godfrey is alleged to have held the theory and the citation of one of his notable contemporaries who also held the view.

Nonetheless, Scotus's closest associates and disciples did follow his treatment of intension and remission quite closely. For example, Antonius Andreas, William of Alnwick, Landulpho Caracciolo, and Peter of Aquila all report the succession theory as the main contrary view, attribute it explicitly to Godfrey, either in the text itself or by marginal annotation, and give the *termini* argument in support.⁹⁶ While these

⁹⁵ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme...*, pp. 61–73. On the role of the Scotists in propagating the attribution to Godfrey, see p. 64.

⁹⁶ See texts 2, 3, 7, and 4 in the Appendix. On these thinkers, see respectively C. Bérubé, "Antoine André, témoin et interprète de Scot", *Antonianum* 54 (1979), pp. 386–446; S. Dumont, "The Univocity of Being in the Fourteenth Century. John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick", *Mediaeval Studies* 49 (1987), pp. 1–75; C. Schabel, "Landulph Caracciolo", in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gracia – T. Noone, Oxford 2003, pp. 409–410; A. Chiappini, "Fra Pietro dell'Aquila 'Scotello' O. Min., celebre scolastico del Trecento", *Miscellanea Francescana* 61 (1961), pp. 283–310. We have also examined the relevant questions in the Franciscans John

perhaps have little independent value beyond Scotus as evidence that Godfrey held the theory, this is not so for other treatments.

For instance, there is the anonymous question on intension and remission in the miscellany preserved in manuscript 732 of the Jagiellonian library in Kraków.⁹⁷ This question is undoubtedly by a Franciscan and was perhaps written at Paris during the second decade of the fourteenth century, judging from its citation of Alexander of Alexandria, who held the Parisian chair in theology immediately after Scotus.⁹⁸ The author cites Godfrey as holding the succession theory, giving both the *termini* and locomotion arguments, but then additionally explains why Godfrey was led to this view. On the one side, Godfrey saw that some new reality had to accrue in intensification; on the other, he maintained the simplicity of form. He thus had to admit that the new reality of each degree was a new form. This explanation is not derivative of Scotus, whom the author also cites, but gives a different motivation for Godfrey's position. Scotus had diagnosed Godfrey's view as the result of making the degrees of intension and remission themselves the terms of motion and then reasoning from their incompatibility to their continual replacement. The present author instead cites Godfrey's core conviction of the indivisibility of form, which Godfrey set out vigorously in both *Quodlibet* II, q. 10 and *Ordinary Question* 18, as the thesis generating the succession theory. Thus, in going beyond Scotus, this author provides independent testimony not only that Godfrey held the succession theory but on what basis.

Of primary importance, however, is the French theologian Peter Aureoli, the most significant Franciscan thinker at Paris after Scotus.⁹⁹ His massive *Sentence* commentary known as the *Scriptum* contains an encyclopedia of contemporary views, which he cites at length giving specific identification of authors and sources.¹⁰⁰ In his discussion

Bassoles, Peter of Navarre, Francis of Meyronnes, and Francis of Marchia, but they include no explicit references to Godfrey.

⁹⁷ See text 6 in the Appendix. On this manuscript, see Z. Włodek – J. Zatyey – M. Zwiercan, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Medii Aevi Latinorum qui in Bibliotheca Jagellonica Cracoviae asservantur*, Wrocław 1980 sqq., vol 5, p. 225 and Z. Włodek, "Une question scotiste du xiv^e siècle sur la continuité du temps", *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 12 (1966), pp. 117–134.

⁹⁸ On Alexander, see L. Veuthey, *Alexandre d'Alexandrie, Maître de l'Université de Paris et Ministre général des Frères Mineurs*, Paris 1932.

⁹⁹ See text 7 in the Appendix.

¹⁰⁰ The *Scriptum* version of Aureoli's *Sentence* commentary was mostly completed during his lectorship at the *studium* at Toulouse just prior to reading the *Sentences* at

of intension and remission in distinction 17 on charity, for instance, Aureoli accurately reports and gives exact citations to Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 24, art. 5 and Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* IV, q. 15.¹⁰¹ His explicit citation of Godfrey warrants comment.

Aureoli's procedure was first to set out the various contrary opinions with their supporting arguments and then to identify their authors only later in his subsequent responses. In the question on intension and remission, Aureoli reports the succession theory as the second contrary view together with six supporting arguments, the first two of which are the *termini* proof and the argument from locomotion. In his subsequent responses to these arguments, Aureoli identifies Godfrey as holding this view and cites a specific work, which, in the 1596 Rome edition, reads as follows: "Opinio Goffredi *Quolibet* 7 quaestione 7". As Auguste Pelzer originally noted, and Maier after him, this reference in the Rome edition does not correspond to the original manuscripts nor, in fact, does Godfrey's *Quodlibet* VII, q. 7 deal with intension and remission. The most authoritative witness of this version of Aureoli's *Sentences*, known as the *Scriptum*, is the famous Borghese 329 of the Vatican Library, a codex presented to Pope John XXII by Aureoli in 1317.¹⁰² In place of the reference to *Quolibet* 7 quaestione 7 found in the Rome edition, this manuscript carries instead *in Quaestionibus ordinariis*.¹⁰³ The latter is undoubtedly the correct reading, as confirmed by other manuscripts and, as we shall see, by other thinkers. This is the first explicit reference to the source for Godfrey's view other than *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, and it comes from a reliable and accurate authority. Which of Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions* did Aureoli have in view? While a secure answer to this requires further evidence, the only obvious candidate would be question 18 on the intensification of virtue. How this can be

Paris from 1316–1318, which survive as *Reportationes*. For an overview, see C. Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316–1345*, Aldershot 2000, pp. 67–76.

¹⁰¹ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*, I, dist. 17, q. 2 [= q. 35], art. 1, ed. Romae 1596, pp. 434–435. The first two articles of this question have been edited from all manuscripts by C. Schabel and published online. See the Peter Auriol Homepage by R. Friedman (<http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/auriol.html>). For a study of Aureoli on intension and remission, see C. Schabel, "Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's *Sentences* Commentary", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 117–161.

¹⁰² On this manuscript, see Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1956, pp. xii–xiii.

¹⁰³ Hoffmans – Pelzer, "Les manuscrits...", p. 285 and pp. 285–286, note 3; Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme...*, pp. 62–64.

reconciled with the view of Maier and Wippel that Godfrey appears there to deny the succession theory remains to be seen.

C. John Baconthorpe

Like that of Aureoli a few years earlier, the Parisian *Sentences* commentary of the English Carmelite John Baconthorpe is encyclopedic in its reporting of contemporary opinions, which it at times transcribes so accurately that it has been used to authenticate and reconstruct the original texts of the authors cited.¹⁰⁴ Citations by Baconthorpe must therefore be viewed as authoritative. In distinction 15 on charity, Baconthorpe explicitly attributes the succession theory to Godfrey and reports versions of the *termini* and locomotion arguments.¹⁰⁵ The reference to Godfrey is found in the text itself of both the earlier version preserved in London, British Library, ms. Royal 11.C.VI and the revised version of the early printed edition. Baconthorpe has the last explicit citation of Godfrey on the succession theory prior to Walter Burley attribution in his *Tractatus secundus* from the early 1320s.¹⁰⁶

Baconthorpe, however, also discusses Godfrey's theory when treating the related topic of the Eucharist in book four. Baconthorpe has two separate commentaries on the fourth book, one containing canonical questions on the sacraments, which is later and has been printed in the early editions of his *Sentences*, and the other taking up theoretical issues, which remains unedited.¹⁰⁷ In question 10 of these latter *Quaestiones speculativae* Baconthorpe attacks Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, quoting it extensively and analyzing it in detail, particularly in regard to the objections that Godfrey raises to his own position on motion in the Eucharist. As we have seen, Scotus sees these objections as raising difficulties that arise from Godfrey's application of the succession theory

¹⁰⁴ B. Xiberta, *De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931, pp. 167–240. For example, Baconthorpe has transcribed into his *Sentences* much of the question on predestination by his contemporary, Thomas Wylton. See my "New Questions by Thomas Wylton", *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 9 (1998), pp. 359–362.

¹⁰⁵ See text 8 in the Appendix.

¹⁰⁶ As I will establish in my forthcoming edition of Thomas Wylton's questions on intension and remission, Baconthorpe quotes Wylton's questions extensively, but is unaware of Burley responses to them in the *Tractatus secundus*. The dispute between Wylton and Burley occurred at Paris, where Wylton was Burley's master.

¹⁰⁷ For a description, see E. Borchert, *Die Quaestiones speculativae et canonicae des Johannes Baconthorpe über den sakramentalen Charakter*, München 1974.

to quantity. In this context, Baconthorpe makes an important observation. He says that those who maintain that motion in the Eucharist is possible without a mobile body as an underlying subject are the same who hold that the preceding grade in augmentation is corrupted by the posterior grade. Here Baconthorpe cites the *Ordinary Questions* of Godfrey of Fontaines and notes that he had discussed Godfrey's theory in distinctions 16 and 17 of the first book.¹⁰⁸ This citation is important for three reasons. First, it confirms that Godfrey held the succession theory in his *Ordinary Questions*. Second, its cross-reference to the discussion of charity in *Sentences* I, dist. 16–17 means that Baconthorpe is citing Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions* as the source for at least some of the arguments that he reports there. Finally, it indicates that Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 cannot be the primary source for the succession theory.

D. *Augustinians at Paris: Gerard of Siena, Michael of Massa,
Gregory of Rimini, and Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo*

The legacy of the prominent careers of Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo was the ascendancy at Paris of Augustinian theologians during the second quarter of the fourteenth century, who in fact provide all the testimonia from this period.¹⁰⁹ In this connection, it is to be recalled that the Augustinians developed a highly elaborate and accurate technique of identifying opinions in the margins of their *Sentence* commentaries.¹¹⁰ The first citation is from Gerard of Siena, whose *Sentences* date from the mid-1320s. In his question on the increase of charity in I, dist. 17, he reports the succession theory and the *termini* proof as its fundamental argument, which are attributed to Godfrey in the margins.¹¹¹ Michael of Massa, whose *Sentences* are now thought to date from the early 1330s, has a very lengthy account of the various views on the increase of charity, reporting and citing the texts of Giles,

¹⁰⁸ See text 9 in the Appendix.

¹⁰⁹ For an overview, see C. Schabel, "Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini and the Problem of Predestination", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden 2002, pp. 221–265, especially pp. 249–252.

¹¹⁰ D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Booklore", *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 146–274.

¹¹¹ See text 10 in the Appendix.

Scotus, Aquinas, Henry, and Hervaeus.¹¹² Massa considers the succession theory last and locates it in Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions*, further confirming the attribution of Baconthorpe and Aureoli. Unfortunately, Massa reports none of Godfrey's arguments, because he says that his position is wholly irrational and dangerous to the faith, an allusion to the difficulties for the Eucharist noted by Scotus.¹¹³ Gregory of Rimini's *Sentences*, which constitutes one of the earliest sustained reactions to Ockham at Paris, dates from the early to mid-1340s.¹¹⁴ Its treatment of intension and remission in I, dist. 17 runs to some two hundred pages and circulated independently as a separate treatise on the topic.¹¹⁵ At the start of his section on the succession theory, Gregory himself attributes it in the margin to both Godfrey and Burley.¹¹⁶ Finally, from the mid-1340s there is the important commentary of Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, which contains scores of chapter and verse citations of theologians from both Oxford and Paris extending back into the thirteenth century.¹¹⁷ Of the more than one hundred such references in the first book, there is only one explicit citation of Godfrey, and it is to the succession theory. Alphonsus's chief target in this regard is Burley's *Tractatus secundus*, long sections of which he has transcribed into his commentary. In replying to Burley's many arguments for the succession theory, Alphonsus pointedly notes that the central *termini* proof was not in fact Burley's own argument, but that of Godfrey, whom Burley followed on this point.¹¹⁸

¹¹² On his *Sentences*, see D. Trapp, "Notes on Some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa († 1337)", *Augustinianum* 5 (1965), pp. 58–133; W. Courtenay, "The *Quaestiones in Sententias* of Michael of Massa, OESA. A Redating", *Augustiniana* 45 (1995), pp. 191–207; C. Schabel, "Questions on Future Contingents by Michael of Massa, OESA", *Augustiniana* 48 (1998), pp. 165–229.

¹¹³ See text 11 in the Appendix.

¹¹⁴ P. Bermon, "La *Lectura* sur les deux premiers livres des *Sentences* de Grégoire de Rimini O.E.S.A. (1300–1358)", in *Mediaeval Commentaries...*, ed. Evans, pp. 267–285.

¹¹⁵ See C. Schabel, "Gregory of Rimini", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2001 Edition), ed. E. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/gregory-rimini/>, section 1.

¹¹⁶ See text 12 in the Appendix.

¹¹⁷ The fundamental study on Alphonsus of Toledo is J. Kürzinger, *Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Scholastik im 14. Jahrhundert*, Münster 1930 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXII, 5–6).

¹¹⁸ See text 13 in the Appendix.

E. Oxford:

William of Nottingham and Robert Walsingham

Although our principal concern is with the identification and reception of Godfrey's theory at Paris, it was also known and explicitly cited during this period in Oxford. There are at least two attributions of the succession theory to Godfrey at Oxford by theologians who had no career at Paris. The first comes from the Franciscan William of Nottingham, whose commentary on the *Sentences*, which dates from about 1310, is heavily annotated with contemporary opinions and in fact constitutes one of our most important documents about early fourteenth-century theological views at Oxford.¹¹⁹ Although not particularly a follower of Scotus, Nottingham adopts Scotus's addition theory in his question on charity and subsequently rejects both the extraction theory, which he correctly identifies as belonging to Henry of Ghent, and the succession theory, which he attributes to Godfrey. It is to be noted, however, that Nottingham's latter identification is slightly qualified, because he says that Godfrey "seems" to have held this view.¹²⁰

Finally, there is the Carmelite theologian Robert of Walsingham, who was regent at Oxford about 1311–12.¹²¹ His *Quodlibetal Questions*, which date from this period, contain identifications and long quotations of contemporary views. His *Quodlibet* I, q. 12, on whether charity can be increased by addition, contains information of singular importance for our topic. Walsingham first identifies Godfrey as holding the succession theory, and gives three arguments for it, which include in first place the *termini* proof. He then supports these arguments with a citation of and direct quotation from Godfrey's *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11, which concerns the traditional problem of whether grace exists as successively or as something permanent.¹²² As will be clear presently, Walsingham's citation of and gloss on this text will be key for finally locating the origin of the attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey. Walsingham goes on

¹¹⁹ On the commentary, see M. Schmaus, "Neue Mitteilungen zum Sentenzenkommentar Wilhelms von Nottingham", *Franziskanische Studien* 19 (1932), pp. 195–223 and J. Barbarić, *Guilelmi de Nottingham OFM († 1336). Quaestiones sex de Eucharistiae sacramento*, Vicenza 1976.

¹²⁰ See text 14 in the Appendix.

¹²¹ Xiberta, *De scriptoribus*, 111–136 and W. Goris, "La critique de Richard de Conington par Robert de Walsingham. *Quodlibet* II, q. 6", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 67 (2000), pp. 269–293.

¹²² The passage that Walsingham quotes is text 16 in the Appendix.

to argue against Godfrey based on his own objections concerning the Eucharist, citing and quoting from *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3.¹²³ As with Scotus and Harclay, Walsingham thus does not depict the succession theory as arising from but as presupposed by *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3.

V. WHERE DID GODFREY HOLD THE SUCCESSION THEORY?

The above survey has established a nearly universal attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey of Fontaines extending from the time of his own activity at the University of Paris to the middle of the fourteenth century. The theologians canvassed are not merely Franciscans who have slavishly followed Scotus's identification but are from various orders and seculars, both at Oxford and Paris. Most are known for their accurate and specific citation of contemporary views. These sources have cited three places where they understood Godfrey to be endorsing the succession theory: his *Ordinary Questions*, *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, and, as just demonstrated by Walsingham, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11. As repeatedly noted, it seems clear that *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 cannot be origin of the attribution to Godfrey. All those who mention this *Quodlibet* invoke it as the place Godfrey solves various difficulties the theory presents for the Eucharist, so that it presupposes rather than develops the theory. We thus turn to an examination of Godfrey's *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 and his *Ordinary Questions*.

A. *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11

The title of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 is whether the charity exists merely successively (*in fieri*) or as something permanent (*in esse facto*), which topic in itself will prove significant. Maier and Wippel refer to this question only in passing, while the Vatican edition does not list it at all as a source for Scotus's attribution to Godfrey.¹²⁴ Celeyrette and Solère alone discuss the text at any length, which they see as principally concerned with the problem that Godfrey's theory raises for the continuity of change.¹²⁵ Our medieval authors, however, see this question as a principal source for thinking that Godfrey upheld the succession theory.

¹²³ See text 15 in the Appendix.

¹²⁴ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme...*, pp. 65–66, note 18 and Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 355, note 91.

¹²⁵ Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", pp. 99–103.

Godfrey's main response to the question is that charity does not have being successively, since it is instantaneously infused by God, but its increase and decrease is successive. It is Godfrey's assertion of this latter point that Walsingham quotes above. In this passage, Godfrey makes three claims, all of which are mentioned by those who cite him as holding the succession view.¹²⁶ (1) The first is that what exists successively is not one thing in reality (*non est... aliquid unum secundum rem*) over the course of the change but really different things at every instant (*aliud et aliud realiter in pluribus instantibus*). That his contemporaries read this as a clear statement of the succession theory is established by Walsingham, who glosses Godfrey's phrase *semper aliud et aliud realiter* to mean 'numerically distinct' (*aliquid aliud secundum numerum quam prius fuit*), that is, numerically distinct instances of charity at every instant of its intensification. As we shall see, Walsingham's interpretation can be independently confirmed and is in fact demanded by the context of this precise topic. (2) Second, Godfrey explicitly states that such is the case in locomotion, where the mobile body is at a really different location at every instant, and that this applies equally to qualitative change of more and less, where there are really different whites at each instant (*semper est ibi aliud et aliud realiter secundum albedinem*). This is exactly the argument from locomotion repeatedly imputed to Godfrey as one of his principal reasons for holding the succession theory. (3) Finally, Godfrey says that this reasoning applies to charity as well as to all other qualitative increase and decrease. This again is reported consistently as part of Godfrey's adherence to the succession theory: it applies not just to charity but to all cases of intension and remission.¹²⁷

The testimony of Walsingham thus establishes with certainty that *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 was one of the sources for the medieval attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey. This can be independently confirmed by two additional references that interpret *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11

¹²⁶ Compare the passages of Walsingham and Godfrey in texts 15 and 16 in the Appendix.

¹²⁷ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 17, n. 127, ed. Vat. XVII, pp. 221–222: "Ad hoc dicunt aliqui quod caritas minor non manet quando augmentatur caritas, et universaliter dicunt quod in intensione vel remissione cuiuslibet formae forma praeexistens corrumpitur in adventu posterioris" and Harclay (Appendix, text 1): "Una est quae dicit quod generaliter non solum in augmento caritatis immo et cuiuslibet formae secundum intensionem semper est nova omnino forma in quolibet gradu intensionis vel remissionis, ita quod nihil praecedentis formae maneat, sed totaliter corrumpitur".

in this same way. The first comes from an anonymous student of Godfrey, who has summarized his *Quodlibets*, tabulated his disagreements with his contemporaries, and regarded his arguments as *multa et pulchra*. In his summary of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11, this student specifies that Godfrey here disagrees with Aquinas and the common view on intension and remission and holds that the posterior grade is numerically and really distinct from the prior grade (*vult quod semper posterius est aliud numero et re a priori*). He also confirms that Godfrey held the same view in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 on the Eucharist.¹²⁸

The second confirmation comes from the well known critic of Godfrey, the Dominican Bernard of Auvergne, who, within the first decade of the fourteenth century made extensive abbreviations of Godfrey's *Quodlibeta* together with a nearly line by line analysis.¹²⁹ In commenting on the same passage of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 quoted by Walsingham, Bernard recognizes a certain ambiguity in Godfrey's text, but he does admit that it can be read as holding the succession theory, in which case Bernard says that Godfrey's position is absurd.¹³⁰

Finally, the context and topic of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 show that Godfrey's contemporaries could only have read his response as a statement of the succession account. As Celeyrette and Solère have observed, the succession theory was an older view going back to the early thirteenth century appearing in questions on the increase and decrease of charity. But the theory was also discussed under the more fundamental rubric of the ontological status of grace or charity itself, namely, whether grace exists merely successively like movement (*esse fiens vel fluxivum*), so that it is continually infused by divine power into the soul, or whether it is infused as a permanent and enduring quality that exists not part-wise but all at once (*esse manens vel fixum*). By posing exactly this question, Godfrey's *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 would have naturally been read in the context of prior treatments and solutions. Among the most substantial of these was Matthew of Aquasparta's question *De gratia*,

¹²⁸ See text 17 below.

¹²⁹ P.T. Stella, *Teologi e teologia nelle 'Reprobationes' de Bernardo d'Auvergne ai Quodlibeti di Goffredo di Fontaines*, Torino 1957, and F. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque 1964, pp. 98–104. Bernard's abbreviations, which extend from Godfrey's *Quodlibeta* V to XIII, are listed in the index of questions in *Les Philosophes Belges*, vol. 14, Louvain 1937, pp. 326–335.

¹³⁰ See text 18 in the Appendix.

disputed at the Franciscan *studium* in Rome in 1284–85.¹³¹ Giving a detailed analysis of the succession view of grace, which he says was maintained by eminent masters and based on Augustine's account of light in *De genesi ad litteram*, Aquasparta notes that the position had to admit a continual corruption of grace corresponding to its continual influx, since otherwise, if the prior part persisted, the grace would become infinite (*ponunt...continuum infusionem, continuum corruptionem*).¹³² On this point, Aquasparta was following his predecessor at the curial *studium*, John Pecham, who had treated this same question a few years earlier in his *Quodlibetum Romanum*. According to Pecham, if grace were a successive entity, it would have to be generated and destroyed from one moment to the next (*Si gratia esset in fieri, ergo continue generaretur et corrumpetur*).¹³³ More informative still are the remarks of Petrus de Trabibus in I, dist. 17 of his *Sentences*, which date from the mid to late 1290s.¹³⁴ In reporting the succession theory for the increase the charity, he claims that it had its origin in the view attributed to Augustine that grace existed in the soul successively, one part succeeding another so that the prior part was corrupted and the posterior generated (*pars succedat partem, ita quod praecedens corrumpitur et sequens generatur*).¹³⁵

As the central authority of Augustine's *De genesi ad litteram* concerning light suggests, the issue of whether grace exists successively was related to the more general question of whether every creature exists in a state of successive, continual becoming rather than as permanent, fixed entity. Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* V, q. 11 (Christmas 1280 or Easter 1281) devoted to this topic is very relevant. In the course of rejecting the interpretation of Augustine that would render the existence of every

¹³¹ For the date and location of Aquasparta's *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, see the introduction to Doucet's edition (text 19 in the Appendix), p. clx.

¹³² Text 19 in the Appendix. The key text of Augustine compares the continual justification of the soul to the propagation of light in the medium: Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII, 12, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 28/1, Wien – Praha – Leipzig 1894, p. 250,2–9: "...sicut aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit, quia, si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret, sic homo deo sibi praesente inluminatur, absente autem continuo tenebratur [...]. Ille itaque operetur hominem bonum atque custodiat, qui incommutabiliter bonus est. Semper ab illo fieri semperque perfici debemus...". Cf. Celeyrette – Solère, "Godefroid de Fontaines...", p. 99, note 69.

¹³³ See text 21 in the Appendix.

¹³⁴ On the *Sentences* of Petrus de Trabibus, who was a disciple of Peter John Olivi, see H.A. Huning, "Die Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus zur Philosophie", *Franziskanische Studien* 46 (1964), pp. 193–287 and 47 (1965), pp. 1–43.

¹³⁵ See text 20 in the Appendix.

creature in its core merely successive, Henry characterizes the succession position. At the basis of Henry's rejection is the argument that if existing in continual becoming and as merely successive means not being one and the same (*unum et idem*) but always different (*semper aliud et aliud*), then such will be numerically different at every instant (*nulla res esset una et eadem numero in duobus momentis*) and the prior will be corrupted with the generation of the posterior (*non posset esse aliud et aliud esse nisi quia uno corrupto fieret aliud esse*). One could not have a more accurate statement of the succession view as it was commonly attributed to Godfrey.

Against this background it is hardly possible that Godfrey's contemporaries could have construed *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 as asserting anything but the version of the succession theory according to which individual instances of charity would be continually corrupted and generated at every instant. Both the precise formulation of Godfrey's question itself and its governing authority of Augustine's *De genesi ad litteram* on light would have unmistakably located *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 within the traditional debate over whether grace, or more generally creatures, were merely successive entities. Within the context of this debate, the succession view was invariably understood to imply a continual process of corruption and generation. Accordingly, when Godfrey denied that grace was in its existence merely successive but then admitted that it was so in its increase and decrease, he would have been immediately recognized as referring to this interpretation of the succession theory that constituted a traditional opinion on the topic. Such a reading would have been confirmed beyond any doubt in the minds of Godfrey's contemporaries by his very clear assertion that charity in its intensification does not remain one and the same in reality (*non... aliquid unum secundum rem*) but always really differs from instant to instant (*semper aliud et aliud realiter in pluribus instantibus*). This was the exact characterization of the succession theory given by Henry of Ghent as he understood it to entail the corruption and generation of individuals at each moment, a fact of which Godfrey himself could not have been unaware. Without a doubt, then, Godfrey formulated his solution to conform to this received understanding of the succession theory.

It is thus certain that *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 was a principal source for the medieval attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey. Three independent witnesses cite the question as asserting the theory, two of which quote and analyze the relevant passages. Moreover, the question contains specific features of the view as commonly attributed to

Godfrey, including the argument from locomotion and the application of the theory beyond charity to all qualities capable of intension and remission. This is confirmed by the historical background of the topic itself of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11, which asks whether grace is a successive or permanent entity. Read in light of the common understanding of the historical opinion that grace was successive, Godfrey's statement that in intensification grace does not remain really one and the same but is wholly different at every instant could only mean that to every moment of the increase there corresponded a new individual instance of grace as the result of continual corruption and generation. This is why Walsingham so precisely glossed Godfrey's phrase "non unum sed semper aliud et aliud" as "aliud secundum numerum", for this was its recognized meaning in the context of this dispute. Indeed, the context of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 shows not only that it was a source for the medieval interpretation of Godfrey, but that Godfrey fully intended such an interpretation.

B. Ordinary Question 18

As indicated, Peter Aureoli, John Baconthorpe, and Michael of Massa all identified Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions* as containing the succession theory. Only question 18 on the intensification of virtue is topically relevant. Although long aware of Aureoli's citation, scholars have nevertheless tended to deny that it refers to *Ordinary Question* 18. At issue is whether Godfrey accepted or rejected the initial objections of the question, among which are arguments that in intension and remission the form does not remain numerically identical and undergoes generation and corruption. In her consideration of Aureoli's citation, Maier appears to have concluded that since these are *initial* objections, they are posed by Godfrey only to be rejected, which is the usual scholastic procedure. She further argues that since *Ordinary Question* 18 does not contain the specific arguments for the succession theory itemized by Aureoli, it cannot be the text that he had in mind.¹³⁶ Wippel considers these initial objections in more detail, but in the end concludes with Maier that they cannot represent Godfrey's position, as they differ from his formal response to the question.¹³⁷ As noted, Celeyrette and Solère

¹³⁶ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme...*, p. 63.

¹³⁷ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 346, note 77 and p. 352, note 88.

respond to Maier and Wippel that since Godfrey does not address these objections at the end of the question, it is unclear whether he endorsed them or not. They thus remain agnostic on Godfrey's final attitude towards these initial arguments.¹³⁸

Interpretation of the initial objections in *Ordinary Question* 18 is made difficult by the absence from it of two standard elements of the scholastic *quaestio*. First, these opening objections are not followed by the usual, second series of arguments to the contrary that correspond to the role of the *respondens* in the oral disputation; second, as just noted, Godfrey does not reply to the objections after his determination of the question. Ordinarily, the arguments to the contrary and final replies of the master would make perfectly clear the relation of the initial objections to the intended solution of the question. Consequently, in the absence of these elements, the formal structure of *Ordinary Question* 18 provides no insight into whether Godfrey accepts or rejects these initial objections, especially those apparently in support of the succession theory. This can only be inferred from the reasoning and conclusions of the arguments themselves.

The six arguments that open *Ordinary Question* 18 differ slightly in the two manuscripts, B and V. Most notably, V omits the second objection, but otherwise the arguments are recognizably the same in both witnesses.¹³⁹ The objections appear to divide into two groups, with the seeming aim of establishing that no form can undergo intension and remission. The first three (or two in V) argue that a form cannot undergo intension and remission and remain the same in essence or species (*nulla forma manente sua essentia possit intendi* V). The second three, which in B are all specifically said to reach the same conclusion (*et sic idem quod prius*), argue that a form cannot do so and remain the same in number (*idem calor numero non potest intendi et remitti* V).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Celeyrette – Solère, “Godefroid de Fontaines...”, pp. 105–106.

¹³⁹ For the objections according to both manuscripts, see text 23 in the Appendix, to which the ensuing discussion refers.

¹⁴⁰ It is to be noted that only the fourth initial objection as found in V expressly concludes that the same *numerical* instance of a form cannot be intended and remitted (*Et sic idem calor numero non potest intendi and remitti* V). The corresponding form of the objection in B omits the qualification ‘numerical’: “Et sic idem calor non poterit intendi et remitti”. As Wippel observes, however, the version of the objection in B has the same conclusion in view (“Godfrey of Fontaines...”, p. 352, note 88). Given that B is explicit that objections five and six prove the same conclusion as objection four (*Et sic idem quod prius*), I take it that all three objections aim at establishing that the numerically same form does not undergo intension and remission. This can be

It would appear, then, that these two sets of objections are intended to form the horns of a dilemma, arguing that since a form can undergo intension and remission neither as a species nor as a numerical, individual instance, intension and remission of a given form is impossible. Since Godfrey obviously admits that certain kinds of forms do undergo intension and remission, it might appear that he would have to reject these arguments, including the latter three that seem to support the succession theory. The situation, however, is not so straightforward.

The first group of three objections all argue similarly that a form cannot undergo intension and remission because the essence or species is invariable, invoking the traditional passage from the *Liber sex principiorum* that defines form as a simple and unchangeable essence. Since intension and remission is a real variation, it is inconsistent with the form taken as an species or essence. As will be apparent presently, Godfrey cannot reject these first three arguments, since they uphold his decided position.

The second set of three objections make a corresponding case for the form as individual, namely, that the numerically same form cannot undergo intension or remission. They reason that because in real change the prior term must be corrupted, the numerically same form cannot persist in intension or remission, which, of course is an exact assertion of the succession theory. The first of the three initial objections, which is the fourth overall, argues from the principle that two distinct actions cannot result in the same form. But something at first becomes hot and then afterwards becomes more hot by two distinct actions. The initial, lesser form of heat must therefore be corrupted and a new form of heat generated, for otherwise different actions would terminate in the same form. Thus, the more intense heat cannot be numerically the same form as the less intense heat. The second objection of this group argues similarly that no motion achieves its term until the prior state has been totally corrupted. Consequently, when something becomes more hot, the less intense heat must be corrupted. The final argument of the leg is taken from Aristotle's discussion in the *Physics* concern-

confirmed from the general source of the fourth and sixth objections, which derive from Aristotle's discussion in *Physics* V, 4, 228a2–19, concerning the relation between the numerical unity of a motion and that of the term or form that it produces, as the example of health in the morning and evening shows. Thus, it is contextually evident that numerical unity of the form is at issue in these objections. For a relevant discussion of this passage of Aristotle, see Thomas Aquinas, *In Phys.*, V, lect. 6, ed. P. Maggiolo, Torino – Roma 1954, §§ 700 [6]–702 [8].

ing the numerical identity of a quality over time. There, according to the objection, Aristotle claims that health of Socrates in the morning and is not the same as his health in the evening, since it is preserved by different actions. Thus, *a fortiori* the less intense heat cannot be numerically the same as the more intense, as this is a greater change than the mere preservation of health.¹⁴¹ This second set of three objections therefore form little more than variations on the *termini* argument in support of the succession theory as it was attributed to Godfrey by his contemporaries. Scholars do not deny that these objections argue in favor of the succession account, but deny that Godfrey could have endorsed them given their initial position in the question and their apparent difference from his main solution to the question.

It now remains to determine, if possible, Godfrey's attitude toward these two sets of objections, particularly toward the second, which seem so clearly to endorse the succession theory. Let us compare these objections to Godfrey's main solution, with which they are thought to disagree. As discussed, Godfrey's formal reply in *Ordinary Question* 18 is that a form does not undergo intension and remission insofar as it is a species, since in this respect all forms are invariable. Rather, a form undergoes such change only "insofar as it is contracted to an individual" (*secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum*), since only in this way is it variable.¹⁴² Contrary to what has been suggested in the literature, the two parts of Godfrey's reply seem evidently responsive to the two corresponding legs of the dilemma posed in the initial objections, which concern, correspondingly, the intension and remission of the form as a species and then as a numerical instance, that is, as individuated. Given that Godfrey's solution is responsive to the initial objections, is it accepting or rejecting their reasoning?

Turning to the first part of Godfrey's solution to the question, there can be no doubt that it accepts the reasoning of the initial objections in the first arm of the dilemma. Godfrey could not possibly reject these initial arguments, since they uphold his most fundamental conviction that the specific form is indivisible and invariable, a position, as we have seen, that he already set out uncompromisingly in *Quodlibet* II, q. 10. Indeed, the first objection in *Ordinary Question* 18 occurs nearly

¹⁴¹ See note 140 above.

¹⁴² See Godfrey's text at note 13 above.

verbatim as the *sed contra* in *Quodlibet* II, q. 10, which is to say, as the argument in support of Godfrey's solution to that question:

Quodl. II, q. 10, *sed contra*, ed. de
Wulf—Pelzer, p. 140

Q. ord. 18, ob. 1

Ergo similiter ratio et essentia speciei uniuscuiusque habitus consistit in indivisibili, ita quod ipsa manente eadem non poterit diminui vel augeri.

[B] Et arguitur quod nulla forma possit intendi [...], *quia essentia uniuscuiusque formae est invariabilis, quia quaelibet forma est essentia invariabili consistens*; tale autem non suscipit magis et minus; ergo etc.

[V] Et videtur quod *nulla forma manente sua essentia possit intendi*, quia [...] auctor *Sex principiorum* "forma est simplici et in invariabili essentia consistens".

The same is true for the second objection in *Ordinary Question* 18, which occurs in manuscript B. It argues in a similar way that a form cannot undergo intension and remission in its species since that cannot vary. Again, Godfrey cannot reject this argument, since it constitutes the core of his formal response to *Ordinary Question* 18 itself, as this comparison shows.¹⁴³

Q. ord. 18, resp.

Q. ord. 18, ob. 2

Ad quaestionem igitur aliter est dicendum, scilicet quod nulla forma secundum suum esse specificum secundum se et absolute consideratum recipit magis et minus [...] quia ista intensio et remissio non convenit alicui nisi secundum quod aliquo modo est variabile. Sed natura speciei secundum se considerata absolute sive abstracte est secundum se invariabilis....¹⁴³

[B] Praeterea, variatio in forma variat speciem; sed quod suscipit magis et minus variabile est; ergo in eadem specie non potest esse magis et minus.

The first part of Godfrey's formal response in *Ordinary Question* 18 thus actually endorses the first three initial objections that the form as a species does not undergo intension and remission. This shows that, at the least, the initial arguments cannot be treated *en bloc* as running contrary to or radically differing from Godfrey's own, determined view.

¹⁴³ See text at note 13 above.

Consequently, it cannot be concluded that Godfrey rejects the initial arguments asserting the succession theory simply because they occur as part of the opening objections to the question. On the other hand, from Godfrey's acceptance of the first three objections denying the intension and remission of the form as a species, it does not necessarily follow that he also endorses the second three that argue for the corruption of the form as individual. What, then, does the second part of Godfrey's formal solution to the question reveal about his attitude towards these latter objections?

In effect, the whole interpretation of *Ordinary Question* 18 turns on what Godfrey means by asserting in the second part of his main reply that in intension and remission the form varies "insofar as it is contracted to an individual" (*secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum*). Wippel, for his part, has repeatedly insisted that Godfrey does not mean here that the form varies numerically. According to Wippel, Godfrey's meaning is rather that the grades or degrees of a form subject to intension and remission belong to an individual instance of that form, as opposed to the species of the form in itself, since that would violate its simplicity and invariability. In intension and remission these grades or degrees vary within an individual instance of a form, which nevertheless remains numerically one and the same over the course of such a change. But as Wippel himself admits, neither in *Ordinary Question* 18 nor anywhere else in his writings does Godfrey expressly say that the form remains numerically one throughout the process of intension and remission.¹⁴⁴

If, however, this second part of Godfrey's main reply is read as addressing the second set of objections, then it would seem to be referring, in line with these objections, to a numerical variation of the form. That is, Godfrey's assertion that in intension and remission a form varies insofar as it is individuated would seem to mean, as the second set of objections argue, that it changes as an individual, which is to say, that it does not remain numerically the same form. This reading seems supported by other places in the question, where Godfrey similarly asserts that a species does not vary in itself but insofar as it is contracted to an individual and then adds that this variation is found in "diverse

¹⁴⁴ Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", pp. 351–352, where Wippel reiterates six times that Godfrey does not deny the numerical identity of the form in intension and remission.

individuals" (*esse specificum secundum quod contrahitur ad diversa individua potest habere magis et minus*), or "in this and that individual" (*secundum autem speciem dico, non absolute et abstracte consideratam, sed in hoc individuo vel in illo contractam*).¹⁴⁵ This language suggests that Godfrey here understands variation in degree to occur by variation in individual instances of the form. On this proposed reading, then, the second part of Godfrey's solution to the question would be conceding the second leg of the dilemma. It would be admitting that in intension and remission the form varies numerically as a succession of individuals, just as the initial objections of the second leg argue.

In sum, Godfrey's main response in *Ordinary Question* 18 seems to concede both arms of the putative dilemma posed by the initial arguments. It asserts that intension and remission do not occur in the essence or species of the form, which remains one and invariable, but in the form as individuated, which varies numerically. This is simply to say, of course, that Godfrey's main response contains an exact statement of the succession theory. If this reconstruction is correct, then it perfectly explains why Godfrey's question was so insistently cited by his contemporaries as advancing the succession view.

An obvious objection to this reconstruction is that Godfrey would not seem to have solved the initial dilemma, if his main response concedes both of its members. This is not a difficulty. The strategy of the apparent dilemma is one of divide and conquer, forcing a choice between what are posed as two exclusive alternatives. The implied argument is that if a form undergoes intension and remission, it must do so either as a species or as an individual. But no species can undergo intension and remission, since it is invariable. On the other hand, neither can a single, individual instance of a form undergo intension and remission, since the opposition of terms in such change entails the generation and corruption of different, individual instances. The putative dilemma arises because neither the species taken just by itself nor the individual taken just by itself can account for intension and remission. On the side of the species, the form persists but does not change, while on the side of the individual, the single forms change one to another, so that none

¹⁴⁵ The first of these two texts is found in B, f. 227ra, lines 18–20 and V, f. 160rb, lines 32–33 and the second at B, f. 227ra, lines 43–45 and V, f. 160va, lines 4–5. It is to be noted that in these texts Godfrey seems to have in mind a quality existing in two different subjects. Nonetheless, the point still stands; he associates differences in degree of a form with its individual instances.

can be said to be undergoing the change. Thus, any attempt to explain intension and remission by one or the other aspects of the form, as the dilemma requires, will fail. Godfrey's solution appears to dispel the aporia by recognizing that both aspects of the form are jointly required. The form as a species persists unchanged and one throughout the process of intensification, while as individuated the form undergoes variation and so does not remain numerical one. No inconsistency arises, since the variation of the form as individuated is accidental to the form taken as an invariable species. In this way, then, it would appear that Godfrey's solution accepts both arms of the apparent dilemma formed by the initial objections, but denies that taken together they imply intension and remission are impossible.

From the foregoing, it appears that Godfrey's contemporaries read his *Ordinary Question* 18 in the following way. The initial 'objections' seem to be arguments in support of Godfrey's own position, namely, that in intension and remission the form as species remains one and invariable, while as individuated it varies numerically owing to the generation and corruption of the terms of change. These arguments are set out in the beginning of the question in an attempt to establish that Godfrey's position on intension and remission actually leads to a dilemma. In his formal solution to the question, Godfrey reaffirms his position by endorsing the conclusions of the initial objections, tacitly denying that the alleged dilemma in fact occurs, since it depends on a false dichotomy. While this reconstruction is somewhat speculative in the absence of Godfrey's own magisterial replies to the initial objections, it nonetheless does have the advantage of accounting for two absolutely certain but otherwise inexplicable facts. First, it explains why the first two objections contain exact statements of Godfrey's determined position. Second, it explains how Godfrey's contemporaries could have so confidently construed this question as containing the succession theory, given that the express arguments for that theory are located among its opening objections.

It would certainly be fair to regard this reconstruction of Godfrey's *Ordinary Questions* as tenuous were it not for additional, unnoticed evidence beyond the general citations of Aureoli, Baconthorpe, and Massa. First, one of the initial objections of *Ordinary Question* 18 is in fact cited in the period to support the attribution of the succession theory to Godfrey. Second, some of Godfrey's contemporaries at Paris specifically quoted and analyzed *Ordinary Question* 18, even though they did not cite it by title. Among these contemporary reports, at least

one expressly interprets *Ordinary Question* 18 as holding that the form does *not* remain numerically the same in intension and remission, as is argued in the initial objections.

The first piece of evidence comes from Henry of Harclay, who, as we have seen, was one of the earliest thinkers after Scotus to attribute the succession theory to Godfrey explicitly.¹⁴⁶ As indicated, Harclay added several arguments to those reported by Scotus in support of this attribution, two of which merited special attention. One was the argument from locomotion, which Harclay expressly imputed to Godfrey, an attribution that was indeed confirmed by Godfrey's *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11. The other argument, as we have seen, was based on the principle derived from Aristotle's criteria for the unity of motion that distinct motions cannot have *numerically* the same term, especially if that term is a form or quality. The exact premise of the argument as formulated by Harclay is: "Duo motus non possunt terminari ad eundem terminum numero [...] et praecipue si sunt motus ad formam, cuiusmodi est alteratio, quia eadem forma non potest esse terminus nec acquiri per multas mutationes".¹⁴⁷ This is recognizable as the fourth initial objection in *Ordinary Question* 18, which argues from the same principle to the same result, namely, that the terms of change must be numerically distinct: "Praeterea, duo actiones non terminantur ad unam formam".¹⁴⁸ Although Harclay expands Godfrey's very compressed argument—for reasons that will be seen shortly—it is clear that what Harclay reports is equivalent to this initial objection of *Ordinary Question* 18. Harclay's report thus confirms the above reconstruction according to which the lead objections in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18 were actually taken by his contemporaries to be arguments in support of his own position.

The second piece of evidence comes from the reports and criticisms of *Ordinary Question* 18 by Godfrey's slightly later successors at Paris. Two such reports are found in the *Sentences* of Hervaeus Natalis and in the *Disputed Questions* of John of Naples. As Dominican defenders of Aquinas, both probably reacted to Godfrey's question because its criticisms of Thomas's view were more explicit than in his earlier *Quodlibet* II, q. 10. Hervaeus lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris about 1302, which he then revised for publication a few years later, probably

¹⁴⁶ See pp. 68–71 above.

¹⁴⁷ See Text 1 in the Appendix, paragraph five.

¹⁴⁸ See Text 23 in the Appendix, objection four.

after 1309.¹⁴⁹ In his question on the increase of charity, Hervaeus summarizes Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18 very faithfully and then criticizes it for making the separability of an accident, i.e., its ability to be or not in a certain subject, the reason why it can undergo intension and remission. Hervaeus's discussion, however, mentions nothing directly relevant to the succession theory.¹⁵⁰ For this, we turn to the longer and more detailed report by John of Naples.

In q. 4 of his Parisian *Disputed Questions*, which presumably date from his regency of 1315–1317, John of Naples gives a very detailed digest of *Ordinary Question* 18, including direct quotations, so that it is certain that he has this particular question of Godfrey in view.¹⁵¹ John attacks Godfrey's discussion on several points, including its main thesis that no form can have degrees taken as a species and in itself but only insofar as it is contracted to an individual, which, as we have seen, conflicts with a main part of Aquinas's solution to intension and remission. John argues that on this central point Godfrey is inconsistent, since whatever belongs to a form insofar as it is realized in several, different individuals belongs to the form in itself and absolutely, for the universal is nothing other than "one over many". But, argues John, Godfrey has to agree that degrees belong to a form in just this way, because—and this is the precise point at issue in *Ordinary Question* 18—according to Godfrey, the more and less intense forms differ numerically (*quia secundum eum forma intensa et remissa differunt numero*). This explicit statement, made just after his direct quotation and analysis of *Ordinary Question* 18, leaves little doubt that John saw Godfrey's question as holding that numerical variation of the form occurs in intension and remission. As such, John must have construed the question's opening arguments that the form does not remain numerically the same (*idem*

¹⁴⁹ On the dating of Hervaeus's *Sentences*, see R.L. Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250–1320", in *Mediaeval Commentaries...*, ed. Evans (cf. note 109 above), p. 69.

¹⁵⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 4, ed. Parisiis 1647, pp. 92b–93a.

¹⁵¹ See text 24 in the Appendix. On John of Naples, see C. Jellouschek, "Quaestio Magistri Ioannis de Neapoli O. Pr. 'Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius' hic primum in lucem edita", in *Xenia Thomistica*, 3 vols., Roma 1925, vol. 3, pp. 73–104; P. Stella, "Zwei unedierte Artikel des Johannes von Neapel über das Individuationsprinzip", *Divus Thomas* 29 (1951), pp. 129–166; F. Merta, *Die Lehre von der visio beata in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel O.P. (†1336)*, Dissertation, München 1964; R. Schneider, *Die Trinitätslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel O.P. (†1336)*, München 1972.

calor numero non potest intendi et remitti) as supporting Godfrey's position. Consequently, he must also have construed the second part of Godfrey's main response, that the form changes only as contracted to an individual, to refer to numerical variation.

The above two pieces of evidence therefore support the proposed reconstruction of *Ordinary Question* 18, according to which Godfrey endorses the initial arguments, which nonetheless occur at the beginning of the question as objections in the form of a dilemma against his position. That Godfrey endorses the first two initial arguments, which comprise the first arm of the dilemma, is beyond doubt, since they unequivocally assert his fundamental conviction that the form taken as a species and in itself is simple and invariable and so incapable of intension and remission. That he also endorses the second set of initial objections, which as a group argue that the individuated form undergoes generation and corruption during a change of degree, is supported by above reports of Henry of Harclay and John of Paris. On this analysis, Godfrey's formal solution would be read as conceding both sets of objections, while denying that they issue in the alleged dilemma, which presupposes a false dichotomy. As such, Godfrey's assertion in his main reply that in intension and remission the form varies "insofar as it is contracted to an individual" (*secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum*) would refer to a numerical variation. No other reconstruction of Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18 seems reconcilable with its medieval interpretation. The obstacle to detecting the medieval allegation of the succession theory in *Ordinary Question* 18 is that its initial objections are actually arguments of Godfrey that have been turned against him. This, apparently evident enough to Godfrey's medieval readers, has been hard to detect at a distance, because his question lacks both arguments *sed contra* and his final replies.

VI. MAGISTER GODOFREDUS, ET MULTI ALII

As noted, after naming Godfrey of Fontaines as an adherent of the succession theory, Walter Burley adds that "many others" also held the view. The chronological order in which Burley lists advocates of the theory suggests that these *alii* came after Godfrey and were perhaps Burley's own contemporaries. Thus, identification of other proponents of the succession account at Paris between Godfrey and Burley could provide not only further evidence of Godfrey's view but also a context

for Burley's *Tractatus secundus* itself. So far, however, scholars have not identified in this period at Paris any defenders of the succession view to whom Burley apparently alludes.

As will be clear, Burley's remark refers at least in part to a renewed defense of Godfrey's statement of the succession view that was almost certainly precipitated by Scotus's lengthy attack of it in his Parisian lectures on the *Sentences* given over the years 1302–1304. This new stage of debate is indirectly evident from the great number of questions after Scotus that specifically took up the succession view, many of which have been already cited, but can also be directly documented by Parisian theologians who defended it. For instance, Peter of St. Denys is reported as holding the succession theory in precisely the form attributed to Godfrey in the collection of questions recorded at Paris by John of St. Germain in the famous codex Q.99 of Worcester Cathedral.¹⁵² Peter was regent and active at Paris for at least a decade immediately following Scotus's lectures there on the *Sentences*, so that his position was likely a reply to them.¹⁵³ Similarly, if the disputed questions on the virtues contained in a precious codex left to the Sorbonne by the fervent student of Godfrey and strident opponent of Scotus, John of Pouilly, in fact belong to him, then one finds again in the years immediately after Scotus's regency another assertion of the succession theory precisely matching that attributed to Godfrey.¹⁵⁴ There could be little doubt that

¹⁵² See text 25 in the Appendix. On ms. Worcester Cathedral Q. 99, see Little's extensive analysis in A.G. Little – F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians, c. A.D. 1282–1302*, Oxford 1934, pp. 220–362 and R.M. Thomson, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Medieval Manuscripts in Worcester Cathedral Library*, Cambridge 2001, pp. 183–184. Quires 1–8 record disputations at Oxford during 1300–1302. At some point, John of St. Germain brought the codex to Paris where he recorded disputations from about 1310–1315 on quires 9–11. The anonymous question on intension and remission that reports Peter of St. Denys's view is in quire 9. On John of St. Germain, see P. Glorieux, "Jean de Saint-Germain, maître de Paris et copiste de Worcester", in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Louvain 1947, pp. 521–529.

¹⁵³ Peter of St. Denys was regent at Paris by 1305 and held a series of three quodlibetal disputes over the years 1311–1314 as recorded by Prosper de Reggio Emilia in his *Recollectio*. Unfortunately, none of these *Quodlibeta* take up intension and remission. See P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. 2, Paris 1935, pp. 221–222 and id., *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, vol. 1, Paris 1934, p. 448. Cf. also W.J. Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century. A Social Portrait*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 201–202, who indicates that Peter could have still been regent at Paris as late as 1330.

¹⁵⁴ See text 26 in the Appendix below. The manuscript in question, Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15371, contains the following inscription on the flyleaf: "Iste liber est pauperum de Sorbonia studentium in theologia ex legato magistri iohannis de poilliac in quo

the polemical Pouilly was upholding the position of his master Godfrey in reaction to the criticisms of Scotus. But the most prominent secular master of the period at Paris to have held the succession theory, other than Burley himself, was one with whom Burley was most certainly acquainted and to whom his remark must have referred. We can be sure of this, since the master in question was the chancellor of the University who granted Burley his license in theology about the time he composed his *Tractatus secundus*. He is Thomas of Bailly.

Thomas of Bailly succeeded Francis Caracciolo as Chancellor of the University of Paris in 1316, an office he held until his death in

continentur multe questiones disputate ab eodem". On this manuscript and its contents, see N. Valois, "Jean de Pouilli, théologien", in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, vol. XXXIV, Paris 1914, pp. 220–222, 267–270 (list of questions) and Hoffmans – Pelzer, "Les manuscrits...", pp. 186–189, from which I have taken (p. 186) the above inscription. The passage quoted in the Appendix comes from the section of the manuscript thought to contain the *Quaestiones ordinariae* of Pouilly. On John of Pouilly, in addition to P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, Paris 1925, pp. 223–228 and *Répertoire des maîtres...*, vol. 1, pp. 450–452, see: Ioannis de Polliaco et Ioannis de Neapoli *Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis*, ed. C. Balić, Sibenici 1931; J. Koch, "Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine Vorgeschichte (1312–1321)", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 5 (1933), pp. 391–422; J.-P. Müller, "Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 15 (1948), pp. 152–170; L. Hödl, "Die Kritik des Johannes de Polliaco an der philosophischen und theologischen Ratio in der Auseinandersetzung mit den averroistischen Unterscheidungslehren. Eine historische Studie zu den *Quaestiones quodlibetales* und *Quaestiones ordinariae* des Johannes de Polliaco", in *Miscellanea Martin Grabmann. Gedenkblatt zum 10. Todestag*, München 1959, pp. 11–30; L. Hödl, "Die Aulien des Magister Johannes von Polliaco und der scholastische Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit", *Scholastik* 35 (1960), pp. 57–75; L. Hödl, "Der unfehlbare Lehrentscheid des Papstes im Prozeß gegen Johannes de Polliaco (1318–1321)", *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 47 (2000), pp. 52–76; L. Hödl, "Non est malitia in voluntate.... Die magistrale Entscheidung der Pariser Theologen von 1285/1286 in der Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco, *Quodl.* 1, q. 10. Untersuchung und Edition", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 66 (1999), pp. 245–297; L. Hödl, "Die Unterscheidungslehren des Heinrich von Gent in der Auseinandersetzung des Johannes de Polliaco mit den Gandavistae", in *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte*, ed. G. Guldentops – C. Steel, Leuven 2003, pp. 371–386; L. Hödl, "Die Opposition des Johannes de Polliaco gegen die Schule der Gandavistae" and "Johannes de Polliaco. Quodlibet I, quaestio 7", *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 9 (2004), pp. 115–147 and 149–177; P.T. Stella, "Intentio Aristotelis secundum superficiem suae litterae. La Replicatio contra magistrum Herveum Praedicatorum di Giovanni Pouilly", *Salesianum* 23 (1961), pp. 481–528; A. Pattin, "La métaphysique de la relation chez Jean de Pouilly", in *Sapientiae procerum amore. Mélanges Médiévistes offerts à Dom Jean-Pierre Müller, O.S.B.*, ed. T. Köhler, Roma 1974, pp. 415–437; R. Zeyen, *Die theologische Disputation des Johannes de Polliaco zur kirchlichen Verfassung*, Frankfurt am Main 1976.

1328.¹⁵⁵ He was licensed in theology about 1300, and his six substantial quodlibetal disputes can be dated from the beginning of his regency in 1301 until 1307.¹⁵⁶ Bailly's disputes thus extend from the activity of Godfrey and coincide with Scotus's time as a bachelor and regent master at Paris. Examination of Bailly's *Quodlibet* relevant to intension and remission shows that it constitutes a defense of Godfrey against Scotus and set off a new round of debate at Paris on the problem that extended to the time when Burley arrived for his theological studies. That Bailly was defending Godfrey's position is apparent not only from his appropriation of Godfrey's arguments, most notably those from *Ordinary Question* 18, but also from the identification of their positions by their contemporaries.

Bailly takes up intension and remission in two quodlibetal disputes, both under the traditional questions on charity: *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 on whether the lesser degree of charity is corrupted and again in *Quodlibet* IV, q. 11 on whether charity can be increased or decreased.¹⁵⁷ In both questions Bailly affirms the succession theory but does so more extensively in the first. The date of *Quodlibet* 4 is certainly 1304, since in it Bailly refers to the bull *Inter cunctas* (February 17, 1304) of Benedict XI (d. July 7, 1304), to whom he refers as still living.¹⁵⁸ Consequently, Bailly's *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 must be dated to 1303. This means it was disputed while Godfrey himself was still alive and shortly after Scotus's own lectures on the first book of the *Sentences* at Paris in Fall term of 1302.

Bailly's *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 would appear to be the most extensive and systematic defense of the succession theory at Paris prior to Burley's *Tractatus secundus*. In his long question, Bailly lays out a series of five arguments for the succession view based on the various elements required for motion and then raises three objections against the theory, to which he replies at length. Of Bailly's five positive arguments, the first three clearly correspond to those already examined in Godfrey, while the lead objection against the view comes from Scotus's Parisian *Sentences*.

¹⁵⁵ C.V. Langlois, "Thomas de Bailli, chancelier de Paris", in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, vol. XXXV, Paris 1921, pp. 301–310 and Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres...*, vol. 1, pp. 442–443; id., *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. 2, pp. 273–277.

¹⁵⁶ *Thomas de Bailly. Quodlibets*, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris 1960.

¹⁵⁷ See *Thomas de Bailly*, ed. Glorieux, pp. 208–219 and 282–293 respectively.

¹⁵⁸ On this citation and dating, see R. Lambertini, "Political *Quodlibeta*", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 1*, pp. 439–474, at p. 459.

The first two of Bailly's arguments are expanded versions of initial objections in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18 marshaled in support of the succession theory. Bailly's first proof is based on the premise that distinct motions must have distinct forms as their terms. But the process by which something became white yesterday is numerically distinct from that by which it becomes more white today. Thus, the two distinct forms in which these motions terminate, namely, the less white and more white, must also be numerically distinct. Since two numerically distinct forms cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject, Bailly concludes that the earlier form must be corrupted in the change.

This argument is the same as the fourth initial objection in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question*, which, as we have seen, is the first of three put forth in favor of the succession theory. Both are based on the same premise taken from Aristotle's discussion of the unity of motion that two actions cannot terminate in the same form, which is stated in Godfrey's question as "duo actiones non terminantur ad unam formam" and equivalently by Bailly as "diuersi motus terminentur ad diuersas formas". They both then reason that since it is granted (*constat*) that first becoming white (or hot, in Godfrey's version) and then afterwards becoming more white are two separate motions, the terms of lesser and greater white must be two separate forms. Bailly substitutes 'yesterday and today' (*heri et hodie*) for Godfrey's 'afterwards' (*postea*) to stress that a temporal interval has occurred between the two motions, but the reasoning is the same. Both then conclude that the earlier form must be corrupted and the later one newly generated. To reach this conclusion Bailly provides an extra step presupposed in the original objection of Godfrey's question—that two numerically distinct accidents cannot coexist in a subject—but again the main argument is the same in both cases.¹⁵⁹ Thus, Bailly's first proof in support of the succession theory

¹⁵⁹ Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, p. 209: "Prima ratio sic formatur: motus cum terminetur ad formam, oportet quod diuersi motus terminentur ad diuersas formas, sicut diuersi secundum speciem ad diuersas formas secundum speciem, et diuersi motus solo numero ad diuersas formas solo numero. Modo constat quod motus quo heri aliquid factum est album, et motus quo hodie de isto albo fit magis album, sunt motus solo numero differentes; ergo et forme ad quas sunt, scilicet minus album ad quod terminabatur primus motus et magis album ad quod terminabatur secundus motus, sunt forme differentes solo numero. Cum ergo duo accidentia realia solo numero differentia non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, patet quod adueniente magis albo per secundum motum corrumpitur minus album quod introductum fuit per primum motum". Compare this with the fourth objection in Godfrey's question at text 23 in the Appendix.

is a restatement of the corresponding objection in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18.

As indicated in the previous section, Henry of Harclay had also reported this same argument in his account of Godfrey's view. In fact, Harclay appears to be relying more on Bailly's restatement of the argument than on the original in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18. But, as demonstrated earlier, there can be absolutely no doubt that Harclay is reporting what he takes to be Godfrey's personal opinion. This implies, as will be documented in more detail, that Bailly was seen as defending Godfrey to such a degree that their views were identified by their contemporaries.

Bailly's second proof for the succession theory comes from the next initial objection in Godfrey's question, which, as seen, argues that the completion of a motion requires the total destruction of the *terminus a quo* by the *terminus ad quem*. Since the change from the less to the more hot is a real motion, it therefore requires the destruction of the former. Except for changing the example from 'heat' to 'white', Bailly gives the same argument nearly verbatim, as this comparison shows:

Godfrey, *Q. ord.* q. 18 (Cf. text 23 in the Appendix)

Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15 (ed. Glorieux, p. 209)

Praeterea, in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum; *sed numquam mobile pertingit perfecte ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo*; ergo numquam aliquid acquirit calorem intensum nisi actu (?) corrupto calore remisso.

Secunda ratio formatur sic: *mobile non potest transire de termino a quo in terminum ad quem nisi prius derelicto termino a quo*; quod contingit propter oppositionem huiusmodi terminorum; ergo mobile non potest de minus albo sicut de termino a quo fieri in magis album sicut in terminum ad quem, nisi derelicto minus albo, quod non derelinquitur nisi per eius corruptionem.

Praeterea, in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum; *sed numquam mobile pertingit in aliquo motu ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo*; ergo numquam aliquid potest moveri ad acquirendum calorem intensum nisi prius corrupto calore remisso, et sic idem quod prius.

As before, Bailly also here expands the argument as it originally occurs in Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18 by supplying a further, supporting step. In this case, he adds that the main premise is a general feature of all change, as is most evident in locomotion, in which the mobile

body cannot occupy multiple places, but upon entering one location (*ubi*), it ceases to exist in the previous one. As an essential element of motion, therefore, the main premise applies equally to qualitative and quantitative increase. This is nothing more than the argument from locomotion, which, as we have seen, is also regularly attributed to Godfrey and in fact is found in his *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11.

Bailly's third main argument for the succession theory is drawn not, as the prior two, from the initial objections of *Ordinary Question* 18, but rather from Godfrey's discussion on the Eucharist in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, which, as we have seen, Scotus analyzed and criticized at length. This argument is actually a slight variation of Bailly's own *sed contra* in the question, and the two should be read together. Bailly here does not argue directly for the succession theory, but rather refutes a mitigated version that would admit the degrees of a form are generated and corrupted yet still insist that the form itself remains unchanged. On this theory, the form itself would persist throughout the process, presumably remaining numerically the same, but its degrees would be generated and corrupted. Bailly rejects this account on the grounds that a form cannot be distinct from, but must be really identical to, its degrees of intensity. Accordingly, there can be no variation in degree of a form without a real variation of the form itself. Thus, if one admits that in intensification a lesser degree of white is corrupted and a greater degree generated, then the white itself must really undergo such change. The view that Bailly is here refuting is brought out more clearly in his parallel *sed contra*. It argues that the subject of motion must be really distinct from its terms, because it remains really and essentially the same, while the terms change. But the terms of change in intension and remission of a form—in this case charity—are its degrees, and these are really and essentially identical to the form itself. Thus, if the form itself were to remain really the same in intension and remission, so as to function as a type of subject of motion, then it could not change in degree. Both of these proofs argue against any model of intension and remission that would posit the form as an unchanging substrate of the change and its degrees as the terms that vary, for such must deny that a form is really identical to its degrees of intensity. Intension and remission therefore requires a real, or as Bailly puts it, 'essential,' variation in the form, and hence its corruption and generation.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ When Bailly says that the degrees of a form are essentially identical to it and that in intension and remission the form changes 'essentially', he does not mean, of

Bailly's refutation is recognizable as that put forth by Godfrey in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 against the same, alternative view that attempts to explain change of the species in the Eucharist by positing the form as an unchanging, persisting subject of the motion and its degrees as the terms of change. Moreover, it is this precise passage in Godfrey that Scotus singled out and analyzed in detail as containing the succession theory, in support of which Scotus himself supplied the *termini* argument. Comparison shows that Bailly here follows the corresponding passage of Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 nearly verbatim:

Godfrey, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, p. 19,3–8:

Sed quia, ut alibi tactum est, videtur quod impossibile est sic fieri talium mutationem, quia *tamen subiectum motus et terminos realiter differre oportet*,

Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, pp. 208, 210:

Contra: subiectum motus differt realiter a terminis motus quia ipso eodem realiter et essentialiter manente, termini motus circa ipsum variantur realiter. Sed essentia caritatis non differt realiter a gradibus eius. Ergo ipsa eadem essentialiter manente, quasi sit subiectum motus, non erit circa eam variatio secundum gradus. Ergo, etc.
[...]

course, that it varies in species nor is he contradicting Godfrey. As Bailly explains in his related *Quodl.* IV, q. 11, ed. Glorieux, p. 285, that the essence of a form has degrees is consistent with it being one and indivisible in its species, as these degrees belong to the form from its relation to a material subject. As such, these degrees are material parts of the form, not formal parts that enter into its definition, so that their variation does not vary its specific nature: "Et est intelligendum propter solutionem unius rationis et ad euidenciam predictorum, et non est inconueniens istos diuersos gradus qui figurantur per magis et minus ponere aut esse in essentia una et indiuisibili secundum rationem specificam, ita quod sub illo gradu uno specifico saluetur essentia in dictis diuersis gradibus, sicut et in natura una secundum speciem est pluralitas numeralis que sibi inest in habitudine ad materiam et quantitatem que sunt aliquid extrinsecum rationi speciei secundum se; sicut et isti gradus qui importantur per magis et minus insunt ipsi essentie in habitudine ad aliquid extrinsecum, puta ad subiectum; et ideo gradus isti sunt quasi materiales, non formales; et per consequens non includuntur in ratione diffinitiva que exprimit rationem formalem speciei". On this point, Bailly would seem to be agreeing with Godfrey in his *Ordinary Question* 18, who likewise says that intension and remission concern the parts of a form that arise from its dependency on the subject, which is consistent with the form being indivisible in its species. Cf. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Intension...", p. 340 and Godfrey's text in p. 340, note 67.

album autem secundum essentiam et magis album et minus album non differunt realiter,

non potest dici quod fiat variatio secundum minus album et magis album quin fiat variatio secundum ipsam essentiam albedinis,

cum magis album et minus album non sunt nisi id ipsum essentialiter quod album.

Tertia ratio sic formatur: *album non differt realiter a minus albo nec a magis albo; immo album in minus albo est idem realiter cum minus albo, et eodem modo album in magis albo est idem realiter cum eo; ergo non potest intelligi, cum aliquis mouetur de minus albo in magis album, quod fiat uariatio secundum magis et minus album quin etiam fiat secundum essentiam albedinis; et sic non potest intelligi quod corrumpatur minus album quin corrumpatur realiter ipsum album, nec quod introducatur magis album nisi etiam introducatur album, quia neutrum istorum est aliud essentialiter quam album.*

Thus, there can be little doubt that in his *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 Bailly is mounting a defense of the view attributed to Godfrey. His first two arguments come from the initial objections of Godfrey's *Ordinary Question* 18, repeatedly identified in the early fourteenth century as the place where Godfrey held the succession theory, and his third comes from Godfrey's *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3, identified and analyzed by Scotus as also containing the theory. As suggested, the occasion of Bailly's quodlibetal defense of Godfrey, who was still active at Paris, seems to have been Scotus's lectures on the *Sentences* the previous term, which, in fact, Bailly addresses in the form of objections.

In *Quodlibet* III, q. 15, Bailly raises three difficulties against the succession theory in order to resolve them. Our concern is with the first. It argues that if the succession theory is true, then intension and remission would comprise an infinite number of distinct changes (*mutata esse*), and thus such a motion would transgress an actual infinity, which is impossible. This follows because there is a change corresponding to every form that is generated. But on the succession theory there is a generation of a form at every instant and for every degree. Moreover, turning intensification into an infinite series of discrete changes would seem to destroy its unity and continuity, which are required for real motion.¹⁶¹ These two related difficulties—that intensification would

¹⁶¹ Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, p. 212.

comprise an infinite number of changes and destroy the continuity of motion—are both lodged as objections against the succession theory by Scotus in his Parisian *Sentences*.¹⁶² Interestingly, these two objections do not occur in the Oxford *Lectura* or the initial text of the *Ordinatio*. Scotus, however, does raise these two precise difficulties against Godfrey by name in a later, personal annotation that he appended to the original draft of the *Ordinatio*.¹⁶³ In responding to these difficulties, then, Bailly appears to be reacting to Scotus, who had raised them specifically against Godfrey, as his personal annotation attests.

Taken all together, the above evidence strongly suggests that Bailly took up the defense of the succession theory attributed to Godfrey in response to Scotus's recent criticism of it in his *Sentences* at Paris. Bailly argues for the theory in a quodlibetal question disputed the year after Scotus began lecturing. He defends the theory with expanded forms of arguments found in Godfrey's texts that were specifically cited in the period as sources of the view. He responds to objections against the succession account raised by Scotus in his Parisian *Sentences* specifically against Godfrey, as attested in his own, personal annotation. The conclusion at which all this evidence points can be corroborated beyond doubt by Bailly's contemporaries at Paris, who not only cited him as a main supporter of the succession theory but also expressly identified his view with that of Godfrey.

Reaction to Bailly's reassertion of the succession theory was almost immediate. The first unambiguous response is found in *Quodlibet* I, q. 8 of the Dominican John of Paris (Quidort), probably disputed in 1304. John rejects Bailly's position and lodges against it the objection based on transgressing an actual infinite reported by Bailly himself. John then gives verbatim Bailly's own response to the objection and in turn replies to it.¹⁶⁴ A few years later the Cistercian James of Therines can be found rejecting Bailly's view in his *Quodlibet* II, q. 14 held in 1308. James gives as arguments against the succession theory the

¹⁶² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 1, nn. 92–93, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, pp. 486–487.

¹⁶³ Text quoted above in note 49. See also note 48 above on the position of these annotations in manuscript A.

¹⁶⁴ A. Heiman, "The First *Quodlibet* of Jean Quidort", in *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts*, ed. J.R. O'Donnell, Toronto 1955, pp. 271–292; edition of *Quodl.* I, q. 8, "Utrum aliquid positivum possit produci a non ente", pp. 284–286. John reports Bailly's response to the objections concerning infinity and continuity on p. 285, 23–30; cf. Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, p. 213.

three difficulties raised by Bailly himself to the view. In reporting the third, however, James also gives Bailly's answer to it, so that he can refute it.¹⁶⁵ That is, both John of Paris and James of Therines report the succession view but take special account of Bailly's solutions to objections in order to address them. While it is absolutely certain that John and James are responding to Bailly from the very close reports of his arguments, they do not expressly name him. This occurs first in the *Sentences* of Hervaeus Natalis, where, after giving arguments that in intension and remission the form does not remain numerically the same, he asserts that, "Although this is a subtle opinion held by eminent men, nonetheless three arguments are brought against it that seem difficult to solve" (*Ista positio licet sit magnorum et subtilis, tamen tres rationes adducuntur contra eam quae videntur esse difficiles*). Opposite this remark in the margin of the early printed edition, no doubt reproducing the manuscript source, is the annotation: "Contra opinionem Thomae". This note, of course, cannot refer to Aquinas but only to Thomas of Bailly, a fact confirmed by the first ensuing difficulty for the position reported by Hervaeus; it is taken nearly verbatim from Bailly's *Quodlibet* III, q. 15.¹⁶⁶

The above witnesses to Bailly's reassertion of the succession theory establish that it became the principal statement of the view at Paris in the early fourteenth century. Opponents paid particular attention to Bailly's responses to seemingly devastating objections against the theory, especially that it entailed an infinite number of changes and violated Aristotle's requirements for the unity and continuity of motion. That in resurrecting the succession theory Bailly was in fact mounting a defense of Godfrey's own view can be established by still further testimony from the period.

The Parisian *Sentences* of the Franciscan master Hugh of Newcastle probably date from the early teens of the fourteenth century and, in no case, later than the collection of Prosper of Reggio Emilia of about

¹⁶⁵ See P. Glorieux, *Quodlibets I et II. Jacques de Thérines. Quodlibet I. Jean Lesage*, Paris 1958. The edition of *Quodl.* II, q. 14, "Utrum caritas augmentata sit eadem numero quae prius", is on pp. 292–294. James's report of Bailly is found on p. 292,2–11; cf. Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, pp. 212–213 and 217.

¹⁶⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 18, q. 5, "Utrum charitas augeatur per additionem", ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 97aA–bA. Compare the first difficulty at p. 97aD–bA with Thomas de Bailly, *Quodl.* III, q. 15, ed. Glorieux, p. 212.

1315, which cites them.¹⁶⁷ Like his Franciscan colleagues at Paris, Hugh reported the succession theory and its attached *termini* and locomotion arguments. Unlike, however, nearly all his confreres, who, as we have seen in detail, identified this position and these arguments with Godfrey, Hugh's *Sentences* carry in the margin the annotation *Opinio Thomae*. Again, this can only refer to Thomas of Bailly. That is, Hugh is asserting that the position and arguments uniformly attributed to Godfrey were also those of Bailly.¹⁶⁸ Subsequent Franciscans are even more explicit on this identification. In his *Sentences* of a few years later, Peter Thomae also reports the succession theory with the standard *termini* argument as well as others found in Scotus. Peter now cites the view as that of *both* Godfrey and Bailly (*Opinio Thomae et Godefridi*).¹⁶⁹ The same attribution to both Bailly and Godfrey is also found in the *Sentences* of Himbert of Gardia, who personally attests to being in Paris during this period.¹⁷⁰

The most explicit witness from the period that connects Godfrey and Bailly on this point is an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* that, according to its *explicit*, compiles the views of masters at Paris, including Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Hervaeus, Durandus, but especially Thomas of Bailly. The date given is 1316, the year Bailly became chancellor.¹⁷¹

Explicit *Lectura super primum Sententiarum* compilata ex diversis doctoribus et ex diversis lecturis, scilicet Fratris Thomae, Aegidii, Hervaei, Durandi, saltem in fine, et ex quibusdam aliis bonis lecturis, scilicet ex *Quaestionibus de quolibet* quorumdam, specialiter Magistri Thomae

¹⁶⁷ On Hugh's *Sentences*, see Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary", pp. 77–78 (cited note 149 above). For the citations of Hugh by Prosper in his *Sentences* contained in ms. Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1086, see A. Pelzer, *Biblioteca apostolica vaticana. Codices vaticani latini. Vat. lat. 679–1134*, Città del Vaticano 1931, p. 682.

¹⁶⁸ See text 27 in the Appendix.

¹⁶⁹ On Peter's *Sentences* in particular, see G. Gál, "Petrus Thomae's Proof for the Existence of God", *Franciscan Studies* 56 (1998), pp. 186–256; C. Schabel, "Peter Thomae's Question on Divine Foreknowledge from his *Sentences* Commentary", *Franciscan Studies* 61 (2003), pp. 1–35; Schabel, "Parisian Commentaries...", pp. 240–243 (cited note 109 above).

¹⁷⁰ See text 29 in the Appendix. Note that the manuscript reads *Sancti Thomae*. The addition of *Sancti* is clearly a scribal mistake, since earlier in the question Himbert already deals with Aquinas's position against treating the increase in charity as an addition of one grade to another. On Himbert's *Sentences*, see Schabel, "Parisian Commentaries...", pp. 238–239 and p. 238, note 38 on his presence in Paris (cited note 109 above).

¹⁷¹ On this commentary, which is contained in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 14570, ff. 1–76, see Langlois, "Thomas de Bailli...", pp. 303–305 (cited note 155 above).

de Balliaco, et quorumdam aliorum, sicut patet in *Lectura*, facta anno Domini CCC XVI.¹⁷²

The question on intension and remission in this commentary, which falls under the usual rubric of the increase of charity, reports the succession theory. Opposite the report Godfrey is identified as the one holding this view. The language of the view, however, is that of Bailly, as it is expressed in terms of charity having a latitude and grades, a position that he endorses in his *Quodlibet* III, q. 16 in elaboration of his defense of the succession theory in the previous question. That the compiler intends to identify Godfrey and Bailly on succession is beyond doubt since he immediately proceeds to explain the latitude of charity by citing Bailly's *Quodlibet* III, q. 16 (*Istam distinctionem invenitis in tertio Quolibet Magistri Thomae de Balliaco*) and quoting it at length.¹⁷³ Here then is unequivocal proof that Bailly was seen as holding the succession theory of forms in defense of Godfrey.

CONCLUSION

As virtually every discussion of intension and remission in the fourteenth century asserts, Godfrey of Fontaines held the succession theory. He held it, as several of these discussions expressly state, in *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11 on whether charity was a successive entity, in *Ordinary Question* 18 on the intensification of virtue, and in *Quodlibet* XI, q. 3 on the change of species in the Eucharist. For various reasons, scholars found Godfrey's position difficult to detect in these texts. In the case of *Quodlibet* IX, q. 11, scholars were unaware of its medieval citation and quotation as a source of the view and were insensitive to the historical context of its solution, which Godfrey developed against the background of the dispute over whether grace was successive or permanent. *Ordinary Question* 18 posed a special difficulty as the initial, contrary arguments supporting the succession theory were thought to disagree, both by their location in the question and in their content, with Godfrey's own solution. To the contrary, however, both medieval references to the question and its internal logic showed that the initial objections were actually Godfrey's own arguments arrayed to construct

¹⁷² This occurs on f. 74r as cited by Langlois (cf. previous note) p. 304.

¹⁷³ See text 30 in the Appendix.

a dilemma for his position. Godfrey's solution consisted in disarming the dilemma, while leaving the initial arguments intact. All these results were entirely confirmed by Thomas of Bailly, who, as medieval sources expressly attest, reaffirmed the succession theory in defense of Godfrey, likely in reaction to Scotus's criticisms in his Parisian *Sentences*.

While these results solve something of a standing mystery in the interpretation of Godfrey's thought in its own right, they also reveal the broader context for the most important and influential defense of the succession theory, Walter Burley's *Tractatus secundus*. Burley's treatise should be seen as the outcome of the debate at Paris that went back, as Burley himself implies, to Godfrey's view, Scotus's criticism of it, and its renewed defense by Bailly and others. Indeed, as can be shown, Burley's *Tractatus secundus* contains a dedicated response to a series of questions on intension and remission by his master, Thomas Wylton, who himself defends Scotus's addition theory against the succession view.¹⁷⁴ Wylton came to Paris to study theology about 1304, the time at which Bailly was busy defending Godfrey's position against Scotus. Wylton disputed his questions on intension and remission about 1315, when Bailly's defense of Godfrey was still very much alive and reaction against it still very active. While the exact relationship between Wylton's questions and Burley's *Tractatus* remains to be determined, it seems clear that their very important exchange should be seen as a piece of the larger, renewed debate at Paris over intension and remission that originated with the view of Godfrey of Fontaines.

APPENDIX

TEXTS ON THE SUCCESSION THEORY OF FORMS

1. HENRICUS DE HARCLAY, I *Sent.*, dist. 17: "Utrum caritas possit augeri", mss. C = Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile B.2, ff. 40ra–va, 41rb; V = Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 13687, f. 48va–49ra, 49vb–50ra; T = Troyes, Bibl. Mun. 501, f. 82va, 83ra–b (excerpt). Harclay's text is transcribed by Anfredus Gonteri in his *Sent.* 1, dist. 17, mss. V₂ = Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1113,

¹⁷⁴ I have edited the questions of Wylton and established their relation to Burley's *Tractatus*. I hope to publish these results in the near future.

f. 109ra–111ra; W = Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka A 211 (I.F.184), f. 185vb.¹⁷⁵

Dicendum quod caritas potest augeri et similiter augetur. [...]

Sed de modo augmenti sunt opiniones. Una est quae dicit quod generaliter non solum in augmento caritatis immo et cuiuslibet formae secundum intensionem semper est nova omnino forma in quolibet gradu intensionis vel remissionis, ita quod nihil praecedentis formae maneat, sed totaliter corrumpitur et omnino nova introducit, quantumcumque forma minimum intendatur vel remittatur.

Pro illa opinione arguitur primo sic: termini motus sunt impossibiles, quia motus significat recessum mobilis a termino a quo ad terminum ad quem. Sed terminus a quo est forma praecedens. Ergo illa [V 48vb] non manet cum forma posteriori. Ergo corrumpitur.

Praeterea, si forma praecedens manet in subiecto cum forma sequente, duo accidentia eiusdem speciei erunt simul in eodem subiecto, scilicet forma praecedens et sequens.

Praeterea, duo motus non possunt terminari ad eundem terminum numero, si sunt motus succedentes sibi, et praecipue si sunt motus ad formam, cuiusmodi est alteratio, quia eadem forma non potest esse terminus nec acquiri per multas mutationes. Sed esto quod mobile moveatur hodie ad albedinem intensam et quiesceret, et cras moveatur ad <albedinem> intensiorem. Isti motus essent (essent: qui videntur V) distincti et non continui, quia intercideret quies media. Ergo termini istorum motuum non sunt idem. Sed termini istorum sunt forma intensa et remissa. Ergo non sunt idem.

Praeterea, sicut est in diversis speciebus, ita est quodam modo in individuis eiusdem speciei; sed in speciebus diversis ita est quod magis perfectum est magis simplex. Ergo in eadem specie individuum quod est perfectius est magis simplex et minus compositum. Sed forma intensa perfectior est forma remissa; ergo simplicior; ergo non recipit formam remissiorem infra sui compositionem. Ergo forma remissa non manet adveniente intensa.

¹⁷⁵ On the relation of these manuscripts, see R. Friedman, "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168 and C. Schabel, "Aufredo Gonteri Brito *Secundum* Henry of Harclay on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents", *Disputatio* 2 (1997), pp. 159–195. I have followed V and corrected it against C.

Praeterea, Aristoteles dicit I *De generatione* quod <est> haec differentia inter nutritionem et augmentationem, quia quod nutritur manet idem in tota nutritione, sed quod augmentatur non manet in tota augmentatione.

Praeterea, sicut est in motu ad ubi, ita videtur esse in motu ad aliquam formam. Sed mobile localiter in movendo continue est in alio et alio ubi in omni instanti signato vel signabili. Ergo similiter quod alteratur de forma remissa ad intensam continue erit sub nova forma.

Contra hoc arguitur primo sic: species et accidentia in sacramento altaris exsistentia sine subiecto possunt alterari et condensari et rareferi per naturam. Patet experimento. Ergo si unum rarefiat quantumcumque parvum, omnino nova qualitas et nova quantitas introducitur per te.

Sed ex hoc sequitur duplex inconveniens.

Primo, quod agens naturale potest aliquid adnihilare, et similiter aliquid de novo producere. Probatio, quia quantitas praecedens omnino per te desinit esse, et non corrumpit<ur> in potentiam materiae, quia materia ibi non est. Ergo corrumpitur in nihil. Item, quantitas sequens non educitur de potentia materiae, quia materia non est ibi (Ergo... ibi *om. per hom. V*), nec de potentia quantitatis praecedentis, quia illud de cuius potentia passiva educitur terminus formalis mutationis est subiectum manens in tota mutatione. Sed forma praecedens omnino non manet adveniente forma vel gradu intenso per te. Ergo de eius potentia non educitur. Ergo de nihilo. Et sic patet primum inconveniens.

Secundum inconveniens est quod facta quacumque parva alteratione in speciebus non manebit ibi corpus Christi. Consequens <est> falsum. Probatio, quia manet corpus Christi dum species manet habentes colorem et saporem panis et vini. Sed in omni alteratione ibi de possibili non est necesse speciem saporem panis et vini corrumpi. Probatio consequentiae, quia corpus Christi non est ibi nisi dum manent accidentia sine subiecto. Hoc est certum, nam saltem credimus quod ita est quod corpus Christi in altari non patitur aliam substantiam quae afficiatur illis accidentibus. Sed forma intensa acquisita per alterationem non manet sine subiecto. Probatio, quia per te illa est omnino nova et numquam informabat substantiam panis praeexistentem; sed sola aliqua quantitas dicitur manere sine subiecto in illo sacramento cuius quantitatis subiectum erat in corpus Christi conversum. Ergo haec quantitas nova virtute illius miraculi non manet sine subiecto; ergo non manet corpus Christi.

Sed ipse respondet ad illa XI *Quolibet* [V 49ra] quaestione tertia (ad quaestionem V; Godefridus XI *Quolibet* quaestione tertia *in marg.* T; Responsio Godefridi ad primum inconueniens *in marg.* V₂).

Ad primum inconueniens dicit quod quando illa quantitas <exsistit> sine materia et non habet habitudinem ad aliquam quantitatem priorem, illa quantitas producit<ur> in esse de nihilo et creatur. Sed non est sic in proposito, nam licet sit ibi quantitas sine materia, habet tamen habitudinem ad quantitatem praecedentem a qua procedit secundum quemdam fluxum. Unde eodem miraculo quo datur sibi posse exsistere sine subiecto, eodem datur sibi posse alterari et rarefieri ab agente naturali.

Ad secundum inconueniens dicit similiter quod eodem miraculo quo prima quantitas exsistit sine subiecto, eodem secunda et tertia, et sic usque ad illam quantitatem vel qualitatem, quae non esset proportionalis substantiae panis, si esset, nam usque illuc manet accidens quodcumque sine subiecto...

Ad ultimum de ubi, dico quod non est simile, sicut ipsemet Doctor dicit [V 50ra] et bene, quia in ubi non attenditur successio motus penes formam in qua est motus, sed tantum penes divisibilitatem mobilis et magnitudinis. In motu autem ad formam, cuiusmodi est alteratio et augmentatio, attenditur successio et continuitas in motu non solum penes partes mobilis, immo penes gradus formae penes quam est motus, scilicet quantitatis et qualitatis. Ideo requiritur unitas formae propter continuitatem motus. Sed in ubi sufficit continuitas mobilis et magnitudinis. Sic posset dici secundum dictum suum ad argumentum, quia propter illud dictum, ipse dicit XI *Quolibet* quaestione tertia, quod licet alteratio et augmentatio possit esse sine alterabili et augmentabili, tamen motus localis non sine mobili.

2. ANTONIUS ANDREAS, *Quaestiones de tribus principiis rerum naturalium* II, q. 5, "Utrum in quiditate formae accidentalis sit dare veros gradus intrinsecos essentiales secundum quos ipsa possit suscipere distinctionem intrinsecam secundum magis et minus", ed. Patavii 1475, f. 42ra:

De tertio circa praedicta occurrunt tria dubia. Primum est quantum ad horum graduum augmentationem. [...] Quantum ad primum dubium, dico tria. Primum dictum est quod in motu intensivo vel remissivo accidentalis formae non corrumpitur gradus formae

praeexistentis. Ad cuius evidentiam notandum quod Godefredus ponit quod cum aliquid fit de albo albius vel minus album tota forma praeexistens corrumpitur et novum individuum formae generatur. Quod probatur dupliciter, tum quia termini motus sunt impossibiles (-passibiles *ed.*) ex V *Physicorum*; sed gradus formae praeexistens et sequens sunt termini motus intensivi et remissivi; ergo non possunt simul esse; tum quia si gradus praeexistens remaneret, forma mutaretur a gradu in gradum, et per consequens forma esset subiectum transmutationis, quod est falsum. Sed contra istam opinionem arguitur...¹⁷⁶

3. GUILLELMUS DE ALNWICK, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. un., "Utrum caritas vel aliqua forma possit augeri secundum essentiam", mss. A = Assisi, Biblioteca del Convento di S. Francesco (Biblioteca Comunale) 172, f. 57v; P = Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana 291, f. 48vb:

Sed de modo augendi sunt opiniones. Dicunt enim aliqui (God-
<fredus> *in marg.* P) quod caritas, et quaelibet forma quae (non
del. P) augetur, augetur (*in marg.* P) secundum corruptionem gra-
dus praecedentis et generationem novam gradus sequentis. Contra
quem modum quantum ad secundum articulum quaestionis arguo
multipliciter.

4. LANDULPHUS CARACCILO, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, "Utrum in augmento caritatis et formae accidentalis gradus praeexistens corrumpatur", mss. E = Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 258, f. 60ra-b; V = Wien, ÖNB lat. 1496, f. 76vb:

Quarto principaliter oportet videre si in augmento formae cor-
rumpitur gradus praeexistens. Et hic dico tres conclusiones. Prima
quod impossibile est quod veniente forma perfectiore corrumpatur
gradus praecedens. (Opinio Godefridi *in marg.* E; Godefridus *in*
marg. V) Dicunt enim quidam quod cum augetur forma, gradus qui

¹⁷⁶ Andreas refers to this question and passage in his questions on the *Liber sex principiorum*, from which it is clear that the *De tribus principiis* constituted a course of disputed questions. Cf. *Quaestiones in Gilberti Porretani Librum sex principiorum*, q. 15: "Quaeritur utrum habitui in essentia formae accidentalis sit dare gradus intrinsecos essentielles secundum quos possit suscipere magis et minus", ed. Venetiis 1479, f. 83vb: "Respondeo quod de hac quaestione iam aliquid dixi in *Praedicamentis* capitulo de qualitate, et multo prolixius determinavi in quadam *Quaestione ordinaria*".

advenit continet gradum formae praecedentis et aliquid plus. Sed gradus praeexistens augmento totaliter corrumpitur. Probatio, quia termini motus sunt impossibiles. Cum igitur forma praeexistens sit terminus motus a quo <et> forma adveniens sit terminus motus ad quem, erunt in<com>possibiles. Cum igitur non desinat esse forma adveniens, desinat esse forma praecedens.

(Landulphus contra Godefridum *in marg.* E; Contra Godefridum sex rationes *in marg.* V) Contra: eodem instanti quo homo meretur per actum caritatis...

(Ad rationem Godefridi *in marg.* E) Ad rationem eorum.

5. PETRUS DE AQUILA, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, p. 2, q. 1, "Utrum caritas quae est donum creatum augeatur", ed. Spiraie 1480, unfoliated:

Alia opinio est Gotfridi quod caritas et omnis forma accidentalis sic augetur quod quando maior gradus caritatis vel qualitatis acquiritur realitas praecedens totaliter corrumpitur et forma sequens continet praecedentem in virtute. Quod autem realitas praecedens totaliter corrumpatur probatur primo sic: termini motus sunt impossibiles, ex V *Physicorum*. Sed caritas praecedens est terminus a quo et gradus qui acquiritur est terminus ad quem. Ergo cum iste acquiritur praecedens totaliter corrumpitur.

Secundo sic: si<cut> acquiritur aliud et aliud ubi in motu locali, sic alius et alius gradus in formae intensione vel augmentatione. Sed in motu locali ubi a quo totaliter dimittitur cum ubi ad quem acquiritur. Ergo. Contra istam opinionem arguitur multipliciter.

6. ANONYMUS O.F.M., "Utrum accidentalis (actualis *ms*) forma recipiat magis et minus in essentia sua", ms. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 732, f. 33rb, 33va:

In ista quaestione erunt tres articuli. Primus est de opinionibus quas refutabimus; secundus de opinione in qua stabimus; tertius est de instantiis contra eam et solutionibus.

Quantum ad primum sunt multae opiniones de modo isto, una quae dicit quod non in essentia sua sed secundum dispositionem subiecti variatur, et est Thomae. Hanc transeo, quia satis de hoc tangitur.

Aliter dicit<ur> quod secundum commixtionem contrarii maiorem et minorem, et est Simplicii *Super Praedicamenta*, quae etiam satis est improbata a doctoribus.

Et ideo est alia, ut Godefridus de Fontibus, qui vult quod intensio formae fit per totalem eius innovationem, quia adveniente gradu augmento corrumpitur praecedens, nam videt ille quod oportet concedere aliquam novam realitatem advenientem in motu intensio- nis. Quia tamen (tum *ms*) movet eum ex alia parte quod forma sit indivisibilis, ponit hunc modum quod prius (primus *in marg.*) gradus corrumpatur. Prima ratio sua: (est *cancel.*) termini motus sunt impossibiles V *Physicorum*; sed in intensione ista gradus prior est terminus a quo, gradus superveniens est terminus ad quem. Ergo, etc. Ergo prior corrumpitur.

Secunda ratio: si induceretur sic gradus super gradum, sequeretur quod forma in essentia sua alteraretur et esset subiectum motus, cuius oppositum dicit expresse VI *Physicorum*.

Tertio sic: sicut est de motu ad ubi, sic de motu in qualitate; sed in motu ad ubi quanto plus accedit mobile ad terminum ad quem, tanto plus recedit a termino a quo, et in fine totaliter. Ergo sic erit hic.

Contra istam etiam multum argutum est in Scoto et Roberto. Addo aliqua. [...]

Alexander apponit duas rationes.

7. PETRUS AUREOLI, *Scriptum* I, dist. 17, q. 2 [= q. 35], "Utrum caritas possit augeri", ed. Romae 1596, vol 1, p. 429aD–bA; p. 435aB–C:

Ulterius videtur, quod dum charitas intenditur prima penitus corrumpitur et nova perfectior inducatur, termini enim motus sunt impossibiles; sed charitas remissa est terminus a quo in motu intensio- nis, intensa vero est terminus ad quem; ergo ista adveniente illa abiicietur...

Praeterea: sicut est in motu ad ubi, ita videtur in motu augmenti et intensio- nis cuiuslibet formae; sed manifestum est quod in motu ad ubi continetur primum ubi quod corrumpitur in adventu secundi [...]. Et per consequens in adventu formae perfectioris, corrumpitur minus perfecta...

Opinio Godofredi in *Quaestionibus ordinariis*.

Propterea dixerunt alii quod caritas augmentatur per hoc quod advenit nova realitas et novus gradus caritatis, sed, non potentes intelligere quomodo illud quod advenit de caritate possit cedere in numeralem identitatem unius formae, dixerunt quod tota prima corrumpitur, et nova alia generatur primam continens in virtute. Pro

hac autem opinione sunt rationes sex superius arguendo secundo loco inductae.¹⁷⁷

8. IOANNES DE BACONTORPE, I *Sent.*, dist. 15, q. un., “Utrum in intensione charitatis minor gradus corrumpatur per adventum maioris”, ed. Cremonae 1616, vol. 1, p. 194bD–E; cf. ms. London, British Library, Royal 11.C.VI, f. 78ra:

Primus articulus: an gradus remissus corrumpatur in adventu intensi, ubi dicunt quidam, ut Godofridus, quod sic:

Quia unum contrarium corrumpitur in adventu alterius secundum omnes. Sed motus est a contrario in contrarium, sive sit ab extremo in extremum, sive a medio versus extremum, ut est in intensione et remissione, ut probatur 5 *Physicorum* text. comm. 19. Ergo in remissione et intensione illud remissum, quod praefuit corrumpitur.

Item, illud est subiectum, quod manet sub utroque termino, 5 *Physicorum* text. comm. 15. Si ergo in intensione et remissione manet forma intensibilis et remissibilis in suo esse, sequitur quod talis forma est subiectum motus, quod est contra Philosophum in 3 *Physicorum* text. comm. 17, ubi distinguit subiectum motus contra formam, quae est terminus.

Item, in toto motu locali corpus motum acquirit aliquod ubi; sed verum est quod continue acquirendo novum ubi perdit continue illud ubi, quod praehabuit; ergo eadem ratione in continua intensione formae perditur gradus praecedens. [...]

Contra istam viam sunt multa argumenta quaestione sequenti articulis 1 et 3, et concordant Scotus et Aureolus.

9. IOANNES DE BACONTORPE, *Quaestiones speculativae super IV Sententiarum*, q. 10, “Utrum species separatae possint alterari et nutrire”, ms. London, British Library, Royal 9.C.VII, ff. 103vb–104ra:

Utrum species separatae possint alterari et nutrire. Hic duo. Primo quid <sit> subiectum in tali alteratione? Secundo qualiter nutriant?

¹⁷⁷ We cited this last paragraph and its heading from the edition of Schabel (see note 101 above). As noted (p. 73), this heading as it occurs in the manuscripts been altered in the Rome 1596 edition, p. 435 col. 1B–C: “Opinio Goffredi Quolibeto 7 quaestione 7”.

Sequitur de primo articulo, quid scilicet sit subiectum huius augmentationis, cum species illae separatae [104ra] per rarefactionem fiunt maiores quam primo erant, dicunt illi, qui dicunt quod gradus praecedens in augmentatione corrumpitur in adventu sequentis, Godefridus in *Quaestionibus ordinariis*, et habetur libro primo distinctionibus 16 et 17, quod ibi est motus sine mobili.

Sed contra se recitat quattuor obiectiones.¹⁷⁸

10. GERARDUS SENENSIS, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, “Utrum [sc. caritas] augeatur per inductionem gradus posterioris et corruptionem prioris, sicut quaerebatur secundum articulum”, ms. Città del Vaticano, Chigi B.VII.117, f. 106r:

(Opinio Gothofridi *in marg.*) Ad quod dicunt aliqui quod sic. Fundamentum autem cui innitur dicta opinio est, quia termini motus sunt impossibiles, et quia in motu augmenti gradus imperfectior est terminus a quo, gradus vero perfectior terminus ad quem, idcirco adveniente gradu perfectiori oportet corrumpi imperfectiorem. Ex quo ulterius relinquitur secundum istam opinionem quod forma intensa et remissa non est eadem forma secundum numerum. [...]

(Contra Gothofridum *in marg.*) Ista opinio deficit in se et in suo fundamento, nam quod deficiat in se apparet ex quinque inconvenientibus quae sequuntur contra eam.

11. MICHAEL DE MASSA, I *Sent.*, dist. 18, q. 2, “Utrum forma suscipiens magis et minus augeatur secundum esse”, ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 2214 (1084), f. 177va:

Sed est alia opinio Magistri Godefridi in *Quaestionibus suis ordinariis* quod augmentum formae fit per additionem perfectioris gradus eiusdem rationis cum priori gradu, ita tamen quod adveniente novo gradu corrumpitur praecedens, ita quod nullo modo sit possibile priorem gradum, qui habet rationem termini a quo, manere una (vel *ms*) cum sequenti gradu, qui habet rationem termini ad quem. Et haec opinio habet plurima motiva, sed puto

¹⁷⁸ Here Baconthorpe quotes extensively from Godfrey, *Quodl.* XI, q. 3, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 18–19.

quod ista opinio sit valde irrationabilis et periculosa, specialiter propter sacramentum altaris.

12. GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 17, q. 4, art. 2, "Utrum forma corporalis intendatur per acquisitionem novae formae vel partis seu gradus formae eiusdem rationis", in *Gregorii Ariminensis Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, ed. D. Trapp et al., 6 vols., Berlin 1979–1984, vol. 2, pp. 387–388:

Quantum ad secundum articulum est una opinio (Gothofredus et Burlaeus in suo *De intensione* Gregorius *add. in marg.*), quae dicit quod intensio formae fit per acquisitionem novae formae perfectioris quam praecedens, cum qua non remanet praecedens, sed simul adveniente nova perfectiore corrumpitur praecedens...

13. ALPHONSUS VARGAS TOLETANUS, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 3, "Utrum charitas augeatur per additionem partis ad partem utraque remanente", ed. Venetiis 1490 (rpt. 1952), col. 467,6–15; col. 475,5–6:

Septimo vero sic: termini motus sunt impossibiles; sed partes formae sunt termini motus alterationis; ergo partes formae sunt impossibiles. Sed impossibilia non possunt esse adequate simul; ergo intensio formae non fit per additionem partis ad partem utraque remanente. Maior est manifesta; minor probatur, quia si fiat motus a minus albo ad magis album, terminus a quo istius motus est albedo remissa, et terminus ad quem est albedo intensa...

Ad septimum principale, dico quod non est istius Doctoris, sed Goffredi, quem iste Doctor sequitur in hac materia.

14. GUILLELMUS DE NOTTINGHAM, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, "Utrum caritas augeatur in essentia sua absolute loquendo per additionem alicuius partis positivae", ms. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 300, f. 58r:

Circum tertium sciendum quod <per> partes caritatis augmentatae, hoc est per caritatem praecedentem augmentationem et caritatem advenientem, intelligo duos gradus positivos, quorum quilibet si per se sumeretur, haberetur totam naturam specificam caritatis secundum rationem eius essentialem et definitivam et haberet actionem competentem caritati [...]. Nec intelligo sicut

aliqui (Gandavus *in marg.*) imaginantur quod augmentatio fit per extractionem partium virtualium de potentia in actum [...]. Similiter non est verum quod alii (Godefridus *in marg.*) videntur dicere, quod caritas praeexistens corrumpitur in adventu alterius.

15. ROBERTUS DE WALSHINGHAM, *Quodl.* I, q. 12, "Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem novae caritatis", ms. Worcester, Cathedral Library F.3, ff. 236v, 237r:

Secundo videndum est an realitas positiva caritatis minoris corrumpatur vel maneat eadem numero in caritate maiori. Ad hoc dicit quidam doctor (Godefridus *in marg.*) quod in intensione cuiuslibet formae realitas sub gradu minori corrumpitur et non manet sub gradu maiori. Et hoc ostendunt in formis quae intenduntur per motum sic, quia termini cuiuslibet motus sunt impossibiles (-ibilis *ms*). Sed gradus praecedens et gradus de novo adveniens in augmentatione sunt termini illius transmutationis. Ergo non possunt esse simul. Unus igitur in adventu alterius corrumpitur.

Item, nisi sic esset, forma esset subiectum motus. Consequens falsum, ergo antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Philosophum et per Boethium *De trinitate*, "forma simplex subiectum esse non potest". Consequentia probatur, quia illud quod manet in tota transmutatione et sub utroque termino est subiectum motus. Si ergo realitas formae in gradu minori maneret sub gradu maiori, cum inter minus et maius sit transmutatio realis, tunc in ipsa essentia formae quae manet una numero sub diversis gradibus esset subiectum istius transmutationis, quia manet in tota transmutatione sub utroque termino.

Item, tertio arguit sic: cum transmutatio de minus albo in maius sit realis, oportet quod subiectum et termini realiter distinguantur. Sicut igitur in substantia numquam est una mutatio secundum essentiam individui quamdiu manet idem individuum numero, ita non sit una mutatio secundum accidens nisi fiat aliud accidens numero.

Item, dicit iste doctor (Godefridus 9 *Quolibet* q. 11 *in marg.*) <quod> cum de minus albo fiat magis album, fit in eo aliquid aliud secundum numerum quam prius fuit, et sic est cum de minori caritate fit maior, et similiter in aliis. Unde dicit quod "illud quod habet esse in fieri quamdiu sic habet esse non est accipere vel significare aliquid unum secundum rem, sed semper aliud et aliud

est in pluribus instantibus, ut patet in motu locali, quia mobile toto tempore habet semper esse in alio et alio ubi secundum rem, licet non in actu, quia tunc non esset motus. Similiter in alteratione cum minus album fit maius album, cum talis mutatio sit vere motus, et secundum illum albedo habet vere esse in fieri oportet ponere quod semper est ibi aliud et aliud realiter secundum albedinem. Et similiter cum sit talis variatio secundum caritatem et secundum aliam quamcumque quantitatem”.

Iste est modus ponendi et rationes positionis meliores.

(Contra Godefridum *in marg.*) Sed iste modus ponendi videtur esse contra theologiam et contra philosophiam...

Ad istas duas rationes vult Doctor Godefridus XI *Quolibet* q. 3 respondere.

16. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl.* IX, q. 11, “Utrum caritas habeat esse in fieri vel in facto esse”, ed. J. Hoffmans, *Le huitième, neuvième, dixième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1924/31 (Les Philosophes Belges, IV), p. 249:

Ex praedictis patet quod illud quod habet esse in fieri, quamdiu sic habet esse, non est accipere vel significare aliquid unum secundum rem, sed semper aliud et aliud realiter in pluribus instantibus, ut manifeste patet in motu locali, quia mobile toto tempore habet semper esse in alio et alio ubi (nisi *ed.*!) secundum rem, licet non in actu; iam enim non esset motus. Et ita etiam est intelligendum in alteratione, cum minus album fit magis album; quoniam cum talis mutatio sit vere motus et secundum illam albedo habet esse vere in fieri, oportet ponere quod semper est ibi aliud et aliud realiter secundum albedinem, ut alias est determinatum. Similiter etiam videtur dicendum de caritate quod [...] quantum ad suum augmentum possit habere esse in fieri motione successiva, cum hoc sit de ratione mutationis in alteratione secundum magis et minus, quod illud quod sic transmutatur secundum alterationem in diversis instantibus habeat esse sub qualitate secundum quam sit transmutatio, non secundum unum gradum, sed secundum alium et (in *ed.*) alium. Et secundum hoc, sicut cum de minus albo fit magis album, ibi est aliud et aliud secundum albedinem, ita videtur esse cum fit talis variatio secundum caritatem, et secundum quamcumque aliam qualitatem.

17. ANONYMUS (FOLLOWER OF GODFREY), *Tabula super Quodlibetum magistri Godefridi. Quodl.* IX, q. 11, in J. Hoffmans, "La table de divergences et innovations doctrinales de Godefroid de Fontaines", *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1943), p. 433:

Item, quaestione undecima, contra Thomam et communem doctrinam de susceptione maius et minus in formis. Ubi vult quod semper posterius est aliud numero et re a priori. Et idem undecimo *Quodlibet*, quaestione tertia.

18. BERNARDUS ALVERNIENSIS, *Reprobationes* of Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodl.* IX, q. 11 [= *Quodl.* V, q. 11 in the numbering of Bernard], mss. V = Città del Vaticano, Borghese 298, ff. 73vb-74ra; F = Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centrale II.II.182, f. 365rb:

Quod autem tertio dicit, quod in augmento caritatis oportet dare duo, scilicet maiorem caritatem (et minorem F), quarum una succedat alteri, si intelligat quod augmentum caritatis fit per additionem (alterius caritatis ad caritatem praecedentem, non est possibile, quia per talem additionem F *om. per hom.* V) non augetur aliqua qualitas, sicut alias videbitur, sed per hoc quod ea qualitas quae fuit prius imperfecta ipsamet perficitur, ita quod non consideratur ibi diversitas numeralis [74ra V] inter qualitatem prius remissam et postea intensam, sed bene considerantur diversi gradus intensionis et remissionis. Et ideo si vocet istas caritates diversos gradus caritatis, verum est, licet sit impropria locutio. Si autem per maiorem caritatem et minorem intelligat duas, quarum una succedat alteri, impossibile est. Specie enim non differrent, nec numero, cum sint in eodem subiecto.

19. MATTHAEUS AB AQUASPARTA, *De gratia*, q. 7, "Utrum gratia in anima habeat esse fiens vel manens, fluxivum vel fixum", in *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, ed. V. Doucet, Quaracchi 1935, pp. 177, 179, 180–181:

Circum istam quaestionem sunt opiniones: Quidam enim ponunt quod gratia in anima est forma fiens, non manens, et habet esse fluxivum, non fixum et mansivum. Et innituntur auctoritatibus Augustini in opponendo adductis, quae videntur valde expressae [...]

Sed quoniam, si continuus influxus, augmentaretur in infinitum, manente quod primo influxum erat [...]; ideo, sicut ponunt continuum influxum, ponunt continuum defectum; continuam infusionem, continuam corruptionem [...].

Ista positio magnorum Magistrorum fuit, multum perspicuum et multum peritorum. Sed quantumcumque fuerint magni auctores et positio quantumcumque subtilis, tamen alii contrarium opinantur...

20. PETRUS DE TRABIBUS, *I Sent.*, dist. 17, art. 3, q. 2, "Quaeritur secundo quomodo caritas augetur", ms. Assisi, Biblioteca del Convento di S. Francesco (Biblioteca Comunale) 154, f. 63rb, as cited in Doucet (text 19 above), p. 179, note 1:

Quidam enim dicunt quod caritas augetur per successionem, ita quod minori succedat maior. [...] Et haec positio fortassis habuit ortum ex sententia Augustini qui vult caritas habere esse in continuo fieri, sicut visum est supra. Sententia autem Augustini recte intellecta non facit pro positione illa, quoniam Augustinus non vult quod caritas habeat esse fiens successive, vel quod pars succedat parti, ita quod praecedens corrumpatur et sequens generetur sive producat, sed quod simul fiat et sit facta et prius facta continue fiat.

21. IOANNES PECHAM, *Quodl.* IV (*Romanum*), q. 39 "Utrum gratia in anima sit in fieri vel in facto esse", in *Quodlibeta quatuor*, ed. F. Delorme – G. Etzkorn, Grottaferrata 1989, pp. 259, 260:

Contra: Si gratia esset in fieri, ergo continue generaretur et corrumpetur; sed non corrumpitur nisi per peccatum mortale; ergo non potest ita corrumpi [...].

Dico igitur quod creatur gratia in anima ut forma absoluta habens esse fixum et manens et non fiens (*finiens ed.*).

22. HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, *Quodl.* V, q. 11, "Utrum esse cuiuslibet creaturae sit in continuo fieri, an simul et in facto esse", ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 168vB–E:

Item si esse creaturae esset in continuo fieri, aut ergo illud esset unum et idem, aut semper aliud et aliud. Non idem, quia

iam habitum esset antequam fieret. Non aliud et aliud, quia tunc aut praecedens corrumpetur adveniente sequente, aut non, sed simul cum ipso maneret. Non primo modo, quia non est assignare causam corruptionis; non secundo modo, quia tunc essent diversa esse simul, aut unum fieret ex pluribus, et esset augmentum, et semper maius et maius: quae omnia falsa sunt. [...]

Si enim esse rei sit in continuo fieri et successive, hoc non potest intelligi nisi aut quod res ipsa et natura subiecta ipsi esse sit una et eadem manens, aut semper alia et alia. Si secundo modo, tunc nulla res esset una et eadem numero in duobus momentis [...].

Praeterea non posset esse aliud et aliud esse nisi quia uno corrupto fieret aliud esse [...].

23. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quaestio ordinaria de intensione virtutum* [= q. 18], mss. B = Brugge, Stedelijke Bibliotheek (Bibliothèque de la Ville) 491, f. 226ra; V = Città del Vaticano, Borghese 122, f. 159rb–va:

V	B
Septimo de intensione virtutum.	Videtur de intensione virtutum.
1. Et videtur quod nulla forma manente sua essentia possit intendi, quia secundum Boethium “accidentia perimi possunt, transmutari non possunt”. Et auctor <i>Sex principiorum</i> “forma est simplici et invariabili (inenarrabili <i>ms</i>) essentia consistens”.	1. Et arguitur quod nulla forma possit intendi sive suscipere magis et minus, quia essentia uniuscuiusque formae est invariabilis, quia quaelibet forma est essentia invariabili consistens; tale autem non suscipit magis et minus; ergo etc.
	2. Praeterea, variatio in forma variat speciem; sed quod suscipit magis et minus variabile est; ergo in eadem specie non potest esse magis et minus.
3. Praeterea, forma quae intenditur variatur; aut ergo ratione alicuius essentialis, et sic, cum non sit composita, totaliter perimitur (<i>post corr.</i>); aut nullo modo; aut ratione accidentis; <si> ratione accidentis, esset accidens in infinitum.	3. Praeterea, forma suscipiens magis et minus aut variatur ratione principii per se et essentialium, aut ratione accidentalium. Non ratione essentialium, quia in talibus variatio mutat speciem, nec ratione accidentalium, quia accidentale non mutat essentielle; ergo nullo modo.

4. Praeterea, duae actiones reales [159va] non terminantur ad unam formam; sed cum minus calidum fit calidius, hoc est alia et alia actione; ergo primus calor corrumpitur et novus generatur. Et sic idem calor numero non potest intendi et remitti.
 5. Praeterea, in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum; sed numquam mobile pertingit perfecte ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo; ergo numquam aliquid acquirit calorem intensum nisi actu (?) corrupto calore remisso.
 6. Praeterea, V *Physicorum* “sanitas mane et vespere non est una”, quia pluribus actionibus servatur (?). Ergo multo minus calor intensus et remissus, ad quos terminantur diversae actiones.
 4. Praeterea, duo actiones non terminantur ad unam formam; sed contingit calidum factum fieri postea magis calidum, et constat quod alia actione; ergo corrumpitur calor primus et generabitur novus. Et sic idem calor non poterit intendi et remitti.
 5. Praeterea, in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum; sed numquam mobile pertingit in aliquo motu ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo; ergo numquam aliquid potest moveri ad acquirendum calorem intensum nisi prius corrupto calore remisso, et sic idem quod prius.
 6. Praeterea, “sanitas in mane et vespere non est una”, sicut videtur Philosophus innuere V *Physicorum*, et hoc quia pluribus actionibus conservata; ergo a simili et multo plus, calor intensus et remissus ad quos terminantur diversae actiones non possunt esse unus calor, et sic idem quod prius.
24. IOANNES DE NEAPOLI, *Q. disp.*, q. 4, “Utrum charitas augeatur secundum gradus in essentia vel secundum gradus in esse tantum”, in *Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae*, ed. Neapoli 1618 (rpt. 1966), f. 31ra–vb:¹⁷⁹

Alii dicunt quod “nulla forma secundum suam absolutam et specificam rationem recipit magis et minus vel habet esse perfectius et imperfectius, sed secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum”. [...]

¹⁷⁹ The material within quotation marks is taken verbatim from Godfrey’s *Ordinary Question 18*. We have checked this entire passage in ms. Tortosa, Archivo Capitular de Tortosa 244, ff. 260vb–261rb, but no reference to Godfrey is found in the margins.

Primum istorum probant sic: “suscipere magis et minus, vel habere esse perfectius et imperfectius, non convenit alicui nisi secundum quod est aliquo modo variabile; sed natura formae secundum suam absolutam et specificam rationem est invariabilis”, quia ut sic est indivisibilis et non diversa [...].

Sed haec opinio stare non potest quantum ad multa, quae ponit. Primo, quantum ad hoc quod dicit, quod “nulla forma secundum suam absolutam et specificam rationem habet quod continet variabilitatem, sed solum secundum quod contrahitur ad individuum”. [...]

Sed illud quod convenit alicui formae, ut salvatur non in uno individuo, sed in multis, convenit ei secundum suam absolutam et specificam rationem, quia universale est unum in multis [...]. Sed recipere magis et minus sic convenit secundum eum omni formae, quia secundum eum forma intensa et remissa differunt in numero. Ergo recipere magis et minus convenit formae secundum suam absolutam et specificam rationem.

25. ANONYMUS, “An aliquid suscipiat magis et minus”, ms. Worcester, Cathedral Library Q.99, f. 102ra:

Quaeritur de modo susceptionis maius et minus.

Dicitur a Magistro Petro de Sancto Dionysio quod secundum corruptionem graduum formae et generationem novi gradus continentis virtualiter (-tutem *ms*) priorem gradum.

Contra:

Tunc non fieret rarefactio continua (?) hostiae, ex quo in toto motu est alia forma et alia. Similiter, tunc non posset esse motus localis hostiae sursum proiectae, quia semper esset alia quantitas hostiae rarefactae in tota projectione et alia, et ita nullum posset esse subiectum manens in projectione.

26. IOANNES DE POLLIACO(?), *Quaestiones ordinariae*, q. 25, “Utrum virtutes augeantur per additionem”, ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15371, f. 58rb:

Sed quaero quid habet amplius albius quam album, ratione cuius possit dici facta esse variatio de minus albo in magis album? Non aliquod accidens, quia sic ipsa albedo maior secundum essentiam non esset perfectior minori nec etiam variata; non alium gradum

additum gradui praecedenti, quia tunc ipsa essentia albedinis maioris non esset una simpliciter nec unius gradus secundum rem; nec ipsa essentia (ens *ms*) prius sub gradu aliquo imperfecto transmutatur ad gradum perfectiorem, ut albedo cum gradu imperfecto fiat albedo cum gradu perfecto, nam cum isti gradus non sint realiter aliud ab ipsa essentia, non potest intelligi fieri transitus de albedine secundum unum gradum ad albedinem secundum alium gradum nisi ipsa essentia transmutetur. Talis autem essentialis transmutatio vel transsubstantiatio unius rei in aliam secundum naturam non est possibilis.

Et ideo videtur dicendum quod in tali mutatione sit corruptio minus albi secundum suam essentiam et gradum et magis albi similiter generatio. Quid ergo habet magis album, etc.? Dicendum quod habet formam perfectiorem quam minus album, non quidem secundum rationem speciei simpliciter et abstracte acceptae, sed secundum ipsam ut in materia determinata et ab agente determinato esse habente.

27. HUGO DE NOVOCASTRO, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 3, "Utrum quando caritas augetur praecedens corrumpatur", ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, S. Crucis Plut. 30 dext. 2, f. 30vb:

(Opinio Thomae *in marg.*) Hic primo ponitur una opinio quod in augmento cuiuslibet formae prior corrumpitur et sequens generatur. Hoc probant sic, quia sicut est in motu ad ubi, ita in motu ad formam suo modo; sed in motu ad ubi semper praecedens corrumpitur, et aliud acquiritur; ergo, etc.

Item, termini motus sunt impossibiles; sed prima qualitas et sequens sunt termini motus; ergo etc.

Respondetur ad hoc quod sunt impossibiles secundum illud quod est imperfectionis in altero termino, non autem quantum ad id quod est perfectionis.

Contra:

Ex hoc sequitur primo quod alteratio non erit motus, quia de ratione motus est habere duos terminos positivos, V *Physicorum*. Tu autem ponis hic unum terminum privatum, scilicet imperfectionem. Ergo, etc.

Item, termini alterationis sunt eiusdem rationis; sed alter terminus est positivus, ergo et alius. Non ergo imperfectio est terminus utrobique. Cum ergo termini motus sint impossibiles, sequitur, etc.

Item, realitas caritatis prioris per se pertinet ad motum. Sed non ut tempus, patet. Nec ut subiectum, quia subiectum manet idem omnino. Nec terminus ad quem, quia isti termini sunt oppositi. Ergo oportet quod sit terminus a quo, plura enim non sunt de ratione motus per se. Tunc resumitur ratio: termini motus sunt impossibiles; sed realitas caritatis est terminus a quo; ergo est impossibilis cum termino ad quem.

Item, illa inter quae cadit comparatio differunt saltem numero. Cum ergo duae formae differentes solo numero non possint esse simul, oportet quod in adventu unius corrumpatur alia.

Contra istam opinionem arguitur sic...

28. PETRUS THOMAE, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 5, "Utrum in augmentatione caritatis caritas praeexistens corrumpatur cum nova caritas inducitur", ms. Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1106, ff. 106v–107r:

Circa secundum (?) [107r] sic procedam: primo ponam unam opinionem; secundo reprobabo istam.

(Opinio Thomae et Godefridi *in marg.*) Quantum ad primum est communis opinio, quae dicit quod in omni intensione uniuscuiusque formae gradus praeexistens formae corrumpitur in adventu alterius gradus sequentis. Sed caritas, ut suppositum est, intenditur et augmentatur. Ergo in eius intensione individuum praeexistens corrumpitur et aliud novum generatur. Huius opinionis rationes fundamentales sunt duae, et accommodabo sibi tertiam.

Prima ratio sua est ista: termini motus in omni mutatione sunt impossibiles, V *Physicorum*. Ergo in augmentatione caritatis sunt impossibiles. Sed gradus praeexistens est terminus a quo et sequens est terminus ad quem. Ergo sunt impossibiles. Ergo adveniente novo gradu caritatis praeexistens semper corrumpitur et novum individuum generatur.

29. HIMBERT DE GARDIA, I *Sent.*, dist. 17, "Quaeritur utrum in augmento qualitatis vel cuiuslibet formae accidentalis adveniente secundo gradu corrumpatur primus", ms. Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1091, ff. 56v, 57r:

In ista quaestione quattuor articulos declarabo: primo utrum caritas augeatur per gradus; secundo videndum est punctus quaestionis; tertio utrum illi gradus sint idem; quarto quomodo faciunt unum [...]

Circa primum articulum suppono [...] Suppono secundo [...] Tertio quaero utrum caritas augeatur per gradus. Hic est duplex modi dicendi. Primus est Sancti Thomae qui dicit quod non. Probat: si augmentum caritatis fieret per gradus, forma accidentalis non consisteret in indivisibili; sed hoc est falsum; ergo, etc. [...]

Contra istam opinionem arguo [...].

Secundus articulus est videre punctum quaestionis, utrum adveniente secundo gradu corrumpatur primus. Hic sunt duo modi dicendi. Primus est [Sancti]¹⁸⁰ Thomae et Godefridi, qui dicunt quod primus corrumpatur. Probant: termini motus sunt impossibiles; sed si primus gradus non corrumpetur, termini motus non essent impossibiles; ergo, etc.

30. ANONYMUS, *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, "Utrum augmentum caritatis sit per additionem", ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 14570, f. 30va:

(Opinio Godefridi *in marg.*) Alii sunt qui dicunt modum alium, scilicet quod augmentatur caritas quia secundum gradus latitudinis in eius essentia ad perfectiorem gradum perducitur. Et secundum istum modum augmentandi dicunt quod gradus caritatis minus perfectus adveniente magis perfecto corrumpitur. Ex quo sequitur quod caritas augmentata non erit eadem numero cum caritate praecedenti, quia gradus praecedens adveniente perfectiori corrumpitur, quod oportet, ut dicunt, de necessitate, quia in motu adveniente termino ad quem recedit terminus a quo.

(Istam distinctionem invenitis in tertio *Quolibet* Magistri Thomae de Balliaco *in marg.*) Quod autem possit esse latitudo in essentia caritatis aliqui declarant sic: "Ad cuius evidentiam est intelligendum quod ista latitudo potest intelligi dupliciter [...]"¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ As indicated in note 170 above, the *Sancti* here is a scribal mistake.

¹⁸¹ The compiler here proceeds to quote Thomas de Bailly's *Quodl.* III, q. 16, "Utrum latitudo illa graduum accipiatur secundum modum quantitatis discretarum", ed. Glorieux, p. 220.

ASCOLI, WYLTON, AND ALNWICK ON SCOTUS'S
FORMAL DISTINCTION: TAXONOMY, REFINEMENT,
AND INTERACTION

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Historians of philosophy as well as philosophers of a realist inclination have devoted considerable study to Scotus's formal distinction. The former have explored the origins of the formal distinction, locating its source in the writings of such thirteenth-century figures as St. Bonaventure, Richard Rufus, and Peter John Olivi.¹ The latter have emphasized the importance of the formal distinction for establishing an ontological foundation for moderate realism in epistemology. Fr. Allan Wolter, O.F.M., for example, has argued that the formal distinction, rightly understood, has its analogue in the philosophy of Aquinas in the form of a distinction of reason with a basis in the thing. Furthermore, he claims that the ontology of the formal distinction allows a moderate realist to account for the partial nature of our knowledge inasmuch as each of the formally distinct features of a thing may be conceived without another being adequately understood.² Yet among both historians of philosophy and philosophers there has been considerable disagreement about whether the formal distinction should be understood as a subtype of the real distinction, as a unique subtype of the distinction of reason

¹ F. Pelster, "Die älteste Abkürzung und Kritik vom Sentenzenkommentar des heiligen Bonaventura. Ein Werk des Richardus Rufus de Cornubia (1253–1255)", *Gregorianum* 17 (1936), pp. 218–220, and G. Gál, "Viae ad existentiam Dei probandam in doctrina Richardi Rufi, OFM", *Franziskanische Studien* 38 (1956), pp. 182–186, showed the significance of the background in Rufus, while the masterful study of B. Jansen, "Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis", *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), pp. 317–344 and 517–544, traced the history of the distinction through Continental figures such as Bonaventure, Peter John Olivi, Petrus de Trabibus, and Matthew of Aquasparta.

² A.B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction", and "The Realism of Scotus", in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*, ed. A.B. Wolter – M.M. Adams, Ithaca, NY – London 1990, pp. 27–53. "The Formal Distinction" originally appeared in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, ed. J.K. Ryan – B.M. Bonansea, Washington, DC 1965 (*Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, 3), pp. 45–60; "The Realism of Scotus" originally appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* 59 (1962), pp. 725–736. Cf. M.J. Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. A Study in Metaphysics*, Washington, DC 1944, p. 101.

or as introducing a third type of distinction, intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason.

Such a disagreement finds resonances in the understanding and characterization of the formal distinction from the fourteenth century onwards. In his baccalaureate thesis published in 1663, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, drawing upon a medieval tradition of which he was probably unaware, described John Duns Scotus's formal distinction as one "intermediate between a real distinction and one of reason".³ Likewise, in his notes to his personal copy of Daniel Stahl's *Compendium Metaphysicae* in the section on the 'Explanation of the Types and Modes of Distinction', Leibniz writes that "the Scotists posit a kind of distinction that is intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason, calling it a formal distinction *ex natura rei*...".⁴ What I would like to explore here is part of the medieval discussion behind Leibniz's identification, or, as we shall see, possible misidentification of the formal distinction as an intermediate distinction by focusing upon two of the more prominent figures in the early history of Scotism, James of Ascoli and William Alnwick, and a non-Scotist supporter of the formal distinction, Thomas Wylton.⁵

³ "Tribuitur [distinctio formalis] communiter Scoto ut media inter realem et rationis..." (G.W. Leibniz, *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, § 24 in *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, hg. von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, VI. Reihe, Bd. 1, Berlin 1971, p. 18).

⁴ "A Scotistis statuitur genus distinctionis medium inter realem et rationis distinctionem, vocaturque formalis ex natura rei..." (G.W. Leibniz, *Notae ad Danielem Stahlum*, W. Tab. XXI, in *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, VI. Reihe, Bd. 1, p. 30).

⁵ James of Ascoli was known to have been present among the masters of theology who approved the proceedings against Marguerite de la Porée in May, 1310; hence his *Quodlibeta* are placed either in that year or the preceding year (1309–1310). In addition to his *Quodlibeta*, he is known to have authored some ordinary questions, a *Commentary on the Sentences*, and a *Tabula* of Scotus's writings. Thomas Wylton, also known as Thomas Anglicus, was a member of Merton College, Oxford from 1288–1301 where he was probably associated with Walter Burley and may also have studied under Thomas Sutton prior to the latter's entry into the Dominican order. Receiving permission from his bishop, Wylton went to Paris to study theology in 1304; he obtained his mastership in theology in 1312. Though he probably remained in Paris until 1316, he returned to St. Paul's shortly thereafter. He did return to Paris once more in the period 1320–1322 before returning to England; he died in 1327. William of Alnwick is known to have been living in the house at Paris (probably for his lectorate) during the academic year 1302–1303, for in June of 1303 he sided with the King of France and against the Pope during the crisis at the University of Paris in 1303. He taught at both Paris and Oxford in the period 1314–1318 and thereafter taught at Bologna (ca. 1322) and Naples. He died at Avignon in 1333.

We shall examine three texts illustrating the understanding of the formal distinction in the theology faculty at Paris: James of Ascoli's *Quodlibet* q. 1, Thomas Wylton's *Quodlibet* q. 5, and William of Alnwick's *Determinatio* q. 14. The advantage of these texts, from the viewpoint of the theme of our conference, is that two of them (Ascoli's *Quodlibet* q. 1, ca. 1309–1310, and Wylton's *Quodlibet* q. 5, ca. 1315) were disputed in Paris within a decade of Scotus's death and the one that was not, Alnwick's *Determinatio* q. 14 (ca. 1322, Bologna), makes Ascoli's text one of its chief objects of criticism. Our interest in studying these texts is to trace out how early Scotists and non-Scotists conceive of the formal distinction, that is, whether it is in their eyes a subtype of real distinction or represents an intermediate distinction, and also how they characterize certain objections to the formal distinction. Valuable points of contrast and confirmation are available for assessing the different authors' positions in the account of the formal distinction of another contemporary Scotist who makes a special study of the theory of distinctions, Petrus Thomae (fl. ca. 1317–1322) and in the remarkably lengthy discussion of the formal distinction by an early critic of Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol.

SCOTUS

Perhaps a thumbnail sketch of the presentation of the formal distinction in Scotus's own writings would provide the easiest gateway into the material at hand. In the relatively early *Lectura*, Scotus introduces his version of the formal distinction in the context of settling the question whether a plurality of persons is compatible with the unity of the divine essence. Having answered the question affirmatively in conformity to the orthodox teaching about the Trinity, Scotus tries to explain how this could be so by distinguishing initially between the relationship of a nature to its supposit and the relationship between the universal and the singular.⁶ Natures can be understood universally and indifferently to a range of instances or thought of as instanced or singular but still not grasped as supposits; we may think of, for example, 'color' or 'white' or we may think of 'this color' or 'this white'. An easy way to see the point is that we often think of singular instances of natures that do

⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 246–248, ed. Vat. XVI, pp. 205–208.

not, and now cannot exist (as, for example, a possible twin brother of Thomas Aquinas). That is to say, a nature may be singular, yet may not be the concretely existing incommunicable subject. To employ a theological example, Christ assumed a given singular human nature, but He did not assume a supposit. What is distinctive about a supposit is that it lacks any kind of communicability at all; it is not that by which (*quo*) anything exists but is simply that which (*quod*) exists. It lacks both the communicability of the nature to its subjective parts and the communicability of a form to that which it informs. In turning to the Trinitarian difficulty, then, Scotus has identified the core of the problem as the following.⁷ Because the divine nature as a nature is communicable to the Three Persons and the Three Persons as persons are suppositis and thus incommunicable, how do we explain the presence of these two incompatible properties, namely communicability and incommunicability, in the self-same thing?

The only way that Scotus sees to make sense of the situation is to propose some kind of metaphysical distinction between the principle that is the essence and the relations by which the persons are what they are. Repeatedly, Scotus states that this distinction is one that is present prior to any act of understanding on the part of God, even prior to any act of understanding on the part of God the Father. Yet, in the *Lectura*, Scotus varies in the terminology he uses to describe the distinction. When he first introduces the distinction between Fatherhood and Godhead, he characterizes the distinction as a virtual difference (*differentia virtualis*).⁸ Slightly later in the same question, he allows the

⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, n. 258, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 211: “Sed adhuc remanet difficultas, quia ex quo natura et suppositum idem sunt realiter, quomodo est quod natura est communicabilis et suppositum non est communicabile?”

⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 271–272, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 215: “Duplex autem est differentia in intellectu: una in concipiendo diversa obiecta formalia, et alia in concipiendo idem obiectum formale secundum diversos modos concipiendi. Et secundum hoc est duplex differentia essentiae et relationis: non enim essentia et paternitas differunt actu, quia haec res ‘paternitas’ non est alia res quam deitas; nec etiam differunt potentialiter, quia ibi non est potentia ante actum; differunt igitur quasi medio modo, quam differentiam possumus appellare ‘differentiam virtualem’, quia paternitas est in essentia virtualiter.

Sed esse in alio virtualiter potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur aliquid esse in alio virtualiter, quia est in eo secundum quamdam eminentiam, sicut effectus in sua causa: et sic non est paternitas virtualiter in essentia. Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid esse in alio virtualiter per identitatem, ita tamen quod formalis ratio unius sit extra formalem rationem alterius: et sic paternitas virtualiter est in essentia; est enim

distinction to be termed one of a difference of reason, but emphasizes that the difference in question is one that obtains prior to any activity on the part of the divine mind. In the parallel text from the *Ordinatio*, Scotus broaches the topic of whether the distinction could be termed a real one. He denies the claim that it could be called a real, actual difference because such a difference would hold between two separable things. Thereafter, he once again affirms that the distinction may be termed either a virtual one or a difference of reason, provided that the latter is understood as mind-independent.⁹

But a shift in the terminology Scotus employs to describe the formal distinction occurs sometime between the *Ordinatio* book I and the Parisian *Reportationes* with q. 19 of the *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* book VII serving perhaps as the weather-vane for the change. In the last mentioned text, Scotus is at pains to accommodate his own thinking on the formal distinction to Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction, but in the end acknowledges that the kind of distinction he has in mind is prior to any activity of the mind and, accordingly, must be termed a real distinction of some sort. What he proposes is a scheme of real distinctions: the greatest type of real distinction is between two (or more) natures or two (or more) supposits; a medium type of real distinction is found between natures within one supposit (here Scotus is probably referring to either the distinction between forms in the plurality of forms theory and/or the plurality of natures within Christ); and, finally, the least type of real distinction,

eadem res cum essentia et formalis ratio paternitatis est distincta ab essentia ita vere sicut si esset accidens in Deo. Unde est differentia virtualis, quia unum non est res alia ab alio, sed est in eo perfecte idem sibi, distinguitur tamen formalis ratio unius a formali ratione alterius”.

⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 400–402, ed. Vat. II, pp. 355–356: “Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis? Respondeo: non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur, ‘differentia realis actualis’ illa quae est differentia rerum et in actu, quia in una persona non est aliqua differentia rerum, propter simplicitatem divinam; et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis, quia nihil est ibi in potentia quod non est in actu.

Potest autem vocari ‘differentia rationis’, sicut dixit doctor quidam,—non quod ‘ratio’ accipiat pro differentia formata ab intellectu, sed ut ‘ratio’ accipitur pro quidditate rei secundum quod quidditas est obiectum intellectus.

Vel, alio modo, potest vocari ‘differentia virtualis’, quia illud quod habet talem distinctionem in se non habet rem et rem, sed est una res, habens virtualiter sive praeeminenter quasi duas realitates, quia utrique realitati ut est in illa una re competit illud quod est proprium principium tali realitati, ac si ipsa esset res distincta: ita enim haec realitas distinguit et illa non distinguit, sicut si illa esset una res et ista alia”.

that found between diverse perfections or perfective features unitively contained within a single nature.¹⁰

When we arrive at the classic text on the formal distinction found in the Parisian questions on the *Sentences*, I, dist. 33, q. 2 (asking “Utrum simplicitati personae divinae repugnet qualiscumque distinctio realis constituentium personam”) the formal distinction is characterized as being a real distinction *secundum quid*. The real distinction *secundum quid* is carefully explained so that the phrase ‘secundum quid’ is understood not to apply to the items that are distinct but rather to the nature of the distinction itself.¹¹ To be really distinct in the fullest sense involves four conditions: 1) the things distinct must be actual, not potential; 2) they must each have their own formal being and not be in the sense that effects pre-exist in a cause; 3) they must not be confused in the fashion of elements in a mixture; and 4) they must enjoy complete non-identity. Because the relations in God and the divine essence only fulfill the first three of these conditions they are said to be really distinct not simply speaking but only ‘secundum quid’.¹² The phrases Scotus

¹⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* VII, q. 19, n. 44, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* IV, St. Bonaventure, NY 1997, p. 370: “Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum; media naturarum in uno supposito; minima diversarum perfectionum sine rationum perfectionum unitive contentarum in una natura”.

¹¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2 (ed. in praep. sine paginatione; ms. Oxford, Merton 59 [= M], f. 154v): “Dico quia essentia et relatio sic distinguuntur quod ante omnem actum intellectus, haec proprietates distinguuntur ab essentia secundum quid. Sed distinctio aliquorum realis secundum quid potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut haec determinatio deminuens, scilicet secundum quid referatur ad realitatem [...]. Sed non sic pono ego essentiam et relationem distingui secundum quid realiter, quia tunc esset sensus quod distinctio essentiae et relationis est distinctio realitatum secundum quid, quod est inconveniens, quia essentia est res simpliciter cum sit formaliter infinita.

Alio modo potest haec determinatio secundum quid referri ad distinctionem, ut sit sensus quod essentia et relatio ex natura rei distinguuntur secundum quid. Et sic est verum, quia distinctio essentiae et relationis est rei et rei simpliciter, sed distinctio est secundum quid”.

¹² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2, nn. 58–60 (M, f. 151v): “Quomodo autem hoc possit intelligi declaro sic: ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur quattuor requiruntur condiciones. Prima est quod sit aliquorum in actu et non in potentia tantum, quomodo distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia in materia et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu.

Secunda est quod est eorum quae habent esse formale et non tantum virtuale, ut effectus sunt in sua causa virtualiter et non formaliter.

Tertia condicio est quod est eorum quae non habent esse confusum ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualibus.

uses here to describe the distinction are phrases such as “distinguuntur ex natura rei” as well as “distinctio aliquorum realis secundum quid”, or the items described are said to lack formal identity. Likewise, we find the same ways of describing the formal distinction in the texts of the *Collationes* printed by Wadding as collatio 23, texts that may in fact date to the Parisian period of Scotus’s academic career.¹³ Finally, another noteworthy point about the Parisian treatment is that Scotus makes a distinction between the formal non-identity of the essence and the relations on the one hand and the lack of adequate identity holding between the properties of the persons and the essence; both cases involve a distinction that is real *secundum quid*, but the latter type of distinction is more refined and weaker than the former.¹⁴

We may summarize the situation inherited by the early Scotists as follows. Scotus’s different lectures on the *Sentences*, Oxford and Parisian, presented different manners of describing the formal distinction: according to one set of texts, the formal distinction is analogous to a virtual distinction and is quite close to the distinction proposed by Bonaventure earlier as a ‘differentia rationis’; according to another set of texts, the formal distinction is a kind of real distinction, though how

Quarta condicio est, quae sola completiva est distinctionis perfectae, est non-identitas, ut patet per Philosophum IV Metaphysicae...”.

¹³ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Collationes*, q. 23, n. 1, ed. Vivès V, p. 236a: “Respondetur quod sic, quod declaratur sic: essentia de se est communicabilis ante omnem actum intellectus secundum omnes, ex natura rei; relatio personalis de se incommunicabilis; haec duo sunt in Patre ante omnem actum intellectus”.

¹⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 33, q. 2 (M, f. 152r): “Sed quomodo est essentiae et relationis non-identitas secundum quid? Respondeo: ibi est duplex non-identitas, scilicet non-identitas formalis et non-identitas adaequata. Et utraque est non-identitas secundum quid, quia simul stant cum identitate simpliciter. Habent enim essentia et relatio primam non-identitatem, id est formalem, quia relatio non est formaliter essentia nec e converso. Dicuntur autem aliqua non habere identitatem formalem quando unum non est de per se et primo intellectu (intellectum eius M) alterius, ut definitio et partes definitionis sunt de intellectu definiti [...]. Nunc autem si essentia et relatio in divinis definiantur, neutrum caderet in per se definitione alterius nisi ut additum [...]. Item essentia et proprietas non sunt eadem identitate adaequata, cuiusmodi sunt illa quorum neutrum excedit alterum, sed est praecise illud, neque magis neque minus, ut definitio et definitum. Sed non-adaequata in identitate dicuntur illa quorum unum excedit aliud [...]. Essentia autem et proprietas non sunt eadem adaequate. Excessus autem vel non-adaequatio unius ad alterum potest intelligi dupliciter. Vel secundum praedicationem et non-convertibilitatem, ut se habent animal et homo [...]. Alio modo secundum virtutem et perfectionem, ut homo est perfectius quid quam animal. Primo modo proprietas transcendit essentiam, quia de pluribus formaliter praedicatur quam essentia [...]. E converso autem essentia excedit proprietatem secundum virtutem et perfectionem, quia ipsa est formaliter infinita, non sic aliqua proprietas personalis”.

this real distinction is described varies and the tendency to compare the distinction to the intentional and virtual distinctions tends to suggest that it may be another type altogether. Another theme found in these texts, especially those dealing with applications of the formal distinction to the properties of being, the distinction among the powers of the soul, and the distinction between a genus and specific difference, is the steady effort to relate the formal distinction to Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction and to argue that the formal distinction is positing what the intentional distinction would require if it is not to collapse into a subtype of the distinction of reason.

JAMES OF ASCOLI

James of Ascoli's *Quodlibet*, q. 1, asks whether the simplicity of the divine nature is compatible with some distinction *ex natura rei* prior to the distinction among the Persons ("Utrum simplicitas divinae naturae compatiatur secum aliquam distinctionem ex natura rei praeviam distinctioni personarum"). Ascoli answers that it is and centers his discussion around five central points which constitute the question's articles: 1) the source of the mutual incompatibility of two things; 2) the divine essence as distinct from the relations that constitute the persons and both, in turn, as distinct from the absolute perfections found in God; 3) the distinction of the essence from the relation as prior to the distinction between the persons; 4) the distinction between the absolute perfections as also prior to the distinction between the persons; and 5) the nature of the formal distinction.¹⁵ Naturally, it is the last of these central points that is most pertinent to our inquiry.

The type of distinction that exists between the divine essence and the relations, as well as between the different attributes, is a distinction that they have because what is said of one must be denied of the other. Indeed, much of Ascoli's discussion is devoted to the treat-

¹⁵ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 3 (ms. Cambridge, University Ff. III, cod. 23 [= C], ff. 131rb–131va): "Hic primo ostendam unum [non posse esse] simul duo et causam impossibilitatis istorum duorum ad invicem; secundo, quod in divinis distinguitur ex natura rei relatio ab essentia et ab eius perfectionibus essentialibus; tertio, quod ista distinctio ex natura rei est praevia distinctioni personarum; quarto, quod distinctio perfectionum absolutarum, intellectus scilicet et voluntatis, est praevia ex natura rei distinctionum personarum; quinto, ponam modum sive possibilitatem huiusmodi distinctionis..."

ment of the divine attributes of intellect and will, because they are the attributes that most clearly illustrate the difficulty of positing simple identity within the Godhead and are the ones directly involved in the two divine processions. Ascoli's manner of arguing for the distinction of intellect and will is to point out that the two different features must have different properties:

Every power that is by its nature naturally ordered to being determined to some object is distinct in the nature of the thing from any other power not so determined. [...] But the divine will is naturally able to be determined through itself to either side of a contingent proposition, whereas the divine intellect is not. Therefore, the intellect is distinct from the will in the nature of the thing, and it is thanks to this distinction that it belongs to the will to determine itself and does not belong to the intellect.¹⁶

Furthermore, in a series of arguments clearly indebted to the discussion of intellect and will found in Scotus's *Metaphysics*, IX, q. 15, Ascoli buttresses his case by appealing to the entirely different manners of acting that will and intellect enjoy in whatever they are found: intellect belongs to the realm of nature and must do its utmost as must any natural power, whereas will is autonomous and self-determining.¹⁷

¹⁶ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 25 (C, ff. 133vb–133ra): “Omnis potentia ex natura rei sua nata determinari ad aliquod obiectum, ex natura rei distinguitur a quacunque potentia non nata ex se determinari ad illud obiectum [...]. Sed voluntas divina nata est ex se determinari ad alteram partem contingentis ad utrumlibet, intellectus autem divinus non. Ergo ex natura rei intellectus distinguitur a voluntate, ratione cuius distinctionis convenit voluntati se determinare et non intellectui”.

¹⁷ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, nn. 27–31 (C, ff. 133ra–va): “Quia nulla potentia naturalis potest determinari ad aliquod eorum quae se habent essentialiter ad ipsam quia potentia naturalis, ad quodcumque se determinat, naturaliter se determinat et ita non possit se determinare respectu contingentis ad utrumlibet; [enim] determinaret se ad utramque partem simul quod est impossibile. Sed intellectus divinus est potentia (impotentia C) naturalis; in hoc enim non distinguitur intellectus divinus a creato, sed distinguitur in aliis. Ergo non potest se, etc.

Respondeo sic. Quoruncumque principiorum modi agendi non possunt coincidere in eundem modum agendi ex parte rei nec illa principia possunt coincidere in idem principium ex parte rei. Patet quia principium agendi non separatur a modo agendi. Sed modus agendi naturae et voluntatis non possunt coincidere in eundem modum ex parte rei. Ergo nec voluntas et natura possunt coincidere in idem principium ex parte rei (*om. C*). Ergo in quocumque reperiuntur natura et voluntas necessario distinguuntur ex natura rei. Maior patet. Probatio minoris. Quia proprius modus agendi naturae ut natura est respectu cuiuscumque obiecti est agere naturaliter et necessario. Natura enim ut natura semper agit ex toto connatu. Sed proprius modus agendi voluntatis respectu alicuius obiecti puta respectu huius quod est ad finem non habens necessariam connexionem ad ipsum est agere contingenter et libere. Impossibile est enim quod respectu eiusdem obiecti numero sit idem modus agendi ex parte rei et non idem, scilicet agere contingenter et necessario. Tunc enim idem numero esset simul

Hence the properties of intellect and will must be understood to be what they are and distinct from each other prior to any consideration of the intellect. In fact, Ascoli thematizes this very point: formally distinct items are not simply distinct in the sense that they have some logically distinguishable feature that allows them not to be identified entirely with each other; rather, they have some positive structure (*ratio* or *aspectus*) whereby one thing is *ex natura rei* distinct from the other. Such a manner of distinction belongs, according to Ascoli, to all the things under consideration—the divine essence, the divine relations, and the absolute perfections—precisely because of what each of them is in itself prior to any mental consideration.¹⁸

productum contingenter et necessario. Ergo isti duo modi non possunt coincidere in eundem modum ex natura rei.

Dicetur quod agere necessario est proprius modus agendi naturae ubi natura distinguitur a voluntate sicut in creaturis. Ubi autem est omnino idem natura quod voluntas agere necessario non est magis proprius modus naturae quam voluntatis. Sic autem est in Deo. Contra: accipio naturam et voluntatem in communi. Agere naturaliter et necessario est aequè proprius modus agendi naturae in communi sicut agere contingenter est proprius modus agendi voluntatis in communi circa ea quae sunt ad finem non habentia necessariam connexionem ad finem. Sed voluntas in quocumque reperitur semper servat istum modum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, agere scilicet libere et contingenter. Ergo natura in quocumque etiam reperitur servat modum suum, scilicet agere naturaliter et necessario. Ergo agere naturaliter et necessario est proprius modus agendi naturae ubicumque reperitur, sive distinguitur a voluntate sive non. Quia non videtur probabile quod natura magis debeat trahi ad modum agendi voluntatis quam e converso, quia prius non magis trahitur a natura posteriori quam e converso. Sed voluntas respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem non potest trahi ad modum agendi naturae, quia non ad modum agendi necessario. Ergo nec natura potest trahi ad modum agendi voluntatis qui est agere contingenter.

Praeterea, non magis convenit voluntas creata et divina quam natura creata et divina. Sed voluntas creata et divina habent uniformem modum agendi respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem non habentium necessariam connexionem ad ipsum; quia utraque se habet mere contingenter respectu illorum. Ergo similiter natura creata et divina tenent uniformem modum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed natura creati respectu cuiuscumque obiecti se habet mere naturaliter et necessario quantum est ex se. Ergo similiter natura divina quae tenet consimilem modum cum natura creata se habebit mere naturaliter respectu cuiuscumque obiecti. Ergo natura in quocumque reperitur semper est principium agendi necessario.

Confirmatur tota ratio. Quia si natura in Deo est idem omnino cum voluntate, ergo agere naturaliter erit idem cum agere voluntarie; quia sicut natura ad voluntatem ita modus agendi naturae ad modum agendi voluntatis. Sed creatura est producta a Deo voluntarie, ergo et naturaliter. Quod est absurdum.

¹⁸ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 45 (C, ff. 135ra–135rb): “Sed habitudo aspectuum non solum ad formaliter importatum nomine distinctionis sed ad rationes quidditativas et proprias extremorum sic ex natura rei, circumscripta omni operatione intellectus, est distinctio aliqua positiva, non solum negativa. Quodlibet enim istorum habet ex natura rei aliquam rationem positivam per quam natum est distingui formaliter a quolibet alio; et ista distinctio potest vocari distinctio formalis”.

In considering objections to the formal distinction, Ascoli canvasses several arguments already addressed by Scotus in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A texts and elsewhere. The sixth and the seventh objections, however, seem to have no parallel in the texts of Scotus, and they raise issues directly relevant to our concerns. The sixth objection is that properties are multiplied with the multiplication of property-bearing subjects. But every being is either a being in the soul or is a being outside the soul. Therefore, every distinction, inasmuch as it is a property of something, is either a distinction according to reason and thus one belonging to being within the soul, or a real distinction and thus one belonging to being outside the soul. The formal distinction is thus a phantom distinction (“Ergo distinctio formalis est distinctio fictitia”). The seventh objection is that if opposite causes are causes of opposite effects and if extremes and media are opposites, then the formal distinction ought to distinguish items that are opposed to both items falling under the distinction of reason and the real distinction, for the formal distinction is supposed to be a distinction that is a medium between a real distinction and a distinction of reason. But what this means, in turn, is that the formal distinction cannot distinguish items that are really distinct (since that is the function of the real distinction), and it cannot distinguish items that are distinct by a distinction of reason. As a result, the objector concludes that the formal distinction is in vain and fails to accomplish what it was designed to do.¹⁹

Ascoli’s replies to these two objections are crucial for determining what he thought was at stake in the terminology used to describe the formal distinction. With regard to the sixth objection, agreeing that properties are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects,

¹⁹ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 53 (C, ff. 135rb–135va): “Sexto sic: passionibus plurificantur ad plurificationem suppositorum. Sed omne ens vel est ens in anima vel extra animam. Ergo distinctio omnis, cum sit passio entis, vel est distinctio in anima secundum rationem vel extra animam et sic est distinctio realis. Ergo distinctio formalis est distinctio fictitia.

Septimo sic: oppositorum oppositae sunt causae; sed medium et extrema opponuntur; ergo medium et extrema sunt causae oppositorum. Sed distinctio formalis praedicta cadit ut media inter (*cod. C add. perperam*: distinctionem formalem et) distinctionem realem et distinctionem secundum rationem. Ergo distinctio formalis et distinctio secundum rem et etiam secundum rationem erunt causae oppositorum. Cum ergo distinctio secundum rem possit esse causa distinctorum secundum rem, distinctio formalis, quae est media, non poterit esse causa distinctorum secundum rem vel secundum rationem. Sed non propter aliud ponitur distinctio formalis nisi ut salvetur distinctio productionum distinctorum realiter in divinis; ergo frustra ponitur”.

Ascoli denies the minor premise of the deduction, claiming instead that a difference *ex natura rei* is a difference outside the soul, but not one that is a real distinction if what is meant by the latter is a distinction between one *res* and another. Alternatively, he offers another reply that accuses the objection of committing the fallacy of *secundum quid et simpliciter*; the objector reasons from the claim that what is proposed by the formal distinction is a distinction *ex natura rei* to the conclusion that the formal distinction is a real distinction. In the reply to the seventh objection, Ascoli answers that the principle that opposite causes have opposite effects is only true in the case of precise causes and their adequate and precise effects. To cause really distinct effects is not the function merely of things really distinct but also of things that are distinct *ex natura rei* apart from any activity of the mind:

To the sixth objection, we may say that it is true that properties are multiplied according to the multiplicity of their subjects. But when the further inference is made 'Because every being is either one within the soul or outside the soul, therefore every difference is either a real difference or one of reason', we should reply that this consequence does not follow. For the difference which is based on the nature of a thing is a difference outside the soul, and nonetheless not a real distinction, understanding a real distinction as a distinction of one thing from another. We could say something different as well by claiming that there is a fallacy of reasoning from a qualified to an unqualified sense in the inference. For a formal distinction based on the nature of a thing is, as it were, a qualified distinction with regard to a real distinction. Accordingly, to conclude to a real distinction from such a distinction that is based on the nature of a thing is to commit the fallacy of reasoning from a qualified to an unqualified claim.

To the seventh objection, when the statement is made that opposing causes are causes of opposite effects, I reply that this proposition holds true if it is understood in regard to adequate and precise effects, as for example when whiteness separates and blackness dispels, but in effects that are not adequate and not precise, the proposition does not hold true. [...] Regarding the main point at stake, I say that to be capable of being the cause of distinct effects does not belong precisely to things that are really distinct, but rather it belongs as well to things enjoying some distinction from the nature of a thing apart from any operation of the mind. Therefore, to posit a formal distinction between the principles of two different emanations is enough to assure two really distinct productions and to yield two really distinct things produced.²⁰

²⁰ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 53 (C, f. 136rb): "Ad sextum quod verum est passiones multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem subiectorum. Sed cum dicitur

What we have seen in Ascoli is that he is reluctant to call the formal distinction a real distinction, possibly because, ever since the thought of Henry of Ghent, the term 'real distinction' had the notion of the separability of the items distinguished attached to it. Note in this connection that Ascoli says the formal distinction is only qualifiedly a distinction, not that it is a qualified type of real distinction. But perhaps Ascoli's reluctance also springs from his awareness that Scotus himself had, at least in some texts, denied that the formal distinction was a real distinction. A final note on Ascoli is his attenuation of Scotus's account of the types of formally distinct items found in God. Recall that Scotus had allotted two different types of non-identity *in divinis*: one, a type he termed formal non-identity, belongs to the distinction between the relations and the essence; the other, a type he termed the lack of adequate identity, describes the distinction between the essence and the personal properties. By contrast, Ascoli conceives of the distinction between the relations and the essence as well as the distinction between the essence and the perfections or attributes as one involving a lack of adequate identity, a surprising development perhaps in light of the dependency of Ascoli's presentation of the formal distinction upon Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis*, I, dist. 33, q. 2, wherein Scotus makes the distinction between formal and non-adequate identity.²¹

ultra 'quia omne ens vel est ens in anima vel est extra animam, ergo omnis differentia realis vel rationis', dicendum quod non sequitur, quia differentia quae habetur ex natura rei est differentia extra animam et tamen non est distinctio realis, sic intelligendo distinctionem realem quod sit distinctio rei a re. Aliter potest dici quod est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia distinctio formalis quae habetur ex natura rei est quasi distinctio secundum quid respectu distinctionis realis. Et ideo arguere ex tali distinctione quae habetur ex natura rei distinctionem realem est facere fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter.

Ad septimum, cum dicitur quod oppositorum oppositae sunt causae, etc., dico quod propositio habet veritatem si intelligatur de effectibus adaequatis et praecisis, sicut quia albedo disgregat nigredo congregat, in effectibus autem non praecisis et non adaequatis, non habet veritatem [...]. Ad propositum dico quod posse esse causam distinctorum effectuum non convenit praecise illis quae distinguuntur realiter, sed etiam habentibus aliquam distinctionem ex natura rei sine omni operatione intellectus. Ideo ponere distinctionem formalem inter principia duarum emanationum diversarum sufficit ad salvandum duas productiones distinctas realiter et ad habendum duo producta distincta realiter".

²¹ Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 6 (C, f. 131va): "Secundo ostendo quod relatio in divinis distinguitur ex natura rei ab essentia aliquo modo et ab eius perfectionibus essentialibus. Primo sic: quaecumque ex natura rei habent identitatem non-adaequatam sive non-convertibilem vel non totaliter idem, illa ex natura rei habent aliquam distinctionem. Essentia et relatio sunt huiusmodi".

THOMAS WYLTON

Ascoli's efforts at addressing the two objections examined above appear to be mere stutterings when compared to *Quodlibet*, q. 5, of Wylton, who devotes considerably more space to these and related objections within his answer to the question "whether all the features that are said of God according to his substance are the same as God and each other in all ways *ex parte rei*" ("Utrum omnes rationes quae dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam sint eadem Deo et inter se omnibus modis *ex parte rei*"). The change in the title and import of the question which treats the formal distinction is, I think, significant: Wylton intends his question to treat of divine attributes, whether pure perfections or transcendentals as applied to God, but not the Trinitarian relations, as he explicitly states.²² The source of change may well lie in the need to show that the attributes are primarily formally distinct as the precondition for explaining how the processions of the Persons are formally distinct inasmuch as the distinction between the Persons hinges on the distinction between two attributes in God, namely, intellect and will. The precise aim of the question becomes then, to Wylton's understanding, whether a divine attribute such as wisdom is no more distinct from one of the other divine attributes than it is distinct from itself.²³

In the section wherein he presents the formal distinction, Wylton outlines a scheme of distinctions in terms of the genus *distinctio aliquorum ex parte rei*. The one, he tells us, that is most commonly acknowledged and the one to which the name 'real' is usually applied involves things that are distinct in their being either as actually separate or separable or at the very least having a natural order whereby one thing is prior to the other and can exist without the other. Clearly, what Wylton means by this sense of the 'real distinction' is what Henry of Ghent calls the

²² Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.1.1, ed. by L.O. Nielsen – T.B. Noone – C. Trifogli, "Thomas Wylton's Question on the Formal Distinction as Applied to the Divine", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), pp. 327–388, at pp. 351–352.

²³ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.1.2, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, p. 352: "Et ideo de talibus modis non quaerit quaestio, sed solum comprehendit modos qui ad perfectam unitatem pertinent, ut sit sensus quaestionis, utrum omnis modus indistinctionis ex parte rei sit inter huiusmodi rationes in divinis, puta quod, circumscripto opere intellectus, omnino nulla sit maior distinctio inter fortitudinem Dei et eius sapientiam quam inter sapientiam et se ipsam".

real distinction, though Wylton's manner of characterizing it is perhaps more indebted to Scotus's descriptions than to anything else. The other type of distinction that occupies the terrain of *distinctio aliquorum ex parte rei* is what Wylton describes as the more hidden distinction (*magis latens*). This distinction is known to be real not through the separability criterion, but because many real properties are known to belong to one feature of a thing that are incompatible with another of its features and/or a thing can be considered with respect to one of its real features without any consideration of another of its real features:

On account of the arguments stated, we should note that the first distinction of certain things on the part of reality is obvious; that distinction is usually called by everyone a real distinction and consists in things being separated from each other in regard to their being, or being separable in their being, or having an order or relation of dependence in terms of priority and posteriority in their natural being. Such a distinction may be shown to be real directly from the first principle. From that principle it follows that the self-same thing cannot be separated from itself or prior to itself in being, for from either of these it would follow that the self-same thing would simultaneously be and not be.

There is another distinction that obtains in the nature of things in such a way that it is not caused by the intellect, but it is lesser than the first and for that reason more hidden. This distinction, moreover, is not shown to be real in the aforementioned ways or in any one of them, but through another means, namely, that many real properties belong to one thing in the nature of the thing, but are incompatible with another. Furthermore, the thing can be known and considered by the intellect in terms of the one reality and for that moment not be known or considered in terms of the other reality.²⁴

²⁴ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, §§ 2.4.2.1–2.4.2.2.1, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, pp. 359–360: “Propter rationes est sciendum quod distinctio aliquorum ex parte rei est manifeste una quae usitato nomine ab omnibus ‘realis’ dicitur, videlicet aliquorum ab invicem in esse separatorum vel separabilium vel ordinem et dependentiam secundum rationem prioris et posterioris in esse naturali habentium, quae distinctio convincitur statim esse realem ex primo principio. Ex quo sequitur quod idem non potest esse separatum a se ipso nec prius in esse se ipso. Ex utroque enim sequeretur quod idem simul possit esse et non esse. Alia est distinctio in natura rei sic quod per considerationem intellectus non causatur, tamen minor alia et ideo magis latens. Haec autem distinctio non convincitur esse realis ex causis praedictis nec ex aliqua illarum, sed per alium modum, hunc videlicet quod multae proprietates reales insunt uni ratione rei quae aliae repugnant. Potest etiam cognosci et considerari ab intellectu secundum unam realitatem et pro tunc non cognosci vel considerari secundum aliam”.

This distinction, he acknowledges, goes by different names, some calling it intentional, others formal, others modal, and still others quidditative.²⁵ The name, Wylton feels, is of no account. What is important is that the distinction between the features does not result from any activity of the intellect.²⁶ As such, the formal distinction is useful to, and proves a valuable tool for, analyses of finite and infinite being, and it applies to a range of problems in philosophy and theology.

Along these lines, an instructive contrast may be drawn between Wylton's general presentation of the formal distinction and the overview provided of the formal, intentional and related distinctions by Scotus in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 33, qq. 1–2. Scotus introduces, and in precisely this order, the opinions of St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines so as to distinguish between those opinions and carefully assess their shortcomings.²⁷ Indeed, Peter Auriol continues the practice of Scotus by likewise keeping the distinctions that are similar to the formal distinction apart from it and assessing their merits

²⁵ By quidditative, Wylton is probably referring to the position of Alexander of Alexandria. See Alexander de Alexandria, *Quodl.*, q. 1, ed. B. Jansen, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), pp. 538–543, at p. 540; by modal, Wylton may be referring to the views of Godfrey of Fontaines expressed in *Quodl.* VII, q. 2, ed. M. de Wulf – J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1914 (Les Philosophes Belges, III), p. 283.

²⁶ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.4.2.2.2, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, p. 360: “Haec autem distinctio ab aliquibus dicitur ‘intentionalis’, ab aliquibus ‘formalis’, ab aliis ‘modalis’, ab aliis ‘quidditativa’. De eius tamen nomine non est cura, dummodo eius natura cognoscatur. Haec autem distinctio convincitur esse aliquo modo realis, pro quanto non dependet nec causatur ab opere intellectus, sed ex natura rei, quia eo ipso, quod aliqua proprietas realis inest uni ratione rei, quae alteri ratione rei non inest, sequitur ex primo principio, quod non-idem omnibus modis ex parte rei. Similiter eo ipso, quod potest cognosci secundum unam talium realitatum et hoc per se et non per medium extrinsecum, ut post dicitur, ipsa non cognita secundum aliam rationem, sequitur ex primo principio, cum idem secundum eandem rationem formalem obiecti non possit simul cognosci per se et non cognosci, quod istae realitates non sunt eadem omnibus modis ex parte obiecti, quod cognoscitur. Nam distinctio in actu cognoscendi eorum, quae cognoscuntur per se et directe et non per medium extrinsecum, significatur ex distinctione formalis rationis obiecti”.

²⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, dist. 33, q. 1, nn. 12–21 (M, f. 152r–152v); dist. 33, q. 2, nn. 43–55 (M, f. 154r–v). The pertinent texts for the distinction *in divinis* are: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 28, art. 2, in corp. et ad 2; Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*, art. 56, q. 4, ed. Parisiis 1520, vol. 2, f. 117r; and Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* VII, q. 2, ed. de Wulf – Hoffmans, p. 283. For the more general discussion regarding the respective distinctions proposed, see Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* V, q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1520, vol. 1, f. 223, and Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* III, q. 1, ed. M. de Wulf – A. Pelzer, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1904 (Les Philosophes Belges, II), pp. 160–174.

independently of the discussion of Scotus's formal distinction.²⁸ Wylton, on the other hand, seems intent on collapsing the intentional, formal, and modal distinctions into a generic distinction that fits under the rubric of real distinction, but one known to be real only by a comparison of the intelligible notes in the items distinguished. To the extent that this is so, we might characterize the impulse of Wylton as syncretist, though his commitment to making the formal distinction a subtype of real distinction seems to place him at some distance from the views of James of Ascoli and closer to the views of William Alnwick.

What is certain is that Wylton's manner of handling the type of objections that we saw above in Ascoli is quite distinctive. Wylton argues that for each formally distinct feature we may descend to formally distinct individuals possessing those features. For example, in the case of the formally distinct feature of rationality in a human being, we have an instance of this rationality which, Wylton maintains, is in a sense a distinct individual in one order of predication and distinct as such from any other of the formally distinct items found in this human being, Socrates.²⁹ Nor is the divine case altogether different in this respect:

Whatever kind of non-identity or distinction is found among any realities signified precisely in common and in the abstract, an equal non-identity holds between the precisely understood individuals of those realities, in whatever thing such individuals may be formally found. But entity, goodness and realities of this sort understood in general do not have every kind of real identity but have some distinction even apart from any effort of the intellect. Since, therefore, per se individuals pertaining to these notions are really and formally in God and not simply virtually,

²⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, sec. 23, nn. 49–52, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1956, pp. 980–983.

²⁹ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, §§ 2.2.3–2.2.3.1.1, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, pp. 353–354: “Et antequam probem primam, expono quid intelligo per ‘per se individua praecise accepta’, quod addidi quia aliter maior haberet calumniam. Non enim oportet quod qualis sit non-identitas inter rationalitatem et sensibilitatem, quod talis sit non-identitas inter Sortem et sensibilitatem. Nam Sortes per se primo modo includit sensibilitatem seu animalitatem, non sic autem rationalitas. Et causa est quia, licet Sortes sit suppositum rationalitatis, tamen non est eius per se et praecise individuum.

Sicut enim quantitas et substantia differunt genere, sic omnes species et individua contenta sub his genere distinguuntur. Diversorum enim generum et non subalternatim positorum etc., in *Praedicamentis*. Similiter hoc patet in formis quae secundum aliquos non sunt simpliciter diversae res. Qualem enim distinctionem aliquis ponit inter rationalitatem in communi et animalitatem, talem distinctionem habet consequenter ponere inter hanc rationalitatem accipiendo praecise individuum rationalitatis, non plicando totum suppositum, et hanc animalitatem—si realem, realem, si rationis, rationis”.

it follows that these individual features, existing in God, differ somehow on the part of reality.³⁰

We may say, accordingly, that Wylton's reply to the problem raised in the sixth objection of Ascoli is that there are a number of subjects multiplied—even in God—corresponding to the number of formally distinct items.³¹ What qualifies and softens this harsh consequence is that, following Scotus's lead in the *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, Wylton emphasizes that formally distinct items are only distinct in a certain sense (*secundum quid*) and introduces a distinction between the type of formal distinction that holds between features such as rationality and animality on the one hand and transcendental features such as unity and goodness on the other. In the case of the transcendentals and *a fortiori* in the case of the divine attributes, we have an unlimited nature, i.e. a nature that of itself has no intrinsic limitations, and hence there is no composition properly speaking whenever two or more such features coincide in the self-same subject.³²

As for the character of the distinction itself, Wylton finds no trouble in calling the distinction a real distinction albeit a qualified one, a point that comes clear in the following text:

Furthermore, we should note in regard to the real distinction simply and principally meant, as well as the distinction on the part of reality spoken of in the second way [i.e., the type of formal distinction found in the case of rationality and animality], even though the latter is not so thorough as the first, nonetheless the items simply and absolutely speaking are able to

³⁰ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.* q. 5, § 2.2.2, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, p. 353: “Qualiscumque est non-identitas seu distinctio inter aliquas realitates significatas in communi praecise et in abstracto, aequalis est non-identitas inter per se individua illarum praecise accepta, in quocumque illa individua formaliter inveniuntur. Sed entitas, bonitas et huiusmodi in communi acceptae non habent omnem modum identitatis realis, sed aliquam distinctionem, omni opere intellectus circumscripto. Cum ergo per se individua istarum rationum sint in Deo formaliter et realiter, non virtualiter solum, sequitur quod istae rationes singulares in Deo existentes aliquo modo ex parte rei differunt”.

³¹ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.6.2.3.1, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, p. 374: “Cum ergo accipitur ulterius in ratione quod, multiplicato inferiori, multiplicatur superius, licet haec posset negari in divinis—nam ibi multiplicantur supposita, et non multiplicatur essentia—tamen aliter dico magis ad rem quod, sicut sunt in divinis multae formalitates ex natura rei multitudine dicta secundum quid, ita sunt ibi multae realitates, sed nec huiusmodi multitudo formalitatum nec realitatum dicta secundum quid arguit compositionem aliquam in Deo, ut supra declaratum est”.

³² Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.4.2.2.3.2, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, pp. 360–361.

be said to be really distinguished simply and absolutely speaking, because one of them is truly and absolutely denied to be the other in the abstract. But the distinction on the part of the thing taken in the third way [i.e., the one involving the transcendentals] does not denominate any things really distinct, absolutely speaking, but only according to some modes of unity such as being one in the first mode according to which items are synonymously convertible. Wherefore, I say that no two things in the entire world are the same altogether on the part of reality except those that are the same synonymously or the self-same, provided we understand the modes of identity opposed to the aforementioned threefold distinction on the part of reality. Therefore the last mentioned distinction on the part of reality is contained under the real distinction, as the real distinction is distinguished over and against a distinction caused by the consideration of the intellect. Nonetheless, the real distinction is said of the first two modes and of this last in the same way that 'being outside the soul' is said of being in act and being in potency and as 'unity' is said of things one in genus, species, and number. For, although being in potency is real being inasmuch as real being is distinct from being as true (which depends on the work of the intellect), one should not grant that being as potency is, simply and absolutely speaking, real being unless one adds some mode, such as 'real being in a sense or as diminished'; in reference to such a qualification, it is consistent to say that, absolutely and simply speaking, such a thing was not a real being at all simply speaking. [...] Although the final mentioned distinction is on the part of reality and is uncaused by the intellect, it is nonetheless a real distinction in a qualified sense, since it is consistent with the highest degree of simplicity, as is clear in regard to paternity and the essence, and the acts of generating and spirating. And the same point holds true in reference to the transcendentals, as was said above.³³

³³ Thomas Wylton, *Quodl.*, q. 5, § 2.4.2.3, ed. Nielsen – Noone – Trifogli, pp. 361–362: "Ulterius sciendum quod distinctio realis simpliciter et principaliter dicta, distinctio autem ex parte rei secundo modo dicta, licet non sit ita perfecta sicut prima, tamen simpliciter et absolute loquendo talia possunt dici distingui realiter ex hoc quod unum eorum vere et absolute in abstracto negatur ab alio. Sed distinctio ex parte rei tertio modo dicta non denominat aliqua esse realiter distincta simpliciter absolute, sed solum cum quibusdam modis unitatis, cuius sunt per se primo modo, in quantum convertuntur sinonimice. Unde dico quod nulla duo in toto mundo sunt omnibus modis idem ex parte rei, accipiendo modos identitatis oppositos triplici distinctioni ex parte rei praedictae nisi quae sunt idem sinonimice vel idem sibi. Distinctio ergo ex parte rei ultima est distinctio contenta sub distinctione reali, ut distinctio realis distinguitur contra distinctionem quae causatur per considerationem intellectus. Tamen 'distinctio realis' dicitur de primis duobus modis et de isto modo ultimo sicut 'ens per se extra animam' dicitur de ente in actu et ente in potentia, et sicut 'unum' dicitur de uno genere, specie et numero. Nam licet ens in potentia sit ens reale, ut ens reale distinguitur contra ens verum, quod dependet ab opere intellectus, non tamen est concedendum simpliciter et absolute quod ens in potentia est ens reale nisi addendo aliquem modum, puta est ens reale secundum quid vel diminutum, cum quo stat simpliciter et absolute loquendo

Before turning to our final author, we may assess the taxonomy of the formal distinction among the two authors examined thus far as follows: Ascoli proposes that distinctions are three in type: real, *ex natura rei* (also known as a qualified or intermediate distinction), and of reason; Wylton proposes that there are two kinds of distinctions, real and the distinction of reason, but he subdivides the real distinction into the principal real distinction, holding between two substances, for example, and the qualified real distinction. The latter, in turn, he identifies with the formal, intentional and modal distinctions, while subdividing it accordingly as the items distinguished are found in a limited or unlimited nature; if a limited nature is involved, then the formalities will have some degree of composition in the subject that they co-constitute, but if the nature is unlimited, then there is no composition in the subject possessing the features that are formally distinct. Whether the two different schemes of distinctions are so fundamentally opposed as may first appear is something open to question. The two objections we encountered in Ascoli's presentation of the formal distinction recur in Wylton, who develops a quite different way of handling both of them.

WILLIAM ALNWICK

When we come to Alnwick's *Determinatio*, q. 14, we encounter a question that seems to address principally intramural Scotistic concerns. Instead of asking whether some distinction is compatible with the simplicity of God or whether the *rationes* found in God are really the same, Alnwick asks about the distinction itself and the type of items it distinguishes by asking whether items that are distinct *ex natura rei* are really distinct ("Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei sint distincta realiter"). In his reply, Alnwick first summarizes the position of Ascoli as being committed to the view that some things are distinct *ex natura rei* that are not, nonetheless, really distinct. His summary is fairly accurate, if perhaps he slightly exaggerates the extent of the disagreement between himself and Ascoli. What is clear is that, following

quod non sit ens reale simpliciter [...]. Licet huiusmodi distinctio ultima sit ex parte rei, non causata ab opere intellectus, tamen est distinctio realis secundum quid, quoniam stat cum summa simplicitate, ut patet de paternitate et essentia et actu generandi et spirandi. Et eodem modo in transcendentibus, ut dictum est".

the line of Wylton, Alnwick too wishes to locate the formal distinction within the scope of the real distinction:

It seems to me that the following consequence holds good absolutely: if some things are distinct *ex natura rei*, they are really distinct and in the manner in which they are distinct *ex natura rei*, they are really distinct. Hence if things are simply distinct *ex natura rei*, they are simply distinct really; if they are distinct *secundum quid ex natura rei*, they are really distinct *secundum quid*; and if they are formally distinct *ex natura rei*, they are formally and really distinct. For between a thing of reality and reason there is no medium, because every positive thing either has actual being or exists only in a concept. If it is of the former sort, it is a being apart from the soul; if it is of the second sort, it is a being of reason within the soul, and thus there is no medium between a being of reason and a real being. Accordingly, there is no intermediate distinction between a distinction of reason and a real distinction. Since a distinction *ex natura rei* is not a distinction of reason, it must be a real distinction.³⁴

Yet even after so firmly committing himself to understanding the formal distinction in the way that was sketched out by Scotus's later writings and marked out slightly more firmly by Wylton, Alnwick feels the need, like Scotus before him, to accommodate the intentional distinction of Henry of Ghent. Fully a third of the question is aimed at exploring the reasons why Henry's intentional distinction must in the end be a kind of real distinction and not an intermediate distinction and, likewise, once Henry's distinction is understood as a subtype of real distinction it is practically identical to the formal distinction of Duns Scotus. In this respect, too, Alnwick seems to be following Wylton's tendency to identify the formal and intentional distinctions, though Alnwick's complicated treatment argues to that conclusion after much analysis

³⁴ Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Determinatio*, q. 14, n. 14, in T.B. Noone, "Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction", *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993), pp. 231–261, at p. 250: "Ideo videtur mihi dicendum quod absolute ista consequentia est bona: si aliqua distinguuntur ex natura rei, quod distinguuntur realiter, et quod eo modo quo aliqua distinguuntur ex natura rei, distinguuntur realiter: ut si simpliciter distinguuntur ex natura rei, simpliciter distinguuntur secundum rem; si secundum quid distinguuntur ex natura rei, secundum quid distinguuntur secundum rem; et si formaliter distinguuntur ex natura rei, formaliter distinguuntur secundum rem. Quia inter rem et rationem non est medium. Omne enim positivum aut habet esse in effectu aut in conceptu tantum. Si primo modo, est res extra animam; si secundo modo, est ens rationis in anima, et ita non est medium inter ens rationis et ens reale, igitur non est distinctio media inter distinctionem secundum rationem et distinctionem secundum rem. Cum igitur distinctio ex natura rei non sit distinctio secundum rationem, sequitur quod sit distinctio secundum rem".

and elaboration, whereas Wylton's identification consists in the simple assertion that the formal and intentional distinctions are the same.

My findings lead me to conclude, therefore, that the pattern of interpreting the formal distinction as an intermediate distinction is quite ancient within Scotism and goes right back to the first-generation of Scotists and to Scotus himself in his various writings; in this sense, Leibniz's formulation seems to enjoy some historical justification. Second, like Scotus before them, some Scotists, such as James of Ascoli, were reluctant to call the formal distinction a real distinction. Third, nonetheless, some early Scotists were willing to account the formal distinction a real distinction, but when they do so they explicitly distinguish that type of real distinction from Henry of Ghent's sense of real distinction. Fourth, Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick all have some degree of textual dependency upon the Parisian treatment of the formal distinction by Scotus and, as such, show the importance of taking Scotus's Parisian teaching into account in making any general assessment of his thought.

A final note, however, is that the objections that preoccupy the three thinkers did not trouble all those dealing with the formal distinction in the period under consideration, as may be readily seen in the treatments of Petrus Thomae and Peter Auriol. Petrus Thomae does not seem to be bothered much at all with articulating the precise sense in which the formal distinction is a real distinction or an intermediate distinction. Instead, he makes the most general division of distinctions to be between those differences arising from an act of a comparative power, whether intellect, will, or memory, and those differences that do not depend upon an act of a comparative power. Under the latter heading, identified as bespeaking a real distinction (*distinctio ex natura rei*), Petrus proceeds to line up distinctions of essence and essence, reality and reality, reality and thing, formality and formality, formality and thing, and intrinsic mode and subject.³⁵ The first of these subheadings, the distinction of essence and essence, is the one that most closely parallels the real distinction in the principal sense traceable back to the writings of Henry of Ghent. Perhaps this broader accounting of distinctions would have saved our authors from making so much over

³⁵ Petrus Thomae, *Quodl.*, pars prima, q. 7, art. 1 in Petrus Thomae, *Quodlibet*, ed. R. Hooper – E. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1957, pp. 119–123. Cf. G.G. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1959, pp. 54–57, 68–132.

their disagreements. For example, Peter Auriol, while listing objections similar to those troubling our authors, seems to marshal a much better defense of the formal distinction against its major opponents than one finds in any of the authors treated here, despite his ultimate rejection of the formal distinction on the grounds that it compromises the divine simplicity and that it is unneeded once one allows Auriol's own postulate of transcendental connotative terms.³⁶ One might suggest, accordingly, that the efforts of the early Scotists would have been better spent elsewhere.

³⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 8, sec. 23, nn. 118–141, ed. Buytaert, pp. 1004–1010. See in particular Peter's response to objections 5 and 6: *ibid.*, nn. 123–124, ed. Buytaert, p. 1006.

THE UNPLEASANTNESS WITH THE AGENT INTELLECT IN MEISTER ECKHART

Wouter Goris (Amsterdam)

jch sprach zo paris in der schoelen, dat alle dynck sollen
volbracht werden an deme rechten oitmoedegen myn-
schene

Meister Eckhart, Pr. 14 (DW I, 235)

A famous pericope in the epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans reads as follows: “For we know that the whole of creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now” (Rom. 8, v. 22). The whole of creation sighs and is in labour until the present day. This has always struck me as quite unfair.

The context is that the sons of God, as joint-heirs with Christ, thus Paul says, will be glorified together with Him. The Apostle underscores the cosmic dimension of this glorification. The whole of creation waits for the manifestation of the sons of God. Creation itself, which shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God, groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only creatures, the Apostle adds, we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the redemption of our body.

Now, it makes sense that man is waiting for redemption, for it was man who sinned in the first place. But why should the whole of creation be redeemed? To put it in other words: what is man, that with him, the whole of creation should suffer?

The whole of creation sighs and is in labour until the present day. Thomas Aquinas interprets the text as follows. First of all he describes the problems which arise if one relates the expression ‘*omnis creatura*’ to sensible creatures and the celestial bodies. Then he continues:

If however this passage is interpreted in relation to man, thus human nature is called ‘the whole of creation’ (*omnis creatura*), because it has something in common with every creature: with spiritual creatures in regard to the intellect, with ensouled creatures in giving the soul to the body, with bodily creatures in regard to the body.¹

¹ Th. Aquinas, *In Epist. ad Rom.*, c. VIII, lect. 4, ed. Frettté, vol. 20, p. 495b: “Si vero exponatur de hominibus, sic dicitur humana natura *omnis creatura*, quia participat cum

Human nature itself, then, can be interpreted as ‘the whole of creation’, for man has something in common with all creatures—a traditional idea. I am not entirely reassured that this interpretation does justice to the meaning of Paul’s text, but that is another question.

It is important to see the correspondence between this interpretative strategy and the way Aquinas deals with Kohelet 1, v. 7: “Unto the place from whence the rivers come, there they return again”. More than 15 years ago, Jan Aertsen called our attention to Aquinas’s approach to this text in the Prologue to the third book of the Sentences-commentary, dealing with the theme of the Incarnation.² “The place from whence the rivers come’ is God. By ‘the rivers’ we have to understand the natural perfections (*bonitates*), which God has communicated to creatures, like being, life and cognition. In the created reality outside of man, these rivers exist separately and disparately, but in man they are in a certain way gathered together. Man is the quasi horizon and boundary of spiritual and corporeal nature, such that he, as the quasi middle between them, participates both in their spiritual and corporeal perfections. When therefore, Aquinas concludes, human nature by the mystery of Incarnation is connected to God, all rivers of natural perfections are bent back and returned to their origin.”³

If man returns to God through the Incarnation, then through him, in a certain way, the whole of creation returns to its origin. This is the perfection of the universe in man according to Thomas Aquinas. We should note that first of all, it has a theological component, the doctrine of Incarnation, and is thus based on faith. Secondly, we should not forget that this affirmation is governed by a ‘quodammodo’. Since man is only ‘in a certain way’ all creatures, the return of man to God accomplishes only ‘in a certain way’ the perfection of the universe.

omni creatura: cum spirituali quidem quantum ad intellectum, cum animali quantum ad corporis animationem, cum corporali quantum ad corpus”.

² Cf. J.A. Aertsen, “Natur, Mensch und der Kreislauf der Dinge bei Thomas von Aquin”, in: *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter*, ed. A. Zimmermann – A. Speer, Berlin – New York 1991 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 21), pp. 143–160.

³ Th. Aquinas, *In III Sent., Prol.*, ed. M.F. Moos, Paris 1933, pp. 1–2: “Flumina ista sunt naturales bonitates quas Deus creaturis influit [...]. Sed locus unde ista flumina exeunt, ipse Deus est [...]. Istia flumina in aliis creaturis inveniuntur distincta; sed in homine quodammodo omnia congregantur. Homo enim est quasi horizon et confinium spiritualis et corporalis naturae, ut quasi medium inter utrasque, utrasque bonitates participet et corporales et spirituales [...]. Et ideo quando humana natura per Incarnationis mysterium Deo conjuncta est, omnia flumina naturalium bonitatum ad suum principium reflexa redierunt”.

Now this 'quodammodo' disappears in the doctrine of Meister Eckhart. The consequence of this is that he must explain how man literally brings about the perfection of the universe. This doctrine being multifaceted,⁴ I want to concentrate here on a small, though unmistakable problem, and that is the relation of activity and passivity. Put in other words, how does the perfection of the universe relate to the perfection of man himself?

Without any doubt, one of the first associations that comes to the mind of someone hearing the name 'Eckhart', is the vital connection between knowledge and passivity, exemplified by the key-term 'detachment' (*abegescheidenheit* in Middle-High-German).

It is well-known that Eckhart urges his audience to assume, here and now, the possibility of *withdrawing* from a worldly life orientated towards creatures and of creating the *emptiness* which forces God to overflow into the soul with all His powers. The Birth of God in the Soul presupposes detachment, passivity, emptiness, the absence of all creaturely fulfillment, the abandonment of all action.⁵

It will cause no wonder, therefore, to hear an authority like Alain de Libera claim in his *Introduction à la mystique rhénane*: "Eckhart hardly ever refers to the concept of an *agent* intellect, and on those few occasions his approach remains rather doxographical".⁶

I always admired this fine assertion in de Libera. It gives us something to hold on to. Everything may remain unsettled and even disputed in Eckhart, but at least this much seems to be certain: There is, apart from some references to positions of other thinkers, no positive use of the

⁴ Cf. W. Goris, *Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts*, Leiden – New York – Köln 1997. Elsewhere, I have pointed at the intimate connection between this doctrine of Eckhart's and the Neoplatonic trias of *mone*, *proodos*, and *epistrophe*: "Der Mensch im Kreislauf des Seins. Von 'Neuplatonismus' zu 'Subjektivität' bei Meister Eckhart", in *Selbst—Singularität—Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus*, ed. T. Kobusch et al., Amsterdam – Philadelphia 2003, pp. 185–201.

⁵ For an excellent overview cf. B. McGinn, *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart. The Man from Whom God Hid Nothing*, New York 2001; for the broader context cf. N. Largier, "Intellectus in deum ascensus. Intellekttheoretische Auseinandersetzungen in Texten der deutschen Mystik", in: *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 69 (1995), pp. 423–471.

⁶ A. de Libera, *Introduction à la mystique rhénane*, Paris 1984, p. 303, note 87: "De fait, il fait rarement référence à la notion d'intellect agent, en ces quelques occasions sa démarche reste plutôt doxographique". Cf. also B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart. Analogy, Unicity and Unity*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia 2001, p. 41: "The intellectus agens lies beyond the scope of Eckhart's interest".

notion of the agent intellect in the work of this German Dominican, and there seems indeed to be no *doctrinal place* this notion could possibly occupy there, either.

If I now proceed to give a rough sketch of the place that the notion of the agent intellect *does occupy* in the work of Eckhart, I do not do so to contradict an incidental remark of de Libera, but, on the contrary, because I agree, in a sense, with his affirmation that for this conception of the agent intellect, which we will present here, there is, in the thought of Meister Eckhart, eventually *no* real place.

The positive use of the notion of the agent intellect in Eckhart can be grasped through some quotations. Each in itself is sufficient to make the point. The first quote is from the recently edited German sermon 109:

All creatures direct their course to their highest perfection. All creatures pose themselves in my intellect, so that they exist spiritually in me. I alone bring back all creatures to God again. Mind, what you're all doing!⁷

No mention of an agent intellect yet. Creatures pose themselves in my intellect, where they receive their *esse spirituale*. And this leads to the sudden and rather striking remark, that I alone bring back all creatures to God again. This first person singular, I, apparently is some universal I, for Eckhart infers that *we all* must become aware of this remarkable and, for some of us, indeed even unsuspected capacity to help creatures return to their origin.⁸

In another recently edited German sermon, nr. 104, we find a tripartite theory of intellect (to which we will return later on). "Man", Eckhart says here, "has an agent intellect, a passive intellect and a possible intellect".⁹ We must resist the temptation to focus on the promising distinction between passive and possible intellect and turn to the description of the agent intellect instead. Eckhart portrays the agent intellect as an intellect acting in creatures and explains this action as:

⁷ Meister Eckhart, Pr. 109, *Deutsche Werke* IV, pp. 767–769: "Nû merket! Alle crêatûren hânt irn louf ûf ir hœhste volkomenheit. [...] Alle crêatûren tragent sich in mîn vernunft, daz sie in mir vernünftic sîn. Ich aleine bereite alle crêatûren wider ze gote. Wartet, waz ir alle tuot!"

⁸ On this "Theory of the I" cf. B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart*; id., "Die Theorie des Ich in seiner Selbst- und Weltbegründung bei Meister Eckhart", in *L'homme et son univers au moyen âge*, ed. C. Wenin, Louvain-la-Neuve 1982, vol. 1, pp. 267–272.

⁹ Meister Eckhart, Pr. 104, *Deutsche Werke* IV, p. 568: "Der mensche hât eine wûrkende vernunft und eine lidende vernunft und eine mûgeliche vernunft".

“an ordering and a bringing back of a creature to its origin”.¹⁰ Similarly he speaks in sermon 37 of the active power of the intellect, which gives all things a new being and raises them up to God.¹¹

Consequently, we must admit that there is, in Eckhart, not only a positive *use* of the notion of the agent intellect itself, but also, at first sight, a clearly defined doctrinal *place* for it. His conception of the agent intellect is of a faculty which expresses the dignity of our knowledge, referring every creature back to its origin. In the German sermon nr. 80, *Homo quidam erat dives*, Eckhart informs us concerning his sources.

The *Liber de causis* plays a central role in this sermon. The rich man in Luke, *Homo quidam erat dives*, and the first cause, *dives per se*. One of the properties of the first cause is that it flows over in all things. Eckhart adds:

With regard to this, Bishop Albert says: In three ways it flows over in all things *universally*: with being, with life and with light, but *in particular* in the reasonable soul in its capacity to know all things and in its bringing back all creatures to their first origin. This is the Light of Lights.¹²

Eckhart evidently refers to the beginning of the second book of Albert's commentary on the *Liber de Causis*, which deals with the different names which *De causis* received in the tradition. The School of Avicenna called it: 'On the Light of Lights' (*De lumine luminum*). In the explanation of this title, Albert declares that the first cause, in a threefold way, flows into things: first there is an influence constitutive of being, then there is an influence which produces virtue, and finally a third: the "influentia reductionis ad primum fontem".¹³

¹⁰ *Ibid.*: "(Swenne si sich vernünftliche üebet in der créature als) in einer ordenunge und widertragenne der créature wider in irn ursprunc".

¹¹ Meister Eckhart, Pr. 37, *Deutsche Werke* II, p. 223: "Mit der würcenden kraft sô treget si alliu dinc ûf in got".

¹² Meister Eckhart, Pr. 80, *Deutsche Werke* III, p. 385: "Hie von spricht bischof Albreht: drierhande wîs vliuzet er ûz in alliu dinc gemeinliche: mit wesene und mit lebene und mit liehte und sunderliche in die vernünftigen sêle an mûgentheit aller dinge und an einem widerrucke der créaturen in irn êrsten ursprunc: diz ist lieht der liehte".

¹³ Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, II, 1, 1, ed. W. Fauser, Münster 1993 (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, ed. Colon. XVII/2), p. 61,16–22: "...cum lumen primae causae tripliciter influat rebus, scilicet influentia constitutionis ad esse et influentia irradiationis ad perfectionem virtutis et operis et influentia reductionis ad primum fontem ut ad boni principium, et huius influentia luminis omnis illuminationis principium sit et lumen, erit ipsum lumen luminum".

Whereas the proper point is rather absent in this passage—for here it is the first cause which leads all things back to itself—, readers of Albert know that the concludary section of *De intellectu et intelligibili* unequivocally affirms that it is the human intellect as God's agent that brings back all things to their origin.¹⁴ The argument runs as follows.

The forms which flow into matter from the light of the first cause and the separate intelligences, strive to reach divine being (*esse divinum*). They only reach divine being, though, if they are separated from matter. So they must be led back to divine being by some intellect which separates them from matter. This cannot be any pure intellect—for pure intellects already hold these forms in their purity—, but only the human soul. So it is the human intellect that brings back all things to their origin.¹⁵

It is our suggestion, therefore, that Albert the Great stands in the background of Eckhart's theory of the agent intellect, bringing back every creature to its first origin.

Albert's doctrine is deeply embedded in the neoplatonist tradition, and in the arabic speculation on intellect as well.¹⁶ It's the very idea of mediate causality that dictates this whole scheme. The superior does not directly act on the inferior. A mediator acts on the inferior through the strength gained from the superior and leads it back to the source from which it originated, thereby bringing the causality of the superior to its fulfilment.

Just the same as the material forms are not produced *directly* by the first cause, but by mediation of the soul, which is the ultimate link between the material and the immaterial, similarly these material forms do not *return* directly to the first cause, but only by mediation of the human intellect, which separates them from matter and connects them to their *esse divinum*.

¹⁴ Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II, 12, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris 1890 (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, ed. Paris. IX), p. 520a: "Hujusmodi autem reductio [...] fiet ergo necessario per intellectum hominis".

¹⁵ *Ibid.*: "Oportet igitur quod per separantem a materia intellectum ad esse divinum reducuntur. Hujusmodi autem reductio non fit per intellectum mundi, quia illarum intellectus habet eas separatas in esse et operatione divina; fiet ergo necessario per intellectum hominis qui ad hoc habet vires et organa, ut a materia accipiat formas divinas".

¹⁶ Cf. C. Steel, "Abraham und Odysseus. Christliche und neuplatonische Eschatologie", in *Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter*, ed. J.A. Aertsen – M. Pickavé, Berlin – New York 2002 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 29), pp. 115–137.

Now man's intellectual act is a proper and substantial part of the theory of the intellect that Albert the Great has formulated. Meister Eckhart, conversely, has a theory of intellect, according to which the consideration of the tiniest creature makes man lose God completely. Whereas our intellection makes creatures return to their origin and gain their perfection, our own perfection makes it necessary to detach ourselves from creatures and their perfection.

Is there any positive place left, then, for an agent intellect? Is it not so that as long as man contributes to the perfection of the universe, he forfeits his own perfection? Or to put it even more bluntly: Isn't man supposed, not to save the world, but to turn his back to the world, for his own salvation?

In the sermon nr. 104, the one with the tripartite division of the intellect, the unpleasantness with the agent intellect sharply comes to the fore. First, we must consider the tripartite division itself.¹⁷

"Man has an agent intellect, a passive intellect and a possible intellect". The agent intellect as intellect, we saw already, acts in creatures, "in an ordering and a bringing back of the creature to its origin".¹⁸ Intellect is called agent intellect here, because this work is within its own power—later on, Eckhart invests the agent intellect with its traditional attributes and functions.¹⁹ But if God is the one doing the working, Eckhart continues, our spirit has to keep itself purely receptive. This entirely receptive or *passive* intellect presupposes a moment of *possible* intellect, which keeps an eye on both of them: what God can work and what our spirit can receive, so that this twofold action be accomplished according to its possibility.

Of the one [the agent intellect], spirit disposes in a state of activity, when it accomplishes the work itself. Of the other [the passive intellect] it disposes in a state of passivity, thus: if God is the one doing the working, then the spirit should be silent and let God work. And before this work is begun by the spirit and accomplished by God, the spirit looks over it and knows it is possible—that it can and could well happen. This is called possible intellect, but it is often thwarted and doesn't become fertile.²⁰

¹⁷ Cf. R. Guerizoli, *Die Verinnerlichung des Göttlichen. Eine Studie über den Predigtzyklus von der ewigen geburt (Prr. 101–104) und die Armutspredigt (Pr. 52) Meister Eckharts*, Leiden – Boston 2005.

¹⁸ Cf. *supra*, notes 9 and 10.

¹⁹ Cf. *infra*, note 22.

²⁰ Meister Eckhart, Pr. 104, *Deutsche Werke* IV, pp. 571–572: "Einez hât er in einem wûrkenne, daz ist, sô der geist selber des werkes pfliget. Daz ander hât er in einem

So, at the heart of the distinction between passive and possible intellect lies the necessity of an insight into the range of possibilities so that man may reduce himself to a state of pure passivity, which would allow God to be the one to work. Without this possible intellect, then, there is no passive intellect. If it is thwarted and doesn't become fertile, theoretical activity or preaching might help to create the required awareness.

In this notion of a possible intellect, Eckhart's own speculative endeavour resides. His theory shows the necessity for man to *reduce* himself to a state of pure passivity and thereby *induce* God's grace. What becomes visible in the possible intellect is that by nature something is possible that by nature man cannot accomplish it.

In a sense, everybody has to cope with this same problem in the age after Thomas Aquinas: if it is true that the functioning of our intellect in the present state is defined by its abstractive power—such that the *quiditas rei materialis* is its proper object—, it is also true that this cannot be the *nature* of our intellect, to be focussed on what can be abstracted from the senses, for otherwise the beatific vision would not be the fulfilment of our natural desire.²¹ Differently from most other thinkers, Eckhart assumes already in the present state the possibility of transcending the constraints of the agent intellect.

The possible intellect creates the awareness that man is not bound by its agent intellect, but can, in a sense, switch off the natural light of reason. After a discussion of the relation between agent intellect and passive intellect—the agent intellect abstracting the phantasmata from the conditions of materiality and informing the passive intellect by an intelligible species²²—, Eckhart specifies the conditions of such an elimination of the agent intellect.

lidenne, daz ist, sô sich got des werkes underwindet, sô sol und muoz sich der geist stille halten und got lâzen wûrken. Und ê diz anegevangen werde von dem geiste und von gote volbrâht, sô hât der geist ein anesehen dar zuo und ein mûgelich erkennen, daz ez allez wol geschehen mac und môhte, und daz heizet diu mûgeliche vernunft, aleine daz si doch vîl versûmet werde und niemer ze vruht enkome”.

²¹ Cf. W. Goris, “Die Vergegenwärtigung des Heils. Thomas von Aquin und die Folgezeit”, in *Ende und Vollendung*, pp. 417–433. For the critique of Aquinas's doctrine by Duns Scotus, cf. L. Honnefelder, *Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Münster 1979 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 16), pp. 63 sqq.

²² Cf. Meister Eckhart, Pr. 104, *Deutsche Werke* IV, pp. 585–587: “Die wûrkende vernunft houwet diu bilde abe von den ûzern dingen und entkleidet sie von materie und von zuovalle und setzt sie in die lidenende vernunft, und diu gebirt ir geistlichiu bilde in sie. Und sô diu lidenende vernunft von der wûrkenden swanger worden ist, sô

Since the agent intellect belongs to the natural state of man and the passive intellect needs some active instance which informs it, the only possibility for man to discard his agent intellect is when God takes over the function of the agent intellect.

All that, which the agent intellect accomplishes in a natural man, the same and much more God accomplishes in a detached man. He takes away the agent intellect and puts himself in its place and achieves himself everything the agent intellect would accomplish. Really: if man abandons all activity and the agent intellect is silent, God necessarily takes over the work and gives birth to himself in the passive intellect.²³

Even if it's tempting to dwell here on speculations on *l'Augustinisme avicennisant*—God as the agent intellect which illuminates reason—, we shall come to a conclusion instead. (i) There is a doctrine of the agent intellect in Meister Eckhart. It has got a well-defined content. It is the function of the agent intellect to bring back every creature to its origin. Man brings about the perfection of the universe. (ii) The doctrine of the perfection of man in Meister Eckhart says that man has to abandon his agent intellect to let God alone inform his passive intellect. Man consequently must abandon the activity which brings about the perfection of the universe. (iii) To conclude: The perfection of man requires him to abandon the universe to its own fate.

A patent lack of solidarity...

behebet und bekennet si diu dinc mit helfe der wûrkenden vernunft. Nochdenne enmac diu lîdende vernunft diu dinc niht behalten in bekantnisse, diu wûrkende enmûeze sie anderwerbe erliuhten”.

²³ Meister Eckhart, Pr. 104, *Deutsche Werke* IV, pp. 587–589: “Sehet, allez daz diu wûrkende vernunft tuot an einem natiurlichen menschen, daz selbe und verre mê tuot got an einem abegescheiden menschen. Er nimet im abe die wûrkende vernunft und setzet sich selber an ir stat wider und wûrket selber dâ allez daz, daz diu wûrkende vernunft solte wûrken. Eyâ, swenne sich der mensche zemâle mûeziget und diu wûrkende vernunft an im gesiget, sô muoz sich got von nôt des werkes underwinden und muoz selber dâ werkmeister sîn und sich selber gebern in die lîdende vernunft”.

BEATIFIC VISION

DURANDUS OF ST.-POURÇAIN AND PETER AURIOL ON THE ACT OF BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

My intention in this paper is to examine and compare the views of Durandus of St.-Pourçain and Peter Auriol on the act of beatific enjoyment (*fruitio beatifica*). The two masters have articulated their views in their *Sentences* commentaries, Book 1, Distinction 1. I will discuss two questions in this paper: (1) What is beatific enjoyment? (2) What is its proper object? Both Durandus and Auriol agree that beatific enjoyment is the pleasure and delight experienced by the blessed in the direct vision of God. The point of disagreement and debate between the masters is whether the immediate object of enjoyment is God alone or the act by which the blessed attain God. For Durandus, the immediate object of enjoyment is the act of attaining the direct vision of God, whereas God Himself is only the remote object. For Auriol, God Himself is the immediate object of enjoyment.

The distinction between enjoyment (*frui*) and use (*uti*) was introduced by Augustine in his treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, Book 1. Augustine conceived enjoyment and use in terms of rational volitional activity. He regarded enjoyment as a form of love of an object *propter se*, whereas he conceived of use as a form of love of an object *propter aliud*. Enjoyment, in particular, can be sinful or praiseworthy, depending on the orientation of the will. Sinful enjoyment is fundamentally a perverse love of sin and evil. Praiseworthy enjoyment is an expression of a rightly directed will, and it can be either perfect or imperfect. It is perfect in heaven, where its proper object, i.e. the divine Trinity, is attained. In the conditions of our earthly life, we are still in a state of exile from God and from our homeland, and we can, therefore, enjoy God only imperfectly.¹

¹ For Augustine's *util/frui* distinction, cf. O. O'Donovan, "Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana I", *The Journal of Theological Studies* 33 (1982),

Augustine's distinction was made available to later scholastic thinkers with the introduction of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as the basic textbook of systematic theology in the theological faculties at Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge in the thirteenth-century. As a result of the rediscovery of the philosophical heritage of Aristotle, we find the Philosopher also participating in the scholastic battle over terms, concepts, and theories along with Augustine in almost every commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the authors treated in this study appeal to both Aristotle and Augustine in support of their analysis of beatific enjoyment.²

II. DURANDUS OF ST.-POURÇAIN: ENJOYMENT AS DELIGHT AND REST IN THE ATTAINMENT AND VISION OF GOD

In the opening question of the first distinction of his commentary on Book 1 of Lombard's *Sentences*, Durandus provides a terminological analysis of the term *fruitio*. Following Augustine, Durandus says that a fruit is, generally speaking, something that we hope to receive when we experience hunger and want to eat and satisfy our appetite. The expectation itself involves a certain pleasure. Pleasure, in its turn, requires a certain cognition. We can experience delight only as long as we have an act of cognition, a knowledge that the object we want will bring us satisfaction. The pleasure that we feel when we obtain something pleasant must necessarily bring rest to the appetite. Thus, according to Durandus, enjoyment demands three things: cognition (*cognitio*), pleasure (*delectatio*), and rest (*quietatio*).³

pp. 361–397; R. Canning, *The Unity of Love of God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Leuven 1993, pp. 79–115.

² For a treatment of *fruitio* in scholastic theology and philosophy cf. K. Georgedes, *The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge. Enjoyment and Use in Fourteenth-Century Theology*, Madison, WI 1995; W.J. Courtenay, "Between Despair and Love. Some Late Modifications of Augustine's Teaching on Fruition and Psychic States", in *Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300–1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. K. Hagen, Leiden 1990, pp. 11–14; W.J. Courtenay, *Scholars and Schools in Fourteenth Century England*, Princeton, NJ 1987; A.S. McGrade, "Enjoyment after Ockham. Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God", in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, ed. A. Hudson – M. Wilks, London 1987, pp. 63–88; for a discussion of *fruitio* in the context of the history of the doctrine of the beatific vision, cf. C. Trottmann, *La vision béatifique. Des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII*, Roma 1995.

³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 5, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 13vb: "Quantum ad primum, sciendum est, quod significata nominum probare non

The next step in the analysis of *fruitio* is to define the relationships between cognition and pleasure, on the one hand, and pleasure and rest, on the other. For Durandus, cognition does not pertain intrinsically (*intrinsece*) to the essence of enjoyment. It is required for enjoyment as an antecedent element. Enjoyment is not essentially cognition, because cognition is not pleasure and it can exist without pleasure, whereas enjoyment is either the same as pleasure or it is inseparable from it. The minor premise—"cognition is not pleasure"—can be proven in the following manner. First, cognition and pleasure are distinct, because each belongs to a separate potency of the soul. Cognition is a part of the apprehensive faculty, whereas pleasure is a part of the appetitive faculty. Second, cognition can occur without pleasure either naturally or by means of the divine power. Since cognition is causally prior to pleasure, therefore it can occur naturally without pleasure. Furthermore, from the perspective of the divine power, it is possible that God allow a person to obtain the character of the supreme good and feel no pleasure. However, there is no enjoyment without pleasure. Otherwise, it would follow that a happy person might feel sadness (*tristitia*) instead of pleasure. The reason for this conclusion is that if enjoyment did not coexist with pleasure, then it would certainly coexist with sadness, which is the opposite of pleasure; and sadness, just as much as pleasure, requires a certain cognition. Therefore, enjoyment is not essentially cognition, but requires cognition as an antecedent causal factor.⁴

possumus nisi ex usu et acceptione doctorum. Beatus autem Aug. 12 de Civ. dicit quod nomen fruitionis a fructu descendit: fruimur enim fructu, sicut cibamur cibo. Fructus autem est illud quod ultimo de arbore, et cum quadam delectatione percipitur. Fruitio ergo includit delectationem: propter quod cum aliquis multum delectatur in aliqua re, dicimus quod fruitur ea. Delectatio autem requirit cognitionem: quia delectari non est nisi cognoscentis, ut habetur 7 Ethic. Ideo fruitio requirit cognitionem prae viam delectationi. Non autem quaecumque delectatio sufficit ad fruitionem, sed illa quae quietat appetitum, vel totaliter, vel in illo genere: quod concordat praedictis. Fructus enim est non quodcumque ex arbore proveniens, sed ultimum, ultra quod nihil aliud expectatur. Sic fruitio a fructu dicta, est delectatio, non quaecumque, sed illa in qua finaliter quietatur appetitus".

⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 6, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 13vb–14ra: "Patet ergo quod tria concurrunt ad fruitionem, cognitio, delectatio, et quietatio. Horum autem trium, primum, scilicet cognitio, non pertinet ad essentiam fruitionis intrinsece, sed antecedit. Cuius ratio est, quia fruitio aut est delectatio, vel saltem non potest esse sine delectatione: sed cognitio non est delectatio, et potest esse sine omni delectatione; ergo fruitio non est essentialiter ipsa cognitio. Maior patet ex dictis. Minor probatur. Quod enim cognitio non sit delectatio de se patet, eo quod cognitio pertinet ad potentiam apprehensivam, delectatio autem ad appetitivam. Quod etiam possit esse sine delectatione, videtur, cum prius possit esse sine posteriori, vel secundum naturam, vel saltem divina virtute. Cognitio autem prior est delectatione;

What is the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure, and enjoyment and rest? Although enjoyment and pleasure are inseparable, as suggested in the preceding paragraph, they are not strictly speaking the same thing. As Durandus explains it, pleasure is related to enjoyment in the same way as a genus is related to a species. Rest, on the other hand, is related to pleasure as a specific difference. In other words, enjoyment is precisely the kind of pleasure that brings rest to the appetite. Enjoyment, along with desire, belongs to the appetite or the will. Desire corresponds to the motion of the appetite (or the will), whereas enjoyment corresponds to the cessation of that motion, i.e., to the rest of the appetite (or the will). Desire is the motion oriented towards the acquisition of a certain good, while enjoyment is the rest resulting from the attainment of the desired good. Therefore, both desire and enjoyment are found in one and the same potency.⁵

As far as the nobility of the act of enjoyment is concerned, Durandus manifestly supports the understanding of his Dominican predecessor Thomas Aquinas. Enjoyment is not the most noble act, but it is the pleasure proceeding from the most noble act, which is, properly speaking, the act of the intellect with respect to the most eminent object (God alone). Thus, the name “fruitio” does not stand for the act that makes us essentially blessed, but for the pleasure that accompanies or follows upon (*supervenire*) happiness.⁶ Accordingly, the possession of

et ideo invenitur quandoque sine delectatione naturaliter. Tristitia enim quae excludit delectationem, necessario requirit cognitionem. Potest etiam esse, saltem divina virtute, quod habentes cognitionem cuiuscumque, etiam habentis supremi boni rationem non sequatur delectatio. Fruitio autem nequaquam est ubi delectatio non est, quia si posset esse sine delectatione, pari ratione posset esse cum tristitia: quod enim non coexistit uni oppositorum potest stare cum reliquo. Relinquitur ergo quod fruitio non sit cognitio essentialiter, sed praeexigit cognitionem antecedentem, quia non delectamur, nec fruimur, nisi cognitis”.

⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 7, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: “Delectatio autem se habet ad fruitionem sicut genus ad speciem, sed quietatio sicut differentia specifica vel eam circumloquens. Est enim fruitio delectatio, non quaecumque, sed quietans appetitum. Et hoc est, quod dicit Aug. 10 de Trin. quod fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas propter se delectata conquiescit. Et ex hoc patet secundum quod quaeritur: cuius potentiae actus sit frui: quia voluntatis. Quod patet dupliciter: primo, ex suo genere sic: Illius potentiae actus est frui, cuius est delectari: Sed delectari est actus voluntatis. Ergo, etc. Secundo patet idem, ex eius specifica differentia sic: Eiusdem est moveri ad terminum, et quiescere in termino. Sed desiderium de bono habendo, et fruitio de bono habito, se habent sicut motus et quies. Ergo eiusdem est desiderare et frui: sed desiderium est actus appetitus vel voluntatis, ergo et fruitio”.

⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 8, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: “Ad primum dicendum, quod fruitio non est nobilissimus actus, sed est delectatio consequens nobilissimum actum, scilicet actum intellectus circa nobilissimum obiectum.

the supreme good (*summum bonum*) is not equal to enjoyment. It is a necessary condition for enjoyment, just as knowledge is a necessary condition for pleasure.⁷

Question 2, distinction 1 of the *Sentences* commentary of Durandus contains an extensive treatment of the problem of the object of beatific enjoyment. In his response to the main question, Durandus defends two theses: (1) the immediate object of enjoyment is not God, but a certain act by means of which we attain God; and (2) the remote object of enjoyment is God Himself.⁸ Durandus gives five arguments in support of thesis (1) and one major argument for thesis (2). I will focus only on the first and fifth argument for the first thesis and I will deal briefly with the argument for the second thesis.

According to Durandus, one should approach the first thesis on the basis of two distinctions. The first distinction concerns the final end of the human being. With respect to this end, one should clearly distinguish the end itself as something attained (*res assecuta*) from the attainment itself of such an end (*assecutio rei*). For instance, the goal of an avaricious person (*avarus*) is not simply money (*pecunia*) as such, but the possession of money. From the point of view of this distinction, one can say that God Himself is the final end of the rational creature as long as we understand this end objectively. As far as the mode of the attainment of the object is concerned, however, one can say that the end of the rational creature is the operation through which we grasp God. This operation is the vision of God.⁹

Unde fruitio non nominat actum beatificantem nos essentialiter, sed delectationem supervenientem beatitudini, sicut supervenit pulchritudo iuventuti”.

⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 9, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod habendo summum bonum, fruimur: sed ipsum habere non est frui, sed quoddam praesuppositum fruitioni, sicut nosse praesupponitur delectationi”.

⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: “RESPONSIO. Dicenda sunt duo: Primum est, quod immediatum obiectum fruitionis non est Deus, sed aliquis actus quo Deus a nobis attingitur. Secundum est, quod obiectum fruitionis remotum est solus Deus”.

⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 5, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: “Primum patet, praemittendo duas distinctiones necessarias ad propositum. Prima est de fine, eo quod delectatio qua quiescit voluntas in aliquo, ut in fine, est fruitio. Finis enim dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, res assecuta, sicut finis avari est pecunia. Alio modo assecutio rei, sicut finis avari dicitur possessio pecuniae. Et eodem modo finis creaturae rationalis est Deus, sicut res assecuta; sed finis eius ut assecutio, est operatio per quam Deum assequimur. Et haec est visio Dei”. It is important to note that Durandus adopts the distinction between the end as such and the attainment of the end from Thomas Aquinas. Thomas maintains that an end must be understood

The second distinction introduced by Durandus concerns the forms of love (*amor*). Enjoyment is an act of the will and must be considered from the point of view of love, which is the root of all acts of the will. Accordingly, there are two forms of love: love of benevolence or friendship (*amor benevolentiae*) and love of desire (*amor concupiscentiae*). We have a love of benevolence towards a person when we want him to obtain a certain good or perfection. The attitude that we adopt towards the good or perfection that we wish for oneself or for the other person is a love of desire.¹⁰

On the basis of the distinction between the love of benevolence and the love of desire, Durandus points out that the immediate object of the love of desire is not subjectively distinct from the desiring self. But enjoyment, as far as it represents the pleasure of obtaining God, is a kind of love of desire. Consequently, the immediate object of enjoyment is not God as such, since God is distinct from the self, but a certain act through which the self attains God.¹¹

It is clear from experience that we love wine with a love of desire. However, the immediate object of this desire is not wine as such, but the use of it, viz. the act of tasting (*actus gustativus, vel actus gustandi*). We do not love wine for itself, directly. We love instead the tasting of wine.¹²

in a twofold way: objectively (*finis cuius*) and formally (*finis quo*). Objectively, the end is the thing in which the character of the good (*ratio boni*) is found. Formally, the end is the use (*usus*) or attainment (*adeptio*) of the good thing as such. One of the examples that Thomas employs in order to illustrate this understanding of an end is the example of the avaricious person, the same example that we find in Durandus: the goal of the avaricious person is either money as such, or the use and possession of money; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I–II, q. 1, art. 8, resp.

¹⁰ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 6, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: “Secunda distinctio est, de amore: quia cum fruitio sit actus voluntatis, et omnes actus voluntatis radicaliter fundentur in amore, omnes habent aliquo modo iudicari ex amore. Est autem duplex amor, scilicet amor benevolentiae, cui volumus aliquod bonum vel aliquam perfectionem; ipsum autem bonum, vel perfectionem quam volumus nobis vel aliis, amamus amore concupiscentiae”.

¹¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 7, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: “Hoc praemisso, patet primum propositum sic: Immediatum obiectum amoris concupiscentiae non est res subiecto distincta a concupiscente, sed fruitio, cum sit delectatio de Deo, et in Deo habito, est quidam amor concupiscentiae. Ergo immediatum obiectum fruitionis vel delectationis non est Deus, cum sit res a nobis subiecto distincta, sed aliquis actus quo a nobis attingitur vel habetur. Utraque premissarum patet. Et primo maior inductione et syllogismo”.

¹² Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 7, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: “Inductione patet. Dilego vinum dilectione concupiscentiae: nunquid immediatum obiectum istius dilectionis est vinum? Certe non, sed usus vini, qui est actus

Furthermore, it can be demonstrated through reason that we want a good for ourselves or for our friends with a love of desire. But something separate or distinct from us, such as bread and wine, can never be our good unless it is appropriated through a certain act. Therefore, the immediate object of desire is the act that unites us with the desired good. Thus, food and wine are our goods insofar as we consume them.¹³

Enjoyment, on the other hand, is either a form of the love of desire or a form of the love of benevolence or friendship. The enjoyment of God cannot be a love of benevolence if the intention behind this love is that God obtains something that He lacks. It is evident that no future good can be superadded to the fullness of God's perfection. In other words, we cannot desire that something be added to God absolutely, we can desire only that something be added to our own perfection, e.g. the obtainment or vision of God. Therefore, the pleasure of seeing God is not a love of friendship but a love of desire. One can also derive this conclusion from the conceptual analysis of the "love of desire". The formal object of this kind of love is the good as useful (*utile*) or delectable (*delectabile*). These two forms of the good must be distinguished from the noble good (*bonum honestum*), which is the formal object of the love of benevolence.¹⁴

gustativus vel gustandi. Non enim diligo vinum immediate, sed gustare vinum, et idem est in omnibus aliis". According to Aristotle, it would be ridiculous to wish good to wine, because wine is an inanimate thing. The most one can wish in respect to wine is its preservation, so that one could keep it; cf. Aristoteles Latinus, *Ethica Nicomachea* VIII, 2, 55b27–30, ed. R.A. Gauthier, Leiden 1973: "Tribus autem entibus propter que amantur in inanimatorum quidem amacione non dicitur amicicia. Non enim est redamacio, neque voluntas illorum boni. Ridiculum enim forte vino velle bonum, set si quidem salvari vult ipsum, ut ipse habeat".

¹³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 8, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: "Ratione patet idem: illud amatur amore concupiscentiae quod est bonum vel perfectio quam nobis volumus vel amicis. Sed res subiecto distincta nunquam est bonum nostrum, nisi ratione actus quo nobis coniungitur sicut nutrimentum: puta panis, aut vinum, nunquam esset nobis bonum, nisi ratione actus quo nobis coniungitur, cum comedimus aut bibimus. Et ipsa coniunctio est bonum nostrum immediatum. Ergo res subiecto distincta a concupiscente non est immediatum obiectum amoris concupiscentiae. Et haec fuit maior".

¹⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 8, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: "Minor probatur, scilicet quod fruitio, quae est delectatio de Deo, et in Deo habito, sit amor concupiscentiae, quia aut est amor concupiscentiae aut benevolentiae. Non potest dici quod sit amor benevolentiae quo volumus aliquod bonum Deo, quia delectatio de Deo habito respondet desiderio de ipso habendo. Sed per tale desiderium non desideramus aliquid Deo, sed nobis: non enim desideramus Deo aliquid habendum ab ipso, (fatuum enim esset tale desiderium, cum nihil futurum possit ei advenire) sed desideramus ipsum habendum a nobis, quod pertinet ad amorem concupiscentiae quo

Durandus also declares that there are two things required for pleasure: the pursuing of the proper good, and the cognition of the pursued good. On the basis of this distinction, Durandus argues that the proper and immediate object of pleasure is the proper good of the person who feels that pleasure. In this sense, God as well as other things distinct from the human being cannot be the proper object of the human being. Therefore, something can be the proper good of the person only by means of the operation through which that good is attained. Thus, a person takes pleasure in a certain good only if he judges (*aestimat*) that good to be his own good in some respect.¹⁵

In what way should God be regarded as the good of the human being? According to Durandus, the answer to this question rests on the distinction between an extrinsic reference (*denominatio extrinseca*) and a formal reference (*denominatio formalis*). We use this distinction when we want to account for the way in which certain things share something in common. For instance, we call the art of medicine, a diet, and an animal healthy. However, what we mean when we apply the term “healthy” to medicine and diet is that they can bring about a state of health, whereas what we mean when we call an animal healthy is that health is *formally* contained in it, i.e. it is in a state of health. Thus, the reference of “healthy” is extrinsic when applied to medicine and diet and formal when applied to animal. Similarly, something can be called good for the human being by means of an extrinsic reference because it is the cause of goodness in the human being. For instance,

desideramus nobis aliquod bonum. Hoc est autem Deum habere, vel videre, vel aliquid tale. Ergo delectatio de Deo habita non est amor benevolentiae ad Deum, sed amor concupiscentiae retortae ad nos. Item, amor habens pro formali ratione obiecti bonum utile, vel delectabile, est amor concupiscentiae; sic autem est in proposito: habet enim fruitio pro obiecto bonum summe delectabile: ergo, etc. Et sic probata est utraque propositio. Resumatur ergo ratio”.

¹⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 17, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14vb: “Quinta ratio talis est: ad delectationem duo requiritur, scilicet consecutio proprii boni et cognitio boni consecuti. Ex hoc sic arguitur: Illud solum potest esse proprium et immediatum obiectum delectationis quod est vel potest esse proprium bonum illius qui delectatur. Sed Deus, et quaecumque res subiecto distincta ab homine, non potest esse proprium bonum eius: immo non potest esse aliquod bonum eius nisi ratione operationis per quam attingitur. Ergo nec Deus, nec aliqua res subiecto distincta ab homine, potest esse immediatum obiectum delectationis humanae. Maior patet, quia nullus delectatur in quocumque bono, nisi quatenus aestimat illud esse suum aliquo modo. Unde Philos. 8 Eth. dicit: Amabile quidem bonum unicuique autem proprium”.

the sun is the good of a cold recipient in virtue of generating heat in it, but it is the heat and not the sun which is *formally* contained in the recipient. Accordingly, God can be the immediate good of the human being only by means of a goodness which inheres *formally* in the human being. The *formal* goodness found in the blessed in heaven is not numerically distinct from the goodness that we predicate of God. So we can say that God is the good of the human being not *secundum se* but by means of His *formal* goodness. Consequently, the immediate object of enjoyment is not God *secundum se*, but it is rather the act by means of which we are united with God.¹⁶

According to the second thesis defended by Durandus, God is the remote object of beatific enjoyment. The act that brings rest to the will must be the most perfect act of the human nature. But we already know that the signification of the term “fruitio” includes rest (*quies*). Therefore, the act that brings rest to the will is the most perfect act of our human nature. Furthermore, this act must belong to the most noble faculty of the human being, because only such a faculty can reach the most noble object, i.e. God. In conclusion: vision is the immediate object of beatific enjoyment; God is the proximate and immediate

¹⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 17, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 14vb–15ra: “Ad cognitionem enim boni secundum se, quae est speculativa, nulla affectio sequitur. Hanc etiam positionem omnes doctores tenent et scribunt. Minor probatur: quia secundum, quando aliquid dicitur tale per denominationem extrinsecam, et aliud dicitur per denominationem formalem, nullo modo potest convenire alicui nisi ratione formalis denominationis. Verbi gratia, sanum dicitur per denominationem formalem, id quod dicitur de medicina, de dieta, et de animali; sed de medicina et dieta per denominationem extrinsecam, de animali vero per praedicationem formalem. Et ideo nec medicina, nec dieta, potest dici sana, ratione sanitatis quae est in animali formaliter. Similiter, aliquid potest dici bonum homini per denominationem extrinsecam, quae est causa alicuius bonitatis in homine: sicut sol est bonus frigescenti, quia causat in eo calorem qui formaliter est bonus ei. Nec unquam posset dici sol bonus frigescenti nisi ratione caloris qui est ei bonus formaliter. Nunc est ita, quod Deus non potest esse bonum hominis formaliter, nec quaecumque res ab homine subiecto distincta, sed solum per denominationem extrinsecam, qualiscumque sit illa. Ergo esse bonum hominis non potest competere Deo nisi ratione bonitatis formalis, quae est in homine formaliter. Immo plus, quod sicut non est alia sanitas numero quam sanitas quae est in homine formaliter et sanitas a qua denominatur medicina sana; sed est una et eadem, sic non est alia bonitas qua Deus dicitur bonum hominis, vel ignis bonus frigescenti quam bonitas per quam beatus est bonus formaliter et bonitas qua frigescenti dicitur bene habere formaliter. Et sic patet minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio principalis, scilicet, quod Deus secundum se non est immediatum obiectum delectationis, sed aliquis actus quo a nobis attingitur vel coniungitur”.

object of that vision; therefore God is only the remote object of beatific enjoyment.¹⁷

As an illustration of the distinction between the remote and proximate object of enjoyment, Durandus uses the aforementioned example of the act of tasting and the object of tasting. The immediate object of pleasure is the act of tasting, while the remote object of pleasure is the thing tasted. We seek both the tasting and the thing tasted, although we take pleasure in the thing itself only indirectly, by means of the act of tasting. Durandus further comments upon Augustine's statement in *De doctrina Christiana*, Book I, that, properly speaking, the things we ought to enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. According to Durandus, Augustine's definition of enjoyment does not exclude the act of cognition of the Trinity. Consequently, because of the primacy of the object over the act, our happiness depends *objectively* on God as an efficient cause and *formally* on the vision of God.¹⁸

It is relevant to ask in the end how is Durandus's notion of beatific enjoyment related to the love of God above all things. Durandus thinks that the love of desire is subordinate to the love of benevolence. He says, for instance, that we love created beatitude, which is the immediate object of beatific enjoyment, with a love of desire. However, we

¹⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 18, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 15ra: "Secundum patet: quia oportet actum quietantem voluntatem esse perfectissimum summa perfectione possibili haberi naturae humanae. Alioquin restaret aliquid desiderandum, et non esset quies. Sed actus quo fruimur, sicut immediato obiecto, quietat voluntatem, ut patet ex nomine fruitionis. Ergo oportet illum actum esse perfectissimum perfectione possibili haberi a natura humana. Sed summa perfectio possibilis haberi a nobis est quod per actum nobilissimae potentiae in nobis attingamus nobilissimum obiectum, quod est Deus. Ergo actus quo sicut immediato obiecto fruimur habet Deum pro obiecto proximo et immediato, et per consequens ipse Deus est obiectum remotum fruitionis".

¹⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 19, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 15ra: "Et ponitur tale simile: delectatio secundum gustum sicut habet pro immediato obiecto actum gustandi, sed pro remoto cibum gustatum, sic fruitio habet pro immediato obiecto visionem Dei, sed pro remoto ipsum Deum quatenus est obiectum proximi obiecti. Utrumque istorum innuit Aristoteles 2 Rhe. ubi dicit, quod fruibile est ex quo non aliud quid dignum praeter usum quaeritur. Ecce fruibile vocat remotum obiectum. Usum autem vocat actum quo attingitur, qui est immediatum obiectum. Utrumque enim horum quaeritur, unum mediante alio; et utroque fruendo delectamur. Sed quia obiecta sunt notiora actibus, actus autem sumunt rationem ab istis obiectis. Ideo Beatus Aug. loquens de his quibus fruimur i. lib. de Doct. Christ. dicit quod res quibus fruendum est sunt Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus: non quidem excludendo actum quo haec cognoscuntur, cum prius dixerit quod illae res quibus fruendum est nos beatos faciunt. Efficimur autem beati Deo obiective; ipso autem actu quo Deum videmus sumus beati formaliter. Sed hoc sit propter principalitatem obiecti respectu actus".

also love created beatitude in relation to our own selves (*propter nos*), and we love our own selves with a love of benevolence. Although Durandus does not say this explicitly, we must also love God *propter se*. After all loving God *propter se* is the essence of Christ's command to love God with one's whole being. But, unlike Peter Auriol who we are about to discuss, Durandus does not call this love of God *propter se* enjoyment.¹⁹

III. PETER AURIOL: THE LOVE AND ENJOYMENT OF GOD *PROPTER SE* AS THE ESSENCE OF BEATITUDE

In his *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, Peter Auriol discusses beatific enjoyment at great length. For Auriol, *fruitio beatifica* is the pleasurable love of God *propter se*. He rejects the view of Durandus for whom the vision of God was the immediate object of beatific enjoyment whereas God Himself was only the remote object.²⁰ Auriol identifies the beatific enjoyment of God with the most eminent act of charity (*actus*

¹⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 24, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 15rb–15va: “Ad secundum argumentum, cum dicitur quod illud quod amatur propter aliud non est obiectum fruitionis, verum est, si amatur propter aliud quod sit diligibile amor concupiscentiae, quia in tali non quietatur voluntas concupiscentiae ad quam pertinet fruitio, sed aliud ultra quaeritur. Sed illud quod amatur propter aliud quod diligitur amore amicitiae vel benevolentiae, bene potest esse obiectum fruitionis. Cuius ratio est: quia illud quod amatur amore concupiscentiae semper amatur propter aliud quod amatur amore benevolentiae. Est enim aliquod bonum, vel aliqua perfectio, quam volumus nobis vel amico unde ipsam beatitudinem creatam, quae immediatum est obiectum fruitionis, diligimus propter nos. Et plus debemus nos diligere quam talem beatitudinem, cum sit quaedam perfectio nostra accidentalis. Et cum dicitur quod Deus amatur propter aliud, dicendum quod aut loqueris de amore benevolentiae, et tunc hoc est falsum; nec est ad propositum. Falsum, quidem est, quia de ratione amoris benevolentiae, non solum respectu Dei, sed etiam cuiuscumque alterius, est quod diligitur propter se, etiam si nihil commodi deberet diligenti inde provenire. Propter quod dicere quod Deus diligatur amore benevolentiae, et tamen propter aliud, non solum est falsum, sed etiam videtur implicare contradictionem. Item, non est ad propositum, quia obiectum fruitionis, de quo quaerimus, ut sic non amatur amore benevolentiae sed concupiscentiae, ut probatum fuit”.

²⁰ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 31, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1952, p. 389,4–13: “Circa primum ergo considerandum quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod voluntas beati in patria non habet actum dilectionis transeuntem super Deum, sed transeuntem super actum quo immediate habetur Deus; et secundum hoc fruitio non est aliud quam delectatio de visione beata, ut sic Deus sit obiectum remotum fruitionis, visio vero dicitur immediatum. Et potest poni tale exemplum: Delectatio namque secundum gustum habet pro immediato obiecto actum gustandi, sed pro remoto cibum gustatum”.

potissimus caritatis). Charity is the love of friendship directed towards God *propter se* and this love is more noble than the love of desire for the sake of ultimate delight. The formal end of beatific enjoyment is therefore God Himself and not the vision of God. In other words, it is not the proper perfection of the blessed that defines the character of beatific enjoyment in heaven but the love of friendship of God *propter se*.²¹

Consequently, Auriol insists that final happiness (*beatitudo, felicitas*) is found essentially (*essentialiter*) in the direct attainment of the beatific object and in an experienced way (*actualiter*) in the perfection of pleasure caused by the vision and possession of God. Only the first kind of happiness should be regarded as enjoyment in the proper sense of the term. This kind of enjoyment is a simple act (*actus simplex*), which involves a love of pleasure and delight (*amor delectationis et complacentiae*). By positing this simple act, Aureol believes that he has overcome the philosophical difficulty raised by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 10: Is pleasure the ultimate good? Auriol argues that the pleasure following upon the operation of seeing or grasping God *in patria* is not the principal good. The ultimate good is the pleasure which directly “reaches” the object (*transit super obiectum*) and ultimately “reaches” God (*transit [...] maxime super Deum*). This is an other-directed, and, more precisely, a God-centered pleasure, which constitutes the most powerful act of love of the human will.²²

²¹ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 63, ed. Buytaert, p. 400: “Praeterea, amor ille est beatificus et fruitio patriae, qui est actus potissimus caritatis. Sed, actus potissimus caritatis est complacere ultimate in Deo. Igitur ultimata delectatio et complacentia boni divini est amor beatificus et fruitio beatorum”.

²² Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 66, ed. Buytaert, pp. 401–402: “Ex praedictis apparet quomodo duplex est delectatio, una siquidem summum bonum, in qua consistit felicitas, quae transit directissime super Deum obiective; alia vero, quae non est principale bonum, sed perficit operationem, sicut pulchritudo iuventutem, et oritur ex ipsa operatione, et haec est delectatio quae transit super habitam visionem et habitationem Dei. In prima consistit essentialiter beatitudo, in secunda actualiter. Prima est vera fruitio quae est simplex actus, amor scilicet delectationis et complacentiae; secunda vero non est fruitio. Prima est summum bonum, secunda vero non. Et in hoc solvitur quaestio X *Ethicorum*, quam Philosophus movet de delectatione: Utrum sit summum bonum? Quam etiam dimittit insolutam. Potest autem solvi ex hoc, quod delectatio consequens operationem non est summum bonum, delectatio autem quae transit super obiectum et maxime super Deum [est summum bonum]; et sic redit opinio Eudoxi et communis animi conceptio, quod felicitas consistit in delectatione, quam etiam omnis natura et animalia desiderant, ut dicitur VII *Ethicorum*. Unde doctores illi, qui non potuerunt delectationem aliam capere nisi illam quae oritur ex visione divina, dixerunt quod beatitudo non potest essentialiter consistere in

In order to understand Auriol's concept of beatific enjoyment, we should consider his characterization of the forms of love. In the second proposition of article 1, he divides love into two orders: the order of the love of friendship and the order of the love of desire. The order of *amor amicitiae* is divided into three acts: (1) taking delight in a friend, (2) desiring for a friend that he obtains what he lacks, and (3) taking delight in the friend's actual attainment of the good. The order of *amor concupiscentiae* comprises three acts as well: (1) taking delight in an object that would bring perfection to oneself, (2) desiring this good for oneself, and (3) taking delight in the actual attainment of the good for oneself.²³

The distinction of the two orders of love depends upon a distinction between two different objects: our friend and the good we desire for his own sake, on the one hand, and the good we desire for ourselves, on the other. Aureol maintains that an object can be taken in two ways: (1) insofar as this object is a good in itself (*obiectum quatenus ipsum est bonum in se*), when a person takes delight in the contemplation or actual company of his friend or wants something good for his friend, and (2) insofar as the object is a good for the one loving it (*quatenus est bonum amanti*), when a drunken person takes delight in imagining the taste of wine, not the wine itself.²⁴

delectatione, nec esse principale bonum; qui vero possunt concipere ducti experientia virtuosius amoris, quod complacere in Deo est quaedam summa delectatio, de qua dicit Propheta: 'Laetamini in Domino et exultate iusti, et gloriamini omnes recti corde', et Augustinus I *De Trinitate* capitulo 8^o, exponens illud psalmi: 'Adimplebis laetitia cum vultu tuo', dicit quod illa laetitia nihil amplius requiretur, quia nec erit quid amplius requiratur; isti inquam facilius possunt advertere, quomodo delectatio sit principale bonum, et quomodo in eo beatitudo consistat. Haec autem delectatio, cum sit potissime actus amoris, est delectatio fructiva, actus unicus et simplex voluntatis".

²³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 57, ed. Buytaert, pp. 397,12–398,20: "Et est unus ordo amoris amicitiae; et est primus actus complacere et delectari in amico; secundus vero desiderare sibi bonum quo caret; tertius vero complacere in praesentia boni quod habet ipse amicus et maxime complacere in existentia et praesentia reali ipsius. Secundus vero ordo est amoris concupiscentiae; et est primus actus delectari et complacere in aliquo obiecto ipsum perficiente; secundus autem desiderare illud sibi; tertius quoque in iam habito delectari et complacere".

²⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 58, ed. Buytaert, p. 398: "Sunt autem hic duo consideranda. Primum quidem quod primus ordo et secundus different ex obiecto. Amor enim amicitiae, sive sit delectatio in amico concepto, sive sit desiderium quo sibi bonum optetur, sive sit delectatio et complacencia in amico praesente, omnes equidem isti actus feruntur in obiectum propter se, quatenus ipsum est bonum in se, non quatenus est bonum amanti. Amor autem concupiscentiae et delectatur in imaginando, et desiderat et concupiscit habere, et delectatur ac concupiscit in habendo, non quatenus obiectum est bonum in se, sed quatenus est bonum sibi. Ex

Furthermore, there is a difference between taking delight in the understanding of a thing (*delectari de intellectione rei*) and taking delight in the thing itself as an object of this understanding (*delectari de re intellecta*).²⁵ Thus, taking delight in my own understanding of *x* is different from taking delight in this *x* in itself. On the basis of this, the difference between the pleasure of friendship and the pleasure of concupiscence is found in the following: *delectatio amicitiae* reaches directly the essence of an object, whereas *delectatio concupiscentiae* attains an object only insofar as it is seen, possessed, or tasted.²⁶

What is the import of Aureol's notion of love in his treatment of beatific enjoyment? The enjoyment of the vision of God in heaven falls under the order of the love of desire, and it is identical with the third act in that order, i.e. taking delight in the act of possession or attainment of an object that brings actual perfection to oneself. This kind of enjoyment, however, is not the essence of human happiness. It is merely a self-referring volition focused on something created and subject to change. True and permanent happiness is found in God, Who

quo patet quod obiectum amoris concupiscentiae est res sub ratione qua perfectio est amantis; et quia perfectio est ratione aliquorum actuum quibus unitur, idcirco amor ille transit super rem quatenus unibilis per aliquem actum, ut sic magis transeat super actum quo attingitur ipsa res, quam super rem ipsam; sicut patet, quod delectatur ebriosus in imaginatione gustus vini, non vini simpliciter, et desiderat gustum vini et ultimate fruitur gustu vini. Obiectum autem amoris amicitiae non est res quatenus unibilis per aliquem actum, sed res simpliciter in se bona; sicut patet, quod virtuosus amicus delectatur in imaginatione amici sui virtuosus, absque hoc quod imaginetur aliquem actum unientem; et desiderat bonum omne competens illi et delectatur in illo et fruitur ipso, et absolute complacet dum est praesens; non quod complacet tantummodo de visione eius, immo exclusa visione complacet et delectatur in ipso”.

²⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 59, ed. Buytaert, pp. 398,45–399,55: “Secundum vero considerandum est, quod aliud est delectari de intellectione rei, aliud de re intellecta; et similiter aliud est delectari de visione rei, et aliud de re visa. Nam prima delectatio habet pro principali obiecto actum visionis et delectationis; pro secundario autem et sine quo non, rem ipsam intellectam vel visam, quia, si sine re posset esse visio vel intellectio, adhuc delectatio et eius obiectum maneret. Secunda vero delectatio habet pro principali obiecto ipsam rem visam vel intellectam; pro eo autem sine quo non, visionem et intellectionem, quoniam si posset transire delectatio super rem sine visione et intellectione, adhuc maneret tota ratio delectationis”.

²⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 59, ed. Buytaert, p. 399,55–63: “Secundum hoc ergo delectatio amicitiae super obiectum praesens transit super rem, quatenus res est, non quatenus visa; delectatio vero concupiscentiae transit super visionem rei vel gustationem eius, vel habitationem ipsius per aliquem actum; super rem autem ipsam non transit per se, sed quatenus visa, habita vel gustata. Unde actus et res attincta per actum, sic quod actus est formalis ratio in isto obiecto, sunt unum obiectum delectationis et desiderii, ad amorem concupiscentiae pertinentis”.

alone is the unique good not subject to any change whatsoever. Thus, according to definition (*secundum definitionem*), beatific enjoyment is the love of friendship for God, which can only be fulfilled in heaven (*in patria*). In this life (*in via*), however, the wayfarer could have some enjoyment caused by the pleasure and liking of the will that is focused on the divine being as known by the mind (*in esse cognito*).²⁷

Auriol makes a fascinating comment in connection with his thesis that the beatific love and enjoyment of the blessed is identical with the act of taking pleasure in the divine good *propter se*. Unlike Thomas and Durandus, he argues that the ultimate formal beatitude is found not in the intellectual act of vision and comprehension, but in the volitional act of ecstatic love of God *propter se*. Auriol says that if we were to ask a blessed person why he wants to enjoy God, his response would be: "Because of God alone, and because this is most suitable (*ita decet*)". If we were to inquire further and ask him why does he wish to see God, he would say: "Because he would find delight in the goodness of God as his friend, just as a virtuous person would be glad to partake of the happiness of his friend".²⁸ With this consideration in mind, we can say

²⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 4, n. 90, ed. Buytaert, p. 411: "Contingit autem delectationem huiusmodi totaliter quietantem, vel esse de re quae ex natura sua hoc habet, simpliciter videlicet et totaliter quiescere; et cum hoc sit solus Deus, solo Deo simpliciter est fruendum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit: Res quibus fruendum est esse Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, qui aeterni et incommutabiles sunt; caeteris autem est utendum. Aut contingit quod natura rei non habet hoc ut voluntas ultimate delectetur et quiescat in ea, et si sic facit talis quietativa delectatio, non erit fruitio recta, sed magis perversa; et in hoc consistit perversitas humana. Talis autem est fruitio in amore concupiscentiae. Unde patet quod nulla ultimata fruitio et perfecta recte posset esse et ordinate, nisi in amore amicitiae; nec in ista, nisi in amore Dei; nec in amore Dei, nisi in patria, ubi Deus realiter erit praesens. Complacencia namque voluntatis in Deum pro statu viae non quietat perfecte, sed excitat desiderium ad videndum. Et sic solvitur quaestio, quam Magister movet in littera: Utrum possimus Deo frui in via. Dicendum est enim quod non fruitione simpliciter dicta, quae est totaliter quietativa, extenso tamen fruitionis nomine ad delectationem et complacentiam rei praesentis in esse cognito; dicendum est quod eo frui possumus, et debemus potius quam quacumque creatura, pro eo quod delectari debemus in eo sic apprehenso per se et ultimate; in nullo autem alio citra ipsum".

²⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, sect. 7, art. 1, n. 65, ed. Buytaert, pp. 400–401: "Praeterea, actus ille, qui ex ratione sua specifica ad nullum actum alium ordinatur, sed tantum ad obiectum, habet rationem ultimi finis formalis; nullus enim actus, qui ex natura sua ad alium actum est ordinabilis, habet rationem ultimi formalis finis, et per consequens nec beatifici actus, cum actus beatificus sit ultimus finis formalis, sicut obiectum beatificum est finis ultimus obiectivus. Sed complacere in Deo et in bono eius ultimate et propter se, est actus ex natura sua non ordinabilis ad actum alium, sed tantummodo ad obiectum. Interrogatus namque beatus quare vult complacere in Deo et in omni bono ipsius, responderet quod propter ipsummet Deum,

that for Auriol the primary intention of the act of beatific enjoyment is to reach God (*transire super Deum*), whereas the secondary intention is to take personal delight in Him. Hence, we should conclude that he does not regard beatific enjoyment as an act derived from the intellectual activity of vision. Enjoyment understood as love of God *propter se* is in a certain sense superior to and more valuable than the exercise of the human intellect in the state of beatific vision.

quoniam ita decet; interrogatus autem cur videre vellet, non dubium quod responderet quoniam ut bonum Dei magis posset sibi placere; amicus enim virtuosus vult videre felicem statum amici, ut congaudeat illi et placeat sibi in eo. Ergo evidenter apparet quod actus iste est summe beatificus et fruitivus”.

PARISIAN DISCUSSIONS OF THE BEATIFIC VISION AFTER
THE COUNCIL OF VIENNE: THOMAS WYLTON, SIBERT OF
BEKA, PETER AURIOL, AND RAYMUNDUS BEQUINI

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In the first question of his sixth *Quodlibet* from 1289¹ Godfrey of Fontaines remarked that it was commonly assumed that man's rational nature is not in and of itself sufficient to perceive and love God but needs to be fortified and uplifted by special gifts or habits of grace.² Godfrey had no intention to challenge this assumption and in question 9 of his fifth *Quodlibet* from the previous year³ he had attempted to identify the precise role played by the gracious habit that enables man's intellect to behold God, or, in technical terms, the so-called light of glory (*lumen gloriae*).⁴ In addition to this, Godfrey explored,

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¹ For the dating, see J.F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy*, Washington, DC 1981, p. xxviii.

² Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1, ed. M. de Wulf – J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1914 (Les Philosophes Belges, III), p. 94: "...ideo supposito, sicut supponitur communiter, quod rationalis natura non potest Deum videre vel diligere beatifice, nisi sint eius praedictae potentiae [scil. intellectus et voluntas] per habitus gloriosos elevatae et perfectae, et quod illis habitibus inexistens Deum sic potest diligere et videre...". For a comprehensive and erudite survey of the development of scholastic thought on the beatific vision and its main doctrinal issues, see C. Trottmann, *La vision béatifique. Des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII*, Roma 1995; cf. J.-P. Muller, "La thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle", in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la Scolastique médiévale*, Louvain 1947, pp. 493–512, as well as C. Trottmann, "Henri de Gand, Source de la Dispute sur la Vision Réflexive", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel, Leuven 1996, pp. 309–342.

³ For the dating, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, p. xxvii.

⁴ Godfrey located the light of glory on the side of the passive intellect which through the *lumen gloriae* is given a special propensity (*idoneitas*) for perceiving God. This implies that even in the beatific vision it is the agent intellect which brings the passive intellect into act, i.e., the actual perception of God, while the light of glory merely prepares the passive intellect for this act; cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* V, q. 9, ed. de Wulf – Hoffmans, p. 34: "...ut dictum est, lumen intellectus agentis [...] non sufficit respectu primi intelligibilis quantum ad immediatam visionem; sed ultra lumen connaturale intellectus agentis, requiritur lumen supernaturale, scilicet lumen gloriae,

in question 9 of his sixth *Quodlibet*, the equally important question of whether the light of glory is invariably and necessarily accompanied by a gift of grace informing man's will and empowering it to love God in bliss. Godfrey answered in the affirmative but nonetheless he proceeded to argue—through an argument *per impossibile*—that even if the light of glory were not accompanied by a corresponding gift of grace in the will, man's will would still love God by a purely natural and, consequently, inferior act of will.⁵

In the constitution “Ad nostrum qui” from 1312, the Council of Vienne condemned a series of errors or heresies that were supposedly widespread among communities of Béghards and Béguines. The fifth article in this document explained that it is heretical to say that a being of intellectual nature is in itself and by its very nature blessed (*beata*) just as it is erroneous to claim that the soul does not need the light of glory in order to see and enjoy God in bliss.⁶ It is incontestable that the decree “Ad nostrum qui” established the *lumen gloriae* as a condition for man's beatific vision of God and, by implication, transferred this kind of light from the realm of theological theory and discussion to that of ecclesiastical doctrine. However, the circumstance that this decision was made in the context of condemning what was perceived as dangerous spiritual trends among Béghards and Béguines raises the question whether the participants in the council fully appreciated that their phrasing of the condemnation implied an important decision on point of doctrine. In the first place, the council did not deal with the beatific vision in any of its other documents, just as the precise role played by the light of glory was not explained. Secondly, just like the Olivi matter,⁷ the business of restraining spirituals like the Béghards and the Béguines could not by any means be construed as a main concern

elevans et illustrans intellectum possibilem, sic quod idoneitas quaedam in ipso fit per hoc ad hoc ut fiat in actu visionis huiusmodi immediate. Huiusmodi enim lumen gloriae non habet secundam actionem respectu obiecti, scilicet respectu Dei...”.

⁵ See Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 9, de Wulf – Hoffmans, pp. 178 sqq.

⁶ “Quod quaelibet intellectualis natura in se ipsa naturaliter est beata, quodque anima non indiget lumine gloriae, ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum” (*Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, ed. H. Denzinger – A. Schönmetzer, Roma ³⁴1967, § 895, p. 282).

⁷ The Olivi affair was anything but a key issue in the council and the strangely ambiguous constitution “Fidei catholicae” (*Enchiridion symbolorum...*, §§ 900 sqq., pp. 283 sqq.) was the result of a protracted and complex process—see D. Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans. From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis*, University Park, PA 2001, pp. 156 sqq.

for the council. Consequently, it is fully possible that the rather oblique manner in which the light of glory became incorporated into Church doctrine as a *de facto* condition for the blessed vision of God reflects an implicit conviction in the council that this viewpoint was nothing out of the ordinary and really quite uncontroversial.

Nonetheless, it appears that the “Ad nostrum qui” influenced and possibly even gave rise to some heated exchanges on the issue of the beatific vision among, at least, Parisian theologians. In this connection the immediately obvious question was, as a matter of course, whether the beatific vision is invariably conditioned by this light or, in other words, whether the *lumen gloriae* is a necessary condition of the *visio beata* or merely a contingent factor in the order of salvation. Naturally, other points of contention were brought into focus in the wake of this debate. Immediately obvious topics were the precise role played by the light of glory and its relationship to man’s natural powers.

In the following the outlines of a few of these Parisian debates will be sketched. Four theologians appear to have contributed in a significant way and from the texts that sprang from these debates it clearly transpires that there was an acute awareness of the boundary set by the decision of the council and the necessity of staying within the confines of Church doctrine.

THOMAS WYLTON AND SIBERT OF BEKA

One of the earliest witnesses to the realization that the Vienne Council had made a decision of significance on this point appears to be Thomas Wylton. Wylton was an English secular theologian who served as professor of theology in Paris from approximately 1312 to 1322. Wylton’s sole surviving theological work is generally assumed to be his *Quodlibet* which is claimed to have been handed down in the manuscript Borghese 39 kept in the Vatican collection.⁸ Apart from this work we know of two major collections of questions by Wylton: one is preserved in the

⁸ The first to identify Wylton’s *Quodlibet* was Anneliese Maier; see A. Maier, “Das Quodlibet des Thomas de Wylton”, in ead., *Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1, Roma 1964, pp. 87–92 (originally published in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 14 (1947), pp. 106–110) and cf. C. Trifogli, “The Quodlibet of Thomas Wylton”, in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2007, pp. 231–266.

manuscript no. 88 in the cathedral library of Tortosa⁹ and the other was recently identified in the manuscript General MS 170 in the Beinecke Library, that forms part of Yale University Library.¹⁰ In the *Quodlibet* as well as in the Tortosa collection we find questions that treat of the beatific vision. In the *Quodlibet* the following questions are found:

- Question 2: "Utrum necessario necessitate absoluta requiratur lumen gloriae in visione beata";
- Question 3: "Utrum actus beatificus sit simplex";
- Question 4: "Quis istorum actuum [*scil.* intellectus et voluntatis] sit principalior portio beatitudinis".¹¹

Three other questions are included in the Tortosa collection:

- Question 16: "Utrum intellectum creatum videre Deum immediate sicuti est, sine aliquo habitu supernaturali, puta gloriae lumine, et voluntatem sine habitu caritatis diligere Deum beatifice implicet contradictionem";
- Question 19: "Utrum voluntas divina sit totalis causa actus intuitivi beatifici circumscripta omni actione obiecti beatifici in quantum tale obiectum beatificum et circumscripta omni actione cuiuscumque agentis creati";
- Question 20: "Utrum manente actu beatifico eodem numero possit terminari notitia circa secundaria obiecta".¹²

Fortunately, there are internal links between these six questions. In the first place, question 4 of the *Quodlibet* is the immediate continuation of the discussion conducted in the preceding question, i.e. the third quodlibetal question. Furthermore, question 2 in the *Quodlibet* is an early version of the somewhat expanded and much more carefully elaborated

⁹ See G.J. Etzkorn – R. Andrews, "Tortosa Cathedral 88. A 'Thomas Wylton' Manuscript and the Question on the Compatibility of Multiple Accidents in the Same Subject", *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 32 (1994), pp. 57–99.

¹⁰ See S.D. Dumont, "New Questions by Thomas Wylton", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 9 (1998), pp. 341–382.

¹¹ Question 11 in the *Quodlibet* is entitled "Utrum ubicumque excessus alicuius arguit excessum alterius ita quod excessus unius in duplo arguit excessum alterius in duplo et sic ulterius secundum proportionem sequatur ex excessu unius in infinitum excessus alterius in infinitum"; here the beatific vision is used as an example but the question as such is not concerned with the nature of the blessed vision.

¹² Editions of these questions as well as the pertinent question in Sibert of Beka's *Quodlibet* (cf. below) have been edited by Cecilia Trifogli and myself: "Questions on the Beatific Vision by Thomas Wylton and Sibert de Beka", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 17 (2006), pp. 511–584. I am grateful to Dr. Trifogli for agreeing to my use of these texts in the present study as well as to Dr. C. Schabel, University of Cyprus, for having drawn my attention to the text by Sibert of Beka.

question 16 in the Tortosa collection.¹³ In Q2 Wylton argues against a determination which an anonymous opponent had given of a disputation that had taken place in the bishop's hall; this opponent had failed to report Wylton's arguments and, instead, he had single-mindedly pressed his own point of view.¹⁴ Whereas Wylton had demonstrated that the *lumen gloriae* is a merely contingent element in the beatific vision, the unnamed opponent had maintained that this kind of light is a necessary condition for man's beholding of God. Moreover, the opponent had claimed that in arguing against the necessity of the *lumen gloriae* Wylton had slipped into heresy inasmuch as he had avowedly shown that the light of glory is superfluous and impossible even according to the established order of salvation or God's ordained power.¹⁵

The viewpoint defended by Wylton's anonymous opponent is forcefully argued in question 11 in the *Quodlibet* of the Carmelite master, Sibert de Beka. This question derives from Sibert's inception as theological master albeit in an indirect manner. Originally Sibert had argued for the necessity of the light of glory in his *vespers* disputation and subsequently he had provided the obligatory determination. By Sibert's own admission his determination had provoked strong protests and the apparently surprising and violent reaction had made it incumbent on him to publish a new reply to his adversaries. This rejoinder is identical to question 11 in Sibert's *Quodlibet* and may so be said to be his

¹³ There are numerous literary indications that reveal the close links between the two texts; in the introduction to the edition referred to in the preceding note an attempt is made to map some of the lines of connection between the texts. Not least telling is the circumstance that in q. 16 of the Tortosa collection Wylton answers objections that do not appear in this question whereas these objections are found in the second question in the *Quodlibet*. In the following I shall refer to these questions by way of simple abbreviations so that Q2 refers to the second question in the *Quodlibet* while T19 refers to question 19 in the Tortosa collection.

¹⁴ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 2: "Rationes autem contra istam repetit quattuor quae debuerunt fuisse factae in aula, verumtamen quia nec ponit rationes illas secundum formam et evidentiam secundum quas ibi positae erant, nec ad illam conclusionem omnino, ideo [...] comprehendo sub ratione una multas rationes ibidem positas, et post ponam solutionem suam, et apparebit si sit sufficiens. Istud tamen facio ex habundanti quoniam ex quo ipse ligat potentiam Dei ad illud lumen, ad me sufficeret defendere rationes suas ostendendo quod non sunt demonstrationes".

¹⁵ Thomas Wylton, Q2, §§ 1.5–6: "Quinto sic: ex quo huiusmodi habitus supernaturalis non facit ad substantiam actus nec ad modum nec est dispositio, igitur quantum ad potentiam ordinatam est frustra. Sexto, ad agens liberalissimum pertinet communicare suam bonitatem eo modo quo passum natum est recipere. Sed intellectus, secundum istos, est natus recipere beatificum actum sine habitu. Igitur cum Deus sit agens liberalissimum ad eum pertinet etiam de potentia ordinata communicare actum beatificum intellectui creato sine habitu quocumque".

third contribution to the debate. Apart from insisting on having been grossly misunderstood and protesting his innocence Sibert accuses his opponents of going beyond what is doctrinally safe since their arguments are of such a nature as to prove that the light of glory cannot be either a *de facto* or even a possible element in the blessed beholding of God.¹⁶ Moreover, Sibert stresses that his insistence on the absolute necessity of the *lumen gloriae* had been motivated solely by his wish to oppose those who claim that the divine will, as distinct from the divine essence, is the only real cause of the beatific vision.¹⁷

The position that was the ultimate target of Sibert's argument is totally identical to the view that Wylton openly defends in question 19 of the Tortosa collection. Here he argues that the divine will as formally distinct from the divine intellect and essence is the sole cause of the vision of God. Furthermore, in this text Wylton reports what went on in a disputation that took place in the bishop's hall and involved the chancellor as well as several masters.¹⁸ In other words, the scenario depicted in this question is in its main features strongly similar to the one referred to in Sibert's 11th quodlibetal question and in Wylton's second quodlibetal question. Obviously, it is not possible to infer that all three texts relate to one and the same disputation. It is not even clear whether Sibert argued against viewing the divine will as the sole cause of the beatific vision in the same disputation as the one in which he defended the necessity of the *lumen gloriae*. What is incontestable, however, is that Sibert's question is a spinoff of the debate that fol-

¹⁶ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, §§ 5.10.1 et sqq.: "Praeterea, unius actus per se est unum principium per se, ut colligitur 8 Metaphysicae. Sed actus visionis <essentiae> divinae est unus per se; potentia vero, si in ea ponatur lumen gloriae, est unum principium per accidens. Ergo etc. Dicendum quod si hoc argumentum bene concluderet, auferret etiam lumen gloriae de facto et de possibili, si scilicet potentiam susceptivam oporteat esse quid unum per se". A more detailed comparison between Sibert's and Wylton's questions and the arguments employed is provided in the introduction to the edition.

¹⁷ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 5.2.2: "Et quando dicunt quod alii hoc concedunt contra quos argui in vespertis, scilicet quod et actio obiecti subest voluntati divinae, dico quod contra istos non argui qui hoc ponunt, sed contra illos qui ponunt essentiam divinam in ratione obiecti nihil causare sed totam visionem causari a voluntate divina. Unde me non ceperunt".

¹⁸ This question is organised in much the same way as Wylton's question on the formal distinction as applied to the divine; cf. L.O. Nielsen – T.B. Noone – C. Trifogli, "Thomas Wylton's Question on the Formal Distinction as Applied to the Divine", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), pp. 327–388. In the first part Wylton provides an account of how the disputation evolved while the second part brings Wylton's fully argued answer.

lowed his inception as theological master. Furthermore, there is a high degree of probability that Wylton's questions Q2 and T16 are related to the same debate.¹⁹ Whether the debate on the cause of the beatific vision was part of Sibert's inception or was conducted in a subsequent disputation is not immediately apparent. At any rate, this debate must have lasted for some time and, as will become apparent, it provides the immediate background to Wylton's T20.

As to the dating of these questions it is important to keep in mind that Wylton's Q2, i.e., the draft version of T16, forms part of Wylton's so-called *Quodlibet*, which has recently been dated to December 1315,²⁰ even though a slightly later date cannot be ruled out.²¹ On the other hand, it is also evident that both Wylton and Sibert accept the *de facto* role of the *lumen gloriae* which had not been part of Church doctrine before the decision of the Council of Vienne. Even though this would appear to tally well with the dating of Wylton's *Quodlibet* it should be recalled that the decrees of the council seem to have remained

¹⁹ It could be said that the fact that Sibert fails to rebut and even fully report Wylton's main reasons against the necessity of positing the light of glory appears to militate against Wylton's being one of Sibert's opponents. However, this failure is precisely what Wylton accused his opponent of and what angered him so much; see the quotation above, note 14, and cf. Wylton, Q2, § 3: "Ad totum istum processum [scil. Wylton's long line of reasoning] non dicunt nisi tria verba. Primum est quod lumen gloriae est necessarium non sicut potentia sed sicut dispositio potentiae superaddita. Aliud dicunt quod licet sine transmutatione proprie dicta possit Deus facere de trunco vitalem, non tamen sine mutatione simplici [...]. Tertium quod dicunt est quod intellectiva, cum sit forma substantialis, naturaliter perficit materiam primam immediate, non sic est de actu beatifico respectu intellectus creati. Et in hoc stat tota sua solutio ad argumenta quae faciunt et ad argumenta facta in aula". In Sibert's question, the part of the discussion which relates to God's free power to create and introduce an accident into unprepared matter—which was the basis for Wylton's line of argument against the necessity of the light of glory—is centered on the *potentia* or *principium vitale*; cf. Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 5.8.2: "Dicendum quod habitus <luminis> gloriae non habet rationem potentiae simpliciter, sed dispositionis necessariae ad actum gloriosum. Neque oportet quod illud quod est principium transmutandi per modum dispositionis necessariae sit potentia, sed solum illud quod transmutationem ut subiectum recipit, et in proposito quod visionem ut principium vitale elicit, quale non est habitus gloriae".

²⁰ See E. Jung-Palczewska – Z. Kuksewicz, "The Date of Wylton's 'Quodlibet'", *Studia Mediewistyczne* 32 (1997), pp. 59–63.

²¹ The *terminus ante quem* for Wylton's *Quodlibet* would seem to be Peter Auriol's *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum* which was completed in late 1316 or very early in 1317; for this cf. L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way With Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the 'Sentences'", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden 2002, pp. 149–219.

unpublished until October 1317.²² It is not easy to decide how much weight this circumstance carries in the present context. *Prima facie* it seems hard to believe that the import of the decree was kept a closely guarded secret for five years and that leading theologians in the major universities would have had to wait that long before learning of the conciliar decisions.²³ Accordingly, there seems to be no compelling reason to revise the current dating of Sibert's inception to 1316.²⁴

PETER AURIOL AND RAYMUNDUS BEQUINI

The third Parisian theologian who treated of the beatific vision in the years immediately after the Vienne Council is the Franciscan Peter Auriol. He lectured on the Lombard's four books of *Sentences* from 1316 to 1318 and was regent master in theology in Paris from 1318 to 1320. His main questions on the subject form part of his *Quodlibet* which was published in 1320.²⁵ Among the 16 questions contained in this work we find three questions whose titles relate to the beatific vision:

- Question 8: "Utrum ad visionem beatificam requiratur aliqua similitudo creata";
- Question 9: "Utrum ad visionem beatificam requiratur aliquis habitus vel lumen creatum";
- Question 10: "Utrum videns divinam essentiam videat necessario quidquid repraesentatur per eam".

²² See E. Müller, *Das Konzil von Vienne, 1311–1312. Seine Quellen und seine Geschichte*, Münster 1934, p. 579, note 52. It has been claimed that Sibert de Beka took part in the Council of Vienne but the basis for this is tenuous; see B.M. Xiberta, *De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931, p. 145.

²³ It is usually assumed that prior to 1316 Peter Auriol chose to abandon his treatise on the principles of nature because of the council's decision on the human soul; see A. Teetaert, "Pierre Auriol ou Oriol", in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. XII/2, Paris 1935, col. 1820, and cf. A. Baldiserra, "La decisione del Concilio de Vienne (1311): 'Substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis forma' nell'interpretazione di un contemporaneo", *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*, 34 (1942), pp. 212–232.

²⁴ See A. Deckert, "Sibert de Beka", in *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, vol. 10, Herzberg 1995, cols. 8–10 (also available on the Internet under www.bautz.de/bbkl/s/sibert_d_b.shtml). It is tempting to speculate that an early version of Wylton's question against Sibert was included in the *Quodlibet* whereas the polished version was left out for no other reason than because the *Quodlibet* was published while the debate was still going on.

²⁵ For the relatively secure dating of Auriol's *Quodlibet*, see Teetaert, "Pierre Auriol ou Oriol", cols. 1838–1839.

In all probability these questions reflect actual disputations conducted by Auriol during his Parisian regency as professor in theology from 1318 to 1320. Early versions of these questions, which seem to be *reportationes*, are found in the manuscript no. 63 of the library of Balliol College, Oxford.²⁶

What immediately transpires from Auriol's questions is that Parisian discussions on the beatific vision had lost much of the agitation that animated Wylton's and Sibert's exchange. Equally, it is apparent that Auriol was familiar with, at least, Wylton's approach to and interpretation of the key elements in the beatific vision. Furthermore, the beatific vision as such appears to be a topic that did not engage Auriol passionately; to him the *visio beata* had a claim to interest first and foremost as an example that may serve to reveal essential features in man's cognitive apparatus.

Auriol's former opponent from Toulouse, the Dominican Raymundus Bequini, appeared in Paris in 1317 in order to lecture on the *Sentences*, and in 1319 he became regent master of theology, a position he seems to have held until 1321. He composed two *Quodlibets*;²⁷ the first is complete, whereas the second was left unfinished and comprises only one question. The beatific vision and its associated problems are dealt with in no less than three questions. In the first *Quodlibet* there are two questions,

Question 3: "Utrum ad videndum clare divinam essentiam requiratur de necessitate lumen gloriae";

Question 4: "Utrum intellectus beatus possit clare et evidenter cognoscere divinam essentiam non cognoscendo proprietates relativas vel personas, vel utrum beatus possit cognoscere essentiam sine personis".

²⁶ Cf. R.A.B. Mynors, *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College, Oxford*, Oxford 1963, p. 43 sqq., as well as L.O. Nielsen, "The Debate Between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 35–98. Editions of these questions will appear in the near future.

²⁷ F. Pelster did a great service to draw Bequini's works out of the shadows, see his "Zur Überlieferung des Quodlibet und anderer Schriften des Petrus Aureoli O.F.M.", *Franciscan Studies* 14 (1954), pp. 392–411, as well as his admirable article "Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli. Raymundus Bequini O.P., und seine Quästionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A.", *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955), pp. 30–47. In the latter work (*op. cit.*, p. 32, note 12), he expressed some reservations with regard to characterizing these works of Bequini's as *quodlibeta*. However, Pelster's hesitation can be dispensed with inasmuch as the author in his cross-references used this term. I expect to publish editions of these two works in a not too distant future.

In the second *Quodlibet* the sole question is,

Question 1: "Utrum intellectus creatus videndo divinam essentiam visione beata de necessitate videat omnia quae possunt in divina essentia repraesentari".

In all three questions Bequini targets Auriol as one of his primary adversaries. It seems, however, that this opposition is predominantly literary inasmuch as Bequini consistently refers to Auriol's quodlibetal questions while there are no direct references to or traces of oral debates. In his *quodlibeta* Bequini refers to Thomas Aquinas under the guise of 'Frater Thomas' and as Bequini gave a short laudatory speech on the occasion of Aquinas's sanctification in 1323 it is quite safe to date these works to the period between 1320 and 1323. Like William of Alnwick²⁸ who used the tenth question in Auriol's *Quodlibet* as the basis for his refutation of the latter's view of the scope of the *visio beatifica*, Bequini is a witness to the very early reception of Auriol's quodlibetal questions and demonstrates that the beatific vision continued to hold the attention of leading theologians.

SIBERT OF BEKA'S DEFENCE OF THE LIGHT OF GLORY

The position that Sibert vigorously defended in his vespers determination is relatively uncomplicated. All cognition involves three factors: the cognitive apparatus, the object of cognition, and the relationship between the two. In the perception of created beings the human cognitive powers are fully sufficient, provided, of course, that the object is appropriately positioned in relationship to man and that the cognitive apparatus is not impaired. With regard to the perception of God the same three factors must be taken into account. In this instance there is, however, an obstacle to man's perception: God transcends man's cognitive powers and is not a naturally given object for man. In order to bridge this chasm the *lumen gloriae* is required as a necessary but also sufficient condition for bringing God within the ambit of human cognition. Provided that man has been equipped with this light of glory even God is no exception to the universal truth that an object of

²⁸ William of Alnwick attempts to disprove Auriol's theory of the dual vision of the blessed in question 10 in his *Quodlibet*; see Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet*, ed. A. Ledoux, Quaracchi 1937, pp. 582 sqq.

cognition terminates the act of cognition and as such functions as the cause of the cognitive act.²⁹

In its basic outline Sibert's position is clear and anything but original. However, Sibert's presentation is deceptively straightforward. With Sibert, it is not at all easy to pinpoint the function that is fulfilled by the *lumen gloriae*. On the one hand, the light of glory is said to fortify the human intellect so as to empower man to take in God's essence as an object of cognition.³⁰ On the other hand, the precise nature of this strengthening of the human cognitive potency remains unexplained but seems to imply that some sort of proportion is established between God as object and the human intellect as cognitive power.³¹ Whether this implies that the human intellect rises above its ontological status remains unclear. It is clear, however, that God as an object of cognition becomes necessary in the sense that man has no voluntary power over this kind of cognition.

From Sibert's text it transpires that his attempt to explain the nature of the blessed vision of God and to assign the proper function of the *lumen gloriae* was perceived as an improper 'naturalization' of man's final bliss. Even Sibert's own master—who unfortunately remains unnamed in Sibert's text—took exception to his pupil's determination. As one of the earliest opponents this master launched the telling objection that the beatific vision should also be ascribed to God's will:

²⁹ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 2.2: "Ubi ergo ex parte obiecti in se nulla esset indispositio, sed plena et perfecta ratio obiecti, et ubi cum hoc nullum medium et nulla situationalis approximatio requiritur, ibi supposita generali influentia per solam dispositionem potentiae obiectum in ratione obiecti efficitur praesens potentiae, cui primo, antequam talem dispositionem haberet, non erat praesens in ratione obiecti".

³⁰ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 3.1: "Quantum ad secundum, quod est directe <ad> propositum sine assertionem teneo probabiliter, quod habens habitum luminis gloriae supposita generali influentia Dei valet <videre> Deum per essentiam. Et intelligo hic de natura angelica et de anima rationali, quae sunt Dei capaces et ad eius imaginem factae".

³¹ Cf. Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 3.2: "...nam habens obiectum sibi praesens in ratione obiecti simpliciter cum proportionali influentia et non potens actum suum suspendere, ex hoc ipso est in actu respectu talis obiecti. Sed ita est in proposito, scilicet quod habens lumen gloriae habet essentiam divinam sibi praesentem in ratione obiecti cum proportionali influentia, neque potest actum visivum quando natus est causari suspendere". This problem in Sibert is highlighted by the objection that his theory seems to entail that grace should empower man to perceive spiritual beings. The objection surfaces in both Sibert's and Wylton's texts but is not developed or reported in greater detail. Later on, Raymundus Bequini noted that talking of uplifting (*elevare*) man to God and of strengthening (*vigorare*) the human intellect for this kind of exalted cognition imply the very same; cf. the quotation from Raymundus Bequini's *Quodlibet* below, note 73.

if God chooses not to be seen, then He remains invisible—Augustine had said as much.³² If, on the other hand, the light of glory is a sufficient condition for the beatific vision then it would seem that God would be forced to let himself be seen by anybody who is in possession of this light.³³ Evidently, the further implication of this fundamental objection is that the beatific vision should not be reduced to solely the perception of God by the blessed. The *visio beatifica* also implies the union of love between God and man, and this union is the culmination and summit of the order of salvation. In the meeting between God and his elect it is, indisputably, God who chooses to open himself to man and who is the principal agent. As a definition of this heavenly encounter between God and man Sibert's rather simplistic epistemological account falls short.

Sibert was not much impressed by his master's objection, and his rather terse reply is that his position does not exclude or compromise the divine will at all. According to his appraisal, the divine will is involved insofar as it is God who grants the light of glory and upkeeps his general influence on creation; as long as these conditions are met the beatific vision conforms to perception in the world of creation.³⁴ Assigning a larger sphere of influence to the divine will would be tantamount to endorsing the stance that the divine will is the sole cause of the blessed vision, whereas the divine essence as the object of this vision holds no causal role. And this position was, as already mentioned, what Sibert first and foremost wanted to refute.

³² The standard text for this is Augustine, "Epistola 147 sive De videndo Deum ad Paulinam", which was quoted by one of Siebert's opponents, and in which it is said "non enim sicut ista sensibilia ita Deum videmus, in cuius enim voluntate situm est videri; videtur si vult, et si non vult non videtur" (PL 33, col. 603).

³³ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 5.1.2: "Iterum, nulla dispositio existens in creatura necessitat Deum ad agendum. Lumen ergo gloriae non facit quod essentia divina necessario causet visionem, quoniam talis actio subsit causalitati volitionis divinae".

³⁴ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 4.2.1: "Ad primum dicendum quod dato quod essentia divina in ratione obiecti nata esset causare visionem, adhuc ipsa visio non causaretur de necessitate naturae absolute. Ad visionem enim praeter causationem obiecti tria concurrunt quae dependent ex mera Dei voluntate: scilicet creatura ipsa intellectualis in qua actus visionis recipitur, lumen gloriae et generalis influentia divinae voluntatis. Et quocumque istorum trium subtracto per meram Dei voluntatem essentia in ratione obiecti non est nata causare visionem. Non igitur sequitur ex ista positione quod Deus aliquid extra se causet de necessitate naturae absolute, sed tribus his quae ex sua voluntate dependent, suppositis non est inconveniens quod in ratione obiecti actum necessario causet sicut et alia obiecta".

In the second part of his question Sibert lists several of the objections that were raised after his first determination had been made public. In the course of this protracted exchange with his adversaries Sibert ends up defending the view that the light of glory is necessary not only in the present order of salvation but also in the absolute sense. This means that, according to his appraisal, beholding God without the light of glory amounts to a logical contradiction.³⁵

THOMAS WYLTON ON THE *LUMEN GLORIAE*

In Q2 and T16 Wylton delivers a most impressive and devastating refutation of the necessity of the *lumen gloriae*. In the first place, Wylton argues, claiming that the human intellect cannot receive a supernatural act like the *visio beatifica* without a mediating habit is simply irrational insofar as, by the same token, there seems to be no compelling reason to accept that the intellect could receive this mediating entity directly. Secondly, the disproportion between man as a created being and God as an agent of infinite power does not preclude the human intellect from accepting the beatific vision directly; otherwise, for the same reason, the intellect would be prevented from accepting a mediating entity such as the light of glory. As a matter of course, Wylton's line of reasoning rests on the basic presupposition that the *visio beatifica* belongs to the realm of creation since it is an act of the human intellect. Accordingly, with regard to ontology there is, seen from Wylton's vantage point, no distinction in principle between the blessed vision and the light of glory, and there is no reason to suppose that it should be possible for the intellect to receive one but not the other.³⁶

³⁵ Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, §§ 5.6.1–2: "Praeterea—ut dicunt—Deum videre sine lumine gloriae non implicat contradictoria, ergo non oportet negari. Dicendum quod in hoc mihi videtur implicari contradictoria quia actus visionis necessario est proportionatus potentiae visivae, quae ipso formaliter est videns. Potentia autem nuda non est proportionata tali actui sic eius naturam excedenti. Ergo ponere quod visio fiat sine lumine est ponere actum esse proportionatum et non-proportionatum potentiae, ut patet deducendi". To Wylton this is tantamount to 'binding' God's power to the light of glory; see the text quoted above, note 14.

³⁶ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 2.1: "Ratio fuit ista: si intellectus noster non possit immediate recipere actum beatificum hoc esset vel quia inter potentiam naturalem omnino et actum supernaturalem sine medio non est proportio, quod non est verum, quoniam secundum hoc intellectus noster non immediate posset recipere illud lumen gloriae, sed mediante alio lumine vel forma supernaturali, et sic esset processus in infinitum; vel hoc esset quia inter potentiam finitam passivam et agens infinitae virtutis, scilicet quando

That the light of glory should prepare the intellect so as to make it capable of receiving the *visio beatifica* is another line of argument that carries no weight with Wylton. To him it is evident that the blessed vision as a created act is ontologically inferior to the human soul which is the form of man. Now it is an established fact that the human soul is infused into matter by God and that God is absolutely free to infuse such a form into matter directly even if there has been no preparation of matter. Consequently, it seems that God is equally free to grant the blessed vision and introduce it into any human being without having to bring about ontological preconditions. Accordingly, the light of glory cannot be said to be an absolutely necessary factor in the order of salvation.³⁷

Wylton is just as dismissive with regard to the widely disseminated view that the light of glory is necessary in the sense that man's intellect needs to be uplifted by such a kind of light in order to approach God. What such a uplifting could mean is not at all clear to Wylton. It may mean that the light of glory raises the human intellect above its ontological status. In that case, however, the intellect *in via* and the intellect *in patria* will clearly be two different things and, in the final analysis, no living human being will be saved. Alternatively, this uplifting may be interpreted to mean that the light of glory fortifies man's intellect so that the intellect becomes better equipped to see God. But, according to Wylton, this explanation amounts to nothing more than positing the addition of a created accident to the created intellect. Why somebody would want to maintain that God is unable to strengthen the

huiusmodi agens agit virtute appropriata virtuti infinitae, videlicet per creationem, non est proportio. Et istud non valet quoniam secundum hoc non posset intellectus creatus immediate recipere illud lumen”.

³⁷ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 2.3: “Nec convenit dicere quod hoc est propter perfectionem actus beatifici inter formas supernaturales ratione cuius non recipitur in potentia naturali immediate nec potest recipi nisi mediante alia forma supernaturali minus perfecta, sicut in naturalibus formae perfectissimae non recipiuntur in materia nisi multis dispositionibus naturalibus praecedentibus. Contra hoc arguebatur dupliciter. Primo quia, licet secundum cursum naturae forma vitalis non possit immediate induci in materia trunci, tamen de potentia Dei absoluta, de qua procedit quaestio, hoc bene fieri potest. Igitur sic ex parte ista. Secundo ad idem arguebam sic: forma magis perfecta potest immediate induci in potentia minus perfecta, et hoc de potentia Dei ordinata. Igitur perfectio actus beatifici non impedit quin de potentia Dei absoluta possit immediate perficere intellectum creatum. Consequentia patet per locum a minori. Antecedens probabam per intellectivam quae est forma supernaturalis et perfectior satis omni actu beatifico creato, ut satis probavi, et tamen <im>mediate perficit materiam primam, quae est potentia longe imperfectior intellectu nostro possibili”.

intellect without adding such an accident, is totally incomprehensible to Wylton. If, on the other hand, the light of glory uplifts the intellect in the sense that it facilitates the intellect's reception of the blessed vision then, obviously, God could easily do without the assistance of such a created entity. Finally, the light of glory may be thought of as a disposition without which the intellect would simply not be capable of receiving the *visio beatifica*. In that case, Wylton argues, the blessed vision would not really belong to the human intellect but would be received by this disposition. Consequently, the intellect would not be the immediate subject of beatification, and this is, of course, totally unacceptable.³⁸

That this line of reasoning should totally abolish the *lumen gloriae* is an inference that Wylton emphatically rejects. What he has proved is solely that the light of glory is not a necessary preparation for or a required element in the beatific vision. According to his appraisal, the *lumen gloriae* may certainly be viewed as an intellectual disposition that facilitates the human intellect's beholding God.³⁹ On the other hand, Wylton maintains, this disposition does not automatically bring about the beholding of God; God may freely give this light to somebody and

³⁸ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 2.4: "Quarto probavi quod non requiritur huiusmodi habitus propter elevationem potentiae, licet hoc videatur probare ratio de anima intellectiva, sic: nam quaero quid intelligitur per illam elevationem. Vel sic quod ille habitus elevet potentiam supra terminum capacitatis debitae suae naturae et suae speciei, vel quod elevet pro quanto confortat et fortificat potentiam, vel pro quanto faciliat vel sicut dispositio mediante qua actus beatificus recipitur in intellectu, sicut superficies est dispositio qua albedo recipitur in pariete. Non est dare primum quoniam secundum hoc intellectus Petri quem habuit in via non beatificatur sed alius, sicut si visus elevaretur ad cognoscendum quidditatem substantiae, iam non esset visus sed intellectus. Nec secundum quoniam, cum talis fortificatio virtutis non sit nisi additio virtutis alicuius finitae ad potentiam intellectus naturalem, posset Deus creare unum intellectum aequae intensi luminis et intensae virtutis cum intellectu sic fortificato per lumen gloriae infusum, et ille intellectus ex naturalibus posset immediate recipere actum beatificum, quod est propositum. Si detur tertium quod requiritur solum sicut facilitans, habetur propositum, scilicet quod intellectus immediate potest recipere actum beatificum etsi non ita faciliter sicut cum lumine gloriae. Nec est dare quartum quoniam tunc sequeretur quod, si virtute divina illud lumen esset separatum ab intellectu, quod ipsum beatificaretur, sicut accideret de superficie separata, quod est falsum. Et praeter haec haberetur propositum, scilicet quod potentia immediate beatificaretur, quia tunc lumen esset potentia. Et multa alia inconvenientia deducta erant in aula". Both in Q2 and T16 Wylton elaborates on this rebuttal at great length.

³⁹ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 5.5: "Ad quintum, non dixi quod lumen gloriae non facit ad modum actus sicut dispositio sed probavi quod non requiritur de potentia Dei absoluta". This is Wylton's reply to the counter-argument that he succeeded in disproving the light of glory altogether; cf. the quotation above, note 15.

yet choose to remain unseen.⁴⁰ And precisely this stance is what Sibert wanted to refute.

THE CAUSE OF THE BEATIFIC VISION ACCORDING TO WYLTON

Over against any attempt to make the divine essence the cause of the beatific vision Wylton maintains with unwavering conviction that the only real cause of the beatific vision is the divine will. Obviously, the divine essence is the object of the beatific vision but, according to Wylton, this is not tantamount to saying that it is the essence that brings about blissful vision. Since the beatific vision is a created act, God relates to this act in precisely the same way as He relates to all other creatures, namely by way of His will. In other words, the beatific vision is totally contingent and has no inner necessity.⁴¹

Wylton openly admits that the distinction between the divine essence and the divine will, which is fundamental to his reasoning, is a merely formal one, just as he readily admits that fundamentally the will is identical to the essence inasmuch as the will flows from the essence while at the same time remaining identical to the essence. Nevertheless he insists that it makes sense to upkeep the distinction between essence and will since the concept of essence is not adequately the same as the concept of will.⁴² Moreover, in identifying the cause of the beatific vision it is

⁴⁰ Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 5.4.2: "Ulterius dico quod non video quin intellectui disposito per illud lumen gloriae posset Deus se ostendere et non ostendere. Nam cum Deus quicquid extra agit, agit omnino libere, non video, cum lumen gloriae sit quiddam absolutum praecedens naturaliter actum beatificum in potentia, quod Deus isto lumine inducto necessitetur ad causandum actum beatitudinis. Unde dico quod obiecto huiusmodi praesente potentiae creatae quacumque dispositione naturali vel supernaturali dispositae, supposita etiam influentia generali, et potest se ostendere et non ostendere de potentia absoluta. Et videtur quod multum derogaret eius libertati quod arctaretur ad agendum extra per aliquam qualitatem creatam". This is obviously in strict opposition to Sibert's claim; cf. the quotation above, note 31.

⁴¹ Thomas Wylton, T19, §§ 2.0.1–3: "Respondeo quod sint ponendae tres propositiones ad propositum. Prima, quod voluntas divina sola circumscripta omni actione cuiuscumque agentis creati est totalis causa vel principalis actus beatifici. Secunda, quod essentia divina in ratione obiecti nullo modo concurrit ut causa nec aliquid effective operatur ut sic ad actum beatificum. Tertia elicitur ex istis duabus, quod videlicet sola voluntas divina sit causa circumscripto quocumque alio in ratione causae sive creato sive increato"; cf. the immediate continuation *ibid.*, § 2.1.1: "Primam propositionem probavit sic: omnis effectus contingens reducitur in primam causam contingentem. Sed actus beatificus est contingens. Ergo etc.".

⁴² Thomas Wylton, T19, § 9.1.2: "Hoc viso accipio aliud quod accipitur in titulo quaestionis, utrum scilicet voluntas sit causa totalis, per quod intelligo causam elicien-

imperative to distinguish between the two inasmuch as divine liberty is only safeguarded provided that it is God's will that brings about the beatific vision. In other words, divine liberty and the gratuitous nature of the beatific vision are the fundamental facts.⁴³

In order to underpin his position on the totally contingent nature of the beatific vision, Wylton points out some unfortunate consequences that would follow if it were assumed that created potencies are active in the bringing about of the beatific vision. If the beholding of God did not solely originate with God's wish to be seen, then the beatific vision would not be uniformly identical across different species, such as angelic and human natures. According to Wylton, if seeing God depended in the least upon created principles then the bliss enjoyed by angels would be specifically distinct from that bestowed upon men. But, Wylton states, this cannot be the case, since beatitude is the supreme

tem totaliter. Imaginor enim duo in divina essentia: unum quod est primum et radix omnium quae in divinis sunt, quod est essentia sub ratione propria, scilicet essentiae, ad quod consequuntur alia ut sapientia et aliae perfectiones attributales vel quaecumque alia. Tunc quaestio potest quaerere de formalitate propria voluntatis ut habet non-identitatem cum essentia, utrum ut sic sit causa omnium quae sunt ad extra, ita quod dato quod ipsa non esset essentia sed voluntas divina tantum, ipsa esset causa sufficiens aliorum. Alio modo posset quaeri ut est eadem cum essentia. Tertio modo, si essentia concurrat ut causa. De solo igitur primo intellectu intelligo quaestionem propositam".

Tellingly Sibert de Beka explicitly refuses to allow this distinction in his report of the debate; cf. Sibert de Beka, *Quodlibet*, q. 11, § 4.2.4: "Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia et voluntas proprie non sunt duo formalia contentiva eiusdem effectus, immo sunt idem contentivum et una simpliciter perfectio, nam voluntas ut praescindit a perfectione divinae essentiae nihil extra causaret. Unum ergo et idem contentivum formale est causans per modum liberae voluntatis et causans in ratione obiecti".

⁴³ Thomas Wylton, T19, § 9.4.3.1: "Quantum ad secundum articulum accipio istam propositionem: effectus qui continetur totaliter in aliquo principio formali, impossibile est quod contineatur in alio formaliter nec virtualiter vel partialiter; aliter esset procedere in infinitum in conceptibus et essent duo prima irreducibilia. Sed voluntas divina continet actum beatificum totaliter. Probatio: quia voluntas divina continet causaliter lapidem, non autem essentia. Tunc sic: primum eodem quo continet causaliter unam creaturam continet et omnia. Sed lapidem continet sola voluntas, quia solum voluntate creatur. Igitur et beatitudinem vel actum eius". Cf. *ibid.*, § 9.4.3.3: "Tertio sic: quod est perfecte liberum, est liberum et in applicando et in agendo. Quod patet etiam in nobis ubi est libertas ad applicationem et ad suspensionem actus, et stante re applicata potentiae et potentia rei potest voluntas velle et nolle. Sed si essentia divina causet actum beatificum, voluntas libera non esset causa nisi applicando, et Deus non libere ageret nisi applicando. Et esset aequae inconveniens ac si diceretur quod non esset summum ens".

perfection of all intellectual creation, and therefore it is not susceptible to graduation or variation according to species.⁴⁴

WYLTON ON THE SCOPE OF THE BEATIFIC VISION

How Wylton's reasoning on the specific unity of the blessed vision was received by his opponents is not known. What is clear, however, is that Wylton's position was open to at least one immediately evident objection. In enjoying the beatific vision the blessed are not limited to beholding only God and what is divine. If prayers to Saints are to be of any effect, and if the beatified preserve their love and concern for fellow creatures, then it seems that the objective scope of the beatific vision should also include creatures. But given the unity and permanence of the beatific vision, such a perception of creatures is only possible if it is through the beholding of the divine that the blessed are granted the possibility of perceiving creatures. If this is the case, then Wylton's insistence on the divine will as the sole cause of the *visio beatifica* is open to at least one serious challenge. Insofar as the divine essence seems to be the only possible cause of such a perception of creatures one would seem justified to conclude that Wylton's voluntaristic interpretation cannot be of universal validity.

That Wylton was aware of this challenge to his position transpires from his question T20. Here he investigates the manner in which the perception of created or so-called secondary objects relates to the seeing of God as the primary object. In explaining this relationship Wylton draws a distinction that was given a very clear exposition by Godfrey of Fontaines.⁴⁵ On the one hand, Wylton agrees that the beatific vision

⁴⁴ Thomas Wylton, T19, § 9.6.1: "Teneo igitur quod potentia creata non se habet ibi active quia hoc dato sequuntur tria inconvenientia per ordinem. Primum quod actus hominis et angeli erunt alterius speciei quia ubi causae non-primae—licet per se—sunt alterius speciei, et actus. Sed angeli et hominis potentiae sunt alterius speciei. Igitur ex hoc sequitur quod actus beatificus angeli et hominis non sunt aequales, quia species sunt sicut numeri et potentiae sunt inaequales. Ulterius ex hoc sequitur tertio quod actus hominis non sit beatificus, quia actus beatificus est actus summus. Duo autem inaequalia non sunt summa, et cum angeli ex primo sic illato actus sit perfectior, quia per se est creatura perfectior, ipse solus erit summus".

⁴⁵ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* X, q. 3, ed. J. Hoffmans, *Le huitième Quodlibet, Le neuvième Quodlibet, Le dixième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1924/31 (Les Philosophes Belges, IV), pp. 307 sqq.; cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* XV, q. 5, ed. O. Lottin, *Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1937 (Les Philosophes Belges, XIV), pp. 34 sqq.

of God's essence includes the perception of the essential aspect of creation. This implies that in beholding God the elect also perceive the ideas or the eternal essences of created beings. On the other hand, the actual existence of created beings are of a fundamentally different order. Since God's decision to bring forth creatures is solely dependent on His will, the divine essence as such does not represent creatures in their actual existence. Consequently, it cannot obtain that the blessed perceive creatures in their actual being by way of seeing God's essence. According to Wylton, the only possible way of accounting for this kind of cognition is to stipulate that the divine will, which brings forth creatures in actual existence, is also the immediate cause and conveyor of the perception of actually existing creatures. Consequently, whereas cognition of creatures in their essential being is universal, perception of creatures in actual being is partial and adapted to the need of the individual elect. In other words, in bliss the perception of the divine essence and the essences of creatures is a constant, whereas the cognizing of actual creatures is changeable and scalable. However, the divine will is the sole cause of whatever the blessed perceive in bliss.⁴⁶

On the surface level Wylton's exposition of the blessed's perception of the divine and the created appears to be a neat and relatively simple solution to a complex problem. But, as Wylton admits, his solution is beset with serious difficulties. Like his contemporaries, Wylton refused to allow more than one act of intellection in the elect who enjoy bliss. As Augustine had intimated, the beatific vision is a single and permanent act.⁴⁷ This implies that secondary objects, like creatures in their actual existence, should be somehow included in the viewing of the divine essence at the same time as they are not actually part of this

⁴⁶ Thomas Wylton, T20, § 4.1: "Et dico quod sicut potentia viae se habet libere ad diversos actus quod per vim activam produco actum, sic voluntas divina quae libere ponit omnia creata in esse volito, ideo libere potest creare. Tunc accipio sic quod essentia ab aeterno sit causa dicendi verbum creaturae quo ad omnia necessaria in creatura, tam simplicia quam complexa. Sed respectu existentiarum concurrunt contingens causa, scilicet voluntatis, et ideo esse cognitum respectu contingentium causat voluntas divina in actu beatifico, ita quod primo causat actum beatificum, secundo in actu causat esse intellectum omnium obiectorum secundariorum sive obiecta secundaria in esse cognito. Essentia igitur divina nullo modo ut essentia est repraesentativa, sed omnia talia sunt producta in actu intelligendi immediate a voluntate, quae est immediata ratio omnium motionum ad extra. Et ideo stante actu beatifico potest illa libere causare et non causare".

⁴⁷ The standard supporting text for this is Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, 16, 26 (PL 42, col. 1079).

primary object. Moreover, since actually existing creatures change over time, it seems that they are ill-suited as objects included in the beatific vision. Finding a way out of this impasse is a difficult task and Wylton openly admits as much. As a possible rationale for his claim that creatures in their actual existence can somehow be implied by or added to the divine essence without introducing change into the blissful act, Wylton suggests that actual creatures may be viewed as real relations added to the divine essence. They are extrinsic to the divine and for this reason the divine essence may equally well be perceived with and without these added relations.⁴⁸ The difficulty with taking this tack is that it implies accepting that the object of cognition may change while the corresponding intellectual act remains unaltered. Wylton is at a loss to find an explanation how this should be possible. But, as he notes, this difficulty is not limited to the beatific vision. Equally, it besets man's understanding of how God perceives created beings, and balancing the contingency of creation with the immutability of divine being was never easy.⁴⁹

THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATION

The opposition between Sibert of Beka and Thomas Wylton on the beatific vision is not an isolated or random instance of two theologians' disagreement on a topic of a highly speculative nature. The

⁴⁸ Thomas Wylton, T20, § 2: "De primo intelligo per actum beatificum actum intuitivum quo videtur essentia ut in se existens. Talis actus secundum aliquos est quaedam qualitas absoluta fundans respectum ad obiectum ita quod de sua essentia est solum illud absolutum, ille autem respectus est extra essentiam suam in quantum dicit entitatem per se unam, quia respectus non est de essentia absoluti. Et tunc non esset multum difficile videre quo modo manente eodem actu beatifico numero posset variari notitia circa obiectum secundarium, quia non videtur multum inconveniens quod mutatio fiat ad solum respectum, sicut patet de unione naturae ad Verbum. Tunc autem talis variatio esset in actu non penes absolutum, sed penes respectum ad obiecta secundaria".

⁴⁹ Thomas Wylton, T20, § 5.3: "Ad aliud: sicut Deus ut causa efficiens indistincta re et ratione est causa effectiva distinctorum, sic ut ratio repraesentativa illimitata eadem re et ratione est ratio repraesentandi multa. Et ideo ad formam argumenti dico quod una re et ratione. Sed quo modo esse intellectum possit produci nisi producatur intellectione, sicut album sine albedine—quia nullus effectus formalis est sine sua ratione formali, similiter nec relativum sine relatione—quantum tali esse convenit produci per se sine productione alicuius absoluti; item, quo modo salvatur in Deo summa necessitas si aliquod aliud esse ab intellectione divina contingens et diminutum ponatur subiective in intellectione divina; quo modo etiam tale non erit ens reale cum correspondeat sibi esse reale et causatur a causa reali et non solum a ratione <non liquet>".

solution Sibert opted for is obviously rooted in the Thomistic school of thought,⁵⁰ and though his presentation and defence of the theory is elementary and lacks in finesse, his exposition is clear and consistent. There can be little doubt that much of the tenacity and confidence that he revealed in the face of apparently strong opposition was due to his conviction that he was solidly building on and upholding the decision of the Council of Vienne.

Seen from Thomas Wylton's viewpoint, what Sibert was lacking was respect for God's omnipotence.⁵¹ That the light of glory forms part of the actual order of salvation is not debatable; that was established in the Vienne Council. On the other hand, this should not be taken to imply that the present order of salvation is absolutely necessary or natural to God. God's omnipotence cannot be limited by creation and this means that the light of glory is a purely contingent element in God's plan for man and devoid of any inner necessity. In the same vein Wylton insisted on the purely voluntary nature of God's self-revelation in bliss. Against this background, Sibert's causal explanation of the beatific vision according to which the divine as object is the ultimate cause of the blessed vision, appeared unduly 'naturalistic' and directly irreverent vis-à-vis the divine majesty.

In its basic features the confrontation between Sibert and Wylton may be said to be a variation of the familiar debate between Thomists and Scotists on the necessity of habitual grace.⁵² What was of seminal

⁵⁰ With some justification Thomas Aquinas may be said to have established the *lumen gloriae* as an element in theological discourse inasmuch as he provided a clear definition of the term just as he outlined the function that this light is supposed to fulfill; cf., e.g., Thomas Aquinas's *Quodlibet* VII, q. 1.

⁵¹ Cf. Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 4.3: "Et arguo sic: asserere absolute Deum non posse de quo sic asserens non est certum—si possit vel non possit—est periculosum; sed asserens quod Deus non potest beatificare intellectum creatum immediate sine habitu, asserit quod sibi non est certum; ergo etc. Maior huius rationis est de se manifesta. Minor probatur quia si Deus hoc non possit, hoc solum esset propter implicationem contradictionis istius 'intellectus creatus absque habitu supernaturali medio beatificatur'; sed quod hoc implicet contradictionem non est certum hoc asserenti. Probatio, quoniam si de hoc sit certus, vel habet de hoc certitudinem adhaesionis tantum, scilicet per fidem vel sacram scripturam, vel certitudinem evidentiae".

⁵² If Wylton's Q2 is anything to go by, this was realised at the outset of the debate since the opponent, i.e., Sibert, argued for the necessity of the light of glory on the basis of the parallel necessity of created grace *in via*; see Thomas Wylton, Q2, § 1.1: "... probatur sic: actus meritorius est hominis formaliter; aut igitur per solam voluntatem hominis, et hoc est error Pelagii, aut per Dei voluntatem acceptantem. Et tunc cum secundum istos actus naturalis et supernaturalis sint eiusdem speciei et illa acceptatio nihil ponat reale in Deo, oportet quod ponat aliquid reale circa potentiam et actum. Si

importance in this confrontation, however, was the circumstance that the debate forced contemporary theologians to explore not only the nature and function of the *lumen gloriae* but also to examine how the realm of creation in both its ideal and actual aspects can be conceived to be included in *visio beatifica*. In pursuing this line of inquiry the successors had to face several challenging epistemological questions of principal significance.

PETER AURIOL

While it is not clear whether Auriol and Wylton confronted each other in actual debate on the beatific vision there can be no doubt that Auriol was thoroughly familiar with Wylton's deliberations on the beatific vision. Auriol shared Wylton's voluntaristic stance and further developed some of his principal lines of argument. On the other hand, Auriol opposed Wylton emphatically both in his assessment of man's intellectual activity in this kind of blissful perception and in his view on how creatures are included in the beatific vision.

In order to appreciate Auriol's approach to and manner of dealing with the beatific vision in the *Quodlibet* it is important to realize that Auriol's treatment in this work was of principal importance to him. In his three questions Auriol approached the theological topic as one that is eminently suited to highlighting the salient features of human

vero ponat respectum, necesse est quod praeponat fundamentum illius respectus, quia novus respectus non advenit sine mutatione in altero extremorum secundum aliquid absolutum, ex 8 *Physicorum*. Illud autem absolutum est habitus. Igitur actus meritorii in via praesupponunt habitus supernaturales in potentiis, ex quo videtur quod simili modo actus beatifici in patria". Apparently, the argument from the supposedly parallel case of habitual grace was blocked by somebody who argued that a correspondence between what is true of habitual grace *in via* and the habitual light of grace *in patria* would imply that habitual grace in this life should provide those who have received this gift, with the ability to see the bodies of the glorified; as this is not the case, the argument from habitual grace does not appear to be pertinent to the issue at hand.

Wylton's questions Q3 and Q4 also re-enact and summarize a long-standing debate between Thomists and Scotists, i.e., that on the question of whether the intellectual or the voluntary aspect of beatitude is the more principal. Not surprisingly, Wylton comes down in favour of the contribution of the will, but his manner of presenting and arguing the case reveals that this discussion was not an issue of topical interest at the time.

intellection, and for this reason his discussion is of far wider scope than was the case with Sibert and Wylton.⁵³

In his ninth quodlibetal question Auriol examines the status and function of the light of glory. From the outset he makes it clear that he does not subscribe to Wylton's purely passive conception of the elects' beholding of God. It is true, according to Auriol, that seeing God is only possible because God chooses to reveal himself. Since God is eminently intelligible He may cause Himself to be cognized without any assistance from the intellect in its active aspect.⁵⁴ This is, however, not tantamount to saying that in cognizing God man's intellect is totally passive or inert. On the contrary, the human intellect is here put in its most intense activity since God is the supreme and uniquely intelligible object. In other words, as far as man's intellect is concerned, the beatific vision as the highest instance of cognition does not eliminate or exclude human nature.⁵⁵

Like Sibert and Wylton, Auriol is, of course, fully aware that the light of glory forms part of Church doctrine and, accordingly, he recognizes that it is necessary to find a role for this light.⁵⁶ But, according to Auriol,

⁵³ In this connection I shall disregard question 8 in Auriol's *Quodlibet* since contrary to what is indicated by its title it does not concern the *visio beatifica* specifically. I am currently preparing a volume on Auriol's philosophy and theology as presented in his *Quodlibet* and here an interpretation of the question will be found.

⁵⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, in *Quodlibeta Sexdecim Petri Aureoli Verberii Ordinis Minorum, Archiepiscopi Aquensis S.R.E. Cardinalis*, Roma 1605, p. 94b: "Sed constat quod Deus non est intelligibile in potentia, immo est summe intelligibilis in actu. Igitur potest sui intellectionem causare in potentia absque hoc quod cooperetur sibi intellectus agens. Praeterea, actio intellectus agentis est principalis, phantasmatis autem instrumentalis. Aut igitur in visione beatifica agens intellectus est principalis et essentia agens instrumentalis aut e converso. Sed non potest dici primum quia tunc homo ex puris naturalibus principaliter beatificaretur. Nec potest dari secundum quia tunc variaretur activitas agentis et fieret de agente principali agens instrumentale. Igitur nullo modo causat visionem beatificam".

⁵⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 95a: "Istae autem duae [*scil.* activitates intellectus] sunt in facto esse, determinare scilicet intellectum possibilem ad susceptionem intellectionis in gradu certo, specifico et numerali, et concurrere ad actum cognitivum per modum cuiusdam integrantis et perficientis ipsum eo modo, quo supra declaratum est. Igitur intellectus agens secundum hos duos modos activitatis concurrat ad beatificum actum".

⁵⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 97b: "Quarta propositio est quod necesse est ponere lumen gloriae distinctum ab actu propter definitionem ecclesiae quia non nisi distorte potest illud exponi quod Decretalis [*scil.* "Ad nostrum"] dicit, ut allegatum est supra, scilicet quod non indigemus lumine gloriae elevante ad Deum videndum et beate fruendum erroneum est dicere [...]. Licet igitur tale lumen tenendum sit, rationem nihilominus cogentem invenire difficile est. Potest tamen istud persuaderi...".

this is far from easy. In the first place, the light of glory is not required so as to make God accessible to the human intellect. The beatific vision belongs to the sphere of creation and here God's will rules supreme; if God does not wish to be perceived He will remain unseen.⁵⁷ Secondly, there is no good reason to claim that the light of glory bridges the gap between what is finite and what is infinite, since this light must of necessity belong to the created order, and adding such a finite entity to man, who is also finite, does not yield something infinite. Equally, the *lumen gloriae* is not required so as to enhance the susceptibility of man's intellect, since in its passive aspect the human intellect is eminently receptive and open to all that is intelligible. Claiming that the intellect is only of limited potency would by necessity mean ascribing some positive property to the intellect in its passive aspect and thus break with the fundamental principles of Aristotelian psychology.⁵⁸

Since the intellect in its passive aspect cannot be the recipient of the light of glory Auriol infers that this gift of grace must reside in the intellect in its active aspect. But, according to Auriol, it is not immediately evident how this light can strengthen man's active or agent intellect. Auriol is very careful to explain that the light of glory should not be assumed to become part of the intellect or add to or otherwise alter the intellect in its essential properties; otherwise man's intellect in bliss would not be identical to the one he has in his earthly existence.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 95b: "Igitur et Deus sua sola voluntate poterit celare suam essentiam intellectui, quantumcumque disposito vel ex naturalibus vel per habitum, cum sit perfectionis libere movere vel non movere".

⁵⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 96a sqq. Upholding a purely passive interpretation of the *intellectus possibilis* is of major importance to Auriol and in this he confronts, not least, Duns Scotus; cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 94b sqq. This agrees closely with Auriol's understanding of the passive or potential intellect in terms of ontology. In the seventh question of his *Quodlibet* as well as in several questions in his commentary on the second book of the Sentences Auriol maintains that the passive intellect is devoid of essential characteristics except potentiality; for this see L.O. Nielsen, "The Quodlibet of Peter Auriol", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2007, pp. 267–331. Thomas Wylton was familiar with the point of view defended by Auriol and he attacked it forcefully in his question on the intellectual soul as the form of man; see in particular §§ 12 sqq. in Thomas Wylton, *Quaestio de anima intellectiva*, ed. L.O. Nielsen – C. Trifogli, together with an English translation by G.C. Trimble (to appear in the series *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi*, British Academy – Oxford University Press, Oxford).

⁵⁹ This is debated in the third conclusion of article four in the ninth question where Auriol concludes as follows: "Sic in proposito lumen gloriae non intendit essentialiter claritatem agentis, nec est in ea [*scil.* natura intellectus] subiective, sed nec directe se extendit ad actum visionis ipsum clarificando et illuminando, quasi habeat per se et

Accordingly, the light of glory must be conceived of as something extraneous to the essence of the intellect. But as extraneous to the intellect this light of glory cannot be said to increase the intellect's cognitive powers or raise the intellect above its natural state.⁶⁰ Consequently, it would be a mistake to view the light of glory as a cause of the beatific vision: the only real causes are the divine will which reveals the divine and, concomitantly, man's intellect which perceives God.⁶¹

Having excluded the roles that the light of glory cannot fill, Auriol at last succeeds in identifying the function that may be assigned to an intellectual light of this kind. According to his appraisal, the *lumen gloriae* may be viewed as an aid in keeping the intellect focused when confronted with God. Since God is the supremely intelligible and infinite object, and since the intellect as a finite being is totally unaccustomed to direct cognition of an actually infinite entity, the intellect would be in danger of losing itself in the confrontation with God. Elaborating on this meeting between the infinite and the finite, Auriol explains that in ordinary perception the intellect becomes more accomplished through practice; doing math makes the mind more adept at performing complex mathematical calculations. Now the fact is that the *visio beatifica* is initiated solely by God's self-revelation, and the intellect is totally unprepared for this. What this means is that, with Auriol, the beatific vision is in principle no different from ordinary intellectual perception: the intellectual act posits its object in intentional being—this is how things normally are according to Auriol⁶²—and in the beatific

distincte super ipsum causalitatem" (Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 97b). Many points in Auriol's rejection of the Thomistic view of the *lumen gloriae* echo Wylton's refutation. On the other hand, Auriol attempts to steer a middle course between Sibert and Wylton which, with Auriol, is the same as saying that they both got it wrong.

⁶⁰ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 97a. In this context Peter Auriol presupposes the dilemma that Wylton presented Sibert with: either the light of glory is something inert or something vital; if the *lumen gloriae* is a simple accident, it is by no means evident how it could facilitate man's perception of God; if, on the other hand, it is something living and spiritual, it would appear to be the immediate subject of the beatific vision. Sibert answered rather poignantly that something as firmly established as habitual grace was just as exposed to Wylton's dilemma as the light of glory.

⁶¹ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 96b sqq. In denying any activity to the light of glory Auriol may be said to agree with Godfrey of Fontaines; see the text quoted above, note 4.

⁶² Cf. L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol", in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.J.E. Gracia – T.B. Noone, Malden, MA 2003, pp. 494–503, and the literature referred to there.

vision the intellect posits God in intentional being. But the intellect has had no training in perceiving an object of this order and, accordingly, there is a real risk that the intellect will be incapable of coping with God and it may simply come to a halt or man's intellectual light could turn into darkness.⁶³ Consequently, the light of glory should be thought of as something that assists the intellect in keeping its focus when confronted with this overwhelming object.

The precise manner in which Auriol conceives of this assistance is greatly clarified by his exposition of what is actually seen in the beatific vision. Dealing with the object of the beatific vision in his tenth *quodlibetal* question, Auriol elaborates on his opposition to Wylton. Auriol totally rejects Wylton's—and, by implication, Godfrey of Fontaines's—distinction between the seeing of created objects in their ideal and in their actual form. Such a distinction would presuppose not only that there were a real distinction between essence and being but also that God's will could be distinguished from his intellect. But neither is true, according to Auriol.⁶⁴ Moreover, Wylton's idea that the blessed may maintain the same intellectual cognition of God while their perception of creatures in their actual existence varies, conflicts with the very nature of intellectual cognition. An intellectual act posits its object in intentional being, and accordingly, it is simply impossible that the inner object of an intellectual act could change without a corresponding change taking place in the intellectual act.⁶⁵ In the third place, Auriol does not share Wylton's concern that God could be known exhaustively if the blessed were to perceive God and the totality of possible and actual creation in one and the same act. As Auriol stresses, God is incomprehensible—in the medieval technical sense—and this is a given, since God is infinite and encompasses the realm of possibility in His unique being. On the other hand, every intellectual act in creatures is something finite, and this is certainly true of even the beatific vision which may be enjoyed by angels and man.⁶⁶

According to Auriol's appreciation, the beatific vision is an intellectual act which by its very nature has God in all His immensity as its proper

⁶³ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 95a.

⁶⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 99b sqq.

⁶⁵ See Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 101a sqq. Wylton's attempt to find a rationale by way of real relations is explicitly rejected by Auriol; cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 102a sqq.

⁶⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 100b sqq.

object. As such the beatific vision encompasses not only what is absolute and relative, that is the divine essence and the divine persons, but also the realm of possibility and actuality, or, in other words, divine ideas and creation in its full actuality. This is, so to speak, the basic instance of the beatific vision. According to Auriol, it is, however, not the only one. It is stipulated by faith that even the blessed perceive what goes on in creation and that God has innumerable secrets, such as judgment day. This entails that there must be several other instances of the blessed vision. In other acts—which are also beatific—the elect are granted permission to perceive selected creatures as they are contained in the divine essence. These intellectual acts are, so to speak, derived from or implied in the fundamental instance of the beatific vision.⁶⁷

This multiplication of visions may sound highly complicated but, as Auriol underscores, it is relatively straightforward, and, in this respect, the beatific vision corresponds to what we experience in everyday life. When placed in front of a large wall decorated with an elaborate relief, we perceive the wall and the relief, but we do not perceive the details of the relief, let alone the single minute carvings in the stone. The initial act of perceiving the wall is comprehensive in the sense that it spans the wall and its decoration, but it is by no means exhaustive. At some distance from the wall we may even be unable to take in the whole wall at once, or we may fail to realize that the decoration is a relief and not, for instance, a mosaic. In other words, the initial perception of the wall in its totality is not exhaustive or sufficiently distinct. When we approach the wall our perception improves and on inspecting the wall we begin to perceive the details of the relief. This gives rise to several subsequent acts of perception by which we perceive the finer details, and by implication these details are constituted as intentional objects. What has changed is only our way of perceiving; in itself the object is unchanged, whereas the intentional objects change with the several acts.⁶⁸

In Auriol's interpretation, the beatific vision may be understood in a similar manner: God is always perceived in both His absolute and relative aspect as well as the totality of possibility and actuality. However, the details of divine wisdom and creation are not immediately accessible

⁶⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 105b sqq.; cf. *ibid.*, p. 106b. Raymundus Bequini presents a succinct exposition of Auriol's position; see the text, quoted below, note 72.

⁶⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Quodlibet*, q. 10, ed. Romae 1605, p. 105a.

to the elect by way of this fundamental cognition of God. Subsequent acts of intellection are required in order to explore the details of God's essence. Moreover, since God determines what to reveal, there is no risk that the blessed end up prying on God. Equally, there is no risk that the perception of the elect will ever exhaust God as an object of cognition, since God is infinite whereas man and his acts remain finite even in bliss.

Within this framework, the role which Auriol assigns to the light of glory becomes easier to delineate. By providing the light of glory as a focusing beam, God directs the elect to contemplate differing aspects of His immensity. However, this light remains extraneous to the intellect and does not alter the basic workings of the intellect or compromise its divine object.⁶⁹

RAYMUNDUS BEQUINI

Raymundus Bequini responded thoroughly to Auriol's conception of the beatific vision and, not surprisingly, he disagreed with Auriol on most points. Even where they agree, Bequini is keen to show that his reasons for holding a particular view are sound, whereas Auriol's reasoning is flawed. Thus, they are both convinced that the light of glory is not necessary in the absolute sense; but Bequini does not endorse Auriol's insistence on the activity of the intellect in the beatific vision or the inactive nature of this light.⁷⁰ Equally, they are both convinced

⁶⁹ It is clear that Auriol's interpretation of the beatific vision entails that the blessed may enjoy two acts of cognition simultaneously since the perception of God as the primary object is constant whereas the perception of creatures is mutable. However, with Auriol this is nothing out of the ordinary, since he explicitly defends the view that man may enjoy two simultaneous acts of cognition; cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Commentarius in tertium librum Sententiarum*, dist. 14, q. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 430a: "Tunc dico quod duo actus ordinati possunt esse simul, sed non infiniti, nec repugnat ex hoc quod poneretur potentia infinita intrinsece; sed quia poneretur infinitas informatione".

⁷⁰ Raymundus Bequini, *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, ms. Avignon, Bibl. Mun. 314, ff. 7vb–8ra: "Sexto, quia non plus habet activitatem intellectus agens respectu actus beatifici quam habeat respectu habitus infusi quia illa visio est infusa a Deo. Sed respectu habituum infusorum, puta fidei et virtutum intellectualium infusarum, non habet aliquam activitatem adeo coexigitivam et determinativam. Ergo nec respectu intellectionis beatae"; *ibid.*, f. 8ra: "Vel aliter quod materia prima vigoratur ad recipiendum formas per dispositiones accidentales quia forma non fit in quacumque materia sed in disposita. Unde vigoratio haec nihil aliud est quam quaedam dispositio in fieri et in conservari. Ita suo modo lumen gloriae vigorat intellectum possibilem disponendo ad recipiendum beatificam visionem et eam conservando eo modo, quo infra dicitur".

that it is absolutely impossible for the elect to behold the divine essence without perceiving the divine persons; nevertheless Bequini strives to undermine Auriol's reasoning in favour of this view.⁷¹

Since Bequini had the good fortune to be able to consult and refer to Auriol's *Quodlibet*, his rebuttal of Auriol is extremely detailed. In this connection only the salient points of his opposition can be considered. In the first place, Bequini rejects Auriol's idea that the elect have several acts of intellection in bliss. To Bequini, it is evident that the blessed are granted only one intellection, and that this intellection may comprise the totality of God and His Wisdom in both its ideal and factual aspects.⁷² Equally, Bequini rejects Auriol's view that the light of glory

⁷¹ This issue is dealt with in the second article of question 4 in Bequini's first *Quodlibet*. Here he accuses Auriol of contradicting himself, inasmuch as he had changed his view on the possibility of having separate concepts of the divine essence and the divine persons. In fact, Bequini has been an attentive reader of Auriol's works, since it is true that Auriol modified his position on the relationship between an intellectual act and the corresponding concept from the time of writing the *Scriptum in Primum Sententiarum* in 1316 to the composition of the *Quodlibet* in 1320.

⁷² Raymundus Bequini, *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, ms. Avignon, Bibl. Mun. 314, ff. 38vb sqq.: "Tertia opinio est, quae ponit tria. Primum est quod beatus videndo divinam essentiam <non> videat in ipsa eodem actu aliquam creaturam quin videat simul omnem creaturam in ea relucentem. Et quia hoc est impossibile, ut dicit, videtur quod beatus videns divinam essentiam videat omnia in ipsa formaliter et terminative. Ideo dicit quod videns divinam essentiam videt omnes creaturas solum eminenter et contentive, non autem formaliter et terminative. Secundum quod dicit, est quod ex notitia beata divinae essentiae oritur et creatur in intellectu beato quaedam alia cognitio supernaturalis in qua revelantur ipsis beatis creaturae, secundum quod placet Deo. Et ista oritur ex prima sicut cognitio conclusionis oritur ex cognitione principii et cognitio principii ex cognitione terminorum. Tertia est quod in visione beata nullo modo potest fieri de novo aliqua revelatio sine reali mutatione actus beatifici vel numerali vel intensiva [...]. Quia istam opinionem non intelligo, idcirco arguo contra eam. Et primo contra conclusionem primam. Primo sic: intellectus beatus potest videre in essentia divina actu beato et distincto aliquas creaturas, ergo poterit et omnem creaturam possibilem repraesentari in ipso—quam habeo ab isto doctore quia ex nullo alio negat quod aliqua creatura non potest ibi videri formaliter et terminative, nisi quia inevitabile est, ut ipse dicit, quin pari ratione videret omnes creaturas, et sic perirent revelationes et sequerentur alia impossibilia supra posita. Item, patet consequentia quia quemadmodum videtur esse de una creatura sic de alia, ex quo omnes creaturae possibiles aequae naturaliter et necessario relucet in essentia divina. Nec obest si quis dicat quod immo aliquae creaturae relucet in essentia divina naturaliter et aliquae libere, quia si beatus videt aliquas creaturas repraesentatas ibi naturaliter, ergo poterit et omnes. Ergo similiter eadem ratione, si potest videre aliquas ibi repraesentatas libere, eadem rationes potest omnes. Secundo, beatus actu beato potest cognoscere divinam essentiam ut ideam. Sed impossibile est cognoscere ideam ut ideam nisi cointelligam eodem actu ideatum. Ergo idem quod prius. Tertio, quod essentia divina in visione beata habet modum et rationem speculi secundum Augustinum, De videndo Deum. Sed ratio speculi cum sit medium cognitum, est quod simul videatur et eodem actu cum illis quae repraesentantur in eo, vel saltem quae possint videri. Ergo etc. Quarto, quia essentia divina in visione

assists the intellect in its active aspect; to him it is clear that it is the intellect's passive side that is in need of improvement.⁷³ Finally, Bequini totally rejects Auriol's conception of bliss and fruition.⁷⁴ Evidently, the opposition between Auriol and Bequini was anything but surprising; in many respects, it is simply a continuation of the well-known opposition conflict between Dominicans and Franciscans.⁷⁵ What is more remarkable is that this circumstance does not induce Bequini to make light of his rebuttal of Auriol; on the contrary, he pursues his opponent tirelessly. Perhaps this should be seen as an—albeit indirect—recognition of Auriol's impact on Parisian theology around 1320.⁷⁶

beata habet rationem causae efficientis in repraesentando aut exemplaris et speculi aut finis. Sed omnia ista ut sic formaliter accepta simul et eodem actu possunt cognosci cum suis effectibus et exemplatis. Ergo etc. Quinto, quia non est minoris efficientiae et perfectionis actus beatificus quo videtur Deus intuitive in patria, quam ille quo videtur abstractive in via. Sed in via possum cognoscere actu abstractivo Deum et simul eodem actu caelum et terram, vel cum pono differentiam inter Deum et creaturam intelligendo quod Deus non est lapis et cetera. Ergo etc.”; *ibid.*, ms. Avignon, Bibl. Mun. 314, f. 41rb: “Tertia conclusio principalis est quod loquendo de possibili absolute quod intellectus creatus beatus posset videre omnes creaturas quantum ad quid est et si est, contra primam opinionem; et quantum ad omnem modum realem et circumstantiam secundum quam subsunt creaturae divino proposito, voluntati et dispositioni, quod est contra secundam opinionem; et breviter quantum ad omnia secundum quae relucet in Deo naturaliter vel libere, quod est contra tertiam opinionem specialiter, et hoc unico actu beatifico. Quod probo sic praeter rationes positas supra in reprobatione primae conclusionis Petri Aureoli”.

⁷³ Raymundus Bequini, *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, ms. Avignon, Bibl. Mun. 314, f. 7va: “Prima namque conclusio negativa, scilicet quod lumen non requiritur nec est ponendum de facto ad vigorandum intellectum possibilem ut suscipiat etc., non videtur vera. Et ideo probo contrarium. Primo sic: illam potentiam animae beatae vel illam realitatem vigorat lumen gloriae ad quam pertinet formaliter beatifice Deum videre. Hoc pro tanto est evidens quia libro 7 Decretalis, ‘Ad nostrum’, dicitur quod non indigemus lumine gloriae elevante ad Deum videndum, error. Igitur secundum determinationem ecclesiae illam potentiam vigorat lumen gloriae ad quam spectat Deum beatifice videre, cum vigorare et elevare in proposito sint idem. Hic solus intellectus possibilis videt. Igitur etc. Secundo, quod lumen non requiritur ad vigorandum agentem principaliter primo quia lumine gloriae est de facto in creatura beata. Sed intellectus agens secundum opinionem magistrorum non est in angelis beatis. Ergo lumen gloriae non requiritur principaliter propter intellectum agentem”.

⁷⁴ Cf. Raymundus Bequini, *Quodlibet* I, q. 7, art. 1, ms. Avignon, Bibl. Mun. 314, ff. 21va sqq.

⁷⁵ Cf. the description, given above, of the opposition between Sibert de Beka and Thomas Wylton.

⁷⁶ This is not least evident in Landulphus Caracciolo who, in his commentary on the Lombard's *Sentences*, attacked Auriol on all fronts; cf. C. Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, Aldershot 2000, pp. 138 sqq., and id., “Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax on Divine Foreknowledge”, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 66 (1999), pp. 299–434. The anonymous commentator on the first book of the *Sentences* in the first part of cod. 53/102, preserved in the Seminary Library in Pelp-

CONCLUSION

It is well worth reflecting on the motives that prompted the scholastics to spend so much energy on a subject as remote and speculative as the beatific vision. Obviously, the theological and religious incentives should not be underestimated and the heritage of the Church Fathers alone made it an obligatory subject for medieval theologians. Moreover, the topic presented itself as a principal part of Christology,⁷⁷ and as such it was not something that could be taken lightly. On the other hand, the beatific vision was also an attractive topic for philosophical reasons. In bliss, the human cognitive apparatus would enjoy optimal conditions under which to function; there the intellect would be on a par with the pure intelligences or spirits inasmuch as it would lose its dependence on the powers of the sensitive soul and be able to cognize the object that is supremely intelligible in itself. Somebody who took this approach to its logical—and ontological—conclusion was obviously Meister Eckhart; but it is certainly also a consideration that is discernible in less lofty thinkers such as Wylton, Auriol and Bequini. Whereas Wylton was mainly concerned with finding a suitable rebuttal of Sibert's all too 'naturalistic' interpretation and safeguard divine freedom, Auriol appears to have pondered this topic for primarily philosophical reasons. Auriol's idea and defence of a 'double' vision enjoyed by the blessed provoked determined rejection from both the Scotist William of Alnwick and the Dominican Raymundus Bequini. Though their treatments were mainly directed towards underpinning the established positions of their respective orders, it is apparent that in so doing they were prompted to update traditional models of explanation and in this indirect manner to make original contributions.

As even a brief and eclectic perusal of the scholastics' debates on the nature of the beatific vision in the aftermath of the Council of Vienne reveals, much more exploration remains to be done before it will be possible to chart in detail the development that led up to Benedict XII's promulgation of the truly epochal "Benedictus Deus" from January 1336.

lin, read "secundum Aureolum" and attempted to refute Caracciolo's arguments; cf. W. Senko, "Quelques contributions à l'histoire de la littérature philosophique du XIV^e siècle d'après le ms. 53/102 de la Bibliothèque du Grand Séminaire de Pelplin", *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 11 (1963), pp. 63–85.

⁷⁷ The *locus classicus* in the context of Christology is, of course, distinction 14 in the third book of the Lombard's *Sentences*.

INTENTIONS

INTENTIONS IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY:
HERVAEUS NATALIS *VERSUS* RADULPHUS BRITO

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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of logical intentions was not new when it was becoming an important object of study by the beginning of the fourteenth century. The name '*intentio*' was the Latin translation for the Arabic '*ma'qul*', which in its turn was Alfarabi's translation of the Greek '*noêma*' (concept, thought). The distinction between first and second intentions was not new either; it is already found in Avicenna, and it can be traced back to Aristotle's primary and secondary substances.¹ Logical intentions have always played a key role in many disciplines; the exact interpretation of their nature and function has far-reaching consequences for theories of science and theology, as well as metaphysics, epistemology and semantics.

During the later Middle Ages, the discussion was primarily focused on the exact nature and ontological status of intentions, and the closely related issue of the role of intentions and intelligible species in the cognitive process. In the process of differentiating intentions from species, acts and things, and differentiating first and second intentions from each other, the definitions of intentions became more elaborate and the subdivisions more subtle. Not surprisingly, the risk of confusion between the different meanings of '*intentio*' became proportionately greater, thereby impairing the clarity of the discussion in the eyes of anyone to whom these differences are not obvious. This applies still more to modern readers who may have more recent theories of intentionality in mind. Matters are further complicated by the fact that medieval source texts are not always easily accessible. This is the case

¹ C. Knudsen, "Intentions and Impositions", in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann – A. Kenny – J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982, pp. 479–495; and K. Gyekye, "The Terms '*Prima Intentio*' and '*Secunda Intentio*' in Arabic Logic", *Speculum* 46 (1971), pp. 32–38.

with early 14th-century thinkers such as James of Metz, Durandus of St.-Pourçain, and also Hervaeus Natalis, who was the first to write a voluminous treatise specifically dedicated to second intentions, existing only in manuscripts and 15th- and 16th-century editions.

In the following pages I will present an overview of Hervaeus Natalis's discussion about second intentions with an opponent he does not mention by name, but who, judging from Hervaeus's description, might well have been his contemporary Radulphus Brito.

II. INTENTIONS, SPECIES, ACTS AND THINGS

Hervaeus Natalis, as a Dominican, was firmly rooted in the Thomistic tradition. According to Thomas Aquinas, we can distinguish four elements in the process of cognition: 1. the thing that is known; 2. the act of knowing that thing; 3. the intelligible species, which is *id quo intelligitur*, that by means of which a thing is known; and 4. the intention, the result of the cognitive act. An intention has only intelligible being; it is inherent in the intellect as an accident or quality. Yet it is attributed to the object as known, and even called identical with the known object. In an earlier period, Thomas did not yet distinguish between intentions and intelligible species, which are both likenesses of the known object. But later, he defined the intelligible species as the principle or the starting point of the cognitive act, and the intention as the result of that act.²

But not all contemporary thinkers, not even among the Dominicans, thought the same on this subject. James of Metz, who read the *Sententiae* between 1301 and 1303, identified the intention with the act of knowing. Durandus of St.-Pourçain, who may have been influenced by James, not only identified the intention with the act of knowing, but also, like Henry of Ghent, rejected the intelligible species as redundant in the act of cognition. Others, like Robert Kilwardby, identified the intention with the known object.³

² For this change in Thomas's early thought, see C. Panaccio, "From Mental Word to Mental Language", *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), pp. 125–147, esp. p. 127. On Thomas and intentions generally, see e.g. R.W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, The Hague 1966.

³ For James of Metz and Durandus of St.-Pourçain, see e.g. J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster 1927 (Beiträge

It seems that in the course of the debate the participants began to feel the need for a specific study of the intention and its relation to the act of cognition, the known thing and the intelligible species. Radulphus Brito first started explaining intentions in a systematic manner⁴ around 1300 in his second sophism and in his commentaries on Porphyry and on Aristotle's *De anima* I and III. Radulphus stated that we can interpret the term '*intentio*' in several ways, and that the intention's ontological status and function in the cognitive process is dependent on, and varies with this interpretation; in one sense, we can call it an act, and in another, we can call it a known object. Hervaeus Natalis, somewhat later, thought the subject worthy of a voluminous treatise: *De secundis intentionibus*, written between 1309 and 1316.⁵ He agreed that intentions can have a different ontological status and function, depending on our interpretation of the term, but his distinctions differed from those of Radulphus, also in being even more numerous.

III. RADULPHUS ON INTENTIONS

Radulphus Brito, an influential philosopher and grammarian who studied and worked in early 14th century Paris, wrote about intentions around 1300, slightly before Hervaeus.⁶ Radulphus's distinctions between the various ways in which the term '*intentio*' is used indicate that the debate about the exact nature of intentions was already troubled

zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXVI), and id., "Jacob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929–30), pp. 169–232. Cf. Knudsen, "Intentions..."

⁴ See J. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito's Sophisma on Second Intentions", *Vivarium* 13 (1975), pp. 119–152, here p. 121.

⁵ J. Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der Intentio Secunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 13 (1974), pp. 49–59, here p. 54. See also D. Perler, "Peter Auriol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 227–262, here p. 242.

⁶ The most important sources for Radulphus's ideas on intentions are his sophisma *Aliquis homo est species* (ed. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito's Sophisma...", pp. 127–152), his commentary on Porphyry (*Quaestiones super Porphyrium*, qq. 5–8, ed. J. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito on Universals", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 35 (1980), pp. 60–123) and his commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* I (*Quaestiones in De anima* I, q. 6, ed. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito on Universals", pp. 124–129 [Appendix I]) and *De anima* III (*Quaestiones in De anima* III, ed. W. Fauser, *Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima*, Münster 1974 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F. 12), pp. 89–313).

by terminological confusion at the time. Radulphus intended to solve the issue by pointing out that the term could mean different things.

Radulphus uses two distinctions: one between first and second intentions, and one between abstract and concrete intentions. These distinctions cross each other; first intentions as well as second intentions can be interpreted both abstractly and concretely. An intention in Radulphus's abstract sense is the act in which a thing is known. An intention in the concrete sense is a thing itself as known. A first intention is an act of the intellect in which a thing is known in itself, considered apart from other things. A second intention is an act in which the thing is known in its relation to other things, or as it is found in particulars. This results in the following four types of intentions:

- A first abstract intention; this is an act of the intellect by which the intellect 'tends' toward something else, namely the known object. In this act, the object is known in an abstract and absolute sense; it is known in itself, not in relation to other things. Radulphus calls this first intention the first cognition of a thing (*prima cognitio rei*). When a thing is known in this sense, it is known in its proper mode of being.⁷ For example: when the intellect knows a man, the cognition of a man in itself and absolutely is called a first cognition and a first abstract intention.
- A first concrete intention; this is the thing (e.g. a man) itself as known by the first act of the intellect described above.⁸
- A second abstract intention; this is the second act of cognition of the intellect, in which a thing is known as a particular and in its relation to something else. This way of knowing a thing is secondary to knowing the thing in itself. Radulphus calls this first intention the

⁷ Radulphus Brito, *Aliquis homo est species*, § 49, ed. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito's Sophisma...", pp. 141–142: "Intentio enim in abstracto nihil aliud est nisi quaedam informatio intellectus, per quam intellectus intendit in aliud. Unde intentio est illud per quod intellectus tendit in rem, et istud est quaedam ratio intelligendi rem vel quaedam rei cognitio quam habet intellectus penes se. Modo duplex est rei cognitio: quaedam enim est prima rei cognitio qua res primo cognoscimus secundum modum essendi proprium rei secundum quamcumque operationem intellectus. [...] Et ista cognitio est prima intentio in abstracto..."

⁸ *Ibid.*: "Et ista cognitio est prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur prima intentio in concreto".

second cognition of a thing (*secunda cognitio rei*); it is a secondary way of knowing a thing.⁹

- A second concrete intention; this is the thing itself as known by the second act of the intellect, namely in its relation to something else. As a second intention, the thing is known in its universal mode of being.¹⁰

Radulphus does realize that his interpretation of an abstract intention as a cognitive act is not without problems, and sometimes he adds a modification to his theory to address the issue of memory. An intention cannot be just a cognitive act, it must leave something behind. If this were not the case, we could not explain the fact that things previously studied are understood much quicker when studying them a second time, nor could we explain how studying is of any use at all if one does not retain what has been learned.¹¹ What is left behind is sometimes called a potency or a habitus by Radulphus. In other places it is called a species.¹² Concerning the latter we must bear in mind that for Radulphus intelligible species as well as intentions are cognitions, and the term ‘intelligible species’ is used by him synonymously with ‘intention’;¹³ therefore the modification Radulphus adds to his theory is no very

⁹ *Ibid.*: “Unde res prius habet intellegi secundum se quam in habitudine ad aliud, sicut prius est conoscere hominem secundum se quam ut est principium intelligendi plura vel ut est reperibilis in pluribus, quia intellectus absolutus prior est intellectu respectivo. [...] Sed cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus dicitur secunda cognitio. Et ista cognitio rei in habitudine ad aliud dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto”.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*: “...et res sic cognita dicitur intentio secunda in concreto, sicut quantum ad primam operationem intellectus cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus est secunda intentio, quae est universalitas”.

¹¹ Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones in De anima III*, q. 8, ed. Fauser: “Hoc etiam in se ipso quilibet experitur, quia, postquam intellexit aliquid, postea potest facilius illud intelligere. Modo illud non esset, nisi post actualem considerationem aliqua cognitio remaneret in intellectu” (p. 178,64–67); “...si non remaneret species, tunc frustra aliquis laboraret in studio, quia sola conversione ad phantasmata statim haberet aliquis cognitionem cuiuslibet rei” (p. 179,83–85).

¹² Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones in De anima III*, q. 8, ed. Fauser, p. 179,72–74: “Post actualem considerationem remanet aliqua species in habitu in intellectu”; “...post actualem cognitionem habitus nulla cognitio potest manere in anima nisi potentia et habitu...” (in Radulphus’s first sophisma *Omnis homo est omnis homo*, ed. J. Pinborg – N.J. Green Pedersen, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 26 (1978), pp. 93–144, here § 39).

¹³ As can be seen from the formulation of question 8 of his *Quaestiones in De anima III*, ed. Fauser, p. 176,1–3: “Utrum species intelligibilis vel alia cognitio de re remaneat in intellectu in habitu post actualem considerationem”.

great help in understanding the ‘something’ which is left behind after the act of cognition. It must be admitted that Radulphus’s account of abstract intentions as cognitive acts is not entirely satisfactory.

IV. HERVAEUS ON INTENTIONS

Hervaeus Natalis, who was to become an important and influential person within the order of the Dominicans, and would play an active role in defending Thomas’s doctrines against any attacks from within as well as from outside the order, obviously found this doctrine very unsatisfactory too; so much so that he extensively refuted it in his treatise *De secundis intentionibus*. This voluminous work was the first of its kind: no treatise had ever been dedicated especially to the subject of intentions before. In this treatise, which comprises 60 pages in the Viennese manuscript, Hervaeus explains the nature, features and mutual relations of intelligible species, first and second intentions, acts of the intellect and objects of cognition, and second intentions as the proper subject of logic.

Hervaeus begins his treatment of intentions with an overview of the different uses of the term ‘intention’, as Radulphus does. But Hervaeus’s distinctions and subdistinctions are more elaborate and complicated.

In the first place, Hervaeus distinguishes between intentions in relation to the will and in relation to the intellect.¹⁴ Since the former do not belong to logic, Hervaeus does not discuss them any further here.

Intentions in relation to the intellect are subdivided into intentions with respect to the knowing subject, and intentions with respect to the known object. This clears up the confusion between intentions and intelligible species: an intention in the former sense, as related to the knowing subject, is that which brings the intellect to knowledge of something by means of representation. In this sense the term ‘intention’ can refer to both an intelligible species and an act of the intellect: when someone knows something, for instance a table, the table is known by means of a representation of that table such as an intelligible species, and by means of the act of knowing the table. This means that an intel-

¹⁴ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, forthcoming, § 14: “Sciendum est igitur quod intentio pertinet tam ad voluntatem quam ad intellectum. Et quia videtur quod intentio importet tendentiam in quoddam alterum, intentio convenit tam voluntati tendenti in suum obiectum quam etiam intellectui respectu sui obiecti”.

ligible species is itself a 'species' of the genus 'intention with respect to the knowing subject'.¹⁵ The intention in the latter sense (intention with respect to the known object) is not identical with the intelligible species; the intention in this sense is identical to the known thing itself insofar as the act of the intellect relates to it as a known thing. This latter sense is again subdivided: intentions with respect to the known thing can be taken formally and abstractly, or concretely and materially. In the formal and abstract sense the intention is the end-point of the act (or tendency) of the intellect, or the tendency itself, which is a relation of the known thing to the act of knowing (a *habitus ad actum intelligendi*). In the concrete and material sense the intention is the known thing itself as it is (*illud quod intelligitur quicquid sit illud*).¹⁶

Hervaeus's second distinction is between intentions taken essentially or denominatively. Intentions in the essential sense are the intentions with respect to the intellect or knowing subject, as described above. Intentions with respect to the known thing are intentions denominatively only: they are called 'intention' in a derived sense, after the essential intention.¹⁷

Hervaeus's third distinction is between the different ways in which something can be in the intellect. In one sense, something is in the intellect as in its underlying subject. This is the way in which species and acts of knowing are in the intellect, and this way of being in the intellect is appropriately called 'subjective being' (*esse subiective*). In the other sense, something is in the intellect as the direct object of the intellect,

¹⁵ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 15: "Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis omne scilicet illud quod per modum alicuius repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive actus intellectus sive conceptus mentis, quando format perfectum conceptum de re".

¹⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 16: "Alio modo dicitur intentio illud quod se tenet ex parte rei intellectae; et hoc modo dicitur intentio res ipsa quae intelligitur in quantum in ipsam tenditur intellectus sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum intelligendi. Et intentio sic dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicit terminum ipsius tendentiae sive ipsam terminationem, quae est quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi. In concreto autem et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur, quicquid sit illud".

¹⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 19: "Nam esse intentionale potest accipi essentialiter et denominative. Nam sicut albedo dicit esse quale essentialiter, sed corpus album dicitur habere esse quale denominative, ita etiam illud quod est intentio per essentiam, dicitur habere esse intentionale essentialiter, sed illud cuius est intentio dicitur habere esse intentionale denominative. Et sic accipiendo intentiones quae sunt ex parte intelligentis, species et actus intelligendi et forma exemplaris, habent essentialiter esse intentionale, quia sunt intentiones rerum; illa autem quorum sunt intentiones illae, dicuntur habere esse intentionale denominative".

called 'objective being' (*esse obiective*). Having objective being means being the object of an act of knowing. This distinction between objective and subjective being does not necessarily imply a multiplication of entities: the object in the external world which is considered as having subjective being, and the object in the intellect which is considered as having objective being (= as being the object of an intellectual act) are one and the same object.¹⁸

V. HERVAEUS'S CRITICISM (OF RADULPHUS?)

In his *De secundis intentionibus*, dist. I, q. 2: "*Utrum prima intentio sit tantum actus intelligendi*", Hervaeus describes an opinion about intentions which he considers wrong, and which he refutes accordingly. In this opinion, Hervaeus says, the first abstract intention is identified with the first act of the intellect, in which the thing is known separately from other things. The second abstract intention is the second act of the intellect in which the thing is known with respect to other things. The first concrete intention is the thing as known absolutely, the second concrete intention is the thing as known respectively.¹⁹ This all sounds so much like Radulphus that, if Hervaeus does not have Radulphus

¹⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, §§ 21–22: "Sciendum ergo quod aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu dupliciter, scilicet subiective et obiective. Subiective dicitur esse in intellectu illud quod est in eo sicut in subiecto; et hoc modo species, actus intelligendi et habitus scientiae dicuntur esse in intellectu. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse in intellectu obiective. Et hoc dicitur uno modo sicut illud quod directe est obiectum cognitum ab intellectu; et isto modo omne illud quod est cognitum ab intellectu quantumcumque sit extra intellectum subiective loquendo, est in intellectu obiective".

¹⁹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, §§ 49–50: "Alia opinio ponit quod prima intentio est primus actus intelligendi, secunda est secundus actus intelligendi, et hoc in abstracto; in concreto autem est res intellecta. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod secundum eos duplex est cognitio rei. Una absoluta, qua res absolute et secundum proprium modum essendi cognoscitur, ut cognoscere hominem secundum quod ratiocinans vel secundum quod sentiens. Et ista est prima. Alia est cognitio rei respectiva, qua cognoscitur aliquid ut in pluribus; et ista est secunda et praesupponit primam, sicut cognitio respectiva praesupponit absolutam. Et dicunt quod prima intentio in abstracto est prima cognitio, in concreto autem est res intellecta prima cognitione. Secunda autem intentio in abstracto est secunda cognitio, ita quod intentio in abstracto et in concreto differunt sicut intelligere et res intellecta. Et dicunt quod secunda intentio fundatur super primam non in abstracto acceptam (quia duo actus intelligendi non possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu), sed in concreto. Nam secunda intellectio quae est secunda intentio in abstracto, non fundatur super primam intellectionem, quae non manet cum ea, sed super rem prima intellectione cognitam".

himself in mind, his criticism certainly applies to Radulphus. According to this position, Hervaeus says, abstract intentions and concrete second intentions are not explained correctly. Also, the explanation of the way in which the second abstract intention is founded on the first concrete intention does not hold.²⁰

First, says Hervaeus, these people claim that a second concrete intention is the thing known with respect to other things, and such a cognition of the thing is called a respective cognition. The question is whether the relation of the thing to other things is a real relation that exists independently of the mind, or a rational relation that depends on the operation of the intellect. If it is a real relation, it is a real relation in the sense of a second concrete intention, the cognition of which is a second abstract intention. In this way, understanding a father as being a father would be a second intention. But we cannot assume that a thing according to its real being is a second intention; it would follow that real sciences studying things under a certain aspect would in fact study second intentions, and this is not true. The above-mentioned second concrete intention can no more be a rational relation; just as the known thing in its relation to its *plura* is a second intention, the abstract thing would then be a second intention. Therefore, it is not possible that only the thing in its relation to other things is a second concrete intention.²¹

In the second place, it is said that, because the absolute cognition of a thing comes first and the respective cognition of a thing comes only later, the first and absolute cognition is called a first intention and the second and respective cognition is called a second intention.

²⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 52.

²¹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 53: "Primo ostendo sic: dicunt enim quod secunda intentio in concreto est res intellecta ut in pluribus. Et dicunt quod cognitio rei ut sic est respectiva. Tunc quaero de isto respectu sive habitudine rei ad illa plura in quibus est, utrum sit relatio realis vel rationis. Si est relatio realis, tunc quaecumque relatio realis est secunda intentio in concreto et eius cognitio est secunda intentio in abstracto. Et sic intelligere patrem in eo quod pater, et dominum in eo quod dominus, pertinent ad secundam intentionem. Quod est absurdum, scilicet quod res secundum suum esse reale quod sibi convenit in rerum natura sit secunda intentio vel concrete vel abstracte, quia sequitur quod quaecumque scientiae reales considerantes de quocumque respectu rei considerarent de secundis intentionibus; quod est falsum. Si autem ista habitudo sit relatio rationis, contra quia: Sicut ad secundam intentionem pertinet res intellecta in habitudine ad plura in quibus sit sive res intellecta ut in pluribus, ita ad secundam intentionem pertinet res abstracta; et multa alia possent adduci. Ergo res intellecta ut in pluribus non debet accipi ut illud quod solum et praecise est secunda intentio in concreto".

But this is not the case: if we could call abstract intentions first and second intentions simply because they are two kinds of cognitions with a certain order, it would follow that we would also have a first and second intention with respect to the cognition of things in their real being (*esse reale*), e.g. '*calidum*' in the sense of '*calidum*' (warm) and '*calefactivum*' (warming) respectively. Now this is false, since the cognition of '*calidum*' is in both cases a first intention and not a second intention.²² Hervaeus adds another argument: an intention must be founded upon a first intention. But if the first act is a first intention and the second act is a second intention, as his opponent says, this cannot hold: the second act cannot be founded on the first act, since the two acts do not exist simultaneously.²³

Hervaeus's third point of criticism regards his opponent's explanation of the way in which the second abstract intention is founded on the first concrete intention. The statement that a second abstract intention is a second act of the intellect, and that a second concrete intention is the thing known with respect to other things is incorrect, says Hervaeus, because in this case we have no fundament for the relation '*ut in pluribus*' (with respect to other things). Also, his opponent does not explain whether a thing as a fundament of a second intention is a fundament in its real being or in its mental being. If the latter, it is not shown in what way this could be the case.²⁴

²² Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 54: "...dicunt quod, quia cognitio rei respectiva est posterior cognitione eius absoluta, ideo cognitio prima dicitur prima intentio et cognitio secunda dicitur secunda intentio. Contra hoc arguitur sic quia: si ad primam et secundam intentionem in abstracto sufficeret quod sint duae cognitiones per ordinem se habentes quarum una sit prima et alia sit secunda, sequeretur quod in cognitione rerum quantum ad suum esse reale sit prima intentio et secunda, sicut cognoscere calidum in eo quod calidum et cognoscere ipsum in eo quod calefactivum. Quod est falsum, quia cognitio calidi in eo quod calidum et cognitio calefactivi in eo quod calefactivum non pertinet ad secundam intentionem, sed ad primam tantum, quia utrumque istorum intelligibilium pertinet ad primam intentionem et neutrum ad secundam, prout hic loquimur de intentionibus secundis".

²³ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 55: "Secunda intentio debet fundari super primam. Sed si actus primus est prima intentio et secundus secunda, non potest hoc salvari, quia sicut ipsi dicunt, actus secundus non potest fundari super primum, quia simul non manent".

²⁴ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, ed. Dijs, § 57: "Tertio ostenditur quod non convenienter assignant fundamentum secundae intentionis. Nam cum dicunt quod secunda intentio in abstracto est secundus actus intelligendi, in concreto autem est res intellecta ut in pluribus, illa habitudo quam importat '*ut in pluribus*' est formale in obiecto secundae intellectionis, et huius habitudinis non datur fundamentum. Nec ostenditur utrum res secundum suum esse reale sit fundamentum eius vel secundum

The above should have made sufficiently clear that it cannot be assumed that the exact meaning of ‘intention’, or of any other key term in any medieval theory of philosophy is known before a thorough study is made of the applicable texts. The same of course applies to modern theories. Before entering into any philosophical discussion, one should follow the example of Radulphus and Hervaeus and start by properly defining one’s use of the key terms, to avoid at least some of the unnecessary confusion and misunderstandings.

esse quod habet in anima. Et si hoc sit secundum esse quod habet in anima, non ostenditur quomodo hoc fit”.

PRIMAE ET SECUNDAE INTENTIONES
EINIGE GRUNDZÜGE DER INTENTIONALITÄTSLEHRE
DES HERVAEUS NATALIS

Georg Koridze (Tübingen)

I. DIE HINTERGRÜNDE

Die wichtigste Quelle zur Intentionenlehre des Hervaeus Natalis ist der Traktat *De secundis intentionibus*.¹ Außerdem sind Passagen zu diesem Thema in seinen *Quodlibeta*² zu finden. Was den Inhalt des Traktats betrifft, ist zunächst festzuhalten, daß es sich hierbei um den ersten Traktat seiner Art handelt; zumindest vertritt Pinborg³ diese Auffassung, und von den Kennern des Traktats widerspricht keiner der Annahme,⁴ daß die eigenständige Gattung der Traktate über die Intentionen von Hervaeus begründet worden sei. Vor allem in diesem Traktat erläutert Hervaeus den Inhalt seiner Lehre über erste und zweite Intentionen und den dazugehörigen Begriff der Intentionalität. Hervaeus Natalis führt in die lateinische Tradition als erster ausdrücklich den Begriff der noëtischen Intentionalität (*intentionalitas*) ein und erläutert ihn.

Man kann die Thematik der logischen Intentionen von der frühen Neuzeit bis zum Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts zurückverfolgen,⁵ als Hervaeus Natalis an der Pariser Universität in der Auseinandersetzung um Thomas von Aquin bestimmte Lehren des Thomas, vor allem angesichts

¹ Diese Schrift wurde zweimal gedruckt, in Paris 1489 und in Venedig um 1500. Ich benutze für meine Ausführungen die Pariser Ausgabe.

² Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 8, ed. Venetiis 1513, ff. 78rb–80vb.

³ Vgl. J. Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der Intentio Secunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 13 (1974), pp. 49–59.

⁴ Vgl. D. Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 227–262.

⁵ Zu den Voraussetzungen der neuzeitlichen Entwicklung vgl. T. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache*, Leiden 1987, zu Hervaeus Natalis pp. 136–143 und *passim*. Zu den Lehren des Renaissance-Thomismus siehe M. Tavuzzi, "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance", *Doctor Communis* 45 (1992), pp. 132–152.

der Kritik des Johannes Duns Scotus, zu präzisieren versuchte.⁶ Außer Hervaeus finden wir aus den Reihen der Dominikaner Franciscus von Prato,⁷ Stephanus von Rieti,⁸ Durandus von S. Porciano⁹ und Armandus von Bellovisu,¹⁰ die eigene Traktate über zweite Intentionen schrieben. Später widmeten auch Magister Conrad,¹¹ Johannes Capreolus¹² und Petrus Nigri¹³—um nur die wichtigsten Beiträge zu nennen—dem Thema längere Abschnitte in ihren umfangreichen Werken. Betrachtlich ist die Behandlung dieses Themas in den Schriften außerhalb des Dominikanerordens und des Thomismus, wie etwa bei Petrus Aureoli,¹⁴ der in den Anfängen der Intentionalitätsdebatte in Paris gegen Hervaeus Natalis opponierte.¹⁵ Etwas später werden sich auch

⁶ Vgl. dazu G. Koridze: "The Formation of the First Thomistic School", in *Dal convento alla città. Filosofia e teologia in Francesco da Prato O.P. (XIV secolo)*, ed. F. Amerini, Firenze 2008, pp. 133–160. Zu Scotus' Lehre von den zweiten Intentionen siehe G. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Leiden – Boston – Köln 2002, pp. 99 sqq., bes. pp. 100–103.

⁷ Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 5 (2000), pp. 147–174. Zur Einordnung der Lehre des Franciscus de Prato vgl. F. Amerini, "La quaestio 'Utrum subiectum in logica sit ens rationis' e la sua attribuzione a Francesco da Prato", *Memorie domenicane* n.s. 30 (1999), pp. 147–218.

⁸ Stephanus de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, ed. J. Domański, *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 12 (1967), pp. 75–106.

⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *De esse intentionali*. Siehe dazu J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster 1927 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXVI), pp. 177 sqq. Obgleich der Autor die Verfasserschaft des Durandus in dieser Schrift offenläßt, findet man Durandus' Theorie der Intentionalität in seinem Sentenzenkommentar, vgl. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 5, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 65vb–66va.

¹⁰ Armandus de Bellovisu, *Tractatus de nominibus secundarum intentionum*, in *De declaratione difficultatum terminorum tam theologiae quam philosophiae ac logicae*, ed. Basileae 1491, P. 2, c. 254–302.

¹¹ Von ihm stammt die für das Thema wichtige Schrift *De secundis intentionibus*. Er lebte im 14. Jahrhundert und war Dominikaner, Näheres ist nicht bekannt. Siehe C. Stroick, "Tractatus Excellentissimi Magistri Conradi O.P. De Intentionibus", in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. W. Kluxen et al., Berlin 1980 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 13/1), pp. 517–546.

¹² Ioannes Capreolus, *Questiones in IV libros Sententiarum (Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis)*, I, dist. 23, ed. C. Paban – T. Pègues, Bd. 2, Tours 1900 (Nachdruck Frankfurt am Main 1967), pp. 176b–185b.

¹³ Petrus Nigri, *Clypeus Thomistarum*, Venezia 1487, Nachdruck Frankfurt am Main 1967.

¹⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum librum sententiarum*, dist. 23; teilweise ediert in Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality", pp. 242–262; vgl. auch Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der Intentio Secunda".

¹⁵ Beide dürften 1317/18 an der Pariser Universität unterrichtet haben.

Wilhelm von Ockham,¹⁶ Adam Wodeham¹⁷ und Walter Chatton¹⁸ an der Kontroverse beteiligten.

Im Traktat *De secundis intentionibus* bestimmt Hervaeus zunächst den Begriff der Intention. Eine Intention bedeutet im allgemeinen die Tendenz zu einem Gegenstand hin, wie etwa die Tendenz des Willens oder des Intellekts zu ihrem jeweiligen Objekt. So teilt Hervaeus die Intentionen in zwei Arten ein: in die willentlichen und in die geistigen, noëtischen. Im folgenden werden wir uns vor allem mit den zuletzt Genannten befassen.

Im noëtischen Bereich sind zwei Arten von Intentionen zu unterscheiden: die Intention vom Erkennenden her, die *intentio ex parte intelligentis*, und die Intention von der erfaßten Sache her, die *intentio ex parte rei intellectae*. Während die ersteren nicht in den Bereich der Gegenstände fallen und die Mittel der Erkenntnis sind, bilden die letzteren, also die *intentiones ex parte rei intellectae*, den Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung. Bei den Intentionen von der erfaßten Sache her unterscheidet Hervaeus zwischen ersten und zweiten Intentionen. Vor einer Beschäftigung mit den Intentionen empfiehlt es sich, zunächst die möglichen Seinsweisen der Dinge, die *modi essendi*, die in der Darlegung der Intentionenlehre vorausgesetzt werden, zu erläutern.

II. MODI ESSENDI UND ERSTE INTENTIONEN

Hervaeus unterteilt das Seiende im allgemeinen in zwei Seinsweisen, die subjektive und die objektive. Diese Bezeichnungen verwendet er immer im ontologischen, nicht im heute üblichen epistemologischen Sinne. Eine subjektive Seinsweise haben diejenigen Dinge, die als Akzidentien einer Substanz anhaften, wie beispielsweise das Grüne oder die Rauheit des Baumes. Das objektiv Seiende zeichnet sich durch eine spezifisch mentale, rein intentionale Seinsweise aus. Nun gibt es insgesamt vier Seinsweisen der Dinge, zwei subjektive und zwei objektive. Subjektiv

¹⁶ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio)*, Prol., q. 1, in *Opera theologica* I, ed. G. Gál – S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, NY 1967, pp. 3–75; *Scriptum*..., dist. 27, in *Opera theologica* IV, ed. G. Etzkorn – F.E. Kelley, St. Bonaventure, NY 1979, pp. 190–264; *Summa logicae*, pars I, in *Opera philosophica* I, ed. P. Boehner et al., St. Bonaventure, NY 1974, *passim*.

¹⁷ Adamus Wodehamensis, *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum*, ed. R. Wood, 3 Bde., St. Bonaventure, NY 1990, etwa im Prologus und in dist. 23.

¹⁸ Gualterus de Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias. Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus*, ed. J.C. Wey, Toronto 1989.

sind erstens die materiellen Dinge außer uns, das Einzelne und Individuelle wie etwa eine Rose oder ein Pferd; zweitens die Akzidentien in unserer Seele wie etwa Erkenntnisakte, intelligible *species* und Begriffe. Die Seele umfaßt damit bei ihren geistigen Inhalten Seiende mit einer subjektiven Seinsweise, wie sie realen extramentalen Dingen zukommt.¹⁹ Objektiv sind diejenigen Entitäten, die, erstens, objektiv im Intellekt vorkommen, zugleich aber instantiiert in den extramentalen Dingen existieren, wie etwa der Begriff bzw. das Wesen des Pferdes; zweitens sind es die Entitäten, die ausschließlich objektiv im Intellekt existieren, wie beispielsweise diejenigen, die das Wesen des Pferdes kennzeichnen. Die erste objektive Seinsweise ist, genauso wie die beiden subjektiven, ein real Seiendes, nur die letztere Form ist ausschließlich objektiv und intentional.

Nun können wir zur Intentionenlehre übergehen: Eine logische Intention²⁰ heißt bei Hervaeus das auf die Begriffsbildung ausgerichtete Gemeintsein der erfaßten Sache. Das primäre Erkenntnisobjekt ist ein reales, extramentales Ding; das zuerst Erkannte ist das Verhältnis zwischen dem erfaßten Ding und dem Verstand.²¹ Direkte Erkenntnisgegenstände sind die ersten Intentionen. Eine erste Intention wird vom Intellekt in einer unmittelbaren Erfassung aufgenommen. Jedes subjektive extramentale Seiende wird durch das Universale erkannt, das in ihm instantiiert ist. Daraus folgt, daß ein real existierendes Seiendes mittels des wesenhaften objektiven Begriffes vom Intellekt her erfaßt und aufgenommen wird. Das Aufgenommensein ist nach Hervaeus in zweierlei Hinsicht zu betrachten: in seiner Sachhaltigkeit und hinsichtlich der Begriffsbildung, d.h. *in concreto et materialiter* bzw. *in abstracto et formaliter*. Bezüglich ihres Sachgehaltes ist die erste Intention das,

¹⁹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 2rb: "Intentio [...] ex parte intelligentis non distinguitur contra esse reale simpliciter".

²⁰ Zum Begriff der logischen Intentionen vgl. Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, Prooemium, c. 4 und c. 6. Hervaeus verwendet diesen Begriff nicht. Er bezeichnet die logische Intention als "Intention von der—erfaßten—Sache her" (*intentio ex parte rei*).

²¹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 8va: "Unde prius est notum privative habitus quorum utrumque pertinet ad primum genus intelligibilium et forte absolutum prius notus est relatione". Wegen der Wichtigkeit dieser Stelle führen wir die entsprechende Stelle aus der Edition Venedig 1500 an, vgl. f. 6v, Zeile 27–28: "Unde prius notum est habitus privatione quorum utrumque pertinet ad primum genus intelligibilium et forte absolutum est prius notum relato".

was erfaßt wird: *id quod intelligitur*.²² Dabei wird eine begriffsbildende Tätigkeit des Intellekts in Gang gesetzt. Deshalb ist die erste Intention *in concreto* nicht statisch und in sich geschlossen, sondern bildet den Ausgangspunkt für einen zweistufigen Erkenntnisprozeß: die Erfassung des Erkenntnisgegenstands und die Begriffsbildung. Die Zweistufigkeit entspricht der erwähnten Differenzierung, die Hervaeus zwischen dem konkreten und dem abstrakten Aspekt jeder Intention macht.²³

Die bisher erörterte erste Intention *in concreto* ist eine vorbegriffliche Erfassung einer Sache, die wir den eigentlichen objektiven Begriff nennen. Hingegen wird der Begriffsinhalt erst in der Abstraktion aus der ersten Intention gewonnen. Sieht man zum Beispiel ein Pferd, erfaßt man seine Natur unmittelbar. Das Pferd bringt die erste Intention hervor, d.h. das Pferd selbst, nicht seine Akzidentien wie etwa seine Farbe oder sein Wiehern, sondern das Pferd als der aus dem Zustand des Erfaßtseins entstandene objektive Begriff. Eine erste Intention *in concreto* ist die in den einzelnen Pferden realisierte und im Denken unmittelbar erfaßte allgemeine Natur des Pferdes.

Somit ist für Hervaeus die *intentio in concreto et materialiter* die erfaßte Sache und die *intentio in abstracto et formaliter* die Begriffsbildung. Die erste Intention *in concreto* wird *ex parte rei intellectae* angestoßen und läßt den Intellekt von der Erfassung an *intentionaliter* vorgehen. Dabei kommt der Sache *in concreto* ein gewisses noëtisches Verhältnis zu, eine *habitus rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi*. Diese *habitus* besteht während des Abstraktionsprozesses in einer Relation

²² Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisii 1489, f. 2ra: "Prima intentio [...] in concreto autem et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur quicquid sit illud".

²³ C. Prantl wies zurecht darauf hin, daß diese Unterscheidung inhaltlich der von Duns Scotus vorgenommenen Unterscheidung der *modi significandi* ähnlich ist (C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Bd. 3, Leipzig 1867, Nachdruck Graz 1955, p. 215). Vgl. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 8, n. 18, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* I, St. Bonaventure, NY 1999, p. 318: "Quamlibet autem essentiam contingit sub propria ratione intelligere [...], et sic significare. Et tali modo intelligendi correspondet modus significandi abstractus. Alio modo contingit intelligere istam essentiam in quantum informat subiectum, et huic modo intelligendi correspondet modus significandi concretus". Die Unterschiede zwischen den Thomisten und Scotisten im Verständnis der ersten und zweiten Intentionen sind übersichtlich dargestellt bei Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache*, pp. 387–394. Auch Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, befaßt sich schwerpunktmäßig mit den zweiten Intentionen bei Scotus im Unterschied zu Thomas. Auf die Thomisten geht er—mit Ausnahme von Ägidius—wenig ein, auf Hervaeus überhaupt nicht.

zum Intellekt,²⁴ um die Intentionalität der erfaßten Sache in eine begriffliche Fassung zu überführen. Nicht die Sache an sich, sondern das Verhältnis eines Erfaßten zum Intellekt steht dem Erkenntnisakt zur Verfügung. Eben dieses Verhältnis ist es, aufgrund dessen die Intentionalität agiert und den Erkenntnisakt so lange stattfinden läßt, bis eine Erkenntnis gewonnen wird.

Intentio in abstracto et formaliter heißt die Tendenz der erfaßten Sache, begriffen werden zu können, was sich in ihrem Verhältnis zum Intellekt ausdrückt. So besitzt jede objektive intramentale Entität, sei sie real seiend oder rein gedanklich, eine Intentionalität, denn bei beiden Arten findet eine Abstraktion statt. Eine Tendenz besitzt auch der Erkenntnisakt, und zwar zur erfaßten Sache hin. Der Erkenntnisakt, der freilich nur ein weiterer Name für den tätigen Intellekt ist, erfaßt das Intelligible und endet beim Verhältnis, der *habitus* der Sache zu ihm selbst. Er endet also mit der Begriffsbildung. Die erste Intention *in abstracto* ist demnach die Intentionalität, der die genannte *habitus* zugrunde liegt.

Die intentionale Tätigkeit hat zum Ziel, die *in concreto* erfaßte Sache begrifflich zu gestalten. Die Begriffsbildung erfolgt durch die Erkenntnismittel. Beim ersten dieser Erkenntnismittel, der Species, zeigt sich die noëtische *habitus* der Sache, durch die die Intentionalität des Aktes bedingt ist. Der Erkenntnisakt erfaßt die Sache mittels ihrer *habitus*, indem er dem Erfaßten einen Namen verleiht.²⁵ Wie sehr der Erkenntnisakt auch im Bereich des Intentionalen verbleiben mag, so wird der ganze Vorgang doch *ex parte rei* grundgelegt, wodurch auch letztlich die Namensgebung zustandekommt. Diese Nennung geschieht jedesmal, wenn die Tendenz des Intellekts, die nichts anderes als den Erkenntnisakt bedeuten soll, beim Begriff endet.²⁶

²⁴ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 2ra: "Intentio sic dicta formaliter et abstracto dicit terminum tantum ipsius tendentiae sive ipsamet tendentiam que est quedam habitudo rei intellecte ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi".

²⁵ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 12va: "Quando ergo dicitur quod homo est prima intentio, concretum sic accepta que est ipsa res quam homo significat ut denominatur ab illa intentionalitate non fundatur in alio".

²⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 3rb: "...intentio illa (scil. ex parte rei intellecte) potest accipi formaliter et in abstracto. Et sic dicit ipsam habitudinem rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi prout terminat tendentiam intellectus ad rem intellectam, que tendentia non est aliud quam actus intelligendi".

Es ist also festzuhalten: Eine erste Intention heißt *in concreto* ein real Seiendes als erfaßte Sache, eine erste Intention *in abstracto* hingegen ist eine noëtische Beziehung einer erfaßten Sache zum Erkenntnisakt, was letztlich zur Intentionalität führt. Die erfaßte Sache gibt sich uns einzig in der *habitus* zu erkennen, der einzigen Form, in der die *natura rei* erscheint.²⁷ Für Hervaeus ist es selbstverständlich, daß die Sache sich so zu erkennen gibt, wie sie ist. Deshalb kann er die Frage nach der Sache an sich beiseite lassen und schlicht von *res intellecta* reden. Die erfaßte Sache ist gerade die Sache an sich, die im Prinzip nur über den Umweg der Universalientheorie erkennbar wird. Dabei ist Hervaeus ein Realist, allerdings wieder im intentionalistischen Sinne. Die Natur, ein anderer Name für die erfaßte Sache, ist zum einen in den subjektiven, extramentalen Seienden realisiert, sie existiert aber objektiv im Intellekt und zeigt ihre Universalität ausschließlich in einer Aussage. Die Universalität selbst ist für Hervaeus ein intentional Seiendes.²⁸

III. DIE ZWEITEN INTENTIONEN UND DIE TRAGWEITE DER INTENTIONALITÄT

Durch die erste Intention *in abstracto* führt Hervaeus die Lehre vom rein gedanklich Seienden ein. Die zweiten Intentionen sind nach seiner Lehre die *proprietates logicae* einer erfaßten Sache. Diese sind ausschließlich objektive, weil intentionale Seiende. Es sind fünf Prädikabilien im Gegensatz zu den ersten Intentionen, die unter die zehn Kategorien fallen—fünf Prädikabilien, die jeweils der Differenzierung der Universalien dienen. Diese sind auch *intentionaliter* im Intellekt, trotz ihrer gleichzeitig realen Seinsweise. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt des *genus intelligibilium* gehört eine zweite Intention zur zweiten Gattung der Intelligibilien, die auf der zweiten Reflexionsebene zu finden sind. Die zweiten Intentionen sind also nur mittelbar zu erfassen. Sie begleiten die erfaßte Sache und zeichnen sich als logische Eigenschaften der Erkenntnisobjekte aus, wie am Beispiel der einfachen Wahrnehmung

²⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 7va: "...res intellecta est quedam natura quantum ad id quod est, et hoc quando nature rerum intelliguntur".

²⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 2va–b: "Unde dicimus quod res intellecta puta substantia vel qualitas est intentionaliter in intellectu".

(*simplex apprehensio*) gezeigt werden kann. Dabei werden folgende Aspekte unterschieden:

- (i) Erfastsein (*esse intellectum*),
- (ii) Abstrahiertsein (*esse abstractum*),
- (iii) Unbestimmtheit (*indeterminatio*),
- (iv) Prädzierbarkeit von Vielen (*praedicabilitas de multis = universalitas*).

Es sind die logischen Eigenschaften, die zu den zweiten Intentionen gehören. Die zweite Intention ist intramental, aber nicht real. Sie existiert nicht in einem Träger, sie hat kein Subjekt, ihre Existenzweise ist intentional und rein objektiv. Sie ist ein *ens rationis* und kein *ens reale* und tritt in Gestalt einer gedanklichen Relation (*relatio rationis*) auf. Da es insgesamt vier verschiedene Arten von gedanklichen Relationen gibt, muß Hervaeus die Art der Relation genauer bestimmen. Er bezeichnet die zweite Intention als *relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum*. Das ist die vierte Art der gedanklichen Relation, nämlich die Relation der einseitigen Abhängigkeit.²⁹ Bei dieser Relationsart sind es eigentlich die Universalien, die abstrahiert werden. Durch die Abstraktion werden sie den drei Operationen des Intellekts zur Begriffsbildung unterzogen. Die einfache Apprehension, die Urteilsbildung und die Bildung des Satzes leisten eine Abstraktion aufgrund der Intentionalität. Diese ist es, die den Begriff formt und bestimmt, während die *habitus* der Sache die Angleichung des Begriffsinhalts an den erfaßten Begriff gewährleistet. Schließlich kann der Begriffsinhalt von der gestaltenden Kraft der Intentionalität aufgebaut werden.³⁰

Da das Pferd, das man gerade sieht, erkannt wird, schließt man daraus, daß das gerade wahrgenommene Pferd erfaßt wurde. Sofern sich nicht nur eine reine Erfassung vollzieht, sondern auch der Begriff des Pferdes gebildet wird, sind weitere Erkenntnisbedingungen notwendig vorauszusetzen: Das erkannte Wesen eines konkreten Pferdes sollte abstrahiert, außerdem sollte auch von jeder näheren Bestimmung abge-

²⁹ Diese wird bezeichnet als *relatio disquiperantiae* oder *relatio dependentiae inconveniens*; andere Arten sind die *relatio similitudinis*, die *relatio aequalitatis* sowie die *relatio aequiperativa*. Vgl. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 1, art. 5, ad 16, in *Opera omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, Bd. I, 2, Roma 1970, p. 17b; id., *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 2, art. 1, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, pp. 628–632.

³⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 7ra: "Sed predicta intentionalitas non potest esse prima intentio concretive: quia ista intentionalitas est prima intentio in abstracto dicta et est preter rationem cuiuscumque entitatis in rerum natura existentis".

sehen worden sein. Zur Bedingung eines objektiven Begriffs gehört auch, daß er von vielen einzelnen Pferden gültig prädiiziert werden kann.

Wenn also die zweiten Intentionen aufgrund der Intentionalität als Eigenschaften der erfaßten Sache erscheinen, ist es konsequent zu sagen, daß die objektive wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis auf ihnen beruht. Die Prinzipien der Logik sind dann auf die Eigenschaften der erfaßten Sachen zurückzuführen. Die ontologische Grundlage der Logik beansprucht in einem weiteren Schritt, die Grundlage aller drei spekulativen Wissenschaften zu sein, denen die Logik zugrunde liegt. Mit der Objektivität der zweiten Intentionen werden die Bedingungen für die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis erfüllt. Kraft der zweiten Intentionen erhalten die jeweiligen Gegenstände der spekulativen Wissenschaften eine universale Geltung³¹—eine genuin thomistische Position. Thomas selbst spricht von *rationes universales*.³²

Ferner sind die drei spekulativen Wissenschaften, nämlich die Physik, die bei Hervaeus *philosophia naturalis* heißt, die Mathematik und die Metaphysik *scientiae reales*, während die Logik eine *scientia rationalis* ist. In der fünften Quaestio des Intentionentraktates erörtert Hervaeus die Frage, für welche Wissenschaft die zweiten Intentionen *primo et per se* das *subiectum* seien. Er kommt dort zu folgendem Ergebnis: Die zweiten Intentionen bilden den Gegenstand nicht nur der Logik, sondern auch der anderen beiden Wissenschaften des Triviums, der Grammatik und der Rhetorik. Es handelt sich bei den Gegenständen der letzten beiden Wissenschaften aber um Gedankendinge anderer Art, nämlich um *entia rationis ex institutione humana*, während der Gegenstand der Logik jeweils ein *ens rationis ex natura rei* sein muß.³³

Vor diesem Hintergrund übernimmt die Intentionalität eine gestalterische Funktion. Wenn die ersten Intentionen den Ausgangspunkt der Intentionalität bilden, sind die zweiten Intentionen gewissermaßen Dreh- und Angelpunkt derselben. Es sind die logischen Eigenschaften der erfaßten Sachen, die erst nach ihrer Erfassung erkannt und auf die Sachen zurückgeführt werden können. *Genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprium* und *accidens* vertreten als Termini etwas, was den Erkenntnisakt

³¹ Vgl. G. Koridze, "Wissenschaft und das intentional Gedachte bei Hervaeus Natalis", in *Ars und Scientia im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. C. Dietl – D. Helsinginger, Tübingen 2002, pp. 97–107.

³² Th. Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 2, ad 4, in *Opera omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. L, Roma – Paris 1992, p. 144a–b.

³³ Vgl. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 88ra: "Utrum sola logica sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto".

in seiner ersten Operation gänzlich einnimmt und als Begriff infolge der weiteren Operationen bestimmt wird. Mittels der zweiten Intentionen ermöglicht es die Intentionalität, das Erfaßte begrifflich einordnen; damit vollzieht sie die Abstraktion. Dabei wird die Intentionalität nicht nur durch die Abstraktion der erfaßten Sache erzeugt. Das Verhältnis der erfaßten Sache zum Erkenntnisakt ist selbst eine Relation, die die intentionale Aufschlüsselung der objektiven intramentalen Verhältnisse hervorruft. Diese Relation ist auch eine gedankliche Entität. So systematisiert Hervaeus die Rolle der Intentionalität bei der Entstehung der zweiten Intentionen, was zugleich einen Bezug zur Grundlegung der spekulativen Wissenschaften hat.

An dieser Stelle muß genauer analysiert werden, wie Hervaeus das Verhältnis der ersten und zweiten Intentionen untereinander bestimmt. Die folgenden Thesen bringen diesen Aspekt zum Ausdruck:

These (i): Die zweite Intention gründet auf einer extramentalen Sache. Die Erkenntnisbedingungen einer erfaßten Sache sind zweite Intentionen, aber nicht in einem primären Sinne. Die erste Erkenntnisbedingung ist das extramentale reale Seiende mit seinem Verhältnis zum Verstand, das die Intentionalität des Erkenntnisvorgangs herbeiführt.³⁴

These (ii): Zwischen dem *ens rationis* und dem *ens reale* gibt es kein Mittleres (*medium*). Die zweite Intention als gedanklich Seiendes gründet also unmittelbar auf der extramentalen Sache.³⁵

These (iii): Eine zweite Intention gründet auf der ersten Intention nicht auf der Ebene der Erkenntnis, sondern als Erkenntnisgrund. Die zweite Intention ist der sekundäre Grund der Erkenntnis insofern, als sie auf die erfaßte Sache angewiesen ist.³⁶

Die Fundierungsart ist in den Thesen jeweils anders, doch eines ist ihnen gemeinsam, und darin liegt das Spezifische der Gedanken des Hervaeus: die zweite Intention hat die extramentale Sache zur Grundlage, während die konkrete erste Intention selbst eine solche Sache ist. Die abstrakte erste Intention, aus der die zweite hervorgeht, d.h. die Intentionalität, ist unmittelbar in der extramentalen Sache fundiert.³⁷

³⁴ Vgl. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 33rb: "Utrum secunda intentio fundetur in prima".

³⁵ Vgl. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 37rb: "Utrum aliqua secunda intentio immediate fundetur super rem extra".

³⁶ Vgl. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 39rb: "Utrum aliqua secunda intentio fundetur super primam".

³⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. 35vb: "Sed fundamentum prime intentionalitatis natum est esse in rerum natura circumscripta operatione intellectus, quia natum est etiam esse sine predicta intentionalitate".

Bedenken wir die Folgen dieses Gedankens: die Intentionalität regelt die Erkenntnisbildung vom Erfaßten bis zu den Begriffen. Wenn dies der Fall ist und die Intentionen unmittelbar mit der extramentalen Realität zu tun haben, dann liegt der Schluß nahe, daß die Logik das Extramentale voraussetzt. So wird verständlich, warum Hervaeus die zweiten Intentionen in ihrer logischen Eigenschaft als gedankliche Entitäten betrachtet. Nehmen wir nun an, die Intentionalität würde nicht vom Extramentalen, sondern von den intramental objektiven Seienden angeregt. So wäre ein intramental Seiendes das Erkenntnisobjekt. Das aber will Hervaeus keineswegs behaupten. Daß das Objektive ausschließlich gedanklich auftritt, ist vielmehr als Position des Petrus Aureoli bekannt. Für Aureoli ist die Intentionalität wohl eine ausschließlich intramentale Angelegenheit, da er zwischen *res*, *conceptus obiectivus* und *conceptio passiva* nicht unterscheidet und sich damit gegen die Auffassung von Hervaeus richtet.³⁸

Wir halten also fest: Die zweiten Intentionen sind direkt in der extramentalen Sache fundiert, ebenso aber auch die ersten Intentionen. Die ganze begriffliche Erkenntnis erlaubt einen Schluß auf die erfaßte *natura rei*. Die Sache selbst ermöglicht also ihre Erkenntnis. Begriff, Urteil und Syllogismus sind nichts anderes als eine intentionale Entfaltung der erfaßten Sache. Verankert ist die Intentionalität stets in der *habitus* der konkreten Sache. Hervaeus geht so weit, daß er sogar die Ordnung des Syllogismus auf die Natur der Dinge zurückführt.³⁹

IV. ÜBER DIE INTENTION DES ERKENNENDEN

Hervaeus behandelt auch die Rolle der erkennenden Seite bei der Intentionalität. Welche Rolle spielt das erkennende Subjekt dabei? Eines betont Hervaeus immer wieder: die Intentionen sind, wie schon

³⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*, dist. 23, n. 64, ed. Perler (Anm. 4), p. 262: "... nec etiam obiectum cognitum ut fundat relationem ad actum intelligendi sic quod huiusmodi relatio sit intentionalitas in abstracto, ut posuit opinio secunda (offensichtlich die des Hervaeus, G.K.), sed est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsam...". Hervaeus' Gegenposition dazu: Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Parisii 1489, f. 35vb: "Predicta intentionalitas non fundatur super illud quod est esse in intellectu et precipue obiective".

³⁹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 3, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 8va: "Si autem intelligas per facere talem ordinem motionis intelligendo res, sic logicus non facit talem ordinem, sed natura rei sicut movens".

erwähnt, auch seitens des Erkennenden vorhanden. Sie können zwar kein Gegenstand der Forschung in der Logik sein und liegen nach heutigem Sprachgebrauch im Zuständigkeitsbereich der empirischen Psychologie. Die Komponenten des erkennenden Subjekts sind bekanntlich der Erkenntnisakt, die intelligible *species* und der formale Begriff. Diese besitzen ein *esse intentionale essentialiter*, während den Intentionen von den erfaßten Sachen her ein *esse intentionale denominative* zukommt. Die *species intelligibilis* scheint die formal erste unter den Komponenten des Subjekts zu sein, gefolgt von Erkenntnisakt und Begriff.

Wir können die Seinsweise der erfaßten Dinge nur beschreiben, indem wir diese vorher durch die in ihnen realisierten Universalien aufnehmen. Bei Hervaeus (wie auch bei Thomas) tut sich das Universale in der Begegnung des Intellekts mit der Realität auf. Eben dieser Aufnahmeakt seitens des Erkennenden ist die notwendige, wenngleich auch keine hinreichende Bedingung für den ganzen Vorgang. Auch die Objekte sind dann und nur dann intentional, wenn sie immer schon vom Intellekt aufgenommen sind. Es ist nicht zu bestreiten, daß wir die Universalien in ihrer Eigenschaft der Unmittelbarkeit und der Klarheit erkennen können. Wir nehmen sie jedoch intramental und intentional wahr, und sie sind die objektiven Entitäten. Subjektiv erleben wir sie nur extramental. Als *rationes obiectivae* erfahren sie ihre Aktuierung in den Individuen. Die subjektive Seite des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens ist hingegen wesentlich intentional. Diese objektorientierte Tendenz (wie manchmal von Hervaeus gesagt wird) des Intellekts einerseits und ihre Ursache, d.h. die seitens der erfaßten Sachen gegebene Intentionalität andererseits, bedingen sich gegenseitig und bilden zusammen die begriffliche Erkenntnis.

V. DIE INTENTIONALITÄT UND DER OBJEKTIVE BEGRIFF

Bei Hervaeus nimmt gerade die Begriffsdefinition eine wichtige Stellung ein. Die Intentionalität geht aus vom objektiven Begriff. Die *ratio obiectiva*⁴⁰ ist die eigentliche Bezeichnung der unmittelbar erfaßten Sache selbst, sie wird später auch nicht selten *conceptus obiectivus*

⁴⁰ Vgl. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 43va. Hervaeus verwendet auch die Bezeichnung "ratio pro re intellecta per conceptum mentis", *ibid.*, f. 43rb. Im *Tract. sec. int.* bevorzugt er vornehmlich die Bezeichnung "res intellecta", selten auch, wie etwa in q. 2, art. 1, f. 16rb, Zeile 13–14: "res intellecta absolute".

genannt, in Abgrenzung zum *conceptus formalis*, der die verstandene Sache mit dem ganzen begrifflichen Material repräsentiert.⁴¹ Der formale Begriff meint hier den Begriffsinhalt, und dieser ist—nicht in Hervaeus' Sinne—objektiv. Jeder Begriffsinhalt ist eine Gegebenheit der Seele. Der Unterschied zwischen den Begriffen erhält ein besonderes Gewicht, wenn wir uns die in der Neuzeit aufgekommene Suche nach der Definierbarkeit der objektiven Begriffe ins Gedächtnis rufen. Es ist kein anderer als Descartes, der die klaren Ideen bestimmen will und die Objektivität dieser ausschließlich intramentalen Begriffe aufdeckt, indem er diese als bestimmte Ideen wiedergebende Begriffsinhalte versteht.⁴² Damit wäre das, was für Descartes ein objektiver Begriff ist, für Hervaeus ein *conceptus mentis*, ein formaler Begriff.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem objektiven und dem formalen Begriff wollte aber schon Johannes Capreolus⁴³ aufheben. Das hatte Folgen auch für das Verständnis der Intentionen.⁴⁴ Hervaeus selbst verwendet hierzu andere Begriffe wie etwa den bereits genannten des *conceptus mentis* beziehungsweise den der *ratio obiectiva*.⁴⁵ Bei Capreolus ist es eigentlich nur der formale Begriff, der sowohl die direkten als auch die indirekten Erkenntnisobjekte repräsentiert. Der intentionalistische Ansatz ist damit natürlich nicht sofort in Vergessenheit geraten und hatte eine eigene Entwicklungsgeschichte bis zu Petrus Nigri. Man kann die späten Ausläufer dieses Ansatzes noch bei Ordensbrüdern von Hervaeus, so etwa bei Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio⁴⁶ und

⁴¹ Zur begriffsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung in der Neuzeit vgl. M. Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif. Suárez, Pasqualigo, Matri", *Les études philosophiques* 60 (2002), pp. 3–30.

⁴² Wie D. Perler zu Recht betont, sind die Ideen bei Descartes geistige Akte mit einem Inhalt; vgl. D. Perler, *Repräsentation bei Descartes*, Frankfurt am Main 1996, p. 46.

⁴³ Vgl. M. Tavuzzi, "Capreolus, Johannes (c.1380–1444)", in: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2, London – New York 1998, pp. 200–202.

⁴⁴ Vgl. Ioannes Capreolus, *Questiones in IV libros Sententiarum (Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis)*, I, dist. 23, q. 1, ed. Paban – Pègues, p. 183b: "Potest tamen dici quod intentio potest dupliciter sumi: uno modo, in vi unius abstracti, et sic non est aliud quam conceptio intellectus, ut dictum est; alio modo, in vi concreti, sicut si albedo poneretur loco hujus nominis, album, quia in proposito vocabula deficiunt, cum non habeamus nomen concretum significans concrete sicut intentio abstractivae; et isto modo intentio dicit rem substratam conceptui animae. Et isto modo omnis res fundans primam intentionem abstractivae dictam, potest dici prima intentio".

⁴⁵ Vgl. oben, Anm. 40.

⁴⁶ Silvestro Mazzolini, *Conflati ex angelico doctore S. Thoma primum volumen*, Perugia 1519. Hier bezeichnet Prierias Hervaeus als den Denker, der die Lehre des Thomas am tiefsten durchdacht habe und dem Rang nach höher als Capreolus und andere unter den Thomisten einzuschätzen sei. Das Zitat in M. Tavuzzi, *Prierias. The*

Chrysostomus Javelli⁴⁷ in der ersten Hälfte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts finden. Hier tritt er in Gestalt einer Synthese mit dem Ansatz von Capreolus auf. Diesem Faktum kann man entnehmen, wie verwurzelt die Lehre des Hervaeus im Thomismus bleibt, in dem sie einen—und vielleicht sogar einen besonderen—Schwerpunkt setzt. In der weiteren Entwicklung dieser Grundperspektive, wie sie etwa im Neuthomismus erfolgte, konnte diese Thematik kaum mehr einen Platz finden, trotz der Tatsache, daß die Beschäftigung eines Brentano mit der Scholastik nicht unbemerkt bleiben sollte.⁴⁸

Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456–1527, Durham, NC – London 1997, pp. 172–173, Anm. 67.

⁴⁷ Chrysostomus Javellus, *Super tres libros Aristotelis de Anima questiones subtilissimae*, Venezia 1568.

⁴⁸ Vgl. etwa É. Gilson, *Le thomisme*, Paris 1989, pp. 287–288; es sei gleichwohl auf einen bemerkenswerten Artikel von Gilson verwiesen: “Franz Brentano’s Interpretation of Mediaeval Philosophy”, *Mediaeval Studies* 1 (1939), pp. 1–10, wo er jedoch nicht auf Brentanos Kenntnis der scholastischen Intentionalitätstheorien eingeht.

REALISM AND INTENTIONALITY: HERVAEUS NATALIS,
PETER AUREOLI, AND WILLIAM OCKHAM IN DISCUSSION

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I want to focus on the relationship between Realism and Intentionality. In particular, I mean to compare the solutions proposed by Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureoli, and William Ockham to the problem of the relationship between a (first) intention and an extra-mental thing.

One of the main goals of the paper is to reconstruct Hervaeus's theory of intentionality by reconstructing the debate held in Paris between Hervaeus and Aureoli at the beginning of the fourteenth century. My point of reference will be Dominik Perler's introduction to the edition of Aureoli's *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 23. Over the last years, Russ Friedman has convincingly revised Perler's 'conceptualistic' interpretation of Aureoli's theory of intentionality.¹ Here, I mean to refine what I said elsewhere about Hervaeus's theory of intentionality by taking into account also Perler's interpretation.²

* I would like to thank Russ Friedman for his useful comments and suggestions.

¹ See e.g. R.L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication", in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, ed. R.L. Friedman – S. Ebbesen, Copenhagen 1999, pp. 415–430; id., "Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 177–193. Compare with D. Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 227–262; id., "What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional Objects", *Vivarium* 32 (1994), pp. 72–89; id., *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Frankfurt am Main 2002, pp. 258–294, 310–317. For a conceptualistic account of Aureoli's theory of intentions, moreover, see R. Dreiling, *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Franziskanerbischofs Petrus Aureoli (Pierre d'Auriol) nebst biographisch-bibliographischer Einleitung*, Münster 1913 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XI, 6).

² On Hervaeus's theory of intentions, see F. Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l'edizione critica della Loyca e del Tractatus de voce univoca*, Firenze 2005, pp. 103–140. See also Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität...*, pp. 294–313; J. Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der Intentio Secunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 13 (1974), pp. 49–59.

I. OCKHAM'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

Let me begin at the end of this story, namely with Ockham.

As is known, in his first theory of concepts, the so-called *fictum*-theory, Ockham agrees with Hervaeus and Aureoli in positing a third kind of entity in between the subject knower and the extra-mental thing known, i.e. a universal concept existing objectively (*obiective*) in the intellect. Ockham gives two basic reasons for positing such an entity. On the one hand, an objective concept is required to grant universality to cognition, especially in the case of non-present and non-existent things. On the other hand, such a concept is required to explain the cognitive fact that every act of cognition is always directed towards one and only one object.

After Walter Chatton's criticism, however, Ockham abandons this view. If we posit there to be in the intellect a universal concept that is distinct from both the act of its formation and the extra-mental thing cognized, such a concept could become the real object of our cognition and hence we could fall into scepticism. Moreover, this kind of universal concept is not strictly necessary to explain intellectual cognition. For a concept is always joined together with an act of understanding, and everything that can be explained by a concept can be explained by an act of understanding as well. Therefore, a concept can be reduced to an act of understanding. As a result, in order to explain intellectual cognition in a complete way, it is enough to work with acts of understanding as referring directly to extra-mental things.³

As is clear, Ockham's final theory of concepts provides a radically simple solution to the problem mentioned at the beginning of this paper. For Ockham explains intellectual cognition in terms of two basic items, i.e. mental acts and extra-mental things, which are related

³ For a useful summary of Ockham's change, see M.M. Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols., Notre Dame, IN 1987, vol. 1, p. 74, note 10. On Ockham's first theory of concepts, see Adams, *William Ockham*, vol. 1, pp. 73–105; ead., "Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities", *The Philosophical Review* 86 (1977), pp. 144–176; F.E. Kelley, "Some Observations on the *Fictum* Theory in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis", *Franciscan Studies* 38 (1978), pp. 260–282; E. Karger, "Théorie de la pensée, de ses objets et de son discours chez Guillaume d'Occam", *Dialogue* 33 (1994), pp. 437–456; S. Read, "The Objective Being of Ockham's *Ficta*", *Philosophical Quarterly* 27 (1997), pp. 14–31. More generally, on Ockham's epistemological realism, see P. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", *Traditio* 4 (1946), pp. 307–335.

to each other in an immediate way. Both items are singular and exist subjectively in the world. With regard to our argument, it is important to note that in Ockham's final theory of concepts there is no room for a distinction between the thing cognized (*res intellecta*), which has to be understood as the primary referent of a universal concept, and the extra-mental thing. The thing cognized is exactly the extra-mental thing in itself. This is so because an act of cognition does not confer any different or secondary kind of existence on an extra-mental thing. What changes about the extra-mental thing is only the fact that the thing is now in a relation with the intellect.

According to such a theory, in order to explain intellectual cognition in a complete way, it is sufficient to grant to the intellect a naturally spontaneous *semantic* activity, which is the result of an immediate interaction between the intellect and the extra-mental world. From this perspective, a singular act of cognition is a mental act signifying one singular thing, while a universal act of cognition is a mental act signifying many singular things. Respecting the principle that every act of cognition is always directed towards one and only one object is no longer necessary. Now, Ockham regards intentionality as a semantic and cognitive function of a mental act rather than as a logical property of a concept or a thing cognized. In particular, intentionality is the naturally spontaneous capacity of the intellect to refer directly to extra-mental things by means of acts. Hence, according to Ockham's final theory of concepts, when we speak of *man* we are speaking of a kind of mental act referring directly and immediately to many extra-mental singular men.

II. SOME PROBLEMS WITH OCKHAM'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

Ockham's later theory of intentionality is fascinating for its simplicity. In one respect, though, it seems to be too simple. On the one hand, indeed, if we endorse a mental-act account of intentionality, we seem to be unable to save the universality of cognition. For every act of cognition is a singular entity. On the other hand, if when we think of *man* we are thinking of an act of cognition signifying many extra-mental things, then speaking about men simply amounts to speaking about mental acts.

In his *Summa Logicae*, I, chapter 40, Ockham seems to be aware of such complications and tries to articulate more fully his epistemological

picture. An act of cognition can be understood in two ways. Insofar as it is a metaphysical entity, it is a singular and real thing inhering in the intellect. Insofar as it is an intentional entity, on the other hand, it is able to take the place of extra-mental things. By such a step, Ockham seems to re-introduce to a certain extent a third kind of entity into his own theory of cognition, but only in the clothes of a different way of understanding one of two basic items of his logical ontology, i.e. the mental act. According to Ockham's final theory, by producing an act of cognition the intellect does not dwell on the act itself, because an act refers immediately to the extra-mental things. So when Ockham talks of the predication of mental acts, or even of mental predication, we can read this claim as it concerns predication of things, since it concerns predication of acts referring immediately to the extra-mental things. From this point of view, speaking about men does not amount to speaking about mental acts *qua* acts, but *qua* acts or signs of the extra-mental things. As a consequence, speaking about men amounts to speaking immediately about extra-mental things. In this way, Ockham's final theory tries to preserve the intellect's direct grasp of reality.

To sum up, Ockham upholds that our intellect can directly grasp an extra-mental thing and predicate one thing of another thing by means of mental acts. Accordingly, Ockham regards intentionality, universality, and predication as semantic and cognitive functions of acts of cognition rather than as logical properties of some kind of mental entity that is distinct from the act. From a semantic point of view, universality is none other than the capacity of an act of cognition to refer naturally to many extra-mental things. From an epistemic point of view, it is a way of knowing many extra-mental things. By a universal mental act, indeed, the human intellect cognizes common features of many singulars or, which amounts to the same, the features of a given singular in a common way. In turn, intentionality is none other than the cognitive capacity of the intellect to grasp things by means of acts. Concretely, a (first) intention is a mental act signifying one or several extra-mental things.

In conclusion, we can claim that Ockham's final theory is both realistic and non-realistic in different respects. With regard to positing in the extra-mental world universal items that correspond to universal concepts, it is non-realistic. But with regard to granting reality to all the items involved in the process of cognition, it is fully realistic.

III. HERVAEUS'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

If we look at the problem of intentionality from an historical perspective, we realise that Ockham's final theory is not new at all. In his *Treatise on Second Intentions*, which can be dated from around 1310, Hervaeus criticises a similar account of intentionality, which seems to be very popular among his contemporaries. As a matter of fact, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, for instance, endorsed different versions of it.

While discussing the questions 'whether an act of cognition is a first intention' (q. 1, art. 2) and 'whether a second intention is an act of cognition' (q. 2, art. 1), Hervaeus points out that mental-act accounts of intentionality pose basically two problems, which concern separation and predication, respectively. On the one hand, an act of cognition is really separated from the things it is directed to. Consequently, if we want to avoid a Platonic position on universals, we cannot identify what is signified by the word 'man' with a kind of mental act. For otherwise man could really be separated from Socrates and Plato. On the other hand, if an act of cognition is singular by nature, it can never be universal in predication. For 'to be singular' and 'to be universal in predication' are incompatible properties. It is important to call attention to this second point, because it is a crucial one in Hervaeus's argument. According to Hervaeus, indeed, when we say for instance that 'man' is predicable of Socrates and Plato, the 'man' at issue has to be an item ontologically homogenous with the subjects of which it is predicated. Thereby it must be a thing. It is not possible to maintain that by saying 'Socrates is man' we are actually predicating an act of cognition of a particular thing.⁴ For we do not mean to say that Socrates *is* a kind of cognitive act (and this holds whether the act is considered in itself or as a sign of extra-mental things). As a result, when we speak (or think) of 'man', we do not refer primarily to extra-mental singular men nor to a mental act, but to a universal mental thing representing extra-mental singular men. Such a thing is a universal object that is correlated immediately to the universal concept of man, once this latter

⁴ Nonetheless, Hervaeus allows that it is possible to say that an act of cognition is singular by nature and universal in representation or signification. For being universal in representation or signification is a property concerning the *function* of a given thing, whilst being universal in predication is a property concerning the *nature* of that thing.

is obtained. As is clear, Hervaeus's argument simply is a re-application of the principle that every act of cognition has to be directed towards one and only one object.

Putting things this way is somehow unavoidable if someone endorses a theory of cognition like the one Hervaeus endorses. According to the Dominican Master, indeed, the intellect begins to form the concept of man by knowing a particular man. However, the intellect forms the concept of man in a proper way when it knows at least two particular men. Once the concept is formed, a general object corresponds to it immediately. In his works, Hervaeus frequently repeats that the concept of man is universal insofar as it represents a universal object, and such an object is universal insofar as (a) it represents indistinctly the things it has been derived from and (b) it is predicable indifferently of each of them.⁵ Thus, what the intellect receives through its act is not a man *qua* particular man, but a man *qua* cognized man, which is universal. Such an object is what the intellect primarily cognizes and what the intellect precisely predicates of particular extra-mental things.

By endorsing this view, Hervaeus rejects the idea that it is sufficient to explain intellectual cognition by referring to mental acts and extra-mental things, which are immediately related to each other. Quite the opposite, he thinks that it is necessary to refer to at least three items, i.e. extra-mental particular things, acts of cognition,⁶ and universal mental objects. Hervaeus thinks of such an ontology as necessary both to preserve the universality of cognition and, as has been said, to explain the cognitive fact that every act of cognition is always directed towards one and only one object. Nonetheless, we cannot avoid the impression

⁵ For an explanation of such a process, see Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, ff. 19ra–20vb; but also *Tractatus de quattuor materiis contra Henricum de Gandavo*, II. *De intellectu et specie*, ed. P. Stella, *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp. 125–170; *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, q. 2, art. 1, *respondeo*, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 19a–b; *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 1, art. 4, ed. Venetiis 1513, ff. 12ra–13ra. On Hervaeus's theory of natural cognition, see P. Conforti, “*Naturali cognitione probare*. Natural and Theological Knowledge in Hervaeus Natalis”, in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, ed. J.A. Aertsen – A. Speer, Berlin – New York 1998 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 26), pp. 614–621; Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato...*, pp. 103 sqq. On Hervaeus's life and works, see A. de Guimarães, “Hervé Noël (†1323). Étude biographique”, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 8 (1938), pp. 5–81.

⁶ In this paper, I do not dwell on the role that the intelligible species plays in the formation of universal concepts. As a matter of fact, however, Hervaeus distinguishes acts of cognition from intelligible species. For our argument, though, it is sufficient to maintain that both acts of cognition and intelligible species belong to the class of the psychological items involved in the formation of universal concepts. So both these items can be counted as items inhering subjectively in the intellect.

that by endorsing this view Hervaeus exposes himself to the classical objections against the metaphysically unnecessary and epistemologically dangerous existence of such universal objects. But in order to understand well Hervaeus's position, let me consider in turn each of the three items mentioned above.

Hervaeus states that the act of cognition has a relational status. Thus, it must be described as the conjunction of a relation and its converse-relation. In particular, the relation from act to things is real and coincides with the act itself, while the converse-relation from things to act is a relation of reason and coincides with what Hervaeus usually calls *habitus*, *relatio* or *intentionalitas ex parte rei intellectae*.⁷ On the other hand, the extra-mental thing is the starting-point of cognition (*obiectum movens*), whilst the mental object is the end-product (*obiectum terminans*). Nonetheless, Hervaeus says that both these items can rightly be called 'the thing cognized' (*res intellecta*), though according to different considerations. An extra-mental thing is called 'cognized' because it is precisely *that which* is cognized by an act, whilst a mental object is called 'cognized' because it is precisely *what* is cognized *about* an extra-mental thing. Such a move enables Hervaeus to claim that an extra-mental thing and a mental object are the same entity, even though they are not identical in every respect.⁸ Indeed, when the intellect cognizes an extra-mental thing, for instance Socrates, Socrates immediately becomes related to the intellect and, as a result of it, he is no longer Socrates in himself, but Socrates *qua* cognized. The relation Socrates bears to the intellect does not modify essentially the metaphysical status of Socrates. For a thing cognized is still a thing. However, such a relation changes the epistemic status of Socrates. For Socrates is now actually related to the intellect. Consequently, when Socrates is related to the intellect, he is no longer a particular thing, but a universal one. For a thing cannot be present in the intellect separately from a universal way of knowing, which necessarily qualifies the way of being the thing itself exhibits in the intellect. Therefore, when the intellect cognizes Socrates and hence

⁷ Cf. e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, pp. 4 sqq. For a useful clarification of Hervaeus's vocabulary, see Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione*, art. II, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 5 (2000), pp. 147–174, here pp. 156–157. For an English translation and a first critical edition of Hervaeus's treatise, see *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), the Doctor Perspicacissimus, on Second Intentions*, ed. and transl. by J.P. Doyle, Milwaukee, WI 2008.

⁸ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 4, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, pp. 50b–57a, *passim*.

knows that Socrates is a man, Socrates is that which is cognized by the intellect, while man is what is cognized about Socrates at the end of the process. This move however does not prevent us from stating that Socrates is the same entity as man. This is the reason why Hervaeus claims that the object of the intellectual cognition is universal and nonetheless is a real, i.e. an extra-mental, thing.⁹

In his works, Hervaeus attaches different labels to such an intellect-related being of a thing: 'intentional', 'logical', 'mental', 'cognized' or 'objective being'. All such labels refer to a sort of natural disposition of the things to be cognized, which completely coincides, on the side of the intellect, with the natural disposition of the intellect to cognize things. More particularly, Hervaeus says that something can have an objective being in two different ways. First, when it is an object of the intellect. Second, when it is a logical mode of being ensuing from the thing insofar as such a thing is an object of the intellect.¹⁰ According to this distinction, Hervaeus thinks that an object of the intellect can be singular as well as universal, and every object of the intellect is a first intention, if we consider it concretely.

In the introduction to his edition of Aureoli's *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 23, Dominik Perler explains Hervaeus's distinction between first and second intentions in terms of the particular/universal distinction (see Hervaeus's text below, note 17). Let me quote from Perler's text:

But objective existence is also ascribed to what the intellect abstracts from the particular. For when the intellect cognizes, for instance, Socrates, then it abstracts from the particular Socrates the universal *human being*. That is why Hervaeus introduces a second kind of objective existence [...] Hervaeus calls a thing having this second kind of objective existence

⁹ Cf. e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de quattuor materiis*, II, ed. Stella, pp. 163,32–164,6; but see also *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 1, art. 3 (*Utrum verbum sit res intellecta*), ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 11va–b. According to Hervaeus, when we state that the object of intellectual cognition is universal, we do not mean that such an object is precisely the universal, but we mean that a true thing (*vera res*), which is cognized, cannot be cognized separately from a universal way of knowing, i.e. separately from universality. From this perspective, the universal is the primary object of intellectual cognition insofar as the underlying subject of universality is what is primarily cognized about a true thing.

¹⁰ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1; q. 3, art. 3; *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 1, art. 3. For more details on such a distinction of objective being, see Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato*, pp. 103 sqq.; Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität...*, pp. 297–299; id., "Reale und intentionale Existenz. Eine spätmittelalterliche Kontroverse", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 102 (1995), pp. 261–278. For an introduction to Hervaeus's theory of intentionality, also see J.P. Doyle, "Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on Intentionality. Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath", *The Modern Schoolman* 83 (2006), pp. 85–124.

a second intention [...].¹¹ To understand Peter's statement, we need to keep in mind Hervaeus's distinction between first and second intentions. First intentions are particular things *qua* cognized things—things such as Socrates, this flower or that house. Second intentions, on the other hand, are universals—things such as *human being*, *animal*, etc. [...].¹² Unlike Hervaeus, Peter classifies universals as first intentions.¹³

I believe that Perler's explanation misunderstands Hervaeus's text. In his *Treatise on Second Intentions*, in fact, Hervaeus seems to endorse a very different position. From an epistemological point of view, Hervaeus identifies a first concrete intention with all that can be called real and he defines what is real as what does not include in its own definition a reference to the intellect or something implying or ensuing from a reference to the intellect.¹⁴ In other words, according to Hervaeus, *real* is all that can terminate the intentionality of the intellect insofar as it can be a distinct object of cognition.¹⁵ According to Hervaeus, therefore, both Socrates and man are first concrete intentions. For both are able to terminate the intentionality of the intellect.¹⁶ By contrast, a second (concrete) intention is defined as a mode of being that follows from the thing, once the thing becomes an object of the intellect. Thus, properly speaking, a second intention is not the human being insofar as it is abstracted from Socrates, but is precisely the mode of being abstract that Socrates has when he is cognized, i.e. when he ceases to be the particular Socrates and becomes a universal man. Similarly, second (concrete) intentions

¹¹ Cf. Perler, "Peter Aureol...", p. 233.

¹² Cf. Perler, "Peter Aureol...", p. 235.

¹³ Cf. Perler, "Peter Aureol...", p. 236. Perler does not seem to reconsider this interpretation in his later works.

¹⁴ On Hervaeus's realism, see F. Amerini, "What is Real. A Reply to Ockham's Ontological Program", *Vivarium* 43 (2005), pp. 187–212, and id., *I trattati De universalibus di Francesco da Prato e Stefano da Rieti (Secolo XIV)*, Spoleto 2003, Introduction. Also see T. Kobusch, "Begriff und Sache. Die Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie", *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (2004), pp. 140–157.

¹⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 3, *passim*.

¹⁶ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 4b: "Nam quaedam sunt quae conveniunt rebus intelligibilibus non ex operatione intellectus speculativi, scilicet prout sunt obiective in ipso intellectu, immo circumscripto tali esse obiectivo [...] conveniunt rebus sive affirmative, ut homo, bos, album, nigrum et similia [...] illud quod intelligitur, saltem quantum ad primum genus intelligibilium, quandoque est res vera extra animam, ut homo, albedo vel nigredo et similia"; q. 1, art. 3, p. 13b: "Et ideo videtur aliter dicendum quod quando quaeritur utrum res in particulari, puta Sortes vel Plato, dicant primam intentionem, dico quod accipiendo intentionem ex parte rei intellectae [...], si in abstracto accipiatur, scilicet ipsa intentionalitas, sic nec Sortes nec homo dicunt primam intentionem. Si autem accipiatur in concreto, non includendo ipsam intentionem denominantem, sic homo vel Sortes non dicunt primam intentionem [...]. Si autem accipiatur prima intentio pro illo quod ab illa intentionalitate denominatur, sic tam homo quam Sortes dicunt primam intentionem".

are the modes of being universal, species, predicable, and so on, which the intellect can attach to a thing once that thing has been cognized.¹⁷ In short, a second (concrete) intention is all that Hervaeus defines as non-real insofar as it depends on the intellect for its own being. But neither for Hervaeus nor for Aureoli is this the case with Socrates and man, while for them this is the case with the notions of species and genus. Therefore, I believe that we should not distinguish Hervaeus's theory of intentionality from Aureoli's on the ground of a different intentional classification of singular and universal things.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HERVAEUS'S AND AUREOLI'S THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

In spite of what is usually believed, Hervaeus's theory of intentionality shares many points with Aureoli's. In my opinion the points of agreement are basically two. (i) First, both authors endorse the view that a (first) intention is primarily the thing *qua* cognized and not an item existing subjectively in the intellect, like intelligible species or acts of cognition. (ii) Second, they share the idea that the thing *qua* cognized is the same as the extra-mental thing. This is true for singulars as well as for universals. Saying this amounts to saying that both universal and singular concepts must have a foundation in the extra-mental world.¹⁸

¹⁷ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 4b: "Alia sunt quae conveniunt rebus prout sunt obiective in intellectu, sicut est esse abstractum, universale et similia, et ista pertinent ad secundam intentionem [...]. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse obiective in intellectu quia scilicet consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu, sicut esse abstractum a Sorte et Platone consequitur hominem prout est obiective in intellectu. Separatio enim sive abstractio hominis a Sorte et Platone non convenit homini prout est in aliquo subiective, quia constat quod homo non est in intellectu sicut in subiecto [...]. Nec etiam in re extra est homo sive natura humana sine Sorte et Platone et aliis similibus subiective. Sed hoc ei convenit prout est obiective in intellectu, quia scilicet homo est in conspectu intellectus sicut obiectum cognitum, non cognito Sorte vel Platone et sic de aliis".

¹⁸ M. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford 1989, pp. 158–163, argues that Aureoli has developed two different and basically incompatible accounts of concept formation. The first account is elaborated in the *Scriptum super secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 2, art. 1–5, while the second one in the *Scriptum super secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 9, q. 2, art. 1–4. I cannot dwell on such a view here. Nonetheless, let me say that in my opinion Henninger's arguments are not conclusive. For the two accounts seem to explain the process of cognition from different perspectives. The first account—which explains the plurality of universal substantial concepts in terms of the *intensity of impressions* produced on the intellect by one

Like Aureoli, Hervaeus denies that there exists in the world a common nature really connecting two particulars. Socrates and Plato, for instance, have a common human nature only in the sense that they have two numerically different human natures that are nonetheless similar in species. Such a relation of similarity in species is the remote metaphysical ground of universal concepts. If we consider such a relation of substantial similarity (*conformitas substantialis, convenientia essentialis*) with regard to different particulars, then Hervaeus agrees with Aureoli in providing a merely extensional interpretation of it. Further, if we consider such a relation with regard to each particular, then Hervaeus still agrees with Aureoli in speaking of different *rationes* that are present in the thing and direct our activity of concept formation.¹⁹ For Hervaeus, such *rationes*, like being animal or being rational in the case of man,

and the same thing—focuses on the cognitive function of universal concepts. On the other hand, the second account—which explains such a plurality in terms of the *extension of the relation of resemblance* existing between things—focuses on the conditions required for both the formation and the identification of universal concepts. Whereas the first account stresses the cognitive side of the process, the second account stresses the metaphysical one. The two accounts, though, seem to share two basic ideas. (i) First, they uphold that one and the same thing does not include within itself different formalities that are the ground of different concepts. The extra-mental ground of universal concepts relies on the relation of resemblance holding between things. (ii) Second, they uphold that one and the same thing can produce *virtually* on the intellect several concepts. The human intellect can have many concepts or impressions of one and the same thing, and these concepts are different in kind or in intensity. However, what enables the human intellect to identify and distinguish such kinds or degrees of intensity is precisely the relation of resemblance existing between things that fall under such kinds. The degrees of such a relation ground the degrees of intensity an impression has in the intellect.

¹⁹ Here, we must introduce some caveat. On the one hand, Aureoli indeed seems to accept the idea of *rationes* that are present in the thing and direct our intellect towards concepts. On the other hand, however, he rejects both (i) the idea that there exist in the thing merely *external* items, like operations (*operationes*), grounding our concepts (*Scriptum super secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 2, art. 4), and (ii) the idea that there exist in the thing *internal* formalities (*Quodlibet*, q. 1). Therefore, it is not easy to capture exactly the status of such *rationes*. Nonetheless, we can observe that Aureoli seems to introduce the notion of *ratio* in order to express a sort of *intrinsic* potentiality that an extra-mental thing has to produce on the intellect impressions with a greater or lesser degree of intensity. Hervaeus also rejects the need of putting merely *extrinsic* items, like *apparentia* (*Quodlibet* I, q. 9), to ground our concepts even though there is a passage in which he seems to agree with such a vocabulary (*Tract. sec. int.*, q. 4, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 66b). Usually, however, he prefers to talk of abilities (*habilitates*) or *rationes* of a thing. In any case Hervaeus, like Aureoli, seems to think that such *rationes* are dependent basically upon the merely *intrinsic* capacity a thing has to ‘connotate’ (*connotare*) and to relate extrinsically to other things according to different degrees of similarity. For more details on Hervaeus’s theory of concept formation, see Amerini, *I trattati De universalibus*..., pp. 46 sqq.; id., “What is Real...”.

are not really distinct from each other and from the thing. Nonetheless, they are not completely identical with each other and with the thing, either. According to Hervaeus, the human intellect plays an important role in identifying and diversifying such *rationes* through its activity of comparing things to one another. Usually, Hervaeus says that animal and man or sensible and rational are really identical but not entirely (*adaequate, convertibiliter*) identical with each other.²⁰ For they are extensionally heterogeneous, since the intellect can find a property that can be predicated of one of them but not of the other, or vice versa. In at least two places in his works, Hervaeus defines a *ratio* as that in virtue of which something is formally so-and-so qualified. For instance, whiteness *qua* whiteness is that in virtue of which a body is formally white and humanity *qua* humanity is that in virtue of which a corporeal body is formally a man (or a human body).²¹ Thus, Hervaeus regards a *ratio* as an intrinsic and essential principle of a thing. In the case of a substantial *ratio*, moreover, he ultimately describes it as a set of definite biological functions that are performed by a substance and are dependent on the substantial form of that substance. Accordingly, Hervaeus thinks that by establishing the extension of such a set of functions the intellect can form increasingly more extensive concepts of such a substance.

In conclusion, we can maintain that Hervaeus agrees basically with Aureoli in promoting a theory of universals that is realistic and conceptualistic at the same time. It is realistic insofar as it provides an extra-mental foundation for universal concepts, while it is conceptualistic with regard to the role the intellect plays in the activity of identification and especially of unification of such universal concepts. If this reconstruction is right, it does not seem correct to distinguish Aureoli's theory of universals from Hervaeus's, as Perler does,²² in terms of a conceptualistic versus a realistic approach to the foundation of concepts.

²⁰ On such a notion of partial real identity, see Amerini, "What is Real...".

²¹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Opinio de difficultatibus fratris Thomae*, q. *De scientia in generali*, art. 7, ed. P. Piccari, *Memorie Domenicane* 26 (1995), f. 29vb; *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 2, q. 2.

²² Cf. Perler, "Peter Aureol...", pp. 238–239.

V. THE DEBATE BETWEEN HERVAEUS AND AUREOLI RECONSIDERED

To be sure, I do not want to suggest here that their theories are in fact equivalent, but that we have to be careful in drawing the borderlines between the two theories. As a matter of fact, points of disagreement are many. With regard to the problem of universals, the main point of disagreement is not about *that which* but about *what* the human intellect cognizes. For instance, like Aureoli, Hervaeus states that singulars are the starting point of intellectual cognition. Unlike Aureoli, however, he states that the ending point is always a universal thing. We can cognize singulars as well, but only indirectly²³ and by reflection.²⁴ However, insofar as the issue of intentionality is concerned, the central point of disagreement is another one. It does not deal with the foundation of universal concepts, but with the exact identification of the conditions required for a thing to be an intention. Therefore, in order to appreciate the differences between Hervaeus's and Aureoli's theories, let me consider this point carefully.

Hervaeus thinks of his own doctrine as necessary in order to provide cognition with a real content and to preserve the general Aristotelian theory of categorical predication. For this predicative theory to extend also to mental items, Hervaeus also thinks that the act of cognition has to be thought as accidental with regard to the nature of the thing cognized. As has been said, cognition does not modify essentially the nature of a thing. Thus, a man becomes an intention precisely when he is cognized. But a man cannot be cognized on his own account. Hence, a man cannot be an intention on his own account. A man becomes an intention precisely when he is related to the intellect. As a result, 'man is an intention' is a *per accidens* or denominative predication.

In the *Treatise on Second Intentions*, Hervaeus criticises Henry of Ghent's idea, proposed again by Aureoli, that Socrates is a thing on his own account, while man is an intention, because, unlike Socrates, a

²³ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 3, *passim*.

²⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de quattuor materiis*, ed. Stella, pp. 164,19–168,13. To my knowledge, Hervaeus does not change his opinion on this point throughout his career. But for opposite evaluations of this topic, see R.G. Wengert, "Three Senses of Intuitive Cognition. A Quodlibetal Question of Harvey of Nedellec", *Franciscan Studies* 43 (1983), pp. 408–431, and K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345*, Leiden – New York 1988, pp. 86–88, especially note 5.

man does not exist in the extra-mental world.²⁵ If so, insists Hervaeus, the predication 'man is an intention' has to be a *per se* or essential predication. Consequently, the property of being an intention has to be included in the definition of man. But this is unacceptable. Nor do the opponents allow it to be possible. For speaking about men does not amount to speaking about mental items. According to Hervaeus, then, Henry of Ghent's and Aureoli's misleading interpretation of the nature of man depends upon their not disambiguating the meaning of the word man. It is true that this word signifies a thing that exists in fact only in the intellect, but a thing in the intellect can be understood in two ways, i.e. either as including intentionality or as non-including it. Accordingly, the word 'man' does not signify primarily the thing insofar as it is intrinsically composed *by* intentionality, but the thing insofar as it is extrinsically composed *with* intentionality.²⁶ In other words, man can be considered both under the mode of intentionality and independently of such a mode. Hence, what the word 'man' signifies primarily is a thing that is considered independently of the mode of intentionality, which nonetheless it actually has.

As is widely known, Aureoli rejects this argument. Man *qua* man is an intention on his own account for Aureoli. For man has something mixed with the operation of the intellect, so that it is not possible to distinguish in the concept of man the thing cognized from the passive conception of it (*conceptio passive dicta*).²⁷ Furthermore, even if someone provides a *relational* explanation of the passive conception, nonetheless the property of being cognized can never be thought as *posterior* or *extrinsic*

²⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 12b. See Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 53, q. 5; art. 32, q. 5; *Quodlibet* V, q. 6; XV, q. 5; Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, pp. 248–249, n. 23.

²⁶ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 41b: "Illud quod dicitur intentio concretionis, ab aliqua intentionalitate abstracta, non oportet quod supponat pro composito ex re et intentionalitate fundata in ipsa. Sicut quando dicimus quod obiectum est terminus ad quem terminatur secundum rationem actus intelligendi, non oportet quod terminus supponat pro composito ex re, quae intelligitur, et ipsa terminatione, quae est relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum; immo supponit pro coniuncto tali terminationi sive pro fundamento talis terminationis. Unde intentio prima concretionis dicta supponit pro ente reali coniuncto tali intentionalitati, praesupposita tamen coexistentia actus intelligendi, sine quo talis intentionalitas non fundaretur in ipsa re".

²⁷ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 246, n. 15; p. 247, n. 17. For an extensive analysis of such an argument, see Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intentions...".

with regard to the thing cognized.²⁸ Therefore, man is an intention on his own account, because man *qua* man (*in quantum huiusmodi*) satisfies all the conditions required for a thing to be an intention. First, he does not exist in the extra-mental world. Second, he is distinguished intentionally from other substantial things. Third, he is formed by the intellect.²⁹ According to Aureoli, all these conditions define what an intention precisely is.

However, by putting things this way, Aureoli seems to misunderstand Hervaeus's doctrine. For, according to the Dominican Master, when we speak of man *qua* man (*in quantum huiusmodi*), we mean to speak primarily of a real thing, which nonetheless exists in fact only in the intellect, i.e. under the mode of intentionality. By such a reduplication, indeed, we want to point to what a man essentially is and not to what a man is in a given condition, i.e. precisely when he is in the intellect.³⁰ Consequently, according to Hervaeus, being an intention cannot be an essential feature of man *qua* man. Unlike Aureoli, Hervaeus thinks that a man is a first intention denominatively, so that the intentionality is not an essential feature of him. The property of being an intention expresses something more than the property of being a thing that can be cognized. For it says that the thing is actually and *accidentally* related to the intellect. As a matter of fact, however, Aureoli reads in a different way a crucial part of Hervaeus's doctrine, referring all the debate to man considered as existing in the intellect.³¹

As is clear, one point of disagreement concerns the nature of intentional predication. But the fundamental point of disagreement is another one. In fact, if we read carefully Aureoli's *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 23, we can note that Aureoli's two major objections against Hervaeus's doctrine concern the notion of intentionality *ex parte rei intellectae*, which is the basic condition, according to Hervaeus, for a thing to be accidentally an intention. To conclude my reconstruction, let me analyse these objections.

(i) Aureoli's first objection concerns the link between intentionality and passive conception. For Aureoli, being in relation with the intellect

²⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 27, pt. 2, in R.L. Friedman, "The Peter Auriol Homepage", web site <http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/ElectronicScriptum.html>, p. 16, 604–609.

²⁹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 247, n. 20.

³⁰ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 4.

³¹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 250, n. 29.

is *posterior* to being cognized by the intellect. A man bears a relation to the intellect when the intellect reflects upon its own act. Then, a man is cognized through a direct act and a man cognized is precisely an intention. Therefore, a thing is an intention before it bears a relation to the intellect. Hence, Hervaeus's notion of intentionality *ex parte rei intellectae* is epistemologically useless.³²

(ii) The second objection concerns the link between relation and foundation. The foundation of a relation cannot exist in virtue of the relation itself. But a thing is an intention when it is cognized, and a thing is cognized before it bears a relation to the intellect. Moreover, a thing cognized is the foundation of the relation a thing bears to the intellect. Therefore, if we would avoid circularity, we cannot found such a relation on the thing cognized. Hence, Hervaeus's notion of intentionality *ex parte rei intellectae* is logically inconsistent.

However, such objections are also based on a misunderstanding of Hervaeus's doctrine.

(i) With regard to the first objection—concerning the logical order between intentionality and passive conception—, Hervaeus carefully does not claim that, for a thing to be an intention, it is essential that we know the relationship of that thing with the intellect. According to Hervaeus as well, we know such a relation only through a second and reflexive act of cognition. Nor does Hervaeus claim that such a relation is *separable* from the thing cognized. Such a relation is always present, i.e. *ontologically concomitant* with and *inseparable* from the thing, when the thing is cognized. In other words, it is not ontologically possible for a thing to be cognized and not to be in relation with the intellect. For to be cognized is exactly the status that thing has according to such a relation.³³ Nonetheless, such a relation can be *separated conceptually*

³² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 251, nn. 33–34.

³³ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 6, ed. Parisiis 1489, p. 34b: "Si autem quaeratur utrum aliae secundae intentiones possint manere sine illa habitudine, dico quod 'alias intentiones manere in intellectu' potest intelligi dupliciter, vel sine ea coexistente vel sine ea cointellecta. Primo modo, aliae intentiones non possunt esse sine illa habitudine, quia impossibile est quod aliae intentiones secundae, quae consequuntur rem ut est in intellectu obiective, possunt esse vel sic intelligi sine tali habitudine existente, quia posito quod aliquid intelligatur, statim consequitur talis habitudo"; q. 3, art. 3, p. 44a: "Ad quantum dicendum quod illa quae est prima inter intentiones concreative dictas [...], quae est ipsa prima intentionalitas abstracte accepta, immediate fundatur super ens reale quando actu intelligitur. Et sicut dictum fuit supra, talis intentionalitas non potest fundari super illud quod actu sit extra intellectum [...], quia impossibile est aliquid actu referri ad intellectum sicut obiectum cognitum

from the thing cognized. Since a thing does not have such an intentional being before it is cognized, and afterwards it does have, then the thing cognized is not the same as the intentional being. Hence, such a relation is necessary and is logically posterior to the thing that is cognized. For the thing cognized, as has been mentioned above, is none other than the extra-mental thing, and it is not possible that one and the same thing can be mental and extra-mental in virtue of itself.

Therefore, in order to evaluate Hervaeus's theory correctly, one should avoid any confusion between what Hervaeus considers an epistemological question and what he considers an ontological one. Thus, asking 'whether such a relation is co-understood when a thing is understood' is different from asking 'whether such a relation is co-existing when the thing is understood'. Nonetheless, Hervaeus does not deny that an act of cognition plays an important role in providing a thing with objective being. Like Aureoli, Hervaeus thinks that the intellect is the efficient cause of the objective being of a thing. An act of cognition, he says, is a necessary condition to ground the relation of intentionality in the thing cognized. Unlike Aureoli,³⁴ however, Hervaeus thinks that an act of cognition is unable to grant objective being to something on its own account. Therefore, from the opposite side, the relation between the thing and the intellect is necessary and it expresses exactly the objective being a thing has in the intellect.

(ii) With regard to the second objection—concerning the link between relation and foundation—, Hervaeus's argument is subtle, but quite problematic. We can reconstruct it as follows. To be in a relation with the intellect means to be objectively in the intellect. Such a kind of being is the basic kind of intentionality *ex parte rei intellectae*. For the sake of brevity, let me call the relation a thing bears to the intellect Intentional Relation. Like any intention, the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing cognized. A thing cognized, however, is just a thing that exists objectively in the intellect. How can we avoid the circularity of this argument, which Aureoli pointed out? As has been said, Hervaeus

et quod cum hoc simul et in eodem instanti non sit in intellectu obiective"; q. 4, art. 1, p. 51b: "In hiis tamen quae consequuntur rem prout est obiective in intellectu, est aliquid quod non praesupponit esse in intellectu obiective, sicut hoc ipsum quod est 'esse obiective in intellectu' sive 'habere habitudinem praedictam ad intellectum', quia tunc idem praesupponeret se ipsum; quod est impossibile. Sed verum est quod talis habitudo, una cum re quae intelligitur, praesupponit actum intelligendi ut oppositae relationis fundamentum".

³⁴ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 248, n. 21.

thinks that a necessary condition for a thing to be objectively in the intellect is for it to be cognized. Consequently, an act of cognition is a necessary condition to ground the Intentional Relation on the thing cognized. However, an act of cognition is not a sufficient condition to grant objective being to something. Therefore, the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing that exists objectively in the intellect, but it is not grounded *precisely* on the thing's property of existing objectively in the intellect. For otherwise such a relation would be grounded on itself. Thus, in order to avoid circularity, Hervaeus distinguishes between two conditions, i.e. a thing's being objectively in the intellect and its being exactly such a kind of being.

Let me clarify this point by quoting one of Hervaeus's favourite examples. The relation of paternity is grounded on Socrates, who is a father, but not on Socrates *qua* father, because Socrates is formally a father just in virtue of the relation of paternity. Likewise, the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing existing objectively in the intellect, but not on the thing *qua* existing objectively in the intellect, because a thing is formally objectively in the intellect precisely in virtue of the Intentional Relation.³⁵ According to Hervaeus's vocabulary, the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing that is joined together *with* an intention, i.e. on the thing as potentially separable from intentionality, and not on the thing actually composed *by* the thing plus intention, i.e. on the thing as actually mixed together with intentionality. Therefore, concludes Hervaeus, when someone states that the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing *qua* cognized, we have to read such a statement as saying that the Intentional Relation is grounded on the thing insofar as an act of cognition, grounding the converse-relation, corresponds to it.³⁶

³⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 3; q. 4, art. 1.

³⁶ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, pp. 24b–25a: “Nullum extremum relationis debet denominari a relatione sibi opposita; nullus enim denominatur dominus a servitute, nec pater a filiatione [...]. Sed res intellecta est extremum correlativum oppositum ipsi intelligenti. Ergo res intellecta non debet denominari relatum a relatione reali ipsius intelligentis. Licet relatio sit ad aliud, tamen non denominat illud aliud ad quod est, sed illud in quo est, sicut paternitas non denominat aliquem nisi illum in quo est paternitas. Et ex hoc sic arguitur: relatio non denominat nisi illum in quo est; sed relatio intelligentis non est in re intellecta; ergo relatio intelligentis non denominat rem intellectam, ita quod secundum eam dicatur relata”; q. 3, art. 4, p. 66a–b: “Quando ergo quaeritur utrum esse intellectum vel esse obiective in intellectu, quod est primum inter secundas intentiones, fundetur super rem ut est intellecta aut super rem absolute, dicendum est quod non super rem absolute, excluso actu intelligendi, immo oportet accipere actum intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis. Et quando dicitur quod si fundetur super rem intellectam, cum res intellecta

As has been said, Aureoli thinks that such an argument does not hold. For him, a thing's being in relation with the intellect logically presupposes its being cognized. In the light of Hervaeus's doctrine, however, it is unclear how Aureoli can explain the cognition of a thing, while adopting the point of view of the thing cognized, without referring to a relation the thing bears to the intellect. Furthermore, as has been said, Aureoli thinks that a thing and the property of being objectively in the intellect can never be distinguished from each other. Again, however, Aureoli's notion of 'indistinguishability' (*indistinguibilitas*) is not clear. It is evident that, from Aureoli's point of view, it is not possible to cognize a man and afterwards to add over it (*superponere*) a relation with the intellect, as it is possible to add the relation of similarity over a white thing. A man is a sort of entity *intrinsically* composed by an extra-mental thing and a passive conception,³⁷ and these two items cannot be distinguished from each other. But it is not clear what it means exactly that the thing cognized and the passive conception of the thing are mixed together in an indistinguishable way. Are the real thing and the intentional mode of being (*modus essendi*), which coincides with the passive conception of the thing, only conceptually indistinguishable or ontologically as well? More generally, is the problem Aureoli poses an epistemological problem or an ontological one? For instance, Aureoli says that the fact that Socrates bears a relation to the intellect presupposes logically the fact that Socrates is cognized. But what does it mean that Socrates is cognized? How is it possible to explain

sic includat esse intellectum, tunc sequitur quod esse intellectum fundetur super se ipsum, scilicet super esse intellectum, quod est ipsummet, dicendum quod non sequitur. Quia quando dicitur 'res intellecta' [...], li 'intellecta' potest accipi prout denominatur res ab actu intelligendi, et tunc est sensus: 'res ut intellecta', idest res ut sibi correspondet actus intelligendi. Vel potest accipi prout res denominatur ab ipsa habitudine rationis quam habet ad actum intelligendi [...]. Tunc dico quod illa habitudo, scilicet esse intellectum vel esse obiective in intellectu, fundatur super rem ut est intellecta, accipiendo 'esse intellectum' primo modo, vel super rem prout respondet sibi actus intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis. Non autem secundo modo, scilicet super rem intellectam vel super rem ut habet habitudinem ad actum intelligendi, quia tunc illa habitudo praedicta fundaretur super se ipsam. Sed secundum primum modum non sequitur quod fundetur super se ipsam nec quod fundetur super actum intelligendi, sed quod fundetur super rem ut ei correspondet actus intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis. Sicut etiam nec super albedinem fundatur similitudo nisi prout respondet sibi alia albedo quae sit fundamentum alterius relationis".

³⁷ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 248, n. 22; p. 255, n. 44. See also above, note 28.

the passive conception of Socrates without referring to an *external* relation Socrates bears to the intellect? Basically, it seems to remain unexplained in Aureoli's theory of intentionality how to reconcile the following claims: (a) intentional being is *different* from the thing, (b) intentional being is *not an absolute* thing, and (c) intentional being is an *internal* relation.

Hervaeus's appeal to intentionality *ex parte rei intellectae* aims to solve just this puzzle. With regard to this, one can allow that Aureoli misunderstands the central point of Hervaeus's doctrine. As a matter of fact, according to Hervaeus, such a relation is really the same as the active intentionality of the intellect itself. It is the intentionality as considered from the side of the thing that becomes cognized. Therefore, such a relation is not something formally different from the passive conception of the thing itself.

I believe that the deep significance of Hervaeus's theory is just that. It is not possible to refer only to the intellect in order to explain the passive conception of a thing. For Hervaeus, this is a principle that holds in any theory of relations. A relation denominates the subject on which it is grounded, but it does not denominate the other extreme. If Socrates is the father of Plato, for instance, paternity denominates Socrates as a father, but not Plato. Nor does the paternity of Socrates denominate Plato as a son. Hence, in the special case of intellectual cognition, we cannot maintain that a thing is said to be cognized by an act of cognition, but we must allow for the converse-relation. For otherwise nothing prevents us from saying that we cognize a thing and, paradoxically, the thing is not cognized by us. In essence, an act of cognition is a necessary condition both for someone to cognize a thing and for a thing to be cognized, but it is not a sufficient condition for a thing to be cognized. Unfortunately, Aureoli does not go deep into such a curious and problematic consequence of Hervaeus's theory.³⁸

In conclusion, in order to understand well Hervaeus's theory of intentionality, we must not forget that, unlike Aureoli, Hervaeus is interested in analysing the process of cognition from a *diachronical* point of view and not only from the point of view of the thing *already* cognized. His goal is to explain what happens before, after and especially while a thing is cognized. If we look at the cognition from the point of view of the thing *already* cognized, then we cannot separate

³⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, p. 248, n. 21.

a thing cognized from the passive conception of it. But if we look at the cognition throughout all the process, then it is conceptually possible to distinguish the thing cognized from the passive conception of it.

CONCLUSIONS

Both Hervaeus and Aureoli think that mental-act accounts of intentionality are unable to explain intellectual cognition in all the details, so they prefer to adopt the point of view of the thing cognized. However, they are careful to avoid any sceptical implications by endorsing the view that the thing cognized is the same as the real thing but with new clothes. Therefore, Ockham's complaints against objective being are not completely justified, as Perler rightly points out.³⁹ Nonetheless, they disagree with each other on some points.

Hervaeus is inclined to explain intellectual cognition by referring to a *substance/accident model*. According to him, a thing has intentional being accidentally, i.e. in virtue of the special relation it bears to the intellect that cognizes it. In fact, a thing cognized is a thing that happens accidentally to be cognized and a thing is an intention precisely when it happens to be cognized. Thus, being an intention cannot be an essential feature of a thing nor of a thing cognized. Nonetheless, it is an essential feature of the property of being cognized, since it identifies to a certain extent with it. Hence, Hervaeus distinguishes in the phrase *res intellecta* the side of the thing from that of the passive conception. His notion of a thing's intentionality, however, remains not entirely clarified.

By contrast, Aureoli prefers to explain cognition by referring to an *action/passion model*. An act of cognition gives intentional being to a thing and a thing receives intentional being in virtue of an act. Therefore, a thing has intentional being in virtue of the intellect that cognizes it, and to be an intention is an essential and indistinguishable feature of a thing, if this latter is considered under the condition of being cognized. Hence, Aureoli thinks that it is not possible to distinguish in the phrase *res intellecta* two sides. Nonetheless, Aureoli's notion of indistinguishability remains opaque. In particular, it is not clear if such a notion concerns only an epistemological problem or an ontological problem as well.

³⁹ Cf. Perler, "Peter Aureol...", pp. 240–241.

In essence, the controversy between Hervaeus and Aureoli on intentionality seems to stem from a reciprocal misunderstanding. If a man is a thing that exists in fact only in the intellect, then for Aureoli asking what a man *qua* man (*in quantum huiusmodi*) is amounts to asking precisely what a man *qua* mental entity is. For Hervaeus, instead, asking that amounts to asking simply what a man, who exists in fact only as a mental entity, essentially is. According to the Avicennian wording, while Aureoli emphasizes the twofold existence of the essence and refers the whole question to the essence as existing in the intellect, Hervaeus emphasizes the threefold status of the essence and refers the question to the essence as 'indifferent' to both mental and extra-mental existence.

In conclusion, we can maintain that Hervaeus's theory of intentionality is not more realistic than Aureoli's because it provides an extra-mental foundation of universal concepts or first intentions, as Perler thinks, but because it is more inclined to consider the interaction between the subject knower and the object known as the result of two linked, but quite independent, epistemological items, i.e. the cognized thing and the intentional property of being an intention or being cognized.

HERVAEUS NATALIS ON INTENTIONALITY: ITS DIRECTION AND SOME AFTERMATH*

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I

In a much quoted passage from 1874, Franz Brentano (1828–1917) wrote:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is not here to be understood as a reality) or immanent objectivity.¹

Since 1874, for observers of Brentano and of intentionality doctrine, whatever else may be at issue the general consensus has been that “intentionality” indicates a direction from knower to known. Thus, Brentano’s most recognized disciple, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), who is credited with introducing the term itself into modern philosophy,² has described it as “the property of being conscious of something”.³ This direction from consciousness to the object (which Brentano himself influenced by the problem of non-existent objects later rejected)⁴ appears in others

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¹ F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. A.C. Rancurello – D.B. Terrell – L.L. McAlister, London 1973, p. 88; as quoted by T. Crane, “Intentionality”, in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4, London – New York 1998, pp. 816–821, esp. p. 817.

² Cf. G. Bealer, “Intentionality”, in *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, ed. H. Burkhardt – B. Smith et al., München – Philadelphia – Wien 1991, vol. 1, p. 400.

³ E. Husserl, *Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson, London 1969, p. 109.

⁴ For this see, J. Haldane, “Intentionality and One-sided Relations”, *Ratio* 9 (1996), pp. 95–114, esp. pp. 96–97.

dependent upon Brentano⁵ and a glance at secondary sources will confirm its almost universal acceptance as the common view.⁶

II

In the Middle Ages: from the Latin Avicenna on, the term "intentio" can be found throughout the thirteenth century.⁷ But, to my knowledge the actual word, "intentionalitas", surprisingly appears first only in the fourteenth-century writing of Hervaeus Natalis.⁸ A bigger surprise for me was to find that Brentano in one place actually mentioned Hervaeus and listed three of his works.⁹ But the biggest surprise of all was to discover that for Hervaeus the direction of *intentionality as such* was not from knower to known but rather oppositewise—from known to knower! My purpose now is to sharpen that discovery as well as to touch on some of its wider *Wirkungsgeschichte*.

⁵ Cf. e.g., Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), *Über Annahmen*, Leipzig 1902, p. 103, as cited by R. Grossmann, *Meinong*, London – Boston 1974, p. 87. On the relation of Meinong to Brentano here, cf. T. Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects*, New Haven – London 1980, p. 48.

⁶ For examples, cf.: Grossmann, *Meinong*, p. 117; id., "Intentional Relation", in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford – New York 1995, p. 413. Also see: T. Crane, "Intentionality", *ibid.*, p. 818; J. Searle, "Intentionality (1)", in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford 1994, p. 380; J. Perry, "Intentionality (2)", *ibid.*, pp. 386 and 388 sqq.; R. Chisholm, "Intentionality", in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards, vol. 4, New York 1967, p. 202; and J.-L. Petit, "Intentionnalité", in *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, dir. A. Jacob, t. II: *Les notions philosophiques*. *Dictionnaire*, vol. 1, Paris 1989, p. 1346. An exception, perhaps, to the general rule is John Haldane, who stresses the immanence of thinking to the point of excluding any necessary relation to an object; cf. "Intentionality and One-sided Relations", p. 114. For a denial of such a directional character among the Scholastics coupled with its attribution to Husserl, see H. Spiegelberg, "Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl", *Philosophische Hefte* 1/2 (1936), pp. 88–89.

⁷ For some of this, see P. Engelhardt, "Intentio", in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 4, Basel 1976, cols. 466–474.

⁸ For this, cf. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, a corrected re-issue..., vol. 5, Oxford 1933, p. 379.

⁹ For this, see the chapter, "Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften", in Johann Adam Möhler, *Kirchengeschichte*, ed. P.B. Gams, Regensburg 1867, vol. 2, pp. 526–584, esp. p. 570; for Brentano's authorship of this chapter, cf. *ibid.*, p. 526.

III

Born in Brittany most probably between 1250 and 1260, Hervaeus entered the Order of Preachers, the Dominicans, in April of 1276.¹⁰ From 1302 to 1307, he evidently was at Paris studying and teaching theology. Likely at this time, he composed his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter the Lombard*¹¹ and received his licentiate in 1308. Meanwhile, he was chosen in 1305 to be Provincial Superior of the Dominicans in France. In 1318 he was elected Master General of his Order, in which office he remained until his death in 1323.

In addition to his *Sentences* commentary, Hervaeus authored other works and engaged in various controversies resulting in polemical writings, especially some directed against Durandus of St.-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334).¹² The work most relevant for our present purpose is Hervaeus's *Treatise on Second Intentions*, thought to have been composed between 1307 and 1316.¹³ The edition which I used¹⁴ runs 224

¹⁰ For the life and work of Hervaeus, see: L. Bazinek, "Natalis, Hervaeus", in *Biographisch-bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, vol. 6, Herzberg 1993, cols. 468–474; ead., http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/n/natalis_h.shtml (Letzte Änderung: 02.02.1999); M. Tavuzzi, "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance", *Doctor Communis* 45 (1992), pp. 132–152; D. Perler, "Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323)", in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4, London – New York 1998, pp. 403–404; F.J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque 1964, pp. 106–117.

¹¹ For a later published version of this, cf. Hervei Natalis Britonis, Doctoris Theologi Parisiensis, Praestantissimi, et subtilissimi ac quondam Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum, Generalis Magistri, *In quatuor Libros sententiarum Commentaria*, quibus adiectus est eiusdem auctoris *Tractatus de potestate Papae*. Parisiis: Apud viduam Dyonisii Moreau et Dyonisium Moreau filium. M DC XLVII. For its date of composition, A. de Guimarães, "Hervé Noel. Étude biographique", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 8 (1938), pp. 48–49 has fixed on 1302–1303. P. Stella, "La prima critica di Hervaeus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand. Il 'De Intellectu et specie' del cosiddetto 'De Quatuor materiis'", *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp. 125–170, acknowledges (p. 135) the merit of Guimarães, but has himself assigned a date between 1304 and 1307.

¹² For Hervaeus vs. Durandus, see J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literaturgeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster 1927 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXVI).

¹³ On this, cf.: "According to J. Pinborg, 'Zum Begriff der "intentio secunda"...', 54, the 'Tractatus' was written between 1309 and 1316" (D. Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 227–262, esp. p. 230, note 6).

¹⁴ *Tractatus magistri Hervei Doctoris perspicacissimi de secundis intentionibus*. Paris: Georgius Mitelhuss, 1489. This edition is of poor quality. Its abbreviations are not consistent. It contains numerous misspellings, as well as patent mistakes. The film copy, which I used at the *Vatican Film Library* in St. Louis, contains many corrections

pages and contains five *Quaestiones disputatae*, which are divided into a total of 22 articles systematically arranged.¹⁵

IV

I have also looked at some *Distinctions* in Hervaeus's *Sentences* commentary, and at his *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, which together with eight treatises, including *De relationibus*¹⁶ and *De verbo*,¹⁷ were edited in a single volume by Marc Antonio Zimara (1460–1532)¹⁸ at Venice in 1513.¹⁹ All eleven of these *Quodlibets* were accepted as genuine in the time following their appearance. So it was that Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) in his *Disputationes metaphysicae* (Salamanca, 1597) cited Hervaeus a total of 77 times²⁰ and made no distinction as to authenticity among these questions.

Palémon Glorieux, who remarked the difficulty involved in identifying and dating Hervaeus's *Quodlibets*,²¹ declared that only the first four are certainly genuine.²² On the other hand, Ludwig Hödl has accepted

in the form of glosses, crossouts, or writeovers by one or more readers. Where legible these usually make sense. But for the most part they are unintelligible on the film. Perler ("Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323)", p. 404) lists a "more or less reliable" Venice 1508 edition, while Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, p. 110, also lists a Paris, 1544 and a Venice, no date, edition. I have not seen any of these other editions. See now the latin text and the english translation in *A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), the Doctor Perspicacissimus, on Second Intentions*, ed. and transl. by J.P. Doyle, Milwaukee, WI 2008.

¹⁵ Hervaeus's *Tractatus* is one of the works, along with his *Sentences* commentary and some unspecified *Quodlibets*, which Brentano mentioned in the place remarked above in note 9.

¹⁶ P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, vol. 1, Paris 1933, p. 203, lists this as authentic and dates it around 1310.

¹⁷ Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres...*, vol. 1, p. 201, lists the *De verbo* as authentic and dates it between 1307 and 1309.

¹⁸ On Venetiis 1513, see E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, Paris 1852, pp. 297–300.

¹⁹ Cf. *Quolibeta Hervei: subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus infra per ordinem descriptis. Quorum omnia: demptis tantum quatuor quolibetis: nunc primum impressa: atque in lucem prodita fuerunt: summaque diligentia castigata. Additis quampluribus in margine notabilibus: necnon eleganti tabula: que secundum alphabeti ordinem omnes principales quaestiones mirifice demonstrat. Tractatus VIII, videlicet. De beatitudine. De verbo. De eternitate mundi. De materia celi. De relationibus. De pluralitate formarum. De virtutibus. De motu angeli*, Venetiis: Georgium Arrivabenum, 1513, repr. Ridgewood, NJ 1966.

²⁰ See J. Iturriz, "Fuentes de la metafísica de Suárez", *Pensamiento*, numero extraordinario, Madrid 1948, p. 40.

²¹ P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique. De 1260 à 1320*, Kain 1925, p. 200.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 200–201; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. 2, Paris 1935, pp. 138–139, with more precise assignments of *Quodlibeta* V–XI on p. 138.

the authenticity of them all, except for the eleventh, which, like Glorieux following Pelster,²³ he has rejected.²⁴ For this paper I have stayed almost exclusively with the first four *Quodlibets* edited by Zimara. I have also used the excerpt from an early work of Hervaeus directed against Henry of Ghent (1217–1293), which was edited in 1959 by Prospero Stella,²⁵ who dated it before the *Sentences* commentary.²⁶

I have indirect contact with Hervaeus through three sources. The first was an excerpt from Petrus Aureoli's (1280?–1322) *Sentences* commentary, edited in 1994 by Dominik Perler, in which Aureoli criticized Hervaeus's intentionality doctrine.²⁷ Second was Burkhard Mojsisch's edition in 2000 of a *Treatise on Intentions* by Hervaeus's 14th century Dominican follower, Francisco de Prato (fl. ca. 1350).²⁸ Third is a similar treatise by another Dominican, Stephanus de Reate (fl. ca. 1350), a contemporary of Prato, which was edited by Julius Domański in 1967.²⁹

V

In the first Article of the first Question of his *Treatise on Second Intentions*, Hervaeus distinguished volitional from intellectual intentions. In both instances there is a first tending toward an object,³⁰ or more exactly

²³ Cf. F. Pelster, "Eine Münchener Handschrift des beginnenden vierzehnten Jahrhunderts mit einem Verzeichnis von Quästionen des Duns Scotus und Hervaeus Natalis", *Franziskanische Studien* 17 (1930), pp. 253–272.

²⁴ Cf. L. Hödl, "Die Quodlibeta Minora des Hervaeus Natalis (+1323)", *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 6 (1955), pp. 215–229, esp. pp. 216–217.

²⁵ See note 11, above.

²⁶ Cf. Stella, "La prima critica...", p. 135.

²⁷ See note 13, above. For further comment on Hervaeus in this context, see D. Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Frankfurt am Main 2002, esp. Teil IV, pp. 253–317.

²⁸ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 5 (2000), pp. 148–174. For Prato's wider logic, cf. *Francisco de Prato, Logica*, ed. C. Rode, Stuttgart 2002.

²⁹ Cf. "Stephani de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, e codice Wratislaviensi Bibl. Univ. IV Q 4 edidit Iulius Domański", *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 12 (1967), pp. 67–106.

³⁰ "Sciendum igitur quod *intentio* pertinet tam ad voluntatem quam ad intellectum. Et quia videtur quod *intentio* importet tendentiam in quoddam alterum inde est quod *intentio* tam voluntati tendenti in suum objectum quam etiam intellectui respectu sui objecti convenit" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.ii v).

toward a thing *in rerum natura*.³¹ But in this *Treatise* his concern is with intellectual intentions, which he immediately distinguishes as either on the side of the knower or of the thing which is known. On the side of the knower he includes the *species intelligibilis*, the act of the intellect itself, the concept (in the sense of what would be called the formal concept), the likeness, the exemplar in the mind, or the *verbum* as this is representative of something.³² On the side of the known he includes whatever is understood, just as the intellect tends to it as something known by an act of understanding.³³ Said in this way, an intention as taken “formally and abstractly” is nothing else but the terminus of that tendency or itself a (reverse) tendency which is a kind of relation of a thing understood to an act of understanding. But taken “concretely or materially” it is that which is understood, whatever that may be.³⁴

Here we note a distinction of intentions as first or second. Hervaeus says that these are distinguished inasmuch as intelligible items fall into two classes (*duplex genus*).³⁵ One class embraces whatever really, that is, apart from any mental operation, belongs or does not belong, affirmatively or privatively, to things in themselves. Examples include, “being a man” (or “not being a man”), “being (or not being) an ox”, “being (or not being) a stone”, “being (or not being) white”, or “black”, or ‘blind’, or “deaf”.³⁶ There is also room in this class for fictions like

³¹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, “La prima critica...”, p. 164; *ibid.*, p. 166.

³² “*Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte intelligentis, omne illud, scilicet, quod per modum repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive illud sit species intelligibilis, sive sit actus intelligendi, sive conceptus mentis quando format perfectum conceptum de re*” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r). Also, cf.: Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 11vb; *ibid.*, f. 12ra; *ibid.*, q. 1, art. 4, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 12rb; and Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 147.

³³ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r.

³⁴ “*Et intentio sic dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicitur terminum tantum ipsius tendentiae, sive ipsammet tendentiam quae est quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi. In concreto autem et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur quicquid sit illud*” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r).

³⁵ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.v r.

³⁶ Cf.: “*Nam quaedam sunt quae conveniunt rebus intelligibilibus non ex operatione intellectus speculativi, scilicet, prout sunt objective in ipso intellectu. Immo, circumscripto tali esse objectifo modo quo infra exponetur, conveniunt rebus, sive affirmative ut homo, bos, album, nigrum, et similia, sive privative ut caecum, surdum, et similia, et ista pertinent ad primam intentionem materialiter captam. Quia prima intentio concreat et materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur*” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r); “...unum dicit hoc quod convenit

golden mountains, chimerae, or goatstags,³⁷ which while they cannot exist outside the mind are conceived to be made up of parts which can so exist. In that they are not mind-dependent and being a fiction is something which belongs to them only accidentally.³⁸ This is something which Aureoli disputes. For him there are no first intentions of what he would call “prohibited beings” (*entia prohibita*).³⁹ The reason is that these involve an intrinsic contradiction and to that extent they are inconceivable.⁴⁰

To this I will return. But first, let me say that for Hervaeus the second class of intelligible items is composed of beings of reason⁴¹ and includes everything that belongs either affirmatively or negatively to things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect. Examples would be “(being or not being) universal” or “(being or not being) abstract” and the like,⁴² which would include “being a fiction” formally as such.⁴³ This second class of intelligibles will include “intentionality itself” (which by my tally is explicitly mentioned 235 times in the *Treatise*) whether

rebus circumscripta operatione intellectus sicut *hominem esse vel lapidem*; et sic de consimilibus sive affirmative sive negative” (*ibid.*, f. b.v r). On this cf. Stephanus de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, ed. Domański, p. 82.

³⁷ “...dico quod hyrcocervus, chimera, et talia consimilia pertinent ad primam intentionem” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 5, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vii r).

³⁸ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 4, in contrarium, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vi v; *ibid.*, resp., f. b.vii r. For the same doctrine, cf. Stephanus de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, ed. Domański, pp. 83–84.

³⁹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 23, n. 45, ed. Perler, “Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality”, p. 255.

⁴⁰ “Illud enim quod contradictionem implicat inconceptibile est. Entia vero prohibita contradictionem implicant...” (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 23, n. 44, ed. Perler, p. 255).

⁴¹ On Hervaeus’s doctrine on beings of reason compared with that of William of Ockham, see C. Rode, “Sein oder Nichtsein, Hervaeus Natalis und Wilhelm von Ockham über das Ens Rationis”, in *Umbrüche. Historische Wendepunkte der Philosophie von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*, ed. K. Kahnert – B. Mojsisch, Amsterdam – Philadelphia 2001, pp. 77–97. For a partial list of such beings of reason, cf. Stephanus de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, ed. Domański, p. 88.

⁴² “Aliud est genus intelligibilium quod dicit esse rationis et est omne illud quod convenit rebus prout sunt objective in intellectu, sicut *universale, abstractum*, et similia, sive affirmative sive negative accipiuntur” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.i r; *ibid.*, q. 1, art. 5, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vi v–b.vii r).

⁴³ Cf. “Ideo licet esse figmentum, formaliter loquendo, dicat illud quod pertinet ad secundam intentionem...” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 5, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vii r).

such intentionality attaches to first or to second intentions.⁴⁴ Diverging from real beings, things that exist only objectively in the intellect have no more than intentional being.⁴⁵ In every instance, the essential note of intentional being on the side of a thing known (or knowable) is its relation to the intellect.⁴⁶

Again I emphasize the distinction on the side of a thing known between the intentional taken materially or concretely and the intentional taken abstractly and formally. Taken formally and abstractly, it is *a relation of the thing known to the act of understanding*, whose constitutive tendency that thing as known terminates.⁴⁷ Taken materially or concretely, it is *that which is known* or that to which this relation is attributed.⁴⁸ The first is attached to items in either the first or second class of intelligibles precisely inasmuch as they terminate an act of the intellect and are in that related to that act.⁴⁹ The second is once more common to either first or second class intelligibles inasmuch as both may be known or knowable.⁵⁰

VI

Getting back to "intentionality" itself, let me underscore Hervaeus again and again telling us that it is *a relation from an object known or knowable to the intellect, or more precisely the intellect's act of under-*

⁴⁴ "Secunda vero intentio materialiter dicitur secundum genus intelligibilium, scilicet, illud quod dicit ens rationis quod, scilicet, consequitur rem prout est obiective in intellectu, scilicet, *universale et particulare*, et etiam *ipsa intentionalitas*, sive prima sive secunda, quia utraque dicit ens rationis" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 4 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.v r).

⁴⁵ Cf. "...universalia non habent esse in re extra sed solum esse in anima—quod est esse intentionale" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.iii r). While this is part of an argument for a position which Hervaeus rejects, he would have no difficulty accepting this division and identification.

⁴⁶ "Ex parte autem rei intellectae habitudo ad intellectum dicit esse intentionale essentialiter..." (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii v).

⁴⁷ "Et sic dicit ipsam habitudinem rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi prout terminat tendentiam intellectus ad rem intellectam quae tendentia non est aliud quam actus intelligendi" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iiii v).

⁴⁸ "Prout vero accipitur in concreto est illud quod intelligitur cui talis habitudo attribuitur" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iiii r).

⁴⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 4 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.v r.

⁵⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.viii v.

standing.⁵¹ This relation is a being of reason.⁵² It subsequently becomes itself known⁵³ when the intellect reflects upon its own act and the

⁵¹ Cf. e.g.: "Relinquitur ergo quod sit habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum vel actum intelligendi, quae est relatio secundum rationem tantum et dicit tantum ens secundum rationem" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.viii r); "Sed *intentio in abstracto accepta*, ipsa scilicet intentionalitas, dicit habitudinem rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi ut ipsum terminat..." (*ibid.*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.viii v); "...dicendum est quod intentionalitas quam importat prima vel secunda intentio ultra rem intellectam non est tendentia intellectus qui [sic] est actus intelligendi. Sed est habitudo ipsius rei intellectae ad ipsam tendentiam prout scilicet terminat ipsum, ut dictum est" (*ibid.*, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.ii v); "...sic est quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, sicut saepe dictum est, sive sit in prima intentione sive in secunda" (*ibid.*, q. 1, art. 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.iv); "...intentio tam prima quam secunda in abstracto accepta est ipsa habitudo praedicta rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi..." (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.i v); "Si ergo capiatur intentio *in abstracto*, ipsa, scilicet, intentionalitas, secundum quam aliquid dicitur concreate, intentio prima vel secunda, sit habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum" (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 6, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. d.viii r); "...intentionalitas in abstracto accepta quantum ad hoc quod est esse intentionem importat formaliter relationem praedictam rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi tam in prima quam in secunda intentione, ut saepe dictum est..." (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.iii r); "...ipsa intentionalitas quae est relatio rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi..." (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.vii r); "Nam intentionalitas abstracte accepta, secundum quam omne quod intelligitur denominatur prima intentio vel secunda, est habitudo ipsius rei intellectae ad ipsum intellectum, scilicet, prout terminat tendentiam actus intelligendi" (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 5, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. d.vi v); "...intentionalitas qua dicitur aliquid prima et secunda intentio est habitudo praedicta rei intellectae ad intellectum et nullum aliud" (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 6, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.i r); "...intentionalitas secundum quam convenit alicui quod sit prima vel secunda intentio est ipsa habitudo obiecti intellecti ad actum intelligendi" (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 1, contra [4], ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.iii r); "...intentionalitas est relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum actu intelligentem. Et hoc est verum de omni intentionalitate abstracta, ut frequenter dictum est" (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.iii v); "...intentionalitas quae est relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum actu intelligentem..." (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.iii v); "...quae quidem intentionalitas est relatio obiecti intellecti ad intellectum actu intelligentem sive actum intelligendi..." (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.v r); "*In abstracto*, scilicet, ipsa intentionalitas secundum quem [sic] aliquid dicitur intentio prima vel secunda est habitudo obiecti cogniti ad intellectum actu cognoscentem, prout terminat actum intelligendi" (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.iii r); "...ista intentionalitas, sive habitudo obiecti ad intellectum, nihil aliud est quam esse in intellectu obiective et esse terminum operationis intellectus" (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 4, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. f.vi v); "...cum sit habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum actu intelligentem..." (*ibid.*, q. 3, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e. vii v).

⁵² "...omnis intentionalitas in abstracto accepta, sive sit prima sive sit secunda, est ens rationis, cum dicat habitudinem obiecti intellecti ad intellectum actu intelligentem" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. f.i r); "...relatio rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, quae est relatio rationis..." (*ibid.*, q. 2, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.vii r).

⁵³ This order in which beings of reason will be presupposed to the activity of the reason was attacked by Aureoli; cf. e.g.: "Praeterea, prius est rem concipi quam rem

relations between that and some subject or object.⁵⁴ In the course of the *Treatise*, intentionality is identified with a number of things. These include: the relation of the object to the act of understanding, but also objective being,⁵⁵ intention in the abstract,⁵⁶ being a terminus of the act,⁵⁷ the (opposite) tending (of the object to the act),⁵⁸ or even the very termination as such of the act.⁵⁹ These identifications were clearly seen by Francisco de Prato⁶⁰ and Stephanus de Reate.⁶¹

VII

Hervaeus has distinguished other levels of both intentions and intentionality beyond those of first and second as these are tied directly to the mentioned two genera of intelligibles. Thus, intentionality itself, whether of a first or a second intention, may in the reflections of the intellect become a concrete second intention to which a new degree of intentionality attaches.⁶² Again, we may have relations of second intentionality among or between things as they are understood: for example,

conceptam ad intellectum referri" (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, n. 33, ed. Perler, p. 251).

⁵⁴ "Nam relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum non est illud quod intelligitur nisi quando intellectus reflectitur super actum suum et super habitudines quae sunt inter actum et subjectum" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, ad 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.v r). For Hervaeus equating "subject" and "object", cf.: "Sed scientiae reales dicuntur scientiae reales quia sunt de ente reali ut de primo et per se obiecto sive subiecto" (*ibid.*, q. 5, art. 1, ob. 1 in contrarium, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.ii v; *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.iv v; and *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 2 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.iii v).

⁵⁵ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.vii v–e.viii r.

⁵⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 4 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.v r.

⁵⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 4, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. f.vi v; also cf. *ibid.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r.

⁵⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r.

⁵⁹ Cf.: "Quia intentio talis sic dicta, ut supra dictum est, non est aliud nisi ipsa formalis terminatio secundum quem obiectum cognitum dicitur terminare actum intelligendi, quae secundum rationem intelligendi accipitur ut quidam actus tendens in obiectum" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 6, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.i v; also *ibid.*, f. e.ii v).

⁶⁰ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione*, I (4), ed. Mojsisch, p. 156.

⁶¹ Cf. Stephanus de Reate, *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, ed. Domański, p. 86; *ibid.*, p. 89.

⁶² Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 6, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.i r; *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 3, ad 1 in oppositum, f. f.iii rv.

among or between *universal* and *particular* objects or between *predicates* and *subjects*.⁶³ This will involve related levels of beings of reason stemming from both simple apprehensions and judgments.⁶⁴ It should allow the same as regards inferences or demonstrations. This will permit us to isolate the subject matter of a science—Aristotle's subject *genos*⁶⁵ or the Scholastic *scibile*, which in the opinion of Hervaeus deserves itself to have a large treatise devoted to it.⁶⁶ Related levels here will also permit a science such as logic whose prime and proper (*primo et per se*) subject matter is second intentions.⁶⁷ At the same time, in different ways some second intentions might seem to be treated by grammar or rhetoric.⁶⁸ However, neither discipline will treat them as its first and proper subject matter.⁶⁹ Instead, the proper subject matter of grammar will be significative words (*voces significativae*)⁷⁰ while that of rhetoric, about which Hervaeus admits he has not thought much, will be things

⁶³ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 4 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.v r; also *ibid.*, q. 2, art. 6, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.i r.

⁶⁴ Cf.: "...sequuntur alia entia rationis, sive dicant privationem sicut hoc quod dico *abstractum*, sive dicant habitudinem unius intelligibilis ad aliud intelligibile prout est obiective in intellectu, sicut hoc quod dico superius et inferius, *praedicatum* et *subiectum* et similia, quae sequuntur rem correspondentem apprehensioni simplici, et postea sequuntur intentiones quae consequuntur intellectum componentem et dividendem" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.vii v; *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 3, ad 1 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. f.iii r).

⁶⁵ Cf. Arist., *Anal. Post.*, I, 7, 75a42–75b1; I, 9, 76a12.

⁶⁶ "Utrum autem sint tot scientiae necessariae quot sunt species rerum scibilium aut ita sint quod una scientia possit tractare de aliquo communi et omnibus contentis sub eo, tam quantum ad communia omnibus vel contentis sub communi, tam quantum ad propria singulorum, ad praesens non definio, quia requirent valde longum tractatum. Sed de hoc forte alias tractabitur" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.viii vab; *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 1, ad 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.v rb); while in this last place Hervaeus is talking about the relation of knowing to known, his remark would apply equally to the opposite relation; also, cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 5; *ibid.*, q. 6, ed. Parisiis 1647, pp. 14–17; *ibid.*, q. 7, ed. Parisiis 1647, pp. 17–20, in which last place the word *scibile* is not used but the doctrine is plain.

⁶⁷ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.ii ra; *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.vii vb.

⁶⁸ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.iii ra.

⁶⁹ "...non videtur quod grammatica habeat pro primo et per se subiecto ens rationis [...]. Similiter et rhetorica, inquantum mihi nunc apparet, non est de ente rationis ut de primo et per se subiecto" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.i rb).

⁷⁰ "...grammatica non est de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et per se subiecto, quia grammatica est de vocibus significativis quae sunt oratio vel partes orationis" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.i va; *ibid.*, f. m.iii rab). For Aureoli's opposition here, cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, n. 53, ed. Perler, p. 258.

with regard to which persuasion can or will be used.⁷¹ In both instances, there will be second intentional considerations but as such these will be properly matter for logic⁷² rather than for grammar or for rhetoric.⁷³ In a similar way, considerations of second intentions, precisely as they are compared with real beings, will especially belong to metaphysics, whose proper subject matter is real being.⁷⁴

Before leaving the question of science and without meaning to do posthumously for Hervaeus what he did not do himself in life, let me say two things. First, as Hervaeus saw it science was a habit of conclusions⁷⁵ or propositions⁷⁶ which were signs of judgments.⁷⁷ It was in fact a concatenation (*connexio*) of conclusions or of propositions whose objectivity (i.e. *esse objectivum*) lay in the relation of the known to acts of knowing and whose truth was established at the term of demonstrations.⁷⁸ Immediately flowing from this is the fact that, for Hervaeus, science as such proceeds at the level of the *esse in veritate propositionis*.⁷⁹ While such a doctrine is in the writing of Hervaeus's great Order-brother, St.

⁷¹ "...rhetorica non habet pro primo et per se subiecto ipsum modum persuadendi sive probabiliter inferendi, sed res in quarum consideratione talis modus natus est inveniri. Et haec dicta sint discurrendo, et absque assertione, quia parum de his cogitavi" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.i va). Aureoli has obviously thought more about this subject and has rejected Hervaeus's opinion on it; cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, nn. 54–59, ed. Perler, pp. 258–260, esp. n. 54, ed. Perler, p. 258.

⁷² "...proprium est logicae tractare de secundis intentionibus adductis primis" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.iii va).

⁷³ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.i va; *ibid.*, f. n.i rb.

⁷⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.v ab; *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4, ad 3, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.vii vb–n.viii ra. On this, see Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, nn. 62 and 64, ed. Perler, pp. 261–262.

⁷⁵ "...scientia est habitus quo prompte et faciliter potest homo, ex eis quae statim sunt per se nota intellectui, conclusiones consequenter se habentes elicere" (Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 146).

⁷⁶ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 7, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 19.

⁷⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 106.

⁷⁸ For some of this, cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 145; Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.iii ra; *ibid.*, f. k.iii vb; *ibid.* f. k.v rb; and *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. n.vii va.

⁷⁹ Cf.: "Sed verum quod scientia requirit esse quod dicit veritatem propositionis in omnibus quae scientiae subsunt, quia vel non est scientia, vel si est oportet omnino esse verum quod scientia iudicat" (Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 164). Further on truth in a proposition, see Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 20ra. Also, cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 69v; *Quodl.* V, q. 1, art. 1, f. 95va.

Thomas Aquinas,⁸⁰ Hervaeus has the merit of making it explicit that *esse in veritate propositionis* is objective being,⁸¹ which means that it is in the intentional relation of the known to the knower.

The second point in this context is that for later Thomists the subject genus of a science was a matter not of things in themselves but rather of things as objects. In this vein, John of St. Thomas (aka John Poinsoot [1589–1644]) could write:

It is certain that the specification of sciences is not taken from the unity or the distinction of an object in its being as a thing but rather in its being as an object. That is to say, it is not from an object considered materially and entitatively in itself, but as it connects with or is proportioned to a certain habit or a faculty. And in line with this, Cajetan has very well advised (in commenting on *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, art. 3) that the nature of an object is one thing in the character or formality of an object (*in ratione seu formalitate obiecti*) and something else in its real being (*in esse rei*), and the species of things are different in their real being from what they are in the being of [being] an object (*in esse obiecti*)....⁸²

⁸⁰ Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2, where he tells us that after proving God's existence we do not know that existence in itself. Rather what we apprehend is a "being of truth" (which is ultimately Aristotle's being as true). That is to say, we know the truth of an existential proposition, which is "God [known and named from his effects] exists". From this and other places we can be sure that such *esse in veritate propositionis* is common to all sorts of propositions, existential and attributive, not just to those about God, but even to those about negations and privations or beings of reason; cf. e.g. Thomas Aq., *In I Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 5; *In II Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3; *De Ente*, c. 1; *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, art. 2; *De Pot.*, 7, art. 1, ad 1; *Summa theol.*, I, q. 48, art. 2, ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 1, art. 1, ad 19; *De Malo*, q. 1, art. 1, ad 20.

⁸¹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 106 and *Quodl.* VII, q. 17, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 144va. On truth for Hervaeus, cf.: "...the proposition expressed by the judgment and the judgment itself are denominated 'true' only by extrinsic denomination insofar as they are the signs or representatives of truth. That which is denominated 'true' intrinsically is the relation of identity or conformity with itself which arises between an intelligible object as it exercises real being outside of the soul and that same intelligible object as it exists *objective* in the soul when it is understood. It is this relation of identity or conformity which is formally truth and is signified by the copula in the proposition. Truth accordingly is not an instance of real being, not a real relation between the mind and an extramental entity. Truth is a relation of reason and therefore an instance of being of reason. It is an instance of that kind of second intention which affects an intelligible object insofar as it is the term of an act of the second operation of the mind" (Tavuzzi, "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic...", p. 137). For 15th and 16th century Thomistic reactions to Hervaeus on truth and intentionality, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137–152.

⁸² "Denique certum est specificationem hanc scientiarum non sumi ex unitate vel distinctione obiecti in esse rei, sed in esse obiecti, id est non ab obiecto considerato materialiter et entitative in se, sed ut conducit vel proportionatur tali habitui vel potentiae. Ideoque optime monuit Caietanus 1. p. q. 1. art. 3. aliam esse rationem obiecti in ratione seu formalitate obiecti, aliam in esse rei; et alias esse species rerum in esse rei,

While neither John nor Cajetan has mentioned Hervaeus in this setting, I feel his presence. I also think here that while his disciples here go beyond what St. Thomas himself said, they are not at odds with that.⁸³

VIII

For Hervaeus, again, whether one speaks of a volitional or an intellectual intention, there must be a first tending toward a thing or object.⁸⁴ In this tending, the primary object of the intellect is real being outside the mind.⁸⁵ The initial tending is in the act of understanding which is presupposed to all relations of things to the mind.⁸⁶ Without this act there would be no further intentions or intentionality.⁸⁷ But once more, intentionality as such first arises in a reverse direction inasmuch as things or objects terminate the tendings of the intellect.⁸⁸

Here more precision is in order. Immediately, in a way that equates with a distinction between subjective and objective being,⁸⁹ intention on the part of the one knowing is a real being while on the part of what is known it is, at least in some way, a being of reason. Thus, on the side of the knower, intelligible species and acts of understanding are real beings with their own subjective reality.⁹⁰ As such, they have categorical

alias in esse obiecti . . ." (Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus, Logica* II, q. 27, art. 1, ed. B. Reiser, Torino 1930, vol. 2, p. 818b). For other places in which Poinset has cited this same text and doctrine of Cajetan (aka Thomas de Vio [1468–1534]), cf. *ibid.*: II, q. 21, art. 2, ed. Reiser, pp. 662b–663a; II, q. 21, art. 4, ed. Reiser, p. 678b; and II, q. 22, art. 5, ed. Reiser, p. 715b.

⁸³ On this, see Tavuzzi, "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic . . .", p. 134; and S.M. Gelonch, 'Separatio' y objeto de la metafísica en Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona 2002, pp. 38–62.

⁸⁴ See notes 30 and 31, above.

⁸⁵ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, ad 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.vi v; *ibid.*, q. 4, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. i.i r.

⁸⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.i r.

⁸⁷ Cf.: "Sed bene requiritur actus intelligendi ut fundamentum oppositae relationis, quia relationes cuiuslibet extremi praesupponunt fundamentum alterius extremi. Fundantur igitur istae secundae intentiones super rem intellectam ut habet esse objective in intellectu, quod non posset ei convenire in se [nisi] intelligere poneretur ex parte intelligentis" (Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1 in oppositum, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.i v; *ibid.*, q. 4, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. i.i v).

⁸⁸ See note 51, above.

⁸⁹ On being in the intellect subjectively versus being in the intellect objectively, see Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii v–iiii r.

⁹⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r.

being.⁹¹ As for intention on the side of what is known, taken concretely and materially it is not distinct from real being. For that which is understood, at least at a first level, is at times a real extramental thing such as a man, whiteness, or blackness, and the like.⁹² But again, that which is formally and abstractly implied by a first intention, namely, a relation of something understood to the intellect understanding it, is a being of reason only, that is to say a relation of reason, which is distinct from every real being.⁹³ Also what is formally implied by a second intention, that is, a relation to an act of understanding which is secondarily understood, for example, *universality* or *abstraction*, is only a being of reason, distinct from all real being.⁹⁴

IX

Throughout his treatment of second intentions, Hervaeus has accepted the Aristotelian⁹⁵ doctrine of the non-reciprocal character of the relations between knower and known. The knower is really related to, i.e. dependent upon, the known (or the knowable) but the known is independent of and only rationally related to the knower.⁹⁶ More exactly, the relation of the knower to the known is a real *categorical* relation while, conversely, the relation of the known to the knower is a relation of reason. This has an immediate application to intentions. Intention on the part of the one knowing is a real being—on the part of what is known, taken formally, it is a being of reason.⁹⁷ In accord with this, intentionality as such is a relation of reason or a being of reason.⁹⁸

⁹¹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 4, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.iiii r.

⁹² Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii r.

⁹³ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii rv.

⁹⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii v; *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 163; and *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 20rb.

⁹⁵ Cf. Arist., *Cat.*, 7, 7b23–34; *Metaph.*, V, 15, 1021a30–35.

⁹⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e. vii v; *ibid.*, q. 4, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. g.v v; *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 1, ob. 5, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.ii r. Cf. Thomas Aquinas: “Relatio realis est in scientia et non in scibili” (*In I Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3 and *Summa theol.*, I, q. 13, art. 7).

⁹⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii rv.

⁹⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. a.iii rv; also *ibid.*, q. 2, art. 3, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.vii rv.

X

The main background here is Aristotle's division in *Metaphysics* VI (E) of four members under being "as said in an unqualified way" (*to on to haplôs legomenon*). These were: (1) being by accident (*to on kata symbebêkos*); (2) being as true (*to on hôs alêthes*); (3) being in the categories, and (4) being as potential and actual.⁹⁹ Of these members, being in the categories is being in the most important way (*kyriôs*).¹⁰⁰ Excluded from metaphysical consideration were being by accident and being as true.¹⁰¹ Since potentiality and actuality are found throughout the categories and since actuality is prior to potentiality, the concern of metaphysics was thus focused on actual categorical being.¹⁰²

In line with this, Hervaeus thought of being as a common dividend whose principal parts were being in the categories, which he identified with real being, and being as true, which was the same as being of reason.¹⁰³ Again, intentional being as such is a being of reason.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, it is the first being of reason (which is presupposed by all others).¹⁰⁵ As such, intentionality or intentional being is not located within the Aristotelian categories which are the subject matter of metaphysics. Indeed, it is excluded from the subject matter of metaphysics and is properly treated in logic.¹⁰⁶

But one must admit that this business has never been so straightforward. At least from the time of Simplicius (fl. ca. 529), there was question about the reality of Aristotle's categories.¹⁰⁷ This question, which was known to the Latins from Boethius (ca. 480–524) on,¹⁰⁸ has been

⁹⁹ See Arist., *Metaph.*, VI, 2, 1026a33–b2.

¹⁰⁰ Arist., *Metaph.*, VI, 4, 1027b31.

¹⁰¹ See esp. Arist., *Metaph.*, VI, 4, 1027b34–1028a3; *Metaph.*, XI, 8, 1065a22–24.

¹⁰² On this, cf. T. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache*, Leiden 1987, p. 25.

¹⁰³ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. c.ii r; also *Quodl.* VII, q. 17, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 144 va.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 2, art. 6, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.i v.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.viii v.

¹⁰⁶ On the difference here between metaphysics and logic, cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 2, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. m.ii v.

¹⁰⁷ The question raised by Simplicius was whether the categories are meant to be divisions of simple terms (*haplai phonai*), of simple concepts (*hapla noemata*), or of things themselves (*pragmata, onta*). Cf. Simplicius, *In Categorias*, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Berlin 1907 (CAG VIII), p. 9,8.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. A.M.S. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, I, PL 64, cols. 159C–161A; and Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de*

addressed by Hervaeus¹⁰⁹ and what he has said has importance both for a reply to Aureoli and for intentionality doctrine. On this latter, let me say directly that Hervaeus, unlike Aureoli, does not reduce any of the categories to the intentional order.¹¹⁰ But, it appears to me that his intentionality doctrine does have a big role to play in his understanding of relation, action, passion, time, place, position, and habit.

Start with relation, since that is the main point at which Aureoli attacked Hervaeus's intentionality doctrine.¹¹¹ As I, after Perler, understand him, Aureoli thinks that first and second intentions exist prior to any added relation to the intellect and that, therefore, such an addition is superfluous.¹¹² Perler sees this as a particular instance of Aureoli's basic (nominalistic) denial of the reality of relations.¹¹³ I incline to agree, but then I do have trouble grasping Aureoli's objection. For the relation posited by Hervaeus is not real but rational and, as such, it does not really add to the thing¹¹⁴ which is related to the understanding. But even if it were a real relation, in the sense of a real categorical being, I do not see it adding that much, in view of what Hervaeus thinks a categorical relation is.

For Hervaeus a relation involves two things, one which it directly posits in its subject and a second which is a *terminus ad quem*. For example, the relation of paternity, which is the relation of a father to a son, *directly* posits something, which is the relation itself by which

Guillaume de Moerbeke, prol., ed. A. Pattin, Paris – Louvain 1971 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum V/I), pp. 12–18, as cited by Perler, “Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality”, p. 253, note 9.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 18v–22v.

¹¹⁰ Cf. e.g. his denial that the last seven categories are mere matters of extrinsic denomination, understood as positing no reality: Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 46vb. For Aureoli's different view, see Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, n. 41, ed. Perler, p. 253.

¹¹¹ Consider Perler's summary of Aureoli's position: “In his *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus* Hervaeus Natalis claims that an intention, taken in the strict sense, is not a mental entity but a thing qua cognized thing having ‘objective existence’. Peter Aureol agrees with this thesis, but he denies that one needs to introduce, in addition to this ‘concrete intention’, an ‘abstract intention’ (a relation holding between the cognized object and the intellect)...” (Perler, “Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality”, p. 227).

¹¹² Cf. Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität...*, pp. 300–301.

¹¹³ Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität...*, p. 301. For Aureoli on relation, see M. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford 1989, pp. 150–73.

¹¹⁴ For the general doctrine here, cf. e.g.: “Et istud ens rationis non ponit aliquam entitatem realem in eo de quo dicitur” (Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* VII, q. 17, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 144va).

the father who is the subject of this relation is in fact related—plus *indirectly* it posits a son as the *terminus* of the relation. Both facets are included in the rationale of a relation.¹¹⁵ The inclusion of the first seems evident¹¹⁶ and Hervaeus tells us that in this facet there is no real distinction between a relation and its foundation.¹¹⁷ There is just one reality which presents two aspects, or as Hervaeus would put it—one reality which is twofold as it is in the gaze of the intellect (*in prospectu intellectus*),¹¹⁸ or as it can be conceived this way, in itself, and that way, as toward another.¹¹⁹ For instance, there is the reality of being white which presents the aspect of whiteness and the aspect of similarity to some other whiteness.¹²⁰ The second aspect is needed inasmuch as without it the relation will not exist.¹²¹ Again, a full relation of similarity posits something directly, which is, say, the whiteness of Plato, as subject of the relation, plus something indirectly, which is the whiteness of Socrates, as the term of the relation.¹²² While Hervaeus allows that to verify that Plato is similar to Socrates some reality is needed which is not needed in order to verify that he is white,¹²³ this does not seem to be anything more than the coexistence of the whitenesses of Plato and Socrates and the connotation that one is like the other.¹²⁴ In all of this then a relation is not something other than its foundation except insofar as it implies the coexistence of a *terminus ad quem*.¹²⁵

¹¹⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21rb; also: *Tract. de relationibus*, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 61ra.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* IV, q. 4, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 90vb.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21vb; *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. e.v rb.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 68ra; *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, p. 155. Also, cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 229 and *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 255; the two last passages have been quoted by K. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345*, Leiden 1988, p. 97, note 36.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21va; *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 47vb.

¹²⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21rb.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*; and *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 47vb.

¹²² Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 19vb.

¹²³ Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21va.

¹²⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21rb; *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 47vab.

¹²⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 21rb.

Perler¹²⁶ has recognized the proximity here between Aureoli and Hervaeus. Much the same was perceived earlier by Suárez who connected Hervaeus and Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio (1456–1527)¹²⁷ with the Nominalists in that they all saw no distinction in reality between a relation and its foundation.¹²⁸ But we should also note that Suárez, relying on John Capreolus (1380–1444), has ascribed to Aureoli a flat denial of the reality of relations.¹²⁹

Not to go deeper into nuances here between Hervaeus and Aureoli, my present aim is to lessen the impact of Aureoli's criticism. Further it is to remark a role for the intellect and objectivity in Hervaeus's understanding of the categories. It is true that he insists on the reality of relation and also of the last six categories beyond relation as they involve real extrinsic denominations.¹³⁰ But it is also true that these categories reveal themselves *in prospectu intellectus*. In other words, while the categories are real their reality seems to be as much in *esse objecti* as in *esse rei*.¹³¹ Furthermore, the very notion itself of a category and any consideration of distinctions among categories as such are second intentional, higher up but along the same line as notions of species and genera.¹³²

More clarification is in order. While extrinsic denomination is central for the constitution of the last six categories, these are not reducible to such a denomination.¹³³ Instead, these categories are real inasmuch as they are based upon the twin realities of a denominating form (e.g. a place or a *locus*) and a denominated subject (e.g. a thing located).¹³⁴ But in their core there is some relation between the extrinsically denominating reality and the denominated subject. More exactly, Hervaeus tells us that the thing denominated (in which the denomination adds no

¹²⁶ Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität...*, p. 301, note 97.

¹²⁷ On Silvestro, cf. M. Tavuzzi, *Prierias. The Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456–1527*, Durham, NC – London 1997. For Silvestro following Hervaeus, especially on his doctrine of relation, see *ibid.*, pp. 95–97.

¹²⁸ Cf. F. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* [= DM] 47, 2, n. 12, in *Opera omnia*, Paris 1856/66, vol. 26, p. 789.

¹²⁹ Suárez, DM 47, 1, n. 8, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 26, p. 784.

¹³⁰ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 22rab; *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 46va.

¹³¹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 68ra.

¹³² Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 18vb; *ibid.*, f. 22vab.

¹³³ Generally see Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, and *Quodl.* II, q. 7.

¹³⁴ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* II, q. 7, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 46ra.

further reality) is related to the extrinsically denominating thing by a relation of reason.¹³⁵

This prompts an addendum. Extrinsic denomination was matter in dispute later on between Suárez and his fellow Jesuit, Gabriel Vázquez (1549–1604). For Suárez an extrinsic denomination was something on the side of *ens reale* rather than of *ens rationis*.¹³⁶ On the other hand, for Vázquez denomination was a matter of naming and naming always entailed understanding.¹³⁷ Therefore, an extrinsic denomination in last analysis was an *ens rationis*. For John of St. Thomas the truth lay between the two positions: an extrinsic denomination was real inasmuch as it required a real denominating thing and a subject denominated. But it did not as such add any reality to the subject in which it was. In that subject it was related to the *denominans* by what John explicitly called a relation of reason.¹³⁸ As I then see them, there is little daylight between Hervaeus's position now and that of John of St. Thomas later.

XI

At this point let me return to golden mountains, chimerae, and goat-stags, for all of which Hervaeus allows first intentions.¹³⁹ The fact that he has lumped these three examples together is to some degree instructive. In his 54th *Metaphysical Disputation* Suárez will later distinguish a golden mountain as possible from chimerae and goatstags, which will be impossible inasmuch as their parts would be mutually contradictory.¹⁴⁰ A golden mountain would thus be classified as a real being while the others, having only objective reality (*esse objectivum tantum*) in the intellect, would be pure beings of reason.¹⁴¹

Debate about such objects and about Hervaeus's estimate of them was a fact in his own lifetime. To attest to this, I would point to Aureoli's

¹³⁵ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* I, q. 9, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 22va.

¹³⁶ On this, see my article: "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez, S.J.," *Vivarium* 22 (1984), pp. 121–160.

¹³⁷ Cf. G. Vázquez, *Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Sancti Thomae*, disp. 115, cap. 2, n. 2, ed. Lugduni 1631, vol. 2, p. 32.

¹³⁸ Cf. Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, *Logica* II, q. 2, art. 1, ed. Reiser, vol. 1, p. 289.

¹³⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 5, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vii r–b.viii r.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Suárez, *DM* 54, 2, n. 18, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 26, p. 1023. Also see *DM* 8, 4, n. 7, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 25, p. 291.

¹⁴¹ On this, see J.P. Doyle, "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (2)," *Vivarium* 26 (1988), pp. 51–72, esp. p. 52, notes 171 and 172.

criticism in the text edited by Perler.¹⁴² But as I have written elsewhere, controversy over impossible objects continued through the 17th century, especially among Jesuits after Suárez.¹⁴³ Those who denied such objects reduced them to a complexus of parts, each itself possible but together impossible. Those who affirmed impossible objects saw them as themselves intelligible with a dimension of objective being beyond all possibility, and in that beyond real being. This then made them pure beings of reason. It also prompted some to go beyond the transcendental concept of being which was the object of metaphysics to a supertranscendental notion of being wide enough to embrace both possible and impossible beings.¹⁴⁴ While, except for the logic of Bartolomeo Amico, S.J. (ca. 1562–1649),¹⁴⁵ I have found few references to Hervaeus in the 17th century treatises on beings of reason that I have explored (none in Suárez's 54th Disputation), I am certain that, whatever about Aureoli's criticism, Hervaeus would have been a foe of impossible objects in the sense that I am speaking of them now.¹⁴⁶

At times he did toy with a common notion of being which was unified enough and wide enough to bridge the gap between real being and beings of reason.¹⁴⁷ On at least one occasion, he allowed that such a notion could have properties (*passiones*), such as *identity* or *diversity*, that might be found in both of its main members.¹⁴⁸ This would seem consistent with his reduction of chimerae and goatstags to their possible parts. Paradoxically, however, in his *Treatise on Second Intentions*,

¹⁴² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 23, ed. Perler, pp. 255–257.

¹⁴³ Cf. esp. J.P. Doyle, "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions. A Seventeenth Century Debate About Impossible Objects", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48 (1995), pp. 771–808.

¹⁴⁴ On this, see J.P. Doyle, "Supertranscendental Being. On the Verge of Modern Philosophy", in *Meeting of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern Philosophy*, ed. S.F. Brown, Turnhout 1998, pp. 297–315.

¹⁴⁵ Bartolomeo Amico, S.J., *In universam Aristotelis Philosophia notae ac disputationes quibus illustrium scholarum Averrois, D. Thomae, Scoti, et Nominalium sententiae expendantur, earumque tuendarum probabiores modi afferuntur*, In *Logicam Aristotelis*, Neapoli: Apud Lazarum Scorigium, 1623.

¹⁴⁶ He will allow that such objects have a *quid nominis* insofar as we can speak of them. But this is not the same as to conceive them as having, precisely inasmuch as they involve contradiction, either an *esse in rerum natura* or an *esse objectivum*. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 1, art. 5, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. b.vii vb–b.viii ra.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. note 103, above; also: Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, ob. 2 in contrarium, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. k.iii r.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. de relationibus*, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 54vb.

he has denied such properties, and therefore any common *scibile* or *scientia* between real beings and beings of reason.¹⁴⁹

I find this paradox interesting in view of later debate. Immediately, let me say that among 17th century Jesuits I have to date found only two, the mentioned Amico and his Polish contemporary Martin Smiglecki (1562–1618) who display any understanding of the known to knower direction of intentionality in Hervaeus.¹⁵⁰ Neither of them has pursued it in depth. But I have found a difference of opinion, without reference to Hervaeus, about properties of supertranscendental being.

Outstanding on one side is Silvestro Mauro (1619–1687) who has explicitly spoken of properties such as supertranscendental goodness¹⁵¹ and supertranscendental truth.¹⁵² On the other side is Mauro's onetime pupil, André Semery (1630–1717), who has flat out denied any possibility of supertranscendental properties and on that score has precluded any science of supertranscendental being.¹⁵³ Setting the stage earlier was Suárez who, without reference to supertranscendental being as such, denied that properties such as identity could be found on both sides of the border between real beings and beings of reason.¹⁵⁴ For Suárez they were in fact beings of reason only.¹⁵⁵ Staying with identity and its counterpart diversity, since these were properties mentioned by Hervaeus, let me record it simply that in 1697 Maximilien Wietrowski (1660–1737) defines these not in terms of extramental reality, such as the mind-independent fact that some thing is the same as itself, but instead says that identity is the direct and truthful *affirmability* of one

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 5, art. 1, resp., ed. Parisiis 1489, f. l.ii rv.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Amico presenting his own thoughts and some of his dependence on Hervaeus: Bartolomeo Amico, S.J., *In universam Aristotelis Philosophia [...]* In *Logicam Aristotelis*, tract. 3, q. 1, art. 2, dub. 1, vol. 1, p. 91aA; *ibid.*, 91aD; *ibid.*, 91bB; *ibid.*, 92aCD; and Smiglecki: *Logica Martini Smigleckii Societatis Jesu...*, Oxoniae: Excudebat Guil. Turner pro Hen. Crips., Edw. Forest, Hen. Curteyne, et Joh. Wilmot, 1638, disp. 1, q. 5, vol. 1, p. 19.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Silvester Mauro, *Opus theologicum in tres tomos distributum*, lib. 2, q. 58, Romae: Typis et Sumptibus Nicolai Angeli Tinassii 1687, vol. 1, p. 186, nn. 33–34; *ibid.*, p. 187, nn. 41–46.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 187, nn. 41–43.

¹⁵³ Cf. A. Semery, *Triennium philosophicum* quod P. Andreas Semery Remus e Societate Jesu in Collegio Romano Philosophiae iterum Professor dictabat. Secunda hac editione ab Autore recognitum et auctum. Annus primus, Romae, Sumptibus Felicis Caesaretti sub Signo Reginae 1682, *Logica*, disp. ult., art. 3, vol. 1, pp. 786–7.

¹⁵⁴ Suárez, *DM* 3, 2, n. 14, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25, p. 111.

¹⁵⁵ Cf., e.g., F. Suárez, *DM* 4, 1, n. 7, in *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25, p. 117—where unity and identity are said to differ as real from rational.

thing of another and distinction is the direct and truthful *deniability* of one thing of another.¹⁵⁶ He has gone on to explain that in both cases “the one and the other thing” are not to be taken *in esse rei* but rather *in esse obiectivo*. In confirmation of this he mentions Porphyry plus some of his own fellow Jesuits, including Mauro¹⁵⁷ and Suárez.¹⁵⁸ But I cannot help thinking he may also have had Hervaeus in mind.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ “Identitas est affirmabilitas in recto, vera, unius de alio: distinctio: negabilitas in recto, vera, unius de alio” (M. Wietrowski, *Philosophia disputata, in qua comprehenduntur conclusiones ex universa philosophia Aristotelis*, Pragae: Typis Universitatis Caroli Ferdinandi 1697, *Logica*, concl. 6, p. 95).

¹⁵⁷ Wietrowski, *Philosophia disputata* [...] *Logica*, concl. 6, n. 5, p. 97.

¹⁵⁸ Wietrowski, *Philosophia disputata* [...] *Logica*, concl. 6, n. 7, p. 98.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tract. sec. int.*, q. 3, art. 4, ed. Parisiis 1489, f. h.ii ra: “...sciendum quod identitas secundum quam dicitur quod tales intentiones sunt impossibiles circa idem non est accipienda secundum esse reale extra sed secundum quod res sunt obiective in intellectu; ita quod istae intentiones dicuntur impossibiles circa idem quae sunt impossibiles circa idem obiectum formale tali modo determinato in intellectu. Unde dato quod eadem res sit animal et homo in quorum uno fundatur intentio generis et in alio intentio speciei, tamen quia animal secundum rationem qua est animal et homo secundum rationem qua est homo sunt diversa obiecta intellectus et diversimode intellecta, ideo nos ponimus quod genus et species sint impossibilia circa idem, quia non sunt compossibilia circa idem obiectum formale”. Wietrowski at times cites Hervaeus and even from the *Treatise on Second Intentions*; cf. *Philosophia disputata* [...] *Logica*, concl. 10, c. 1, n. 139, p. 178.

REALITIES AND RELATIONS

DER ONTOLOGISCHE STATUS DER RELATIONEN
NACH DURANDUS VON ST.-POURÇAIN,
HERVAEUS NATALIS UND PETRUS AUREOLI

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Die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status der aristotelischen Kategorien gehört zu den Themen, die in der Philosophie und Theologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts besonders intensiv diskutiert wurden. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Debatten stand dabei vor allem die Kategorie der Relation, da diese nicht nur im Vergleich zu den übrigen neun Kategorien einen besonderen ontologischen Status hatte, sondern vor allem auch deshalb, weil sie eine große Bedeutung für die christliche Theologie bei der Erklärung des Trinitätsdogmas hatte. Welchen ontologischen Status haben die Relationen? Sind sie von unserem Denken abhängig, oder haben sie ein denkunabhängiges, extramentales Sein? Welche Art von extramentalem Sein müsste man ihnen dann zuschreiben? Ferner: Ist eine Relation identisch mit ihren Relata, oder hat sie ein von ihnen unabhängiges Sein? Solche und ähnliche Fragen standen dabei im Mittelpunkt der Debatten.

Den philosophischen Hintergrund für die Erörterung dieser Fragen bildete die aristotelische Lehre von den Relationen im siebten Kapitel der Kategorienschrift und in Buch V, Kap. 15 der *Metaphysik*. Nach dem substanzontologischen Ansatz des Aristoteles und der mittelalterlichen Aristoteliker ist eine Relation wesentlich durch zwei Aspekte charakterisiert: Zunächst gehört sie zu den neun akzidentellen Kategorien, das heißt, sie inhäriert in einem Subjekt, ihr Sein ist ein *esse-in*. Ferner gehört zu einer Relation ein Bezug, eine Hinsicht auf etwas anderes, auf das sie bezogen ist, sie ist also charakterisiert durch ein *esse-ad*. Diese beiden Aspekte des *esse-in* und des *esse-ad* bildeten die Grundlage für das mittelalterliche Verständnis der Relationen, und besonders der Aspekt der Bezogenheit auf etwas anderes verleiht ihr eine besondere Stellung unter den Kategorien und wirft unvermeidlich die Frage nach ihrem ontologischen Status auf.¹

¹ Zur mittelalterlichen Theorie der Relationen und ihrem aristotelischen Hintergrund vgl. M. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford 1989; R. Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines*

Die besondere Bedeutung der Relation resultierte vor allem aus ihrer Relevanz für den theologischen Diskurs. Augustinus hatte den Relationsbegriff in die Trinitätslehre eingeführt, um das Verhältnis der drei Personen in Gott zu beschreiben. Der Gebrauch des Relationsbegriffs bot dabei die Möglichkeit, an der Existenz dreier real verschiedener Personen in Gott festzuhalten und gleichzeitig die Einheit des göttlichen Wesens zu bewahren, d.h. die Vereinbarkeit von absoluter Einfachheit und Einheit einerseits und von Vielheit andererseits in Gott zu erklären, wie es Boethius dann knapp und elegant formuliert hat: "Ita substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem".² Dieses auf dem Relationsbegriff basierende Modell stellte einen von drei Ansätzen dar, die sich in den trinitarischen Diskussionen seit dem 13. Jahrhundert herausgebildet hatten.³ Er wird vor allem von Thomas von Aquin und den Dominikanern aufgegriffen. In diesem Zusammenhang ergeben sich die schwierigen Fragen nach dem genauen Status der trinitarischen Relationen in Gott: Wie verhalten sich die innergöttlichen Relation zum göttlichen Wesen? Welchen ontologischen Status haben diese Relationen in Gott einerseits und die Relationen zwischen Gott und seinen

Denkens und der Scholastik, Leiden – New York – Köln 1994; B. Mojsisch, "Relation. II. Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance", in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 8, Basel 1992, Sp. 586–595; sowie J. Brower, "Medieval Theories of Relation", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition)*, ed. E.N. Zalta (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/relations-medieval/>).

² Boethius, *Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus et non tres Dii (De Trinitate)*, c. 6, in Boethius. *The Theological Tractates*, ed. H.F. Steward – E.K. Rand – S.J. Tester, Cambridge, MA 1973, pp. 28–30.

³ Zu den beiden anderen Modellen zur Erklärung der Trinität gehörte einmal das von Richard von St. Viktor eingeführte, von Alexander von Hales und Bonaventura aufgegriffene und besonders von den Franziskanern und auch von Petrus Aureoli bevorzugte Emanationsmodell, bei dem der Begriff des Hervorganges, der Emanation, im Mittelpunkt steht und die Konstitution der göttlichen Personen durch ihre Ursprünge, d.h. durch ihren Hervorgang aus dem Vater mittels Zeugung und Hauchung erklärt wird. Daneben kursierte noch das auf Augustinus' Theorie des Wortes zurückgehende psychologische Modell. Vgl. dazu R.L. Friedmann, "Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology. Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325", *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999), pp. 13–25. Zur Bedeutung des Relationsbegriffs für die trinitarischen Debatten im frühen 14. Jahrhundert vgl. M. Schmaus, *Der 'Liber propugnatorius' des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II. Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen*, 2 Bde., Münster 1930 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXIX, 1–2); B. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 1967 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XLII, 1), pp. 351–492; sowie H.G. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity. A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335*, PhD Diss., University of Wisconsin 1974.

Geschöpfen andererseits? Sind dies reale Relationen, oder handelt es sich hier lediglich um Beziehungen, die sich allein der Tätigkeit des menschlichen Intellekts verdanken und die somit nur Gedankendinge (*entia rationis*) sind?

Im folgenden soll die Diskussion um dem ontologischen Status der Relationen bei drei wichtigen Denkern in den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten des 14. Jahrhunderts untersucht werden: bei Durandus von St.-Pourçain, bei Hervaeus Natalis und bei Petrus Aureoli. Dabei wird zunächst die Auseinandersetzung über den Status der Relationen dargestellt, in welche die beiden Dominikaner Durandus von St.-Pourçain und Hervaeus Natalis verwickelt waren, wobei der Schwerpunkt der Darstellung auf Durandus' Relationslehre gelegt werden soll und die Position des Hervaeus nur im Hinblick auf seine Kritik an Durandus betrachtet wird. In einem zweiten Teil soll dann die Relationslehre des Petrus Aureoli, der sowohl Durandus' als auch Hervaeus' Auffassung kritisiert, in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt werden.

I. DIE AUSEINANDERSETZUNG ZWISCHEN DURANDUS UND HERVAEUS ÜBER DEN ONTOLOGISCHEN STATUS DER RELATIONEN

Durandus von St.-Pourçain, der "doctor modernus", gilt als einer der Wegbereiter des Nominalismus des 14. Jahrhunderts, während Hervaeus Natalis als der führende Vertreter des Thomismus zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts die Lehre des Thomas in einer Reihe von Auseinandersetzungen u.a. mit Duns Scotus, Heinrich von Gent, Durandus und Petrus Aureoli entschieden verteidigt hat. Einer seiner Dispute mit Durandus, der sich über einen Zeitraum von mehr als zehn Jahren erstreckte und eine Vielzahl von Texten hervorbrachte, betrifft den ontologischen Status der Relationen.⁴ In seiner monumentalen und bis heute immer noch grundlegenden literargeschichtlichen Studie zu Durandus hat Joseph Koch eine umfassende Übersicht über alle in diesem Zusammenhang

⁴ Vgl. dazu E. Lowe, *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain*, New York – London 2003, pp. 87–96 zur Kontroverse über die Relationen, sowie die materialreiche und detaillierte Untersuchung von I. Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas*, Oxford 2005, die auch ausführlich auf das Problem der Relationen und die Entwicklung der Lehrmeinungen des Durandus dazu eingeht.

einschlägigen Texte von Durandus und Hervaeus gegeben.⁵ Hier seien nur die wichtigsten Schriften kurz genannt: Von Durandus haben wir zunächst den Sentenzenkommentar, der in drei Redaktionen vorliegt.⁶ Der Disput mit Hervaeus nimmt seinen Ausgang von der ersten Redaktion von Durandus' Sentenzenkommentar, die auf die Jahre 1307/08 zu datiert ist. Außerdem besitzen wir von Durandus fünf Sammlungen von *Quolibeta*, von denen zwei im Jahre 1312 in Paris entstanden sind, während die anderen drei um 1314 oder kurz danach in Avignon disputiert wurden; letztere liegen seit 1965 in der kritischen Edition von Prospero Stella vor.⁷ Hervaeus' Ansichten zum Status der Relationen können zunächst aus seinem frühen, um 1302/03 und damit noch vor dem Ausbruch der Auseinandersetzung mit Durandus entstandenen Sentenzenkommentar ermittelt werden.⁸ Daneben enthalten seine elf *Quolibeta* diverse einschlägige Quaestiones zum Thema.⁹ Außerdem haben wir Hervaeus' Traktat *De relationibus*, der fünf Fragen zu den göttlichen Relationen umfaßt, sowie eine Quaestio *Utrum in Deo sit relatio realis ad creaturam*, die auch unter dem Titel *De relatione contra Durandum* bekannt ist und seit 1966 ediert vorliegt.¹⁰ Koch vermutete, daß diese Quaestio vor 1314 verfaßt wurde. Schließlich gibt es von Hervaeus noch eine Reihe kleinerer Werke, die das Problem der Relationen behandeln, so vor allem seine *Correctiones*, die er gegen Durandus' erstes Avignonenser *Quolibet* verfaßt hat.¹¹

⁵ J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster 1927 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXVI), pp. 5–187 zu Durandus' Schriften und pp. 211–271 zu den gegen Durandus gerichteten Schriften des Hervaeus.

⁶ Von Koch als [A], [B] und [C] bezeichnet. Die ersten beiden Fassungen sind noch unediert, lediglich die dritte Fassung, [C], liegt als Druck vor. Von der 1571 in Venedig erschienen Ausgabe gibt es einen fotomechanischen Nachdruck aus dem Jahre 1966. Zu Durandus' Lehre von den Relationen in [A] vgl. Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain*, pp. 109–121.

⁷ *Magistri D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano Quolibeta Avenionensia tria*, ed. P.T. Stella, Zürich 1965.

⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *In quattuor libros Sententiarum commentaria*, Parisiis 1647, fotomech. Nachdruck Farnborough 1966.

⁹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Quolibeta*, Venetiis 1513, fotomech. Nachdruck Ridgewood, NJ 1966.

¹⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *De relatione contra Durandum*, ed. T. Takada, Kyoto 1966.

¹¹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Correctiones Hervei Natalis supra dicta Durandi de santo Porciano in primo Quolibet*, ed. P.T. Stella, *Magistri D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano...*, pp. 293–326.

Der Verlauf der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Hervaeus und Durandus über den Status der Relationen stellt sich in den Grundzügen dann folgendermaßen dar:¹² Schon die erste Redaktion seines Sentenzenkommentars brachte Durandus 1309 eine Ermahnung des Generalkapitels der Dominikaner ein, weil er dort u.a. die These vertreten hatte, es gäbe in Gott einen realen Unterschied zwischen den innergöttlichen Relationen und ihrem *fundamentum* (“relatio est alia res a suo fundamento, et tamen non facit compositionem”)—eine häresieverdächtige Ansicht, da sie die Einheit Gottes in Frage stellt. In der zweiten Redaktion seines Sentenzenkommentars, die auf 1310/11 zu datieren ist, hat Durandus die umstrittenen Ansichten entfernt. Aus dem Jahre 1312 haben wir die zwei Sammlungen der Pariser *Quolibeta*, in denen Durandus bereits auf Hervaeus’ Kritik reagiert. Im Juli 1314 veröffentlicht eine Kommission des Dominikanerordens eine Zensur von 91 Sätzen, die aus der ersten Redaktion von Durandus’ Sentenzenkommentar stammen. Durandus reagiert darauf mit der Abfassung einer Verteidigungsschrift, den *Excusationes*, deren Inhalt uns in der Schrift überliefert worden ist, die Hervaeus zu ihrer Widerlegung verfaßt hat, den *Reprobationes Hervaei*. Im weiteren Verlauf des Jahre 1314 disputiert Durandus die erste Gruppe seiner Avignonenser *Quolibeta*, nach Koch “ein Widerruf vor der Öffentlichkeit”.¹³ Hervaeus seinerseits reagiert darauf mit seinen *Correctiones*. Schließlich verfaßt Durandus zwischen 1317 und 1327 die dritte Redaktion seines Sentenzenkommentars.

Im folgenden soll zunächst die Relationstheorie des Durandus nach der ersten Quaestio seines ersten Avignonenser *Quolibet* dargestellt werden, die eine klare Darlegung von Durandus’ Ansichten zum Status der Relationen enthält und die er selbst zur Grundlage für die Abfassung der entsprechenden Abschnitte (Buch I, dist. 33) der dritten, letzten Redaktion seines Sentenzenkommentars gemacht hat, wo Durandus den Text der ersten Quaestio des *Quolibet* fast wörtlich, allerdings mit einigen Hinzufügungen, wiederholt.¹⁴

Sind das Wesen Gottes und die Relation auf irgendeine Weise real unterschieden? (“Utrum divina essentia et relatio differant aliquo modo

¹² Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*..., pp. 184–187, 211–236 und 268–271.

¹³ Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*..., p. 121.

¹⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 33, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 88vb–91ra; vgl. Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain*, p. 261.

realiter“) lautet die Frage, die Durandus behandelt.¹⁵ Nachdem er einige Argumente für und einige Argumente gegen die Annahme einer realen Differenz von Wesenheit und Relationen in Gott angeführt hat, unterteilt Durandus das *corpus quaestionis* in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil erklärt er den Unterschied zwischen einer realen und einer gedanklichen Differenz (*differre secundum rationem*); im zweiten Teil trifft er einige wichtige Unterscheidungen, so diejenige zwischen absoluten Akzidentien und Hinsichten (*respectus*); im dritten Teil schließlich gibt Durandus in drei *conclusiones* eine Antwort auf die gestellte Frage.

Zunächst unterscheidet Durandus im ersten Teil des *corpus quaestionis* zwischen einem realen Seienden (*ens reale*) und einem Gedankending (*ens rationis*): real ist ein Seiendes, das ein Sein in der extramentalen Wirklichkeit hat, ohne daß eine Tätigkeit des Intellekts beteiligt ist, während ein Gedankending gänzlich von einer Tätigkeit des Intellekts in der Weise abhängt, daß sein ganzes Sein in einem Erfastsein besteht, wie dies etwa bei den logischen Intentionen der Fall ist.¹⁶ Entsprechend sagen wir dann, daß zwei extramentale Dinge real unterschieden sind, wenn sie gemäß ihrer Natur und unter Absehung von jeglicher Tätigkeit des Intellekts verschieden sind.¹⁷ Ähnlich definiert Durandus dann auch die reale Gleichheit sowie die Gleichheit *secundum rationem*, die dann vorliegt, wenn es sich um gleiche Gedankendinge bzw. um eine Identität der Begriffsinhalte handelt.¹⁸

Im wichtigen zweiten Teil des *corpus quaestionis* trifft Durandus eine Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Bedeutungen von Ding (*res*), die sich für seine Deutung der Relation als grundlegend erweisen wird. Da “Wirklichkeit” oder “Realität” vom Wort “res” abgeleitet ist, können wir

¹⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1; ed. Stella, pp. 45–62. Ich weiche bei Zitaten aus dieser Edition gelegentlich von Stellas Interpunktion ab, ohne dies besonders zu kennzeichnen. Vgl. zu diesem Text auch Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain*, pp. 220–225.

¹⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1; ed. Stella, p. 47,4–10: “Ens autem uno modo accipitur pro ente, quod habet esse in re extra circumscripta omni operatione intellectus; et istud vocatur ens reale. Alio modo dicitur ens illud, quod non habet aliquam entitatem nisi per operationem intellectus; et sic concipitur ita, quod sic concipi est totum suum esse, sicut genus et omnes intentiones logicae; et istud vocatur ens in anima seu ens rationis”.

¹⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 47,11–12: “...illa differunt realiter, quae differunt ex natura rei extra animam existentis circumscripta operatione intellectus...”.

¹⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 47,17–19: “Illa sunt idem ratione, quorum non sunt diversae rationes, seu non sunt diversa entia rationis nec concipiuntur sub diversis rationibus”.

verschiedene Grade realer Identität oder Verschiedenheit unterscheiden, die jeweils den verschiedenen Realitätsgraden entsprechen, die wir in einem Ding vorfinden, denn "res" wird nicht univok, sondern äquivok oder analog gebraucht. Da nun einige *res* absolute Dinge sind, andere reine Hinsichten (*respectus*), so ist nach Durandus auch eine zweifache Bedeutung von "Ding" zu unterscheiden: in erster Linie und schlechthin bezeichnen wir mit "res" ein absolutes Ding wie etwa eine Qualität, eine Quantität oder eine Substanz; in zweiter Linie und in einer gewissen Hinsicht (*secundum quid*) bezeichnet "res" nur eine bestimmte Hinsicht (*respectus*), d.h. etwas, was selbst eigentlich keine *res* und kein *ens reale* ist, was aber zu einer anderen *res* als deren Seinsweise (*modus essendi*) gehört.¹⁹ Beispiele für Dinge in diesem sekundären Sinne sind die Seinsweise des für sich Subsistierens, die Seinsweise des Existierens in einem anderen oder der Seinsmodus des Berührens von etwas anderem. Das Sein dieser Art von Dingen besteht ausschließlich darin, daß sie die Seinsweise einer anderen *res* sind, und ihr ganzer Wesensbegriff (*conceptus essentialis*) liegt in diesem *esse alterius*.

Durandus wendet diese Unterscheidung dann auf die Akzidentien an. Nach dem vierten Buch der *Metaphysik* des Aristoteles gibt es viele Weisen, nach denen das Sein im allgemeinen und die Akzidentien im besonderen als "seiend" bezeichnet werden, und zwar auf eine je verschiedene Weise bei absoluten Dingen und bei den Seienden, die selbst nur Hinsichten (*respectus*) oder Seinsweisen anderer Seiender sind. Absolute Akzidentien sind Seiende auf eine begleitende Weise (*concomitative*), da sie etwas anderem zugehören, dem sie als ihrem Subjekt inhärieren. Darüber hinaus haben sie noch eine formale Seiendheit und eine Washeit (*formalis entitas et quiditas*), die selbst aber nicht darin besteht, zu etwas anderem zu gehören. So hat das Weißsein oder die Weiße (*albedo*) eine bestimmte Essenz oder Qualität, nämlich das Weißsein selbst, das sich nicht im bloßen Inhärieren in einem

¹⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 47,21–48,6: "Quantum ad secundum notandum est, quod, cum reale dicatur a re, manifestum est quod gradus in identitate et diversitate reali est secundum gradum, qui invenitur in re vel in natura rei. Res autem non dicitur univoce de omnibus, de quibus dicitur, sed aequivoce vel analogice [...]. Cum enim rerum quaedam sint absolutae et quaedam puri respectus, res dicitur per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta, de qua dicitur formaliter praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc, sicut dicitur quod albedo vel quantitas et fortiori ratione substantia est res vel ens reale; per posterius autem et secundum quid solum dicitur de respectu, qui non est res vel ens reale, nisi quia est rei tanquam modus essendi eius."

Subjekt wie etwa dem Schwan erschöpft.²⁰ Das Weißsein hat, so könnte man sagen, wenigstens potentiell eine Realität außerhalb seines bloßen Inhärierens in einem anderen Seienden.

Hingegen ist ein nur bezogenes Sein, ein *respectus*, und allgemein jeder *modus essendi*, nur auf eine solche begleitende Weise ein Seiendes, da er ja als Akzidenz notwendig zu etwas anderem gehört und ihm inhäriert, und die *modi* und *respectus* haben darüber hinaus auch keine andere Natur oder Seiendheit (*entitas*). Der formale Begriff der Wesenheit (*quidditas*) eines Seinsmodus, sagt Durandus, besteht genau darin, daß dieser nicht als ein Dieses oder Jenes aufgefaßt wird, sondern als ein *esse huius*, ein Sein von diesem (anderen).²¹ Mit anderen Worten: ein Seinsmodus wie beispielsweise eine Relation setzt notwendig etwas anderes voraus, das gerade diesen Seinsmodus des Bezogenseins auf etwas anderes, also der Relation hat. Ein solcher *modus essendi* hat damit nicht die potentiell unabhängige Art von Realität, wie sie etwa einer Qualität wie dem Weißsein zukommt.

Durandus erläutert diesen Punkt am Beispiel der Seinsweise des Zusammengesetztseins und des Berührens: Die Teile von etwas, das aus Materie und Form zusammengesetzt ist, sind selbst *res*, Dinge im weitesten Sinne. Das Zusammengesetztsein als Seinsweise existiert jeweils sowohl in der Materie als auch in der Form und wird von diesen denominativ und nicht wesentlich ausgesagt, d.h.: von der Form wird gesagt, sie sei in der Materie, und als Materie bezeichnen wir dasjenige, in dem als Zugrundeliegendem die Form existiert. Das bedeutet: Die Wesenheit (*quidditas*) oder die Seiendheit (*entitas*) des Seinsmodus des Zusammengesetztseins besteht in nichts anderem als in der Tatsache, daß die Form in der Materie existiert und daß die Materie der Form zugrundeliegt. Eine Zusammensetzung kann somit nach Durandus nur

²⁰ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 48,10–22: “Nam quamvis omne accidens sit ens quia entis, ut dicitur IV *Metaphysicae*, aliter tamen et aliter convenit hoc absolutis et respectivis [...] absoluta sunt entia quia entis, non quidem formaliter et essentialiter, sed solum concomitative, quia non essent naturaliter, nisi essent in alio scilicet in substantia, tamen sua quidditas non est esse in alio, immo praeter hoc habent suam formalem entitatem et quidditatem [...]. Unde albedo, quae et huius ut subiecti, puta cigni, est aliquid essentialiter praeter eius esse, quia esse huius non est eius essentia”.

²¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 48,23–49,2: “Sed modus essendi, quia est esse huius, non est quidditative vel formaliter aliqua natura vel entitas praeter esse huius; totus enim conceptus formalis quidditatis eius est concipi, non ut hoc vel quod, sed huius...”.

aufgefaßt werden als eine wechselseitige Beziehung, ein gegenseitiges Sich-Verhalten (*habitus*) von Materie und Form.²²

Aus diesen Überlegungen zieht Durandus dann zwei Schlußfolgerungen.²³ Erstens kommt es einem Seinsmodus nicht *per se* zu, zu subsistieren oder in etwas anderem zu inhärieren, sondern es gibt eine *res*, dem dieser Seinsmodus auf denominative Weise zukommt. Ein reiner Seinsmodus selbst hat keinen solchen, ihm denominativ zukommenden Seinsmodus, denn dann müßte man diesem selbst wiederum einen Modus zuschreiben, diesem Modus wiederum einen Modus usw. *ad infinitum*. Zweite Schlußfolgerung: Kein Seinsmodus bildet mit dem Ding, dem er denominativ zukommt, eine Zusammensetzung. Wie später noch deutlich werden wird, sichert diese These, angewandt auf den Fall der Relation, die Einfachheit Gottes, denn auf diese Weise kann es in Gott keine Zusammensetzung von innertrinitarischen Relationen und göttlichem Wesen geben.

Um diese Schlußfolgerung weiter zu erläutern, greift Durandus noch einmal auf das Beispiel des Zusammengesetztheits zurück: Das Zusammengesetztheits umfaßt zwei Seinsmodi: Einmal den Modus des Seins in einem anderen (*ut in alio*), welcher denominativ der Form zukommt; zweitens den Modus, etwas zu sein, in dem etwas anderes ist (*ut in quo aliud*), welcher denominativ der Materie zukommt. Dann ist es offensichtlich, daß ein solches Zusammengesetztes in keinem dieser beiden Teile eine Zusammensetzung bildet, denn jede Zusammensetzung kommt dadurch zustande, daß eines in etwas anderem inhäriert. Ein Seinsmodus wie das In-einem-anderen-Sein subsistiert jedoch nicht

²² Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 49,4–14: “Verbi gratia, componi et tangi sunt modi essendi reales rerum componentium et tangentium, importantes solam realem habitudinem; partes ergo compositi, scilicet materia et forma [...] sunt res, quarum sunt illae habitudines [...]. Forma enim dicitur esse in materia et materia, in qua est forma, et utrumque dicitur esse denominative et non essentialiter, quia essentia partium compositi non est sic esse; sed essentia vel quidditas seu entitas horum modorum tota consistit in hoc, quod est esse huius, quia compositio non est aliud quam forma inesse materiae et materiam subesse formae...”.

²³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 49,21–50,3: “Ex quo sequuntur duo: Unum est, quod nulli modo essendi competit per se esse subsistens vel esse alteri inherens, quia omne tale est res habens modum essendi competentem ei denominative. Sed nihil, quod sit purus modus essendi, habet modum essendi ei competentem denominative, quia tunc huius modi esset alius modus, et sic in infinitum. Ergo, quod est purus modus essendi non est per se subsistens vel inherens, sed est essentialiter ipse modus essendi per se vel inherendi aliorum, quibus denominative competunt. Secundum est, quod nullus modus essendi facit compositionem cum re, cui convenit denominative”.

für sich und inhäriert auch nicht einem anderen, wie Durandus in der ersten Schlußfolgerung festgehalten hat.²⁴

Ein anderes Beispiel ist nach Durandus noch deutlicher: Die Seinsweisen des Berührens und des Berührtwerdens sind reale Seinsmodi, die unterschieden sind von den beiden sich berührenden Dingen. Diese existieren nämlich auch dann noch, wenn sie sich nicht mehr berühren. Wenn also ein Gegenstand einen anderen berührt, dann ist er nicht in höherem Maße Teil eines Zusammengesetzten, als wenn er mit keinem anderen Gegenstand in Berührung ist.²⁵

Fassen wir mit Durandus die Ergebnisse des zweiten Teils des *corpus quaestionis* zusammen:²⁶ "Ding" (*res*) hat eine zweifache Bedeutung: Primär bedeutet es absolute Seiende und Wesenheiten, in zweiter Linie Modi oder Seinsweisen, deren Sein allein darin besteht, eine *habitus aliorum*, d.h. eine Bezogenheit auf etwas anderes zu sein. Hinsichtlich der Identität und der Differenz kommt Durandus zu dem Schluß, daß diejenigen Dinge in primärem Sinne und schlechthin real voneinander verschieden sind, bei denen entweder jedes einzelne für sich auf eine ihm eigentümliche und unterschiedene Weise subsistiert (*propria et distincta subsistentia*), oder wo eines von ihnen subsistiert und das andere ihm inhäriert, so wie etwa das Weißsein in einem Körper besteht. Wenn daher ein absolutes Ding (*res absoluta*) und eine Seinsweise vorliegen, dann können diese real verschieden nur in einem sekundären Sinne und in einer gewissen Hinsicht (*per posterius et secundum quid*) sein.

Im dritten und letzten Teil des *corpus quaestionis* faßt Durandus seine Antwort auf die Frage nach der realen Unterschiedenheit von göttlichem Wesen und innertrinitarischen Relationen in der Form von drei *conclusiones* zusammen:²⁷

²⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 50,3–8: "...compositio, quae includit duos modos essendi, scilicet modum essendi ut in alio et modum ut in quo aliud, quorum primus denominative competit formae et secundus materiae, non facit in aliqua dictarum partium compositionem, quamvis differant aliquo modo realiter ab utraque, quin immo tota compositio est illarum rerum, quibus illi modi denominative conveniunt, scilicet materiae et formae...".

²⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 50,14–17: "...clarissimus est in tactu, quia nullum tangentium est secundum se magis compositum, quam si non tangeret aliud, et tamen tangere vel tangi est realis modus essendi differens aliquo modo realiter ab utroque tangentium, cum illa possunt manere soluto tactu".

²⁶ Vgl. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 50,17–51,9.

²⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 51,10–15: "Quantum ad tertium, quod est principale quaesitum, dicenda sunt tria: Primum est, quod differentia essentiae et relationis in divinis non est pure et praecise secundum rationem. Secundum est, quod non est dicendum simpliciter et absolute quod differant realiter.

Erstens: Der Unterschied zwischen dem Wesen Gottes und den göttlichen Relationen ist nicht einfach und genau genommen (*pure et praecise*) ein gedanklicher Unterschied, eine *differentia secundum rationem*.

Zweitens: Man kann nicht schlechthin und absolut sagen, daß Wesen und Relationen in Gott real verschieden sind, wobei "real" hier in primärem Sinne zu verstehen ist.

Die dritte und wichtigste, zusammenfassende Schlußfolgerung: Man muß notwendig sagen, daß Wesen und Relationen in Gott in gewisser Weise real verschieden sind, wenigstens in einer gewissen Hinsicht und mit einer (näheren) Bestimmung.

Durandus' Beweis für die erste Schlußfolgerung, daß also der Unterschied von Wesen und Relationen in Gott nicht bloß ein rein gedanklicher ist, verläuft folgendermaßen:²⁸ Ein Unterschied, der derart aus der Natur der Sache entspringt, daß keine Tätigkeit des Intellekts dabei beteiligt ist, kann nicht bloß ein verstandesmäßiger sein. Nun ist aber der Unterschied von Wesen und Relationen in Gott von solcher Art, also kann dieser nicht rein verstandesmäßig sein. Der Unterschied von Wesen und Relationen in Gott liegt deshalb in der Natur der Sache, weil das göttliche Wesen formal in einem Zugrundeliegenden, einem *suppositum*, existiert, in dem es *formaliter* keine Relationen gibt. So ist beispielsweise das göttliche Wesen formal im Vater, aber im Vater ist die Sohnschaft (*filiatio*) nicht in gleicher Weise, denn sonst müßte man annehmen, daß der Vater wegen der in ihm existierenden Sohnschaft auch zugleich der Sohn wäre. Dies wiederum würde jedoch bedeuten, daß es keinen Unterschied zwischen Vater und Sohn gäbe, was häretisch ist. Daraus folgt, daß der Unterschied zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen nicht nur rein gedanklich sein kann.

Durandus' Argumentation im Beweis für die zweite *conclusio*, daß die Differenz zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen keine reale Differenz sein kann, "real" hier in primärem Sinne verstanden, ist folgende:²⁹ Aus dem bisher Gesagten ist klar, daß zwei Dinge schlechthin und absolut voneinander verschieden nur dann sein können, wenn entweder beide unterschieden für sich subsistieren

Tertium est, quod necessario oportet dicere quod differant aliquo modo realiter, saltem secundum quid et cum determinatione".

²⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 51,16–52,6.

²⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 52,7–53,8.

oder wenn eines für sich subsistiert und das andere ihm inhäriert. Aber im Falle des göttlichen Wesens und der innergöttlichen Relationen trifft keines von beidem zu: Die Relationen können dem göttlichen Wesen nicht inhärieren, denn dann gäbe es in Gott eine Zusammensetzung, was unakzeptabel ist. Aber die innergöttlichen Relationen können auch keine voneinander verschiedenen subsistierenden Dinge sein, denn dann gäbe es mehr als einen Gott, da jedes ungeschaffene und subsistierende Seiende selbst ein Gott wäre. Also folgt, daß eine Relation in Gott weder ihm inhärieren noch für sich subsistieren kann. Was ist dann aber, fragt Durandus, eine Relation in Gott? Diese scheint nur ein bloßer Seinsmodus oder eine Weise des Habens des göttlichen Wesens (*solus modus essendi vel habendi essentiam divinam*) zu sein. Die genaue Bedeutung dieser Aussage wird im folgenden noch deutlicher werden.

Schließlich gibt Durandus eine Begründung für die dritte, die beiden vorhergehenden *conclusiones* zusammenfassende Schlußfolgerung: Wenn die Differenz zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen nicht einfach und genau genommen eine gedankliche Differenz ist, so muß sie in einer bestimmten Weise real sein. Sie kann jedoch, nach der zweiten Schlußfolgerung, nicht schlechthin und absolut real sein, also muß sie es in einem sekundären Sinne sein, d.h. sie ist real in einer gewissen Hinsicht und mit einer (näheren) Bestimmung.³⁰

Die exakte Natur dieser Bestimmung ist jedoch, wie Durandus sagt, von verschiedenen Autoren auf verschiedene Weise interpretiert worden. In diesem Zusammenhang diskutiert er drei verschiedene Ansichten, ohne diese jedoch ausdrücklich bestimmten Personen zuzuordnen.³¹

³⁰ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 53,9–17: “Tertium autem necessario concluditur ex praedictis duobus sic: Omnis differentia, quae non est pure et praecise secundum rationem, sed est ex natura rei excluso omni actu rationis, est aliquo modo realis; sed differentia essentiae et relationis in divinis non est pure et praecise secundum rationem, sed est ex natura rei excluso omni actu rationis; ergo talis differentia est aliquo modo realis. Utraque praemissarum patet ex iam dictis. Ulterius, cum talis differentia non sit dicenda realis simpliciter et absolute, ut supra probatum fuit, sequitur necessario, quod sit dicenda realis secundum quid et cum determinatione”.

³¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 53,18–54,11: “Illa autem determinatio diversimode ponitur a diversis. Quidam enim dicunt, quod essentia et relatio differunt, quia non sunt idem adaequate et convertibiliter. Nam paternitas est essentia et nihil aliud, sed essentia divina est paternitas et aliqua res, quae non est paternitas, videlicet filiatio, et sic essentia est in plus quam paternitas [...]. Alii autem dicunt, quod essentia et relatio differunt sicut res et modus habendi rem illam, cuius modi sit entitas et conceptus, ut dicamus, non quod sit alia res ab essentia nec subsistens nec inhaerens, sed quod huius. Et differt hic modus ab essentia ex natura rei [...].

Einige glauben—und dies ist etwa die Meinung des Hervaeus—, daß das Wesen und die Relation verschieden sind, weil sie nicht auf adäquate und vertauschbare Weise identisch sind. Letzteres ist deshalb der Fall, weil die Vaterschaft in Gott mit der Wesenheit zusammenfällt und nichts darüber hinaus beinhaltet, wohingegen das göttliche Wesen in der Vaterschaft und in noch etwas anderem, der Sohnschaft, besteht, was die Vertauschbarkeit von Wesen und Relation in Gott ausschließt.

Andere sagen—dies ist die zweite Meinung—, daß das Wesen und die Relationen in Gott verschieden sind, gerade so wie ein Ding und die Weise, dieses Ding zu haben, verschieden sind. Dies ist etwa die Ansicht Bonaventuras und auch Jakobs von Viterbo, aber auch die Meinung, die Durandus vor 1314 selbst noch ausdrücklich vertreten hat.³² Dieser Seinsmodus ist weder etwas, was subsistiert, noch etwas, was einem anderen inhäriert, sondern er gehört zum göttlichen Wesen hinzu, wobei er von ihm aber der Natur der Sache nach verschieden ist. Formal gesprochen kann man nicht eigentlich sagen, die Vaterschaft sei das Wesen Gottes oder umgekehrt, vielmehr handelt es sich dabei um eine bloße Seinsweise.

Schließlich gibt es noch eine dritte Meinung, die man Duns Scotus zuordnen kann und die behauptet, daß das Wesen und die Vaterschaft in Gott *formaliter* voneinander verschieden sind, obgleich sie wegen ihrer Identität dasselbe sind. Demzufolge wäre es wahr zu sagen: Die Vaterschaft ist das göttliche Wesen durch die Identität, es wäre aber falsch zu behaupten, daß die Vaterschaft *formaliter* die Wesenheit ist. Durandus fügt jedoch noch hinzu, daß er nicht wisse, was hier mit *formaliter* gemeint sei, wenn es nicht auf eine der in den anderen beiden Meinungen genannten Weisen verstanden werde. In der entsprechenden Passage in dist. 33 der dritten Redaktion seines Sentenzenkommentars, wo er den Text aus dem *Quolibet* fast wörtlich übernimmt, fügt Durandus an dieser Stelle verdeutlichend hinzu, daß er es für wahrer halte, das “formaliter” so aufzufassen, daß die dritte Ansicht die beiden anderen Meinungen einschließe.³³ Im Text des *Quolibet* hingegen schließt sich

Alii autem dicunt, quod essentia et paternitas differunt formaliter, quamvis sint idem identitate; unde concedunt quod haec est vera ‘Paternitas est essentia identitate’, sed haec est falsa ‘Paternitas est formaliter essentia’, quia differunt formaliter ex natura rei. Et hanc formalitatem non intelligo, nisi coincidat cum aliquo dictorum modorum”.

³² Vgl. Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, pp. 132–142, und Mojsisch, “Relation”, Sp. 590. Den Hinweis auf Bonaventura verdanke ich Isabel Iribarren.

³³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 33, q. 1, n. 28, ed. Venetius 1571, f. 90ra: “Alii dicunt quod relatio et essentia differunt formaliter ex natura rei,

Durandus nicht ausdrücklich einer dieser drei genannten Meinungen an, sondern beschränkt sich darauf, denjenigen Aspekt herauszustellen, den alle drei gemeinsam haben: Alle Auffassungen sehen nämlich die Differenz zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen als eine von der Natur der Sache her in gewisser Weise reale Relation an.³⁴

Die Theorie der Relationen als Seinsweisen (*modi essendi*), die Durandus hier vertritt, geht zurück auf Heinrich von Gent.³⁵ Nach dieser Auffassung haben die Relationen unter den aristotelischen Kategorien insofern einen besonderen Status, als sie eben nur Modi oder Seinsweisen von anderen Dingen sind und selbst keine eigene Seinsweise haben. Durandus nennt sie daher Dinge (*res*) in einem sekundären Sinne.

Gegenüber dieser Auffassung der Relation als *modus essendi* vertritt Hervaeus Natalis eine Theorie, nach der eine Relation ihrem Fundament nichts hinzufügt, was von diesem real verschieden wäre, vielmehr sind die Relation und ihr Fundament als *res* identisch. Das Relat wird lediglich konnotiert, d.h. die Relationen bezeichnen extrinsisch etwas, was vom Fundament der Relation verschieden ist und in einer gewissen Beziehung zu diesem steht.³⁶

quamvis sint idem identice; unde concedunt, quod haec est vera 'Paternitas e[s]t essentia identice', sed haec est falsa 'Paternitas est essentia formaliter', quia differunt formaliter ex natura rei. Et hanc formalitatem non intelligo, nisi coincidat cum aliquo dictorum modorum vel includat utrumque, quod verius credo, quia in hoc quod dicunt, quod essentia et relatio sunt idem identice et quod unum verificatur realiter de alio, includunt primum modum, quo alii dicunt quod sunt idem realiter. In hoc autem quod dicunt, quod non sunt idem formaliter, sed differunt formaliter ex natura rei, includunt illud quod primi dicunt, quod non sunt idem adaequate, et illud quod dicunt secundi, scilicet quod differunt sicut res et modus habendi rem".

³⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 54,12–18: "Verumtamen, quicumque istorum trium modorum detur [...] omnes tamen in hoc conveniunt, quod ista differentia est ex natura rei aliquo modo realis...".

³⁵ Vgl. I. Iribarren, "Henry of Ghent's Teaching on Modes and its Influence in the Fourteenth Century", *Mediaeval Studies* 64 (2002), pp. 111–129, die auf Jakob von Metz als Verbindungsglied zwischen Heinrich und Durandus hinweist, *ibid.* p. 125; zur Relationstheorie Heinrichs siehe auch J. Decorte, "Relatio as Modus Essendi. The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10 (2002), pp. 309–336.

³⁶ Hervaeus Natalis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Parisii 1647, p. 126aC–D: "Quia, cum, ut deductum est, relatio in subiecto non addit aliquid diversum a fundamento, oportet quod ipsa et fundamentum inter se sint unum re. [...] oportet quod praeter fundamentum secundum quod subiectum dicitur esse tale [relatio] importet extrinsece quoddam alterum, ad quod subiectum relationis se habeat in aliqua habitudine...". Zu Hervaeus' Relationstheorie vgl. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, pp. 416–424.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Ansicht gibt Hervaeus eine direkte Antwort auf Durandus' Avignoneser *Quolibet* in seinen *Correctiones [...] supra dicta Durandi de Sancto Porciano in primo Quolibet*.³⁷ Seine Erwiderung auf den dritten Artikel, in dem Durandus seine Schlußfolgerungen formuliert hatte, besteht aus vier Teilen: Zunächst gibt Hervaeus im Wesentlichen eine längere Aufzählung der Aussagen des IV. Laterankonzils zur Frage des Verhältnisses von Einheit und Verschiedenheit in Gott, im zweiten Teil antwortet er auf die drei Schlußfolgerungen des Durandus, im dritten Teil nennt Hervaeus einige Einwände, die gegen seine eigene Position vorgebracht werden könnten, von der Hervaeus jedoch beansprucht, daß sie mit den Aussagen des Laterankonzils übereinstimme, und im vierten Teil antwortet er abschließend auf diese Einwände.

Ich beschränke mich hier auf Hervaeus' Antwort auf die drei *conclusiones* des Durandus: Die erste Schlußfolgerung, daß es sich bei der Differenz zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen um einen realen und nicht bloß gedanklichen Unterschied handelt, ist nach Hervaeus falsch, denn eine reale Differenz setzt für ihn voraus, wie er immer wieder betont hat, daß beide *relata* real verschiedene Dinge sind, was im vorliegenden Fall jedoch offenkundig nicht gegeben ist.³⁸

Der zweiten Schlußfolgerung des Durandus, daß die besagte Differenz nicht absolut und schlechthin real ist, stimmt Hervaeus zu,³⁹ allerdings nicht ohne eine Kritik an Durandus' Beweisführung zu äußern, denn er wirft ihm vor, diesen Schluß aus einem falschen Obersatz hergeleitet zu haben.

Auf die dritte Schlußfolgerung des Durandus, in der eine—in gewisser Hinsicht (*secundum quid*) und mit einer Bestimmung bestehende—reale Differenz zwischen göttlichem Wesen und innergöttlichen Relationen behauptet wird, gibt Hervaeus eine zweifache Antwort: Wenn man

³⁷ Hervaeus Natalis, *Correctiones...*, ed. Stella, pp. 293–326; Hervaeus' Antwort auf Durandus' dritten Artikel beginnt p. 298,11.

³⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Correctiones...*, ed. Stella, p. 300,15–20: "Dico quod prima conclusio secundum sensum, quem verba primo ostendunt, est falsa [...]. Et hoc patet sic, quia, sicut supra frequenter dictum est, differre realiter est eorum, quorum unum non est realiter alterum".

³⁹ Hervaeus Natalis, *Correctiones...*, ed. Stella, p. 300,22–25: "Quantum ad secundam conclusionem, quantum verba primo ostendunt, vera est, videlicet quod essentia et relatio non differunt simpliciter et absolute, quia non differunt qualitercumque realiter, inter se loquendo saltem".

diese Behauptung so verstehen soll, daß die besagte Differenz in gewissem Sinne real sei, so ist sie falsch. Wenn aber die Einschränkung "in gewisser Hinsicht" meint, daß diese Differenz eine gedankliche ist, so ist die *conclusio* wahr.⁴⁰

Insgesamt vertritt Hervaeus also die Meinung, daß die Differenz zwischen dem göttlichen Wesen und den innergöttlichen Relationen in keiner Weise real, sondern nur gedanklich ist. Das schließt für ihn jedoch die Existenz realer Relationen etwa in der geschaffenen Welt nicht aus, womit er sich klar von einer konzeptualistischen Sicht der Relationen unterscheidet, wie sie Petrus Aureoli vertritt.

II. PETRUS AUREOLI ÜBER DEN ONTOLOGISCHEN STATUS DER RELATIONEN

Petrus Aureoli kritisiert in seiner Relationstheorie sowohl die Ansichten des Hervaeus als auch die des Durandus.⁴¹ Die Grundgedanken seiner Lehre lassen sich gut anhand seiner Darstellung in dist. 30 des ersten Sentenzenbuches herausarbeiten. "Gibt es eine Relation in der Natur, wenn man von der Tätigkeit des Intellekts absieht, oder besteht jede Relation nur im Erfastwerden?" fragt Aureoli im ersten Teil dieser *distinctio*, die aus drei Artikeln besteht: Während er sich im ersten Artikel kritisch mit den Ansichten von Thomas, Hervaeus, Durandus und Scotus auseinandersetzt, trägt er im zweiten seine eigene Meinung über das Wesen der Relation vor und geht im dritten Artikel auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den letzten sechs Kategorien und der Relation ein.⁴²

⁴⁰ Hervaeus Natalis, *Correctiones* ..., ed. Stella, p. 300,29–35: "Tertia vero conclusio, videlicet quod differant aliquo modo realiter, saltem secundum quid et cum determinatione, est falsa, dum tamen illa differentia secundum quid sit differentia realis, qua differant inter se qualitercumque realiter. Et illud patet ex reprobatione conclusionis. Si 'differre secundum quid' acciperetur pro 'differre secundum rationem' [...], tunc verum est, quod differrent secundum quid".

⁴¹ Allgemein zur Philosophie Aureolis vgl. R.L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2002 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/auriol/>) und T. Kobusch, "Petrus Aureoli. Philosophie des Subjekts", in *Philosophen des Mittelalters. Eine Einführung*, ed. T. Kobusch, Darmstadt 2000, pp. 236–249; speziell zu Aureolis Relationstheorie siehe Henninger, *Relations*, Kap. 8 ("Relation as Concept: Peter Aureoli"); R.L. Friedman, 'In principio erat verbum'. *The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325*, PhD Diss., University of Iowa 1996; sowie Brower, *Medieval Theories of Relations*, Kap. 3.1.

⁴² Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, ed. Romae 1596, p. 660aA: "Utrum aliqua relatio sit in rerum natura circumscripto omni opere intellectus, vel sit omnis relatio in sola apprehensione".

Aureolis Ansicht über den ontologischen Status der Relationen entfaltet sich in diesem Text in drei aufeinander aufbauenden Gedankengängen: Zunächst zeigt Aureoli (negativ), daß die Relationen kein Sein in den Dingen haben. Relationen verdanken sich (positiv) vielmehr einem vergleichenden Akt des Intellekts. In einem zweiten Gedankengang wird dann die genaue Seinsweise der Relationen näher bestimmt: Relationen haben ein intentionales Sein, sie sind Konzepte in der Seele. Drittens schränkt Aureoli dann diese konzeptualistische Position ein, insofern nach ihm die intentionale Seinsweise der Relationen verschieden ist von derjenigen bloßer Figmente, da die Relationen zumindest ein potientes Sein in den extramentalen Dingen haben.

Zunächst zur ersten These: Die Relationen haben nach Aureoli kein Sein in den Dingen und in der extramentalen Realität. Ihre Existenz verdankt sich vielmehr nur ihrer Erfassung (*apprehensio*) durch den Intellekt in einem Akt des Vergleichens und in einem Urteil. Die erkennende Seele stiftet die Verbindung zwischen den beiden Gliedern der Relation.⁴³

Aureoli liefert eine genaue und ausführliche Begründung für seine These, die er in vier Schritten bzw. vier Unterthesen entwickelt, indem er nacheinander alle Arten von Relationen durchgeht und zeigt, daß diese keine extramentalen Dinge sein können. Nacheinander behandelt er:⁴⁴

1. Die Relationen gemäß Zahl und Einheit (Identität, Ähnlichkeit);
2. die Relationen, die auf einem Hervorbringen beruhen (Vaterschaft, Sohnschaft);

⁴³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, pp. 667bE–F: "Circa secundum autem considerandum, quod sumendo relationem pro eo, quod dicit formaliter et in recto—videlicet pro habitudine quae inexistit fundamento et mediat inter fundamentum et terminum et quae non est aliud quam esse ad aliud et respectus—, ipsa quidem ut sic non habet esse in rebus circumscripta omni apprehensione intellectiva et sensitiva, sed habet esse in anima obiective ita, quod in rebus non sunt nisi fundamenta et termini; habitudo vero et connexio inter illa est ab anima cognitiva".

⁴⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 667bF: "...hoc autem poterit ex propositione quadruplici apparere: Prima quidem, quod relationes, quae dicuntur modo numeri vel unius, non sunt in re extra sine opere intellectus..."; *ibid.*, p. 671aA: "Secunda vero propositio est, quod paternitas et filiatio et universaliter respectus de secundo modo, qui fundantur super producere et produci, non possunt esse res extra animam existentes..."; *ibid.*, p. 672aB: "Tertia quoque propositio est, quod relatio scientiae ad scibile et sensus ad sensibile, et sic de omnibus, quae referuntur ut mensuratum ad mensuram, non sunt in rebus. Impossibile est enim aliquam rem dependere a non re..."; *ibid.*, p. 673bA: "Quarta demum propositio est, quod relationi repugnat in communi ex sua ratione quod sit res in natura existens...".

3. die Relationen, die sich wie Maß und Gemessenes verhalten (Wissen—Wißbares, Sinn—Sinnfälliges).
4. In einem vierten Schritt zeigt Aureoli dann, daß allgemein aus dem Begriff der Relation folgt, daß eine Relation kein extramentales Ding (*res*) sein kann.

Zunächst zum ersten Schritt, in dem Aureoli zeigt, daß die Relationen, die nach der Weise der Einheit—also Identität, Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit—oder nach Art der Zahl—wie das Doppelte oder das Mehrfache—ausgesagt werden, in den extramentalen Dingen nicht ohne eine Tätigkeit der Seele existieren. Aus der längeren Begründung, die Aureoli für diese Behauptung gibt, sei hier nur ein Argument hervorgehoben: Daß etwa die Identität keine Relation ist, die in den Dingen ohne eine Tätigkeit des Intellekts existiert, erhellt aus folgendem Argument, das mit einer in diesem Fall drohenden unendlichen Vervielfältigung der Relationen und damit der Dinge operiert. Das Argument lautet: Es kann in der Natur kein Ding geben, dessen Existenz das Dasein einer unendlichen Anzahl von Dingen und damit etwas Unmögliches impliziert. Wenn man nun aber annehmen würde, die Identität sei ein Naturding (*quaedam res in natura*), gleichsam ein Verhältnis (*habitus*), das zwischen denjenigen Dingen existiert, die identisch dieselben sind, so müßte man unendlich viele Identitäten *in actu* und damit unendlich viele Naturdinge annehmen. Denn wenn Sokrates und Plato jeweils eine Identität zukäme, so hätten diese Identitäten wiederum, da sie von derselben Art (*eiusdem speciei*) sind, zwei andere Identitäten; und wenn die ersten beiden Identitäten jeweils Dinge sind, so sind auch die letzten beiden Dinge. Denn sie sind, wie auch die beiden Menschen, gleichermaßen zwei Entitäten derselben Art, und auf ähnliche Weise hätten diese wiederum zwei Identitäten usw. *ad infinitum*.⁴⁵

In einem zweiten Schritt zeigt Aureoli dann, daß die Relationen, die, wie Vaterschaft oder Sohnschaft, auf einem Hervorbringen oder Produzieren beruhen, keine extramentalen Dinge sein können. Um auch hier eines der Argumente, die Aureoli anführt, herauszugreifen: Alle Naturdinge werden von etwas anderem hervorgebracht. Wenn nun Relationen wie die Vaterschaft extramentale Dinge wären, müßten auch sie von etwas anderem hervorgebracht werden. Dies kann aber weder

⁴⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 668aA–B.

das Hervorbringende noch das Hervorgebrachte noch etwas Äußeres sein, weil alle diese Möglichkeiten zu absurden Schlußfolgerungen führen würden, wie Aureoli ausführlich erörtert.⁴⁶

Im dritten Schritt betrachtet Aureoli dann diejenigen Relationen, die sich wie Maß und Gemessenes verhalten, also die Relationen: Wissen—Wißbares, Sinn—Sinnfälliges, Sehen—Sichtbares usw., von denen ebenfalls gilt, daß sie nicht in den Dingen existieren. Andernfalls würde ein Ding von nichts bzw. einem Nicht-Ding (*a non re*) abhängen, was absurd wäre. Daß etwa die Relation zwischen dem Wissen und dem Wißbaren von einem Nicht-Ding abhängen würde, erhellt daraus, daß das Wißbare gar nicht *in actu* existieren muß, wenn das Wissen besteht, ebensowenig wie das Sinnfällige während der Wahrnehmung. Das Wissen von einer Sache kann sogar bestehen bleiben, wenn die Sache selbst gänzlich vernichtet ist.⁴⁷

In einem vierten und letzten Schritt legt Aureoli schließlich dar, daß aus dem Begriff und der Natur der Relation im allgemeinen folgt, daß eine Relation kein extramentales Ding ist. Zum Begriff der Relation gehört nach Aureoli nämlich, daß sie in dem einen Relationsglied, dem *fundamentum*, aufgenommen oder erzeugt wird, ohne daß dieses selbst sich ändert; nur im zweiten Relat, dem *terminus*, tritt eine Veränderung auf. Ein Naturding aber kann nicht in einem Zugrundeliegenden aufgenommen werden, ohne daß ein *agens* dieses berührt und es somit verändert.⁴⁸

Nachdem Aureoli ausführlich bewiesen hat, daß den Relationen kein Sein in den extramentalen Dingen zukommt, sondern nur eines im Denken bzw. in der Seele,⁴⁹ so ist noch die genaue Art der Existenz der Relationen in der Seele zu klären. Aus dem bisher Dargelegten ergibt sich für Aureoli evident, daß die Relationen ein objektives Sein in der Seele haben. Ihre Seinsweise ist also für Aureoli dieselbe wie die der

⁴⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 671aA–E.

⁴⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 672aC–D.

⁴⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 673bA–C.

⁴⁹ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 674bF: "Ex quo colligitur evidenter, quod relatio vere habet esse in anima obiective et quod hoc competit cuilibet trium numerorum ex sua propria ratione et omni relationi ex proprietate et ratione communi...".

Universalien: Sowohl Relationen als auch Universalien sind Konzepte, *entia rationis*; sie haben ein intentionales Sein.

Am Beispiel der Relation der Ähnlichkeit zeigt Aureoli die Rolle des Intellekts und des Urteils bei der Stiftung einer Relation. Die Erfassung der Ähnlichkeit zweier weißer Dinge durch den Intellekt erfolgt durch eine ununterschiedene Erfassung (*apprehensio indistincta*), die von einer weißen Farbe als dem *fundamentum* ausgeht und in der anderen weißen Farbe als dem *terminus* endet. Neben den beiden weißen Dingen erfassen wir auch ihre Ununterschiedenheit hinsichtlich ihrer Farbe. Aureoli unterscheidet dabei den Akt der Erfassung von seinem Inhalt (*apprehensio actus—apprehensio obiectiva*). Jedem Akt entspricht ein erfaßter Inhalt, den Aureoli als "objektive Erfassung" oder auch "Urteil" (*iudicium*) bezeichnet. Die Relation der Ähnlichkeit ist dann nichts anderes als genau dieses Urteil über eine farbliche Identität.⁵⁰

In einem dritten und letzten Gedankengang wird der Konzeptualismus, wie Aureoli ihn bezüglich des Seins der Relation und der anderen vier Kategorien vertritt, die, wie die Substanz, kein reales Sein in der extramentalen Wirklichkeit haben,⁵¹ nun aber dahingehend abgeschwächt, daß die Relationen ein Sein nicht nur im Intellekt bzw. in der Seele haben. Aureoli stellt hier ausdrücklich fest, daß die Seinsweise der Relationen eine andere ist als die bloßer *figmenta*, d.h. vom Intellekt erdachter Dinge, die in keiner Weise ein Sein außerhalb der Seele haben. Im Gegensatz zu diesen *figmenta* kommt den Relationen

⁵⁰ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 2, ed. Romae 1596, p. 670aB–F: "Unde non est aliud similitudo duarum albedinum quam earum apprehensio indistincta, non quidem apprehensio actus, sed apprehensio obiectiva. Haec autem apprehensio indistincta incipit ab una albedine et terminatur ad alteram et e converso. Et ideo est habitudo respiciens pro fundamento illam, a qua incipit, et pro termino reliquam, et similiter e converso. Unde sunt ibi tria concepta, videlicet particularis albedo et distincta apprehensio obiectiva ab alia albedine et tertium alia albedo. Apprehenditur quidem particularis albedo in sua singularitate, et ultra hoc alia singularis albedo, et cum hoc quaedam indistinctio unius ab altera.

Haec autem indistinctio non est mere negatio, quia omne indistinctum est in aliquo indistinctum: illud autem aliquid non potest esse natura albedinis in communi, alioquin similitudo, quae est relatio, et conceptus specificus essent idem; nec potest poni illud, in quo distinguatur singularis natura earum, quia in illa sunt indistinctive; quare necesse est, quod illud sit iudicium obiectivum vel apprehensio. Unde non est aliud similitudo inter duas albedines quam iudicium inter eas, sicut per contrarium dissimilitudo est iudicium discrepans et diversum. Actui enim apprehenso correspondet apprehensio obiectiva, propter quod, cum intellectus duas albedines iudicat indistinctas, correspondet obiective inter illas iudicium indistinctum...".

⁵¹ Vgl. zu Aureolis Behandlung der anderen Kategorien Friedman, "Peter Auriol", Kap. 2.1.

nämlich zumindest ein potentielles Sein in den Dingen außerhalb der Seele zu, das dann dadurch, daß sie vom Intellekt erfaßt werden, in die Wirklichkeit überführt wird. Die Relationen haben eine "schwache Seiendheit", die schon Averroes den Relationen zugebilligt hatte.⁵² Selbst wenn man von der Tätigkeit des Intellektes absieht, so kommen Petrus und Paulus gemäß einer sie verbindenden potentiellen "Hinsicht des Übereinkommens" (*respectus convenientiae*) stärker überein als etwa Petrus und eine Rose, wenn auch dieser *respectus convenientiae* zunächst nur ein potentieller ist und erst durch den erkennenden Intellekt in die Wirklichkeit überführt werden muß.⁵³

Insgesamt zeigt sich, daß Aureoli mit seiner konzeptualistischen Sicht der Relationen einen Mittelweg einschlägt zwischen einer strikt realistischen Position, wie man sie etwa bei Duns Scotus findet,⁵⁴ und einer Anschauung, die den Relationen jegliches *fundamentum in re* abspricht. Interessant ist abschließend noch der Hinweis, daß Aureoli im Kontext der Trinitätslehre versucht, die Bedeutung der Relationen abzuschwächen und diese aus den realen Kategorien wie *actio* und *passio* herzuleiten, ganz im Sinne jenes alternativen Erklärungsmodells für die Trinität, das von den Ursprungsbeziehungen in Gott ausgeht und auf dem Begriff der Emanation aufbaut.⁵⁵

⁵² Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 3, ed. Romae 1596, p. 688aD: "...entitas in anima est aliqua entitas, quae non competit figmentis, praesertim quia figmenta nullo modo habent esse extra, nec actu nec potentia; relationes vero sunt extra in potentia et actus eorum completur ab anima. Haec est ergo illa debilis entitas, quam relationibus attribuit Commentator".

⁵³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 30, prima pars, q. un., art. 3, ed. Romae 1596, p. 688bA: "...circumscripito actu intellectus Petrus et Paulus plus conveniunt secundum propinquam potentiam ad respectum convenientiae quam Petrus et rosa. Nihilominus respectus convenientiae non est in actu, nisi reducatur per intellectum".

⁵⁴ Vgl. zu Scotus' realistischer Auffassung der Relationen J.P. Beckmann, "Entdecken oder Setzen? Die Besonderheit der Relationentheorie des Duns Scotus und ihre Bedeutung für die Metaphysik", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. L. Honnfelder – R. Wood – M. Dreyer, Leiden – New York – Köln 1996, pp. 367–384.

⁵⁵ Dazu Friedman, "Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology", pp. 23f.

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT OF DURANDUS OF
ST.-POURÇAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF
AN EMERGENT THOMISM

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In their study of the union between the divine and human natures in Christ, medieval theologians inherited the Chalcedonian claim whereby the two natures are united ‘in one person (*hypostasis*)’. This claim excluded the alternative views that the two natures are somehow mixed into one new nature, and that Christ’s humanity is separable from his divine person—a view associated with Nestorianism. Chalcedonian Christology thus implicitly prescribed a distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘person’. On the other hand, from the twelfth century onwards medieval discussions on the union of natures in Christ had to reckon with another doctrinal hurdle which further narrowed the room for manoeuvre, namely the condemnation of ‘Christological nihilianism’—the view that Christ’s human nature was ‘nothing’ in itself and independently from the divine *suppositum*. The nihilianistic claim was condemned in 1170 and again in 1171 by Pope Alexander III, who explicitly ascribed this doctrine to Peter Lombard. Whether or not the Lombard subscribed to this view remains a matter of debate,¹ but what is important for our purposes is that the Lombard’s discussion of Christological nihilianism together with the subsequent condemnation, brought to the fore the question of the status of Christ’s human nature, specifically the need for an explanation of subsistence which could account for the assumed nature as an individual substance while avoiding the Nestorian claim of two separable persons.² The accepted

¹ For the Lombard’s treatment of this view, see *Sentences*, III, dist. 10, c. 1, nn. 2–4. According to M. Colish, “Christological Nihilianism in the Second Part of the Twelfth Century”, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 63 (1996), pp. 146–155, the Lombard in fact wants to reject the nihilianistic claim, for it wrongly presupposes that every human substance is a person. So what seems to be at stake for the Lombard is the status of the human substance, specifically how it fails to be a person. The Lombard’s aim is therefore to explain the union in a way that avoids Nestorianism. See also R. Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, Oxford 2002, pp. 239–242.

² In his study on scholastic Christology, Richard Cross has identified this issue as the ‘subsistence problem’, see Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, pp. 10–11. Thus, although

claim that Christ's human nature is an individual substance problematized the required distinction between a nature and a person, for it severely restricted the applicability of Boethius's definition of 'person' as an 'individual *substance* of a rational nature'.³ The Lombard identified this as the main problem, and the centrality of the *Sentences* in the scholastic theological curriculum ensured that it remained the focus of attention for succeeding generations.

Aquinas was no exception. At the root of his account of the union is the metaphysical issue of the relation between nature and *suppositum*. Aquinas's understanding of this issue is however ambiguous, for he seems to operate on two different views of subsistence, which in turn yield two divergent Christologies. According to the standard Thomist account, a nature is not the sort of reality which could subsist, but is rather that in virtue of which a *suppositum* is the kind of thing it is. The composite of a *suppositum* and a nature results in a *suppositum* of a certain kind. Nature is understood as an essential part of a thing, whereas the *suppositum* is the whole that includes *esse*, nature, and accidents.⁴ On this account, then, there is no need to explain how the assumed nature fails to constitute a *suppositum*: Christ possesses only one *esse*, the divine.⁵ On the other hand, Aquinas sometimes seems to

the literature on this subject has generally concentrated on the issue of Christ's *esse*, that is, whether he also has a human and not only a divine *esse*, Cross perceives the 'subsistence problem' to be the basic underlying issue. See for example, E. Hocédez, *Quaestio de unico esse in Christo a doctoribus saeculi XIII disputata*, Roma 1933; J.-H. Nicholas, "L'unité d'être dans le Christ d'après saint Thomas", *Revue Thomiste* 65 (1965), pp. 229–260; F. Pelster, "La quaestio disputata de Saint Thomas 'De unione Verbi incarnati'", *Archives de philosophie* 3 (1925), pp. 198–245; S. Brown, "Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries on the Unique Existence of Christ", in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans. Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, ed. K. Emery, Jr. – J. Wawrykow, Notre Dame, IN 1998, pp. 220–237.

³ For Boethius, see *De Persona et Duabus Naturis*, 3, p. 85 (Loeb edition).

⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, III, q. 17, art. 2; q. 2, art. 2: "Natura enim significat essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio. [...] Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui". See also *Quodl.* IX, q. 2. For a more detailed account of the contrast between Aquinas's alternative views and their connected Christologies, see Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, pp. 7–8, 246–247.

⁵ See for example Thomas Aq., *Compendium theologiae*, c. 212, n. 418: "Ea vero quae ad suppositum sive hypostasim pertinent, unum tantum in Christo confiteri oportet. Unde si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius suppositi, videtur dicendum quod in Christo sit unum tantum esse. Manifestum est enim quod partes divisae singulae proprium esse habent, secundum autem quod in toto considerantur non

suggest that subsistence is something that could belong to an individual nature.⁶ On this assumption, he would need to tackle the subsistence problem, for if the nature is individual in its own right, then it must be explained how it fails to be also a *suppositum*. Aquinas propounds that what is required for subsistence is the possession of a 'proper' *esse*, such that in Christ there is the subsistent *esse* of the divine *suppositum* and the 'secondary' *esse* of the assumed nature.⁷ The claim that a nature could have its own *esse* individuated independently from a *suppositum* is however atypically supported by Aquinas. He generally feels uncomfortable with this claim because it could suggest that the nature exists independently of the Word, thereby jeopardising the tightness of the union.

The ambiguity in Aquinas's account makes it an instructive case for studying the reception of Thomist teaching by fourteenth-century Dominicans, shedding light on the considerable hermeneutical work operating behind the promotion of Thomism. In what follows I propose to examine the Christological account of Durandus of St.-Pourçain against the background of interpretations of Aquinas's teaching by contemporary Dominicans of Thomist persuasion. A good source for these alternative interpretations is the 1317 censure list against Durandus, in particular article 126, for it registers an interesting conflict between Hervaeus Natalis's Christology and the standard Thomist view.

habent singulae suum esse, sed omnes sunt per esse totius. Sic igitur si consideremus ipsum Christum ut quoddam integrum suppositum duarum naturarum, erit eius unum tantum esse, sicut et est unum suppositum".

⁶ See for example Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, III, q. 2, art. 2, ad 3: "Dei Verbum non assumpsit naturam humanam in universali, sed [...] in individuo, [...] alioquin oporteret quod cuilibet homini conveniret esse Dei Verbum, sicut convenit Christo. Sciendum est tamen quod non quodlibet individuum in genere substantiae, etiam in rationali natura, habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem illud quod existit in alio perfectiori. [...] Licet igitur humana natura sit individuum quoddam in genere substantiae, quia tamen non per se separatim existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in persona Dei Verbi, consequens est quod non habeat personalitatem propriam. Et ideo facta est unio in persona". As we shall see, Pierre de la Palud makes the same connection in the censure article between assigning proper *esse* to the nature and an accidental (rather than personal) union. See also Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, I, q. 29, art. 1, ad 2.

⁷ Thomas Aq., *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, art. 2: "Si tamen ponatur humanitas a divinitate separari, tunc humanitas suum esse habebit aliud ab esse divino. Non enim impediēbat quin proprium esse haberet nisi hoc quod non erat per se subsistens [...]. Et sic patet [...] quod in Christo est unum esse substantiale, secundum quod esse est suppositi proprie, quamvis sit in eo multiplex esse accidentale". See also Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, III, q. 4, art. 2, ad 3; *Summa contra Gent.*, IV, 43, nn. 3804–3805.

As we shall see, in his explanation of the hypostatic union Durandus is comfortable with ascribing a human, and not only a divine *esse* to Christ, and he does so on the assumption that *esse* is a feature which accidents and not only substances can have. Although some Thomists, notably Hervaeus, share the same general line, Durandus, and not Hervaeus, earned the censure of Dominican authorities. Since their Christologies appear to be fundamentally compatible, their different fortunes seem to point to a more profound difference, of the kind which would explain why Hervaeus's treatment of the matter fitted more convincingly with the Thomist outlook. Indeed, Thomist claims often conflicted with what Aquinas actually said, and what was recognized as 'Thomist' sometimes depended on what the leading Dominican of the time treated as distinguishing features in Aquinas's thought.⁸

For this study I will rely on the template presented by Richard Cross in his book *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*. In his examination of late thirteenth-century Christological accounts, Cross identifies two main models for understanding the hypostatic union: on the one hand, the 'substance-accident model', generally preferred by Franciscans, is based on the relation between a substance and its accidents as a suitable analogy for the relation between the assumed nature and the Word. On the other hand, the 'whole-part model', characteristically Thomist, rejects the substance-accident analogy as inappropriate, and sees the assumed nature rather as an essential part of the whole 'Christ'. Underlying each model is a distinct account of subsistence and of the relation between a substance and its accidents. I hope to spell out these metaphysical aspects as I examine the relevant Christologies.⁹

THE 'THOMIST' CENSURE AGAINST DURANDUS

The most relevant article for our purposes is article 126, on the question of Christ's *esse*.¹⁰ It reads as follows:

⁸ Indeed, Hervaeus's reading of Aquinas's Christology became standard among fourteenth-century Dominicans. See for example Ioannes de Neapoli, *Quaestiones variae disputatae*, q. 9, ed. Neapoli 1618, in part. f. 83rb.

⁹ See Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, esp. pp. 33–50.

¹⁰ Interestingly, this article is not found in the more general 1314 list, nor is any reference to the question of the unicity of Christ's *esse*. This suggests that Durandus's solution to the question was not perceived as unorthodox, but rather as a matter of Thomist interpretation.

Within the same distinction [6] question 2, whether in Christ there is only one being (*esse*), he [i.e. Durandus] maintains that, although in Christ there is only one subsistent being (*esse subsistentiae*), there is however [in Christ] a plurality of actual existent and in-existent beings (*plura esse actualis existentiae et inexistentialiae*),¹¹ and that the human nature in Christ possesses its own actual existent being. Contrary to Thomas, same distinction question 5, in which he inquires whether in Christ there is only one being (*esse*). Considering what he [i.e. Thomas] says in the body of the question, it appears (*videtur sentire*) that it is not the case that in Christ there is a plurality of substantial beings (*esse substantialia*), not only of subsistent being (*subsistentiae*), but also non-subsistent being (*existentiae*). Likewise, he says in the last part that, if the human nature were to arrive in the divine person accidentally, then there would certainly be a plurality of beings (*esse*). But since [the human nature] is assumed in the unity of the *suppositum*, there is [in Christ] only one being (*esse*)—although to this argument master Hervaeus responds by asserting a plurality of beings (*esse*) in Christ, claiming that Thomas posits a plurality of beings (*esse*) in Christ in the ninth *Quodlibet* q. 3, and likewise in *Quaest. disp. De Unione Verbi*.¹²

This article contains the main strands of the medieval Christological debate. It reveals awareness of the contrast between the two models for the hypostatic union; it draws the link between the question of Christ's

¹¹ As I hope to show in the following section, Durandus uses the terms *esse existentiae* and *esse inexistentialiae* to designate subsistent being and non-subsistent being respectively, understanding both as *actual* beings. The 'existential being' of a complete substance is substantial being. 'In-existence' refers to a condition of dependence which is prior to inherence, so that 'in-existent' beings include, but are not restricted to, inherent accidents. See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 224vb–225ra, n. 15.

¹² "Articulis in quibus magister Durandi deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae", ed. J. Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2, Roma 1973, p. 96: "[126] Eadem d. q. 2, utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse, tenet quod, licet in Christo non sit nisi unum esse subsistentiae, sunt tamen plura esse actualis existentiae et inexistentialiae, et quod humana natura in Christo habet proprium esse actualis existentiae. Contra Thomam eadem d. q. 5, ubi quaerit, utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse. Consideratis hiis quae dicit in corpore quaestionis videtur sentire non esse in Christo plura esse substantialia, non solum subsistentiae, sed nec existentiae. Item etiam dicit in ultima parte quod, si natura humana adveniret personae divinae accidentaliter, veraciter essent plura esse. Nunc autem quia in unitatem suppositi assumitur, non est ibi nisi unum esse, licet ad illud argumentum respondeat magister Hervaeus sustinens in Christo plura esse, et dicat quod Thomas ponit in Christo plura esse nono Quodlibet q. 3; item in q. disp. De unione Verbi". Cf. art. 125: "D. 6 a. 1, utrum in Christo sit pluralitas suppositorum, in secundo articulo positionis recitat et sustinet opinionem quae dicit quod Christus absolute loquendo non debet dici nec unum nec plura sed cum determinatione. Contra Thomam, eadem d. q. 4 in corpore, q. 2, et in solutione ad ultimum argumentum".

human *esse* and the issue of the ontological status of accidents; and it brings to the fore the ambiguity in Aquinas's account of the hypostatic union. In attempting to unravel these strands we could begin by first looking at how Pierre de la Palud, to whom we owe this article, understands the situation. Pierre appears to follow Aquinas's standard view that *esse* is a feature of a *suppositum* and not of a nature. According to Pierre's reading, it is not the case that in Christ there is a plurality of actual beings (*esse*), whether subsistent (*subsistentiae*) or non-subsistent (*existentiae*). In Christ there is only one being, the substantial being corresponding to the divine *suppositum*.¹³ The nature does not add any *esse* to the *suppositum*, and hence the equation, also found in Aquinas, which links the plurality-of-*esse* claim to an accidental union. For if the human nature is treated as an accident which contributes its own *esse*, the resulting union would then be accidental and not substantial. Pierre's reading thus appears to confirm that Aquinas's reasons for rejecting the substance-accident analogy are connected to his reasons for rejecting the *habitus* theory—the theory, that is, according to which the human nature is as it were an accident of the divine person which does not however inhere or entail any changes *in* the Word.¹⁴

Instead, Aquinas prefers to explain the hypostatic union in terms of a whole-part analogy. The advantage he sees over the substance-accident model is that in a whole-part union the part does not actualize any passive potency in the concrete whole, a threat he sees more patent in the relation between a substance and an accident.¹⁵ Whereas an accident informs its substance by communicating its own sort of *esse*, a part does not contribute any *esse* to its *suppositum* but rather shares in its existence. Together, the parts compose the one *esse* of the whole concrete *suppositum*.¹⁶ Likewise in the Incarnation, the human nature is a 'part' of the 'whole' which is the divine *suppositum*. The nature 'informs' the *suppositum* by sharing in its existence, in virtue of which the divine *suppositum* is then said to belong to the human kind.¹⁷

¹³ See Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, III, q. 2, art. 2; q. 17, art. 2.

¹⁴ Along with the *homo assumptus* and subsistence theories, the *habitus* theory is one of the current solutions to the hypostatic union reported by the Lombard in his *Sentences*, III, dist. 6, c. 4, nn. 1–3.

¹⁵ See Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, I, q. 3, art. 6.

¹⁶ See Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, III, q. 17, art. 2; *Quodl.* IX, q. 3. See also Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, pp. 52–54.

¹⁷ See Thomas Aq., *Summa theol.*, I, q. 76, art. 8.

The whole-parts analogy provided however a double-edged advantage. Parts do not actualize a passive potency (like accidents do in their substances) because they have no *esse* of their own.¹⁸ But this would entail that parts, unlike accidents, are *essential* (i.e. necessary) to the whole, with the unwelcome theological result that the human nature is an essential part of the divine *suppositum*. Aquinas would then be treading dangerously close to monophysitism, which claims that Christ's divine and human attributes count as parts of one composite nature. The difficulty with the whole-parts model is that parts must be explained as parts of a person but not of a nature. Aquinas's account meets this condition only unsatisfactorily, yielding one nature with two kinds of attributes, in contrast to the whole required by the Chalcedonian definition of one person with two natures.¹⁹

Aquinas is not unaware of these problems, and he later expresses some reservations about the whole-part analogy. In his later work *De unione verbi incarnati* he rejects the whole-part analogy and claims that Christ's human nature contributes a 'secondary *esse*' (*esse secundarium*) to the Word—a way of claiming that the human nature somehow 'informs' the whole.²⁰ Like before, Aquinas disengages his account from any language of actualization, but this time he does so without committing himself to the whole-part model and the idea connected to it, that parts *share* in the existence of their *suppositum*—the idea that compromised the orthodoxy of the first, standard account. Interestingly,

¹⁸ For this reasoning, see Thomas Aq., *Quodl.* IX, qq. 2 and 3; *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2, n. 82.

¹⁹ On the closeness between some of Aquinas's statements and a monophysite explanation of the union, see Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, pp. 56–57, 60. See also R. Cross, "A Recent Contribution on the Distinction between Monophysitism and Chalcedonianism", *The Thomist* 65 (2001), pp. 361–383.

²⁰ Thomas Aq., *De unione verbi incarnati*, art. 4: "Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente. Accidentia enim et formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse in quantum eis aliquid subsistit [...] [A]liquae formae sunt quibus est aliquid ens non simpliciter, sed secundum quid [...] aliquae autem formae sunt quibus res subsistens simpliciter habet esse, quia videlicet constituunt esse substantiale rei subsistentis. In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei quae simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter substantificatur per naturam humanam, quia persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam [...]. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale, quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei [...] non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium. Si autem in Christo essent duo supposita, tunc utrumque suppositum haberet proprium esse sibi principale: et sic in Christo esset simpliciter duplex esse" (My italics). That is, the human *esse* predicated of the *suppositum* is not predicated of him primarily—i.e. as a substantial form—but 'secondarily'—i.e. as a dependent form.

the insight underlying this shift is similar to that which guides supporters of the substance-accident model.²¹

This is the Thomist line which Hervaeus claims to follow. In Pierre's article, Hervaeus is reported to assert that there is a plurality of *esse* in Christ. Pierre presents this as Hervaeus's own reading of Aquinas, whose authority Hervaeus claims by arguing that Aquinas's rejection of a human *esse* is merely a way of distancing himself from the *habitus* theory. Hervaeus thus attenuates Aquinas's rejection of a plurality of *esse* in Christ in an attempt to reconcile the Thomist view with the substance-accident model more current at the time and to which Hervaeus himself subscribes.²² According to Hervaeus, *esse* is a feature which natures and accidental forms can have, and on this assumption he claims that an accident communicates *esse* to its *suppositum*, such that in one substance we find the substantial *esse* which belongs to it properly, and the accidental *esse* which it has by virtue of the accident depending on it.²³ And just like the accident of whiteness does not multiply the

²¹ See Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, pp. 62–64.

²² See Hervaeus Natalis, *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, pp. 295b–296a: “Dicunt aliqui quod licet necessarium esset esse sequi naturam humanam, tamen quia assumpta est ad esse alterius suppositi, ideo caret in Christo proprio esse. Quia impossibile est in eodem supposito esse plura esse substantialia, quia tunc essent plura supposita. Et volunt imponere hoc scilicet Thomae, qui videtur verba sua hoc sonare, quia secundum eum impossibile est in eodem supposito esse plura esse simpliciter [...]. Quod autem haec, et non alia immediate posita, fuerit de mente sancti Thomae, patet respicienti ipsum in nono *Quolibet* q. 2 articulo primo et secundo, ex hoc quod semper in fine deductionum suarum concludit quod non est in Christo nisi unum esse personale. Sed quia ipse dicit in tertia parte quod si natura humana adveniret personae divinae accidentaliter essent ibi plura esse, nunc autem, quia in unitate suppositi assumitur, non est ibi nisi unum esse simpliciter suppositi sive personale. Ex quo videtur quibusdam quod intentio eius sit quod actus essendi naturae humanae nullo modo manet, nec scilicet ut inesse, quia tunc esset accidentale [...]. Sed hoc dicentes *non attendunt differentiam inter accidere quod convenit accidenti proprie dicto, sicut albedo dicitur accidere homini, et accidere substantiae secundum quod una substantia dicitur accidentaliter advenire alteri, sicut vestis advenit homini*. Quia plurificato primo cui advenit esse, non plurificatur esse suppositi [...]. Sed quando una substantia advenit accidentaliter alteri, ut vestis homini, non tollitur diversum esse suppositi ex tali accidente [...]. Unde homo et vestis sunt duo supposita [...]. Similiter, si humana natura quae substantia quaedam est, adveniret accidentaliter personae divinae, sicut vestis advenit homini, tunc essent duo esse suppositi, et duo esse simpliciter...” (My italics).

²³ Hervaeus Natalis, *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, pp. 294b–295a. See also *Quodl.* VIII, q. 5, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 149vb: “Esse autem consequitur omnem naturam humanam naturaliter [...]. Unde quot sunt naturae aliquo istorum modorum existentis [i.e. accidentalis] in Christo, tot sunt ibi in esse”; cf. also *Quodl.* III, q. 6, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 76rb: “[O]pinio quam credo veriore est quod natura et suppositum differunt sicut diversae res quantum ad quamcumque naturam quae alteri innititur, sicut omnis natura accidentalis in creaturis et natura humana in Christo, quia tales

substances in the man who is white, in the Incarnation Christ's human nature has its own *esse* which does not count as a distinct substance because it exists in a relation of dependence with the Word.²⁴

In claiming Thomist ancestry, however, Hervaeus appears to overlook the fundamental divergence between Aquinas's view and the idea, decidedly non-Thomist, that the nature communicates its own *esse* to the *suppositum*. To this extent Hervaeus's theory seems to have more in common with the views defended by theologians who accept the substance-accident model. That Hervaeus nevertheless preserved his reputation as a leading Thomist—only reconfirmed by Pierre's manifest respect for his opinion alongside Aquinas's—reveals that defending one *esse* in Christ was not perceived as a necessary condition for claiming Thomist allegiance on Christological matters. But before examining what was really at stake in later interpretations of Aquinas, I would first like to consider what Durandus had to say on the subject.

naturae innituntur alteri in suo esse". Interesting for what it reveals of Hervaeus's interpretation of Aquinas's theory of subsistence, see Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 6, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 76ra–b: "Si autem ponatur secundo modo quod *suppositum* dicat non compositum ex natura et esse, sed naturam coniunctam ipsi esse, tunc *suppositum* praedicabitur de natura et e converso. Nam natura coniuncta ipsi esse est natura et e converso. *Nec est ista opinio fratris Thomae, ut quodam volunt dicere, et hoc patet ex suo nono Quodlibet, ubi quaerit an suppositum et natura differant in angelis*" (My italics).

²⁴ Hervaeus Natalis, *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647, p. 295a: "Dicunt ergo quod esse humanae naturae remansit in Christo non sub ratione esse simpliciter sive sub ratione subsistendi, sed sub ratione inessendi. Quia illud esse non est ipsius naturae in se, quia ipsa non est; sed est ens in ordine ad aliud cui innuitur". See also Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 5, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 149vb: "[I]n Christo sunt plura in esse. Plura autem subsistere non possunt esse in Christo, quia subsistere est per se et non in alio aliquo praedictorum modorum existere. Unde quod subsistit nec est in alio, sicut est natura humana Christi in supposito divino; nec est in alio, sicut accidens in subiecto [...]. In Christo autem non est nec esse potest nisi unum suppositum; et ideo non est ibi nisi unum subsistere. *Et hoc ut credo est intentio doctoris venerabilis, scilicet Thomae, quia dicit quod esse simpliciter quod pertinet ad suppositum, quod scilicet est ipsum subsistere in Christo, non est nisi unum, et illud unum existens habet relationem rationis ad naturam humanam, et natura humana relationem realem ad ipsum...*" (My italics); "Mihi videtur salvo meliori iudicio quod in Christo sint plura esse, et plura in esse sive in existere..." (*ibid.*); "[I]n Christo sunt plures naturae tales, puta natura humana et omnia accidentia existentia in ea. Ergo, in Christo sunt plura in esse" (*ibid.*). S. Brown, "Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries..." (cf. supra, note 2), pp. 230–231, identifies Godfrey of Fontaines's influence in Hervaeus's view of Christ's human *esse*, and claims that the predominant interpretation of Aquinas in the early fourteenth century originated with Godfrey of Fontaines. As we shall see, there are also distinctive Scotist elements in this interpretation, which suggest that more than an interpretation of Aquinas, these fourteenth century Thomists were attempting to update their doctor with the predominant current of thought of the day.

DURANDUS'S CHRISTOLOGY

Like most non-Thomist theologians by the late thirteenth century, Durandus subscribes to the substance-accident analogy as the most appropriate for explaining the relation between the assumed nature and the Word. The basic insight is that, like an accident, the human nature comes to a substance that is already complete in being,²⁵ but unlike an accident, the human nature does not *inform* the divine person because it does not actualize any potentialities in him.²⁶ For Durandus the appropriateness of this analogy relies on the distinction between absolute accidents—those accidents whose mode of being consists in inhering in their subjects—and relative accidents—accidents which merely ‘modify’ their foundations without inherence.²⁷

In Durandus's metaphysics there are absolute beings which possess an absolute essence, and relative beings which possess a relative essence. Unlike relative beings which are essentially modes of being ‘towards another’, absolute beings are things in themselves which do not formally include a reference towards something other.²⁸ As a mode, relation is not the sort of being which makes an accidental unity with anything,

²⁵ Durandus shares this insight: see *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 1, q. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 213vb, n. 14: “Sicut se habet accidens ad subiectum naturaliter, sic aliquo modo se habet naturam assumptibilis ad suppositum divinum supernaturaliter. Ipsa enim aliquo modo degenerat in accidens secundum doctores, quia advenit enim enti in actu”. See also Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 6, q. 1, n. 8; dist. 1, q. 1, n. 3; *Quodl.* XIX, nn. 13, 23.

²⁶ For the standard distinction between accidental dependence and accidental inherence for Christological accounts, see Bonaventura, *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3 and ad 4; dist. 5, q. 2, art. 1, ad 2. Bonaventure disengages these two functions of an accident by claiming that the relation between the human nature and the Word exists in the nature only, and not in the Word.

²⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In IV Sent.* [C], dist. 12, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 321vb–322ra, n. 4: “Intelligendum est quod accidentium quaedam sunt absoluta, quaedam respectiva. Vocatur respectivum illud cuius *essentia* est ad aliud habitudo, et esse ad aliud se habere, ut est relatio et quaecunque includunt respectum *essentialiter*. Absolutum autem est cuius *essentia* non est habitudo ad aliud nec esse eius est ad aliud se habere, sed est in se quaedam natura et non solum modus naturae, ut quantitas et qualitas” (My italics).

²⁸ See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* I, q. 1, ed. P.T. Stella, *Magistri D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano Quolibeta Avenionensia tria*, Zürich 1965, p. 48, 18–21: “Respectus, autem, et omnes modi essendi, sunt entia quia entis, non solum concomitative, sed etiam quidditative et formaliter, quia nullam entitatem habent, nisi eam quae est *huius...*” (My italics).

because relation does not inhere in its subject.²⁹ Relation and its subject exist in a metaphysical unity distinct from an inherent or absolute accidental one. That is, whereas it pertains to absolute accidents to *inform* their subjects by virtue of actualizing a passive potency, relative accidents *depend* on their foundations in the sense that the existence of the foundation is a necessary condition for the existence of a relation.³⁰ By drawing the main ontological division between absolute and relative rather than between substance and accidents, Durandus's new template made inherent accidents metaphysically closer to substances than to relative accidents. This enabled Durandus to disengage the function of inherence from that of dependence, with the theological benefit of guaranteeing the suitability of the substance-accident analogy for the hypostatic union.

Durandus understands this union as a relation of dependence between a non-subsistent nature and a subsistent *suppositum*. The subsistent *suppositum* is the term of the relation in both senses of 'terminating' or ending the dependence, and of being opposite the subject of the relation.³¹ As Durandus articulates his position:

²⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* II, q. 1, ed. Stella, pp. 174,20–175,2: "Et potest hoc probari sic: si relatio, vel quicumque modus essendi, faceret compositionem cum eo, cuius est modus essendi, hoc esset quia unum eorum inhaeret alteri, scilicet respectus vel modus, et aliud esset illud cui respectus vel modus inhaeret. Sed istud non potest esse. Ergo, etc. Maior patet. Probatio minoris, quia illud quod est in alio ut ei inhaerens, est res habens modum, et non est modus solum. Ex quo enim est, res est saltem large loquendo, et quia est in alio inhaerenter, modum habet essendi. Sed respectus est modus solum, et non res modum habens [...] [E]rgo, ei non competit esse in alio, modo quo ex talibus fit compositio". Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 30, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 84vb, n. 15.

³⁰ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* II, q. 1, ed. Stella, p. 175,7–14: "[I]psis, autem, non competit esse per se vel in alio vel ad aliud denominative, sed sunt tales modi essendi per se et essentialiter. Unde prius esset negandum quod nihil esset essentialiter respectus, quam esset ponendum quod illud quod est pure et essentialiter respectus, esset in alio subiective vel inhaerenter. Esset, enim, processus in infinitum. Sic, igitur, patet quod talis respectus et quicumque realis modus essendi non facit compositionem cum suo fundamento, etiam in creaturis, et multo minus in divinis, ubi minus differunt respectus et fundamentum". See also *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 30, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 84va–b, nn. 14–16; *In IV Sent.* [C], dist. 12, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 322ra, n. 5: "Est autem inter haec accidentia duplex differentia. Prima est, quod accidens absolutum est quaedam natura in se cui competit aliquis modus essendi. Accidens autem respectivum solum est modus essendi alterius partis. Secunda differentia est, quia *accidentia absoluta proprie dicuntur esse in subiecto*, sed *respectiva* in illa natura in qua immediate sunt *magis dicuntur esse sicut in fundamento quam sicut in subiecto*" (My italics).

³¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 3, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 225va, n. 5: "Alio modo sit talis compositio per solam dependentiam habitudinis

According to a third way [of understanding how the human nature can be accidentally united to the divine person], something can be said to arrive accidentally because it arrives in an actual being (*enti*) without inherence, changing into (*cedens*) the same thing according to *suppositum* with that in which it arrives, just as a new branch is grafted into a tree completely (*perfecte*). And in this way the human nature can be said to arrive accidentally in the divine person, because it changes into (*cedit*) the same thing according to *suppositum*, and arrives in an actual complete being (*enti*) without the inherence of one in the other.³²

The image of grafting conveys the basic insight shared by those who subscribe to this model, that the human nature comes to a substance that is already complete in being. The human nature, like a new branch, is 'grafted into' the divine person without effecting any changes in him.³³ The pivotal point in this passage is the claim that the human nature 'changes into', or yields to, the divine *suppositum* (*cedit in idem secundum suppositum*). Durandus's emphasis on this point is intended to correct a theologically undesirable reading of the substance-accident model, mainly the claim—voiced by Aquinas—that understanding the human nature as an accident entails that it is united to the Word accidentally, and is thereby tantamount to some version of the *habitus* theory. The image of grafting is made to correct this view by conveying the idea that the nature's arrival in an already complete being is without inherence. The union is therefore not accidental—i.e. according

relative, ita ut unum sit inexistens, aliud vero subsistens terminans respectum et dependentiam inexistens...

³² Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 226ra, n. 7: "Tertio modo [intelligendi naturam humanam uniri accidentaliter personae divinae], potest dici aliquid advenire accidentaliter, quia advenit enti in actu completo absque inhaerentia, cedens in idem secundum suppositum cum eo cui advenit, sicut si ramus novus inseratur arbori perfecte. Et hoc modo natura humana potest dici advenire accidentaliter personae divinae, quia cedit in idem secundum suppositum, et advenit enti in actu completo absque inhaerentia unius ad alterum".

³³ Durandus is prepared to recognize some advantages in the *habitus* theory: it captures the idea of the human nature coming to an already complete substance; and the analogy of 'clothing' suggests that the human nature adapts itself to the divine person, such that it depends on him without bringing any changes in him. See *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 4, ad 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 226ra, n. 9: "[N]atura humana in Christo, quam non adveniat Verbo extrinsece per modum habitus, comparatur tamen habitui propter duo. Primum est, quia advenit personae divinae post esse completum et ut quaedam substantia non inhaerens, sicut vestis est quaedam substantia quae advenit homini in esse completo. Secundum est, quia vestimentum coaptatur et aliquo modo mutatur secundum figuram corpori. Sic natura humana coaptatur et aliquo modo mutatur secundum congruentiam divinae personae, quia [natura humana] caret proprio subsistere et inexistit in persona divina prout personae divinae congruit".

to inherence—for while it is true that the human nature depends on the Word, it is not true that it actualizes any potentiality in the divine person.³⁴

According to Durandus, Christ's human nature has its own distinct existence which is distinct from the substantial existence of the divine *suppositum*.³⁵

That the human nature in Christ should have its own being (*esse*) beyond the being (*esse*) of the *suppositum*, is more suitable than that an accident should have its own being (*esse*) in its subject beyond the being (*esse*) of the subject. Therefore, the human nature in Christ has its own being

³⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 225vb, n. 6: "Alio modo [intelligendi naturam humanam uniri accidentaliter personae divinae], dicitur aliquid advenire alicui accidentaliter, quia advenit enti in actu, cedens in unum secundum suppositum, quia inhaeret ei cui advenit. Et isto modo non videtur possibile, quod [...] [persona divina] non potest esse subiectum alicuius inhaerentiae...". Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 225vb, n. 5: "Naturam humanam uniri accidentaliter personae divinae potest intelligi multipliciter. Uno modo, quod natura humana, quae est substantia in sui unione, transeat seu convertatur in naturam accidentis. Et ille modo forte non est possibilis [...], [quia] secundum eum non potest salvari incarnatio secundum quam dicitur homo natus, passus, et mortuus, quia per naturam accidentis ista non possunt de filio Dei verificari". Cf. *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 7, q. 1, ad 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 226vb, n. 11: "Ista est vera 'Deus est homo' [...] magis proprie posset dici per accidens quam per se, quia omnis propositio vera per se vera est cum reduplicatione termini supra se. [...] Sed non potest dici quod Deus secundum quod Deus est homo, quia quod importatur formaliter in nomine Dei non est ratio convenientiae praedicati cum subiecto, sed sola unitas suppositi, quae etiam in propositionibus per accidens est tota causa verificationis. Propter quod talis propositio magis est dicta per accidens quam per se, non propter hoc quod humana natura sit accidens, aut adveniat inhaerenter vel extrinsece ad modum habitus, sed quia advenit enti in actu...". True Christological predication thus ultimately rests on the unity of *suppositum*.

³⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 224vb–225ra, n. 15: "Tertius modus est [...] quem credo verum esse, scilicet quod in Christo est aliquo modo tantum unum esse, et aliquo modo plura. Ad cuius intelligentiam sciendum est quod sicut ens commune est, communitate analogiae ad substantiam et ad accidentis praedicamenta, et in ipsa dividitur et de ipsis praedicatur, sic nomen essentiae commune est ad substantiam, quantitatem, qualitatem, et sic de aliis, et in ipsa dividitur et de ipsis praedicatur. [...] Et sicut substantia est ens et essentia per se subsistens, quantitas autem et quodlibet aliud accidens *non est ens nec essentia per se subsistens, sed potius inexistens, hoc est, in alio existens. Utrumque tamen tam substantia quam accidens dicuntur alias essentia entia et ens*, sic esse existentiae substantiae completae dicitur esse subsistentiae. [...] Hoc viso patet quod *esse existentiae, si solum accipiat pro esse subsistentiae, de quo simpliciter et per prius dicitur*, sic in Christo, et in quolibet supposito uno non est nisi unicum. Si vero esse existentiae extensive accipiat pro omni eo de quo dicitur sive per prius sive per posterius, sic in Christo et in quolibet supposito creato in quo est aliqua natura creata materialis sunt plura esse, quorum unum est esse subsistentiae, reliqua vero omnia sunt esse inexistentiae" (My italics).

(*esse*) beyond the being (*esse*) of the *suppositum*... [B]ecause if an accident did not have another being (*esse*) in its subject beyond the being (*esse*) of the subject, then it would not be separable from its subject without being corrupted by losing all the being (*esse*) which it previously had.³⁶

Christ has a plurality of actual *esses* on account of the two natures, but only one substantial *esse* because he is only one person.³⁷ Thus, unlike Aquinas but like Hervaeus, Durandus does not subscribe to the theory that makes *esse* the mark of subsistence, for *esse* is a feature that non-subsistent beings such as modes can have. In Durandus's account, what makes a thing subsistent is not actual existence but independence.³⁸ Independence is the mode of being of a thing which exists of itself and does not formally involve a respect towards something other. Therefore, only absolute—i.e. non-relational—things are subsistent.³⁹ For Durandus, then, the distinction between a nature and a *suppositum* is drawn not in terms of *esse* but in terms of—the acquisition of—a mode of being.⁴⁰

³⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 225ra, n. 17: "Magis competit naturae humanae in Christo habere proprium esse praeter esse suppositi, quam competat accidenti habere proprium esse in subiecto praeter esse subiecti. Sed accidens habet proprium esse in subiecto praeter esse subiecti. Ergo, natura humana in Christo habet proprium esse praeter esse suppositi. [...] Quia si accidens non haberet in subiecto aliud esse praeter esse subiecti, tunc non posset a subiecto separari, nisi corrumpereetur eo quod amitteret totum esse quod prius habuisset".

³⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 2, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 225ra, n. 16: "Esse subsistentiae sequitur naturam per se subsistentem, vel secundum quam suppositum est per se subsistens. Sed tales naturae non possunt plurificari in uno supposito, quia quae differunt secundum subsistentiam differunt secundum suppositum. Ergo, in uno supposito non possunt esse plura esse subsistentiae". Cf. *In III Sent.* [C], dist. 6, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 224rb, n. 17: "Natura divina et humana sint plura entia simpliciter et in actu...".

³⁸ Likewise in Henry of Ghent's later account (post-1286), according to which independence is a sufficient condition for being a *suppositum*. See Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* X, q. 8.

³⁹ See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In IV Sent.* [C], dist. 12, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 321vb–322ra, n. 4: "Absolutum autem est cuius essentia non est habitudo ad aliud nec esse eius est ad aliud se habere, sed est in se quaedam natura et non solum modus naturae, ut quantitas et qualitas".

⁴⁰ See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quol. Aven.* II, q. 1, p. 175,3–4: "Res per se subsistens est res absoluta, habens talem modum essendi ex sua independentia". Again, this sounds very much like Henry of Ghent. Henry also believes that the change from non-subsistence to subsistence is a modal one. What a nature gains over the change to subsistence is an additional mode of being. In the Incarnation, Henry would therefore claim that the assumed nature has the mode of an accident, whereas an independent nature has the mode of a substance. See Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* X, q. 8.

If by virtue of the mode of being 'in itself' a *suppositum* has a natural tendency to subsist,⁴¹ it must then be explained how the assumed nature, as individual, lacks the inclination to subsist which would make it a *suppositum*. Durandus's solution to the subsistence problem is one which had been current since the mid-thirteenth century:⁴² if we accept that the human nature is individual, in order to explain how it can fail to be a human person, non-assumption must be taken as a necessary condition for subsistence. As Durandus expounds it, parts as well as inherent or dependent wholes are abstract forms, and as such do not subsist of themselves but only as contracted or 'possessed' by a concrete form. Thus, although the human nature is an individual nature in the category of substance, it is nevertheless an *assumed* nature, and as such it stands for the human species and not for the concrete *suppositum* 'man'.⁴³ That is, the assumed nature does not constitute a natural union with the divine *suppositum* such that would result in an individual man; the union is rather hypostatic, in that the only *suppositum* is the divine. As Durandus puts it, the assumed nature 'degenerates' into an accident, since it does not gather the sufficient conditions for constituting a (human) *suppositum*, but rather depends on a *suppositum* of another nature.⁴⁴

Summing up: the guiding assumption in Durandus's Christology is that non-subsistent beings such as relative accidents can have *actual* existence and are individual independently from the substance on which they depend. This assumption enabled Durandus to adopt and

⁴¹ See Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 26, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 74va, n. 6: "[S]uppositum proprie dictum est quid subsistens completum completionem ultima in natura illa [...]. [S]uppositum est illud quod subsistit per se [...] [Suppositum] significat ut habens, non ut res habita..."

⁴² See Cross, *The Metaphysics...*, p. 242.

⁴³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 34, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 92vb, n. 26: "Natura humana in Christo est natura et non suppositum, non propter hoc quod natura et suppositum vel concretum et abstractum important diversa de principali significato, sed quia concretum ex modo significandi intelligitur ut habens. Quod autem innititur alteri non est habens ut sic, sed potius habitum. Propter quod natura humana in Christo non dicitur homo sed humanitas".

⁴⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], dist. 34, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 92va, n. 18: "[C]oncretum directe supponat pro habente formam, et non pro forma habita. Illud autem quod habet rationem partis vel inhaerentis vel alteri innitens habet rationem habiti et non habens. Ideo, tali non convenit nomen concretum. Propter quod natura humana in Christo, quia est alteri innitens et habita, non dicitur homo sed humanitas. Nec Filius Dei dicitur assumpsisse hominem sed humanitatem [...]. In Christo enim humanitas degenerat in accidens, quantum ad hoc non constituit suppositum proprium, sicut nec accidentia".

adapt the substance-accident analogy as a suitable explanation for the hypostatic union. However, Durandus's understanding of this model was informed by a metaphysics of absolute and relative accidents which ultimately distanced him from Hervaeus, who otherwise subscribed to the same general Christology. What ultimately dictated Hervaeus's use of a predominantly Franciscan model for the hypostatic union was a standard Aristotelian division between substances and inherent accidents which did not immediately recognize the notion of relative modes which neither subsist nor inhere.⁴⁵ What probably earned Durandus's Christology an entry in the censure list, therefore, was the alternative metaphysical template in which it was embedded.

This seems to be confirmed by Pierre's treatment of Durandus's view in the article above. In his report, Pierre brings to the fore the undesirable connection between the substance-accident model and the *habitus* theory (a connection which Aquinas makes), thus reading into Durandus's view a type of accidentality which Durandus's modal doctrine was designed to check. By contrast, in the brief reference to Hervaeus's position Pierre seems to allow for a valid interpretation of Aquinas's doctrine. In Pierre's reading, therefore, Durandus is *deviating* from Aquinas's teaching, while Hervaeus is offering an *interpretation* which, although at face value controversial, comes from a direction which is at least consistent with Thomist parameters. Admittedly, as Hervaeus saw it, the difference between his view and Aquinas's was not material but strategic: Aquinas distanced himself from using the language of accidentality for its unwelcome associations with the *habitus* theory.

⁴⁵ See for example Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodl.* III, q. 6, ed. Venetiis 1513, ff. 75vb–76ra (on the question of the connection between nature and *suppositum* in creatures): “Si dicat quod (suppositum) dicit aliquid ut modum realem rei non autem rem [...] an sit in re aliqua res aut nihil. Non est invenire medium, quia ista sunt contradictoria: aliqua res et nulla res. [...] Illud quod habet minimum de entitate non constituit ens perfectissimum sed affectio est huius cum resultet ex coniunctione accidentis cum subiecto et suppositum dicit ens completissimum”.

AUREOL AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE DISTINCTION OF REASON

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It is well known that the schoolmen were often occupied in differentiating between the possible meanings of sentences like “A is not B”, where A and B refer to simple terms, not to propositions. For this purpose, they devised several types of non-identity or distinction. The present paper calls attention to the taxonomy of the distinction of reason (*distinctio rationis*), which was meant to save opposite predicates from contradiction when real identity is supposed to obtain between their respective subjects, A and B. Although my study is to a certain degree about Pierre Aureol’s teaching on this issue, I shall not be inquiring directly into the position of Aureol as expounded in the first and the eighth distinction of his first book on the *Sentences* and in the fifth question of his *Quodlibet*. I shall rather focus on a dispute in the mid-17th century. This later source will give us the sense of Aureol’s being very much alive at that time. We thus suggest that it is worthwhile to have a look upon our 14th century author from this later perspective.

I. *DISTINCTIO RATIONIS RATIOCINATAE*

The question concerning what kind of distinction is to be drawn between a thing’s essential predicates that are neither inclusive nor included, e.g., ‘animal’ and ‘rational’, is a time-honored ontological issue. From about 1500 on, the distinction between a genus and its differentia began to be employed as the paradigm case for the so called *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*. This is to say: it is up to the mind to distinguish between animal and rational, yet in doing so the mind does not proceed arbitrarily, but operates on a foundation on the side of the object, i.e., it manifests different empirical effects and from this one can gather that their causes also are different. The distinction between animality and rationality thus became the paradigm case for the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* among those who embraced this type of a distinction, that is: among the Thomists. The Scotists, the champions of the *distinctio*

formalis, of course for the most part found it superfluous. The Franciscan friar Bartholomew Mastri (1602–73), however,¹ in his 1646 *Metaphysical Disputations* is far from questioning its usefulness. The “arguably most important 17th-century Scotist”² joins the Thomists in seeing a real need for this type of a distinction and many of his pages are devoted to the question, attempting to make sense of it from a Scotistic standpoint. Among several contemporary proposals reported by Mastri in his effort to provide the rationale of a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, there is one which is especially relevant here. Its author was the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo (d. 1664), whose two volumes of *Metaphysical Disputations* appeared in 1634–36.³

In order to explain how the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* works, that is to say, how it indicates a distinction in the object itself, without this distinction being mind-independent, Pasqualigo tells us that he means by ‘object’ any individual substance and then posits two modes of being for every object: real or extramental being on the one hand, objective or intentional being in the mind on the other. The object’s objective being is taken to be something distinct from the object in itself as well as from the mental activity. First, it is distinct from the object in itself, since an object’s mental representation often does not square with reality. The mind grasps something which as such is not contained in the object itself. From this fact it must be inferred that the object’s representation differs from the object itself, since the object in itself cannot vary in this way. Secondly, the object’s objective or intentional being must not be confused with the mental activity, since the act of knowing is not *what* is represented, but the *means* of representation. Thus, a mode of being must be granted, ‘objective being’, which is neither the mind’s formal concept nor the object in its real being. Pasqualigo goes on to draw two conclusions. His first

¹ Cf. M. Forlivesi, *Scotistarum Princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) e il suo tempo*, Padova 2002; C.H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 2, Firenze 1988, pp. 249–250; J. Schmutz, “Mastri da Meldola”, in *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, vol. 17, Herzberg 2000, pp. 905–909.

² W. Hübener, “Die Logik der Negation als ontologisches Erkenntnismittel”, in id., *Zum Geist der Prämoderne*, Würzburg 1985, pp. 52–83, here p. 53. Similarly W. Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, vol. 1, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1964, p. 435. As for Mastri’s total taxonomy of distinctions, cf. A. Poppi, “Il contributo dei formalisti padovani al problema delle distinzioni”, in id., *Problemi e figure della scuola scotista del Santo*, Padova 1966, pp. 601–790, here pp. 723–773.

³ Cf. M. Forlivesi, “La Distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif. Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri”, *Les études philosophiques* 60 (2002), pp. 3–30, here pp. 15 sqq.

conclusion: although a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* is said to have a real foundation, it is a mere mental phenomenon. It does not affect the object's real, extramental state, otherwise it would not be a distinction of reason at all. His second conclusion: nevertheless, the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* posits a distinction in the object, provided that 'object' in this case refers to the objective being in the mind. This intentional mode of being is not simple, but multiple according to the plurality of *rationes* into which one and the same object is divided by the mind. According to this multiple intentional mode of being, the distinct *rationes*, say genus and differentia, each of which has its own intentional being, are the products of the mental activities. Never are two *rationes* simultaneously the result of the same act of mind.⁴

I contend that this theory roughly squares with Aureol's approach in the eighth distinction of the first book of the *Sentences*.⁵ Particularly

⁴ "Pasqualigus tom. 2. Metaph. disp. 56. sect. 2 ut declarat, quomodo distinctio rationis ratiocinatae ponat distinctionem in obiecto, advertit, quod obiectum nedum considerari potest secundum esse reale, quod habet in seipso, sed etiam secundum esse obiectivum quod habet in intellectu, et consistit in eo, quod ipsi intellectui repraesentetur; quod autem hoc concedi debeat, tamquam aliquid distinctum tum ab obiecto prout habet esse in seipso, tum ab ipso actu intellectus, probat, quia obiectum aliter multoties repraesentatur, ac sit in seipso, et aliquid attingit intellectus quod re vera non est in obiecto, tum autem id quod repraesentatur, necessario concedendum est esse quid diversum ab obiecto, quia idem secundum idem non potest aliter atque aliter se habere, ut accidit in casu isto. Praeterea neque est ipse conceptus intellectus, quia conceptus intellectus non est id quod repraesentatur, sed ratio repraesentandi; cum autem intelligo Petrum, Petrus repraesentatus se habet ut quod, et tamquam obiectum. Quare concludit dari debere istud esse obiectivum, quod neque sit conceptus formalis intellectus, prout repraesentativus, neque sit obiectum ipsum secundum esse reale quod habet in seipso, sed sit obiectum quatenus intentionali modo continetur ab ipsa cognitione, tamquam a ratione manifestativa obiecti. His praemissis duas ponit conclusiones. Prima est, quod si obiectum consideratur secundum esse reale quod habet extra intellectum, distinctio rationis cum fundamento non cadit supra ipsum, quia etiamsi fiat cum fundamento in re, est merum opus intellectus, ita ut tantum habeat esse in ipso intellectu; ergo ex vi ipsius non potest poni aliqua distinctio in obiecto, prout habet esse extra intellectum, alioquin ista distinctio non haberet esse solum in intellectu. Altera conclusio est distinctionem istam rationis cum fundamento ponere distinctionem in obiecto, quatenus intentionali modo existit in intellectu, quia hoc esse intentionale non est unum, sed multiplex iuxta pluralitatem formalitatum, in quas ab intellectu dividitur idem simplex obiectum, et sic distinctae formalitates possunt secundum distincta esse intentionalia distinctas cognitiones terminare absque eo, quod una formalitas terminet cognitionem, quam terminat alia formalitas" (B. Mastrius – B. Bellutus, *Cursus philosophicus ad mentem Scoti*, Venezia 1727, vol. 4: *Disputationes in XII Aristotelis Stagiritae libros Metaphysicorum*. P.I., Disp. 6, 312). Considering the different editions of this work not reprinted since 1757, I quote the volume, the disputation and the paragraph. The *Metaphysics* has been composed by Mastri alone.

⁵ "Eadem [...] res intra animam obiective potest aliter et aliter se habere [...], quia intra animam oritur obiectiva alietas ex impressione diversa, facta in anima [...]. Sic

the ontological commitment in terms of an intermediate 'objective being' is noteworthy. As Professor Kobusch has pointed out, 'objective being' is "the central feature in Aureol's work".⁶ The only new feature is Pasqualigo's talk of *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*. Aureol's hypothesis of the realm of 'objective being' is taken to provide the rationale for that kind of a distinction of reason which is supposed to be more than an arbitrary fiction of the human mind.

Now Mastri utterly disapproves of this theory for three reasons, the first two of which are relevant to our discussion here:

First, the hypothesis of an 'objective being' distinct from the object's real being as well as from the intentional act itself is to be rejected, since this 'objective being' is nothing else but the object's being known. To be known, however, is a property which an object acquires only insofar as it is posited in the mind. For the object outside the mind, this 'being known' is an extrinsic denomination derived from the intentional act, and this extrinsic denomination is no third entity to be placed between the intentional act and its object. Rather, it is indistinct from both of them. Whether or not the object is known as it is in itself, its being known is a denomination of the intentional act having it as its term.⁷ Here Mastri obviously reasons along the same lines as Aureol's 14th-century adversaries had done, viz., William Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, who strongly rejected any reification of the thing's being known and therefore, instead of talking about modes

igitur in esse apparenti et obiectivo non est inconueniens, quod una et eadem res sit aliter et aliter..." (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sententiarum*, dist. 8, sect. 23, n. 166, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1956, pp. 1017–1018). Aureol was of the opinion that this accounts for the distinction between a genus ("color") and a differentia ("disgregativum"). See sect. 23, n. 88, ed. Buytaert, p. 999; n. 138, ed. Buytaert, pp. 1008–1009.

⁶ T. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache*, Leiden 1987, p. 141.

⁷ "Haec tamen explicatio non placet neque idonea est ad praesentem difficultatem declarandam, nam in primis falsum est dari debere illud esse obiectivum et intentionale ut quid diversum ab ipsa entitate physica obiecti, et a cognitione ut ad ipsum terminata, ut ait Pasqualigus, quia illud esse obiectivum et intentionale, ut ipsemet fatetur, aliud non est, quam esse cognitum quod habet obiectum ex vi cognitionis prout in intellectu existit; sed esse cognitum in obiecto ponit tantum extrinsecam quandam denominationem realiter ab ipso obiecto indistinctam, et a cognitione prout ad ipsum terminata, in communi fere omnium sententia: ergo etc. Et hoc quidem verum est, sive obiectum cognoscatur, ut est in seipso, sive aliter ac sit in seipso, nam semper esse cognitum dicit denominationem cogniti in obiecto derelictam ex terminatione cognitionis ad illud" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 313).

of being,⁸ stressed the feature 'extrinsic denomination'. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the option for 'extrinsic denomination' in this epistemological context is not specifically nominalistic. This device was earlier employed by Godfrey of Fontaines, and afterwards also by Walter Burley and other philosophers with a strong realist commitment.⁹

Secondly, after having challenged the notion of 'objective being', Mastri goes to say that if an intentional act provides an abstract knowledge about 'animal', for instance, it is not satisfied by animal according to that objective being: but rather according to its real being.¹⁰ Animal according to its objective being would be 'animal-as-being-known'. The abstract notion of animal, however, does not include the animal's being known; it is not reflective knowledge. These are two different things: to have knowledge about an animal, and to have knowledge about the animal as being known. In order to make up the distinction between animal and rational, the direct act is sufficient. It suffices to entertain an abstract knowledge about an animal, one need not realize that the notion of animal prescinds from the notion of rational.¹¹ This argument is confirmed by the following: If—in virtue of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*—a human being is conceived of as an animal, and rationality left out of consideration, animal is not conceived of according to its objective being, but according to its real being, since what is then at issue are the animal's metaphysical formalities as well as its empirical effects. Viewed in this way, 'animal' is not conceived of as prescinding from rational, but the act of conceiving of 'animal' is in

⁸ The notion of 'modes of being' (*modi essendi*) is equivocal enough. See S.K. Knebel, "Modus essendi/existendi", *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 36 (1993), pp. 7–42, here pp. 34 sqq.

⁹ See S.K. Knebel, "The Early Modern Rollback of Merely Extrinsic Denomination", in *Meeting of the Minds. The Relations Between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, ed. S.F. Brown, Turnhout 1998, pp. 317–331.

¹⁰ "Deinde falsum est cognitionem praecisam animalis v.g. terminari ad animal secundum illud esse obiectivum, quod habet ex vi cognitionis, et non potius secundum illud esse, quod habet a parte rei" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 313).

¹¹ "Probatur hoc, quia animal, ut cognitum, vel habens esse obiectivum in intellectu, dicit animal, ut subest cognitioni, vel cognitionem, ut terminatam ad animal; sed cognitio praecisiva animalis non attingit ipsam cognitionem, neque est reflexiva supra seipsam: ergo non terminatur ad animal ut cognitum, et ut substat illi esse intentionali. Maior patet. Probatur minor: quia sicut aliud est cognoscere animal, aliud cognoscere animal esse cognitum—primum namque fit per actum directum, aliud vero per actum reflexum—, ita quoque aliud est praescindere animal a rationali, et aliud cognoscere animal esse praecisum a rationali, nam hoc secundum fieri nequit sine actu reflexivo, sed ad primum sufficit actus rectus, et illud quidem satis est ad distinctionem ratiocinatam constituendam" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 313).

itself prescinding from rational. Therefore, in order to establish the fact that the object itself is affected by the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, one must mistakenly assume that one and the same real object due to its own multiple intentional existences is able to ground a plurality of acts of knowledge.¹²

Mastri's refutation of what might well be labeled Aureol's position, rests on two assumptions. On the one hand, the reification of the objective being is rejected: objective being is not an additional world distinct from thinking. On the other hand, it is maintained that even such entities, whose distinction is no more than an instance of a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, do not imbibe objective being. Apparently, Scotists, like Mastri, cared little for the glories Aureol had revelled in, viz. the refinements of the metaphysical analysis, which spring from the added modification of the object itself brought about in the mind's purview.

This, however, is only part of the story.

II. AUREOL IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Aureol's influence over the centuries is a matter we are certainly not yet prepared to ascertain adequately. There is no doubt that it was considerable, but it is not easy to trace. The *terminus a quo*, the salient features in Aureol's work itself, as well as the possible *termini ad quem* are equally not well known, and it can only be hoped that this obscurity will gradually clear up from one source, namely, by the ongoing endeavour to provide Aureol's work with the same accessibility which the writings of some of his 14th century peers enjoy since decades, if not

¹² "Confirmatur, quia quando ex vi distinctionis ratiocinatae cognoscitur animal in homine non cognito rationali, tunc non cognoscitur animal secundum aliquod esse intentionale, quod habeat ex vi cognitionis, sed secundum aliquod esse reale, licet per talem actum non cognoscatur ut praecisum actualiter a rationali—quia ad hoc requiritur actus reflexus—, sed eo ipso actu praescinditur a rationali: ergo falsum est ex vi distinctionis ratiocinatae derivari distinctionem in obiecto praecise, quatenus intentionali modo existit in intellectu, et hac ratione idem obiectum reale secundum diversa esse intentionalia posse diversas terminare cognitiones. Probatur assumptum (nam consequentia patet), quia in praecisione animalis a rationali cognosco animal, secundum quod est substantia animata, sensitiva, et secundum quod ei conveniunt operationes sensitivae; sed haec et similia praedicata ei competunt, secundum quod est a parte rei, non autem secundum aliquod esse obiectivum et intentionale" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 313).

centuries.¹³ As for other sources of his influence, we can distinguish conveniently between critical and positive responses. Those who turned a critical eye to Aureol were William Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Ioannes Canonicus, Gregory of Rimini, and Alphonsus Vargas. A more sympathetic reading is found in the writings of Ioannes Capreolus's, whose merits in having handed down Aureol are well known.¹⁴ Capreolus, the 15th-century "prince of the Thomists" was a champion on behalf of Aureol.¹⁵ Professor Chris Schabel's reference to Nicholas Bonetus and his relationship to Aureol is also valuable¹⁶ as an appreciation closer to our 17th century study, since the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Bonetus's *cursum* seems to have reached its peak in the 16th century.

When we pick up the issue of Aureol's influence within the perspective of the 17th century, it is mainly due to the fact of Cardinal Sarnano's 1596/1605 edition of Aureol's *Sentences*. Beyond the appearance of this work, we might ask: who, in the scholastic context of the 17th century, was open at all to Aureol? As a first response to this question, we might say that it does not seem that the edition of Aureol's work had the same effect as the 1618 edition of Baconthorpe's *Sentences*. This latter edition is known to have brought about a rupture within the Carmelites, whose outlook till then had been strongly Thomistic. With the publication of Baconthorpe's text in the second half of the 17th century Carmelite textbooks "ad mentem Ioannis Bachonis" began to flourish. *Prima facie*, nothing similar can be said to have happened within the Franciscan order with the publication of Aureol's work. Rather, Aureol

¹³ How extraordinarily difficult this task is may be gathered from L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the *Sentences*", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden 2002, pp. 149–219. Nielsen holds (p. 210) that Aureol was working on and co-ordinating two separate commentaries on the first book of the *Sentences* at the same time.

¹⁴ His extensive quotations cannot be dispensed with even in regard to those portions of the *Scriptum* which have been edited by Buytaert. One instance: Compare Buytaert's edition on Aureol's doctrine on the 'propositio per se nota' (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 2, sect. 10, nn. 101–108) with the excellent text given by Ioannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae D. Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. C. Paban – T. Pègues, vol. 1, Tours 1900, repr. 1967, pp. 145b and 146b–147a.

¹⁵ See Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache*, p. 155.

¹⁶ See C. Schabel, "Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's *Sentences* Commentary", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 117–161, here pp. 140–141. Additionally, compare Aureol's doctrine on the concept of being (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 2, sect. 9, nn. 51 sqq., ed. Buytaert, pp. 484 sqq.) with N. Bonetus, *Quatuor volumina*, ed. Venetiis 1505, fol. 38va–b.

was embraced by many individual figures outside the Franciscan tradition, particularly by Spanish Jesuits. Antonio Perez (1599–1649), e.g., extolled Aureol as “the acutest of all theologians and philosophers I ever read”.¹⁷ Aureol had a certain appeal for the conceptualist tendencies which were en vogue in the Jesuit scholasticism. Mastri himself, the “prince of the Scotists”, bore witness thereto, when he declared in the preface of his huge 1646/47 *Metaphysical Disputations* that his chief objective was to defend Scotism against an adversary who till then had been undeservedly neglected: Aureol. For Aureol, says Mastri on more than one occasion, had become the “*Promptuarium Neotericorum*”.¹⁸ This 17th-century Scotist could no longer afford to ignore Aureol, if Scotism was to have a future. When we consider that Mastri’s remark regarding the dissemination of Aureol’s thought might equally well apply to an indefinite number of figures from still less known quarters than those of the Jesuits, e.g., to the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo, we can imagine, how much is still to be done to see the spread of Aureol’s influence. Indeed, the task is complex, and we must not presume that the scholastic mainstream of Thomism and Scotism remained unaffected by Aureol’s thought. Following upon my summary of Mastri’s criticism of Aureol’s impact in the theory of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, I would like to give a specimen of what we might call Aureol’s ‘undercover presence’ regarding a related topic in the *Metaphysical Disputations* of the very same Mastri who seemed to be so uncompromising an adversary of Aureol.

¹⁷ For Perez’s, Ruiz de Montoya’s (d. 1632) and Oviedo’s (d. 1651) appreciation of Aureol, see S.K. Knebel, “Necessitas moralis ad optimum (III). Naturgesetz und Induktionsproblem in der Jesuitenscholastik während des zweiten Drittels des 17. Jhs.”, *Studia Leibnitiana* 24 (1992), pp. 182–215, here p. 194; id., *Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550–1700*, Hamburg 2000, pp. 23–24; T. Ramelow, *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl. Die Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen A. Perez S.J. und G.W. Leibniz*, Leiden 1997, p. 67; J. Schmutz: “Dieu est l’idée. La métaphysique d’Antonio Perez entre Néo-Augustinisme et Crypto-Spinozisme”, *Revue thomiste* 103 (2003), pp. 495–526, here p. 513.

¹⁸ “...cuius [sc. Aureoli] vestigiis inhaerere non erubescit tota fere famosa schola Jesuitarum, qui suas praecipuas sententias modumque illas defendendi ab acutissimo Aureolo desumpserunt, unde non abs re tantum Doctorem [...] ‘*Promptuarium Neotericorum*’ appellavimus” (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 33; cf. *Logica* 8, 49). This sentence got some celebrity. It is quoted by the church historian E. Noris, *Vindiciae Augustinianae* (1673), PL 47, col. 691A.

III. *DISTINCTIO RATIONIS RATIOCINANTIS*

What exactly is to be understood by a 'distinction of reason' is a subject which had often been addressed but had not been settled during the 14th century.¹⁹ Pierre de la Palud and Gregory of Rimini distinguished long arrays of possible meanings. Interestingly enough, Peter Aureol was one of the first who proposed a dichotomy, claiming that certain distinctions of reason arise from the intellect itself and some from the nature of the object.²⁰ He thus rejected the commonly held view that a distinction of reason must have some foundation in the object in order not to be useless.²¹ Aureol's rejection of this requirement,²² however, is far from being unambiguous, since what he himself put forth as a distinction that springs from the intellect went along with his broad notion of an 'identity of repetition'²³ and thus accounted for the fact that "one extramental thing can serve as the basis for a whole set of universal concepts".²⁴ This suggests that it did not really differ from what people afterwards would call a 'virtual' distinction or a '*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*'.

¹⁹ See S.K. Knebel, "Entre Logique mentaliste et métaphysique conceptualiste. La *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*", *Les études philosophiques* 61 (2002), pp. 145–168.

²⁰ "...distinctio rationis quaedam oritur ex ipso intellectu, [...] et quaedam oritur ex natura rei..." (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 8, sect. 23, n. 124, ed. Buytaert, p. 1006).

²¹ "...omnis differentia rationis, nisi sit falsa et vana, oportet quod habeat fundamentum in re, licet sit ab intellectu completive" (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 8, sect. 23, n. 18, ed. Buytaert, p. 972). As for Godfrey of Fontaine himself (cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 1, ed. M. de Wulf – J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1914 (Les Philosophes Belges, III), p. 273), one might question, whether he really held this position. It is to be found, however, in Durandus de S. Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 3, n. 15, ed. Venetiis 1571, repr. 1964, f. 18vb. Cf. also Ioannes Canonicus, *Quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum*, ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 15va; G. Vázquez, *Commentariorum ac Disputationum in primam partem S. Thomae*, vol. 2, disp. 117, nn. 8–9, Lyon 1620, pp. 40b–41a.

²² "...non est verum totale fundamentum istius [sc. Godefridi de Fontibus] positionis. Innititur enim huic, quod nulla multitudo sit secundum rationem in aliquo intellectu, nisi proveniat ex aliqua pluralitate reali..." (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 8, sect. 23, n. 86, ed. Buytaert, p. 998).

²³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 1, sect. 6, n. 99, ed. Buytaert, p. 364. This notion (in contradistinction to 'identity of indistinction') encompasses three cases: 1) "Sortes est Sortes", 2) "Marcus est Tullius", 3) "Sortes est homo", "Sortes est animal" etc.

²⁴ R.L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 177–193, here p. 190—"...non apparet quare non possit ab eadem re simpliciter moveri intellectus ad diversos conceptus [...]. Conceptus generis et differentiae fundantur in eadem re simpliciter. Sed isti assumuntur absque distinctione reali alicubi reperta" (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 8, sect. 23, nn. 87–88, ed. Buytaert, p. 999).

At any rate, when the famous dichotomy *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae/distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* originated in the late 15th century, this late arrival among the scholastic divisions of identity and distinction was commonly portrayed as a differentiation between a distinction of reason *with* some foundation in the object and a distinction of reason *without* such a foundation.²⁵ In fact, no one ever doubted that besides the instances of the later '*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*', there was room left for positing another kind of distinction, which would apply to the subject and the predicate of identity propositions: "A is A". The following quotation from a 16th-century Thomist summarizes what virtually all schoolmen had to say on this score: "This proposition is true: 'Whatever is identical by reason, is distinct by reason', because Sortes is *identical* with himself by *reasoned* reason, and at the same time *distinct* from himself by *reasoning* reason, since Sortes as preceding the copula is distinct from himself as Sortes following the copula".²⁶ The way a distinction was to be saved in the case "Sortes est Sortes" was answered by resorting to the distinction that is paramount in mentalist logic, namely, the distinction between terms of first intention and terms of second intention. It is only if one distinguishes between a first intention, e.g., 'Sortes', and a second intention, e.g., 'the subject', that it turns out not to be a contradiction that the same Sortes at the same time is not the subject, but the predicate, or vice versa. The *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* was judged to be something consequent to second intentions being applied to first intentions. Petrus Thomae and the *Magister Formalitatum* (Antonius Sirectus) gave precisely this account for what is to be understood by a 'distinction of reason' which is the distinctive mark of Scotism.²⁷

²⁵ Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 7, 1, n. 4, in *Opera omnia*, Paris 1856–1878, vol. 25, p. 251a; Collegium Conimbricense SJ., *Commentarii in universam Dialecticam*, Köln 1607, repr. 1976, vol. 1, p. 117; Collegium Complutense OCD., *Disputationes in Aristotelis Dialecticam*, Lyon 1668, repr. 1977, p. 88a; Ioannes a S. Thoma, *Ars logica*, ed. B. Reiser, Torino 1948, p. 296a. The same description can be found in the textbooks from the 18th up to the 20th centuries.

²⁶ "...haec propositio est vera: *Illa quae sunt eadem ratione, sunt distincta ratione*, quia Sortes est idem ratione ratiocinata sibiipso, est tamen distinctus ratione ratiocinante, quia Sortes ut praecedat copulam distinguitur a seipso, ut consequitur copulam" (M. Aquarius, *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis*, Napoli 1605, pp. 39–40).

²⁷ G.G. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae OFM.*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1959; W. Hübener, "Robertus Anglicus OFM und die formalistische Tradition", in *Philosophie im Mittelalter*, ed. J.P. Beckmann et al., Hamburg 1987, pp. 329–353, here p. 334.

As I already mentioned, Mastri is very explicit in seeing a philosophical need to embrace the distinction of reason according to both of its variants.²⁸ He rehearses the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* in two places: in his *Logic* and in his *Metaphysics*. The treatment in the *Logic* is textbook standard, the treatment in the *Metaphysics* is more developed. The *Metaphysics* advances a premise which formerly had been buried, since it supplies sufficient evidence for Mastri's departure from traditional Scotism. In order to give the rationale of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, Mastri first quotes Suárez, then Sirectus. His quotations suggest that both say basically the same thing; as they actually do, namely, that this distinction results from the collative power of the reasoning faculty, and that the identity proposition is its paradigm case. Mastri bluntly rejects this. To be sure, he does not dismiss the identity proposition as an instance of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. He challenges, however, the position that this type of distinction would fail to obtain if the mind had not been previously creating relations of reason or second intentions.²⁹ According to Mastri, a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* would just as well obtain, e.g., in virtue of the 'right/left'-distinction, since the schoolmen assumed that any distinction between right and left is without a foundation in the object.³⁰ Generally, a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* is said to obtain, whenever "the diversity entirely springs from the mode of conceiving, not from the conceivable *ratio*".³¹ At this point, any reader of Aureol will prick up his ears, for the dualism of the conceivable and mode of conceiving, e.g., confusedly or distinctly, is arguably a major feature of Aureol's conceptualism, his

²⁸ "Nominales [...] distinctionem rationis [...] saltem sterilem faciunt et infaecundam, dum negant ipsam dividi in distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis, et ratiocinatae" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 166).

²⁹ "...Neuter dicendi modus sufficienter rem explicat, et uterque unum falsum supponere videtur, nempe distinctionem rationis haberi tantum per actum collativum intellectus idem sibi diversimode comparantis; hoc enim falsum est [...]. Distinctio rationis inter aliqua restringi non debet ad actum collativum intellectus, praesertim quo idem ad seipsum comparatur sub ratione subiecti, et praedicati, vel aliarum secundarum intentionum, sed haberi etiam potest per actum absolutum, et rectum..." (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 258).

³⁰ "[Distinctio] secundum rationem dextri et sinistri in columna [...] non est nisi rationis ratiocinantis" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 281). Petrus Thomae, for his turn, had explicitly rejected this case as an example of a *distinctio rationis*, cf. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction*..., pp. 64–65.

³¹ "...ita ut tota diversitas sit ex parte modi concipiendi, non ex parte rationis conceptibilis, et ideo dicitur *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*..." (Mastrius – Bellutus, *Logica* 1, 87).

whole ontology depending on the separability of the mode of conceiving from any conceivable *ratio*.³²

Mastri maintains that the object's being known is an extrinsic denomination deriving from the act of knowing, and "to be distinct", consequently, is an extrinsic denomination deriving from the act of distinction.³³ In regard to an identity proposition, however, the object is said to be not simply repeated in two distinct speech acts, but to be distinct "from itself".³⁴ Mastri does not take this to be contradictory, since in the latter case, he says, it is not the extramental object which is being referred to. If there is no contradiction that the same *Sortes* be at the same time the subject and not the subject of a proposition, *Sortes* must be referred to be in a state that is fit to be multiplied. Where does *Sortes* enjoy this state? In the mind. The object, says Mastri, can be thought to be distinct from itself due to the diversity of its objective or intentional being which it acquires from the mind. The object keeps its real identity, but a new mode of being supervenes, objective or intentional being.³⁵ Mastri specifies this supervenience of being when

³² "Et si dicatur quod conceptus et ratio idem sunt, et ita, si est alius conceptus, erit alia ratio: dicendum quod ratio appellatur id quod est conceptibile. Nunc autem in conceptu aliquid includitur ultra id quod est conceptibile, quia modus concipiendi. Propter quod, possunt esse diversi conceptus absque diversitate conceptae rationis" (Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum*..., dist. 8, sect. 21, n. 133, ed. Buytaert, pp. 928–929). Cf. sect. 21, n. 88, ed. Buytaert, p. 910. As for ontology, cf. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 9, Basel 2001, cols. 1015–1016, s.v. "Verworrenheit. I".

³³ Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 264; "...obiecto [...] appingitur distinctio rationis ratiocinantis" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 286); "...distinctio rationis ratiocinantis attendi [...] debet [...] nullatenus [...] ex parte obiecti [...], ex quo sequitur, hanc distinctionem nullam prorsus tollere identitatem ex parte obiecti, sed relinquere illud omnino idem..." (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 259).

³⁴ "...in propositione identica, distinctio rationis tangit obiectum, illudque a seipso intentionaliter distinguit" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 258).

³⁵ "...cum quaeritur, an idem secundum rationem possit a seipso distingui, sensus non est, an per eiusmodi actum collativum intellectus ponatur aliqua vera distinctio a parte rei in ipsa entitate rei—tunc enim esset implicancia in adiecto, et sensus esset, an id quod est idem sibi realiter et formaliter, quatenus tale a seipso realiter distinguatur, tum quia certum est intellectum per suam operationem talem distinctionem in rebus causare minime posse—, sed sensus est, an id, quod est omnino idem a parte rei, secundum diversum esse obiectivum ac intentionale, quod ab intellectu suscipere potest, possit veluti cogitari a seipso distinctum, adeo ut secundum diversa illa esse rationis contradictionem fundare possit [...]. In quo quidem nulla cernitur implicancia, et ratio est, quia potest res omnino eadem cum retentione suae entitatis ac realis identitatis acquirere novum esse obiectivum, ita ut rationes distinctivae sint secundae intentiones; et talis distinctio rationis utique cum identitate reali compossibilis erit, quia sumitur penes denominationes rationis, quae nequeunt intrinsece ac realiter immutare entitatem obiecti" (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 262).

he goes on to say that the object acquires its objective being when the mind compares the object with itself. The objective or intentional being is bestowed on the object in the very same act of collation, and this in its turn could not be performed if it lacked an ontological foundation.³⁶ Thus, Mastri's notion of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* differs from the traditional one in that he thinks it requisite that it be not entirely extrinsic in regard to the object. Whenever a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* applies, it presupposes the creation of an intermediate sphere of objective being which paves the way for this kind of non-identity.

What is to be inferred from all this?

The theory of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* opens a window revealing Peter Aureol's presence in 17th-century Scotism. His presence occasioned a crack in the traditional Scotistic definition of the distinction of reason. The crisis of Scotist 'formalism' was, in part at least, an effect of the intrusion of Aureol's conceptualism. I do not want, however, to make Mastri into a partisan of Aureol. A subtle difference remains after all. Mastri endorses the very same solution in the case of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* which he utterly disapproves of in the case of the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*. This contrast is telling. If we describe the difference between Mastri and Pasqualigo in terms of objective or intentional being, this intermediate mode of being is something admitted by Pasqualigo, whereas it is something fictional according to Mastri. Pasqualigo employs this device in an Aureolian manner, namely, in the framework of a quasi-phenomenological approach, whereas, according to Mastri, objective or intentional being is only the result of intellectual activity. Mastri avoids this device whenever people intend to portray features of the real world in this way. For him, objective being is limited to feeding the mind with distinctions which in a very strict sense are *a priori*. Whenever a distinction between A and B is due to impressions which the mind receives from without, this distinction still might be a distinction of reason, but it cannot rest on a multiplicity of objective or intentional beings. This tenet certainly separates a Scotist, like Mastri, from Aureol.

³⁶ "...cum dicimus idem a seipso *ratione* distingui, sane sensus [...] est [...] solum distingui a seipso secundum aliquod esse rationis, quod de novo acquirit ex eo, quod per intellectum cum seipso comparatur, quod est secunda intentio..." (Mastrius, *Metaph.* 6, 264).

SINGULARITÉ ET INDIVIDUALITÉ SELON PIERRE AURIOL

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L'interrogation sur le principe d'individuation—liée de près à la problématique de l'universel et de son rapport avec les réalités singulières—a été soulevée au Moyen Âge dans de nombreux textes, que ce soit à l'occasion des commentaires du *De trinitate* de Boèce où la question était traitée en relation à la distinction des personnes trinitaires, dans les commentaires des *Sentences*, dans les *Sommes* ou dans des écrits spécialement consacrés à ce sujet.¹ Conformément à cette large prise en considération du problème, les solutions formulées étaient très variées, au point où Pierre de Jean Olivi parlera d'une "infinitam silvam opinionum in hac materia".² À cette "forêt d'opinions" nous voudrions en ajouter une autre: celle de Pierre Auriol, dont la position est d'un intérêt philosophique certain et ne manque pas d'originalité.³ En effet, bien que la thèse soutenue par Auriol à ce sujet ait déjà été relevée,⁴ il nous intéresse ici, d'une part, d'examiner de près son argumentation—développée par le biais d'une critique de la conception scotiste—, et, d'autre part, de rendre compte de la distinction significative, qui émerge de sa théorie, entre les notions d'"individuel" et de "singulier".

¹ Thomas d'Aquin, par exemple, traite du principe d'individuation dans de nombreux textes, dont l'évolution est retracée par I. Klinger, *Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin*, Münsterschwarzach 1964.

² Une variété d'opinions qu'il résume en les classifiant selon quatre modèles: cf. Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 12, ed. B. Jansen, Quaracchi 1924, vol. 1, p. 213 sqq.

³ Cet aspect de la pensée d'Auriol n'a par ailleurs pas fait l'objet d'études précises: on peut le constater en consultant la bibliographie la plus récente et exhaustive: cf. R. Friedman, *Peter Auriol Homepage*, pp. 6–22 (<http://www.igl.ku.dk/~russ/biblio.html>).

⁴ Cf. R. Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars", *Vivarium* 38 (2000), pp. 177–193 (voir pp. 178–179), ainsi que: "Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Praedication", in *Medieval Analysis in Language and Cognition*, ed. S. Ebbesen – R. Friedman, Copenhagen 1999, pp. 415–429; L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol", in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.J. Gracia – T.B. Noone, Malden, MA 2003, pp. 494–503 (voir en particulier pp. 498–499). Je remercie Russ Friedman pour ses remarques pertinentes lors de la présentation orale de cette étude.

I. LE CONTEXTE DE LA DISCUSSION

Il convient de préciser tout d'abord le contexte dans lequel Auriol discute ce problème: il s'agit de la IX^{ème} distinction du commentaire du II^{ème} livre des *Sentences*—ou *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*⁵—, dont la rédaction fut terminée en 1317.⁶ La distinction IX a pour objet les actes hiérarchiques des anges⁷ et comprend quatre questions: la première porte sur les actes hiérarchiques et traite de la connaissance mutuelle des créatures spirituelles (articles 1 et 2), de l'illumination (article 3) et du langage (article 4). La deuxième question s'occupe des hiérarchies et des ordres angéliques, dont il s'agit de clarifier les distinctions (distinction des anges à l'intérieur d'un même ordre et des ordres et des hiérarchies entre eux); cette question, très importante pour notre propos, est structurée en quatre articles et traite notamment de l'unité spécifique: il s'agit en effet de vérifier si l'unité spécifique est une réalité extra-mentale (article 1), si elle est une unité "d'indifférence" (article 2), s'il s'agit d'une unité de similitude ou "qualitative" (article 3), et si cette unité est réelle ou seulement d'ordre intellectuel (article 4). La troisième question—qui nous intéresse de plus près—s'interroge sur ce qui réduit la nature commune à l'individualité, c'est-à-dire précisément sur le principe d'individuation: "Per quid contrahatur ad individuum. Postquam visum est de communi entitate naturae specifica: nunc secundo videndum est de eo, quo contrahitur ad individuum, quod est principium individuationis".⁸ La quatrième et dernière question porte sur la distinction des hiérarchies angéliques, et notamment sur la légitimité de leur tripartition.

La problématique de l'individuation est donc discutée dans le cadre de l'angélogologie: au-delà de la raison textuelle immédiate, une motivation théorique importante intervient ici, à savoir le caractère problématique du statut de l'ange, considéré comme une espèce par les uns et comme

⁵ Dans les notes qui suivent, nous citerons ce texte par l'abréviation *In II Sent.*

⁶ Cf. T. Kobusch, "Petrus Aureoli. Philosophie des Subjekts", in *Philosophen des Mittelalters. Eine Einführung*, ed. T. Kobusch, Darmstadt 2000, p. 237 ainsi que R. Friedman, *Peter Auriol Homepage*. Pour une étude textuelle détaillée du commentaire d'Auriol sur les livres des *Sentences* nous renvoyons à: L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the Sentences", in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden – Boston – Köln 2002, pp. 149–219.

⁷ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9: "De angelis quantum ad actus hierarchicos et ad maiorem evidentiam", ed. Romae 1605, p. 97.

⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, ed. Romae 1605, p. 109.

un individu par les autres:⁹ d'où la nécessité de clarifier le principe de sa distinction, ce qui exigeait préalablement la détermination du principe d'individuation au niveau des réalités matérielles.

II. L'UNITÉ SPÉCIFIQUE OU *COMMUNITAS NATURAE*

La détermination du principe d'individuation dépend étroitement de la manière de concevoir le statut de l'espèce et son rapport aux réalités individuelles qui en font partie. À partir du constat de la similitude qui lie une multiplicité de réalités individuelles et permet de les regrouper en fonction de leur appartenance à une espèce, la difficulté majeure—qui a d'ailleurs marqué l'histoire de la problématique des universaux¹⁰—a consisté à déterminer la nature et le fondement de cette similitude: s'agit-il d'une simple représentation ou image, d'un concept ou d'une réalité subsistant indépendamment de l'esprit qui la conçoit? Dans la deuxième question de la distinction IX Pierre Auriol discute précisément ce problème et clarifie sa conception.

Dans une première étape de sa démarche, il se demande “*Utrum unitas specifica sit unitas alicuius rei communis extra animam in individuis*”.¹¹ Avant de formuler sa réponse, Auriol rappelle la conception platonicienne—“*haec fuit opinio Platonis*”—selon laquelle l'unité spécifique est celle d'un universel existant réellement et indépendamment de l'esprit, et relève que cette opinion trouve beaucoup de partisans chez ses contemporains: “*multi hodie realiter incidunt [in opinionem Platonis]*”. Cette conception est ramenée à l'idée de la différence réelle entre ce qui est commun à plusieurs individus et ce qui les distingue¹²—une différence dont l'admission débouche sur la thèse de l'existence réelle et séparée de la nature commune et de la différence individuelle. Qui sont les auteurs auxquels Auriol fait ici référence? Son renvoi est plutôt vague—puisqu'il se réfère simplement à “*multi*”—, mais la formulation de cette position permet sans doute d'y inclure celle de Jean Duns

⁹ Nous renvoyons, à ce propos, à notre étude: *Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparées au XIII^e siècle*, Paris 2002 (I^{ère} partie). Dans une prochaine étude nous examinerons la position d'Auriol sur ce point.

¹⁰ On consultera, sur ce point, A. de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Paris 1996.

¹¹ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 103–107.

¹² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 103b: “*Dicunt enim quod alia est realitas, in qua convenient Sortes et Plato, et aliae sunt realitates per quas differunt*”.

Scot,¹³ même si celui-ci ne semble pas représenter le seul terme de référence.¹⁴

Auriol s'oppose à cette conception par une première thèse, formulée en termes négatifs: l'unité spécifique n'est pas l'unité d'une entité réelle subsistant dans les individus et indépendante de l'intellect qui la conçoit.¹⁵ Le franciscain précisera plus loin (dans le troisième article) en quoi consiste cette communauté de nature ou similitude partagée par plusieurs individus; ici il se contente de nier l'existence réelle d'une nature commune présente en chaque individu comme entité distincte: son intérêt premier est en effet d'ordre critique et réside dans la réfutation de l'opinion qu'il associe à la conception platonicienne.

Auriol produit quatre arguments en faveur de sa thèse. Le premier est une réduction à l'absurde: si une telle unité spécifique existait réellement, Dieu ne pourrait pas anéantir un individu sans détruire tous les individus de la même espèce. Par analogie, il ne pourrait pas non plus créer un individu sans créer par là-même la totalité des individus de la même espèce. L'absurdité de telles conséquences impose le refus de la thèse dont elles dérivent, à savoir l'existence réelle dans chaque individu d'une communauté de nature ou unité spécifique.¹⁶

Le deuxième argument, inspiré par la critique aristotélicienne de la théorie platonicienne des idées, relève que si une telle nature commune existait réellement dans les individus, il s'ensuivrait la présence en chaque homme de "deux humanités", à savoir l'humanité commune partagée avec les autres individus et l'humanité propre de chacun. Une telle conséquence ne pouvant être admise, il faut refuser son fondement.¹⁷

Le troisième argument s'inspire encore d'Aristote et relève le fait suivant: si l'on posait une nature commune extérieure à l'intellect et

¹³ Jean Duns Scot présente sa conception de l'unité spécifique dans: Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1, ed. Vat. VII, pp. 391–410.

¹⁴ En effet, lorsque Auriol se réfère exclusivement à Duns Scot, il le caractérise de manière plus précise, à savoir par "Doctor modernus" ou "Doctor subtilis": ici, en revanche, Scot est associé à une position partagée aussi par d'autres. À propos des différentes conceptions de l'unité spécifique dans la première école scotiste cf. J. Kraus, "Die Lehre von realen spezifischen Einheit in der älteren Scotistenschule", *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg) 14 (1936), pp. 119–144.

¹⁵ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 103b: "Propositio est ista: quod unitas specifica non potest esse unitas alicuius rei existentis extra animam realiter in individuis".

¹⁶ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 103b–104a.

¹⁷ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 104a.

indépendante de lui, il faudrait procéder de la même manière pour tous les genres et les espèces et poser les universaux correspondants, si bien qu'il y aurait une "animalité commune" comme il y aurait une "corporalité commune", et ainsi de suite. À partir de là, il faudrait admettre la conséquence absurde de la présence de plusieurs substances distinctes dans une seule réalité individuelle.¹⁸ Un tel résultat étant inacceptable—car "homo est per se una substantia"—, il faut refuser la thèse dont il découle.

Le quatrième argument fait appel aux modalités de prédication:¹⁹ il s'agit en effet de clarifier la manière dont une telle nature commune pourrait être prédiquée des individus. Selon Auriol il faut le vérifier en examinant l'alternative entre une prédication d'identité ou formelle et une prédication qui ne l'est pas: pour reprendre l'exemple de l'humanité et de l'individu humain, lorsqu'on dit "Socrate est un homme" ou "Platon est un homme", il faudra vérifier si la prédication est telle qu'on puisse affirmer en toute vérité que "cette humanité est la 'socraticité' ou la 'platonité' (*sorteitas, platonitas*)", ou bien s'il faut simplement dire que l'humanité n'est pas la "socraticité", mais seulement "quelque chose dans Socrate" et dans les autres individus humains. Auriol exclut le premier terme de l'alternative, car poser une prédication d'identité signifierait qu'une réalité peut être prédiquée par identité de plusieurs réalités réellement distinctes—ce qui ne se vérifie que pour les personnes de la Trinité divine; le second terme de l'alternative est tout aussi inacceptable, car, dans ce cas, connaître l'humanité de Socrate signifierait ne rien connaître de lui, puisque son humanité serait en lui en étant différente de lui. Puisque aucun de ces modes de prédication n'est valable, il faut en conclure que l'hypothèse de départ—l'existence réelle d'une nature commune—est fausse.²⁰

À l'occasion de cet argument, Auriol développe d'importantes considérations relatives à l'attribution d'un prédicat universel à un individu. En effet, lorsqu'on attribue le prédicat "homme" à Socrate ou à Platon, "homme" n'est pas quelque chose de différent de Socrate ou de Platon, ni quelque chose de commun qui serait présent en eux; autrement dit, la nature commune ou unité spécifique n'est pas une réalité (*res*) au sens propre, et ne possède donc pas une unité réelle.

¹⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 104b.

¹⁹ Pour plus de clarifications concernant la prédication selon Auriol voir: R. Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intentions...".

²⁰ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 104b.

L'unité qui apparaît lorsqu'on dit de chaque individu qu'il est un "homme" est une unité purement conceptuelle, résultant de ce que ces différents individus peuvent être conçus sous une notion commune. Cette notion ou concept, qui correspond à un acte intellectuel, permet de penser des réalités individuelles distinctes sous le mode de l'unité, mais il s'agit là précisément et uniquement d'une unité conceptuelle à laquelle ne correspond aucune réalité extra-mentale. Aussi, lorsqu'on dit que Socrate est un homme, on ne prédique pas une réalité d'une autre réalité, car "Socrate" et "homme" coïncident parfaitement, étant donné que dans la réalité il n'y a que l'individu Socrate qui existe. Au prédicat "homme" ou "humanité" ne correspond donc pas une chose une, mais uniquement un concept produit par l'intellect. Dès lors, il n'y a aucune communauté réelle de nature, aucune unité spécifique réelle, mais uniquement la convergence d'une pluralité en une notion dont l'unité est purement conceptuelle.²¹

L'on sait que cette manière d'envisager le rapport du concept universel aux réalités particulières a été interprétée et caractérisée de différentes façons: comme une forme de "réalisme modéré",²² comme "conceptualisme",²³ voire comme "nominalisme ambigu".²⁴ Nous n'allons pas discuter ici la pertinence de ces étiquettes, car il nous intéresse surtout de mettre en évidence la critique de la conception scotiste de la nature commune impliquée dans la position d'Auriol. Cette critique est développée à l'occasion de l'interrogation suivante: "Utrum unitas specifica sit unitas alicuius rei [in]differentis".²⁵ Se référant à Scot par

²¹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 106a: "Dico quod quando praedicatur homo de Sorte et Platone, homo non est res alia a Sorte et Platone, nec tamen est una res in ipsis, nisi unitate rationis, quae consistit in uno concipi, quia omnes illae res, puta Sortes et Plato, et sic de aliis, conveniunt in uno concipi passive, et ideo sub illa ratione attinguntur unica intellectione et uno intelligi, et ideo est una ratio, quae non est aliud, quam unitas conceptus, nec illud concipi, ut dictum est alias, respicit rem ut substratum, sed per indivisionem".

²² Cf. S. Vanni-Rovighi, "L'intenzionalità della coscienza secondo P. Aureolo", in *L'homme et son destin au Moyen Âge*, ed. C. Wenin, Louvain 1960, pp. 39–65.

²³ Cf. R. Dreiling, *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Petrus Aureoli*, Münster 1913 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XI, 6), pp. 1–129; cette interprétation est critiquée par R. Friedman: "Peter Auriol on Intentions...".

²⁴ Cf. F. Prezioso, "Il nominalismo ambiguo di Pietro Aureolo", *Sapienza* 25 (1972), pp. 265–299.

²⁵ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 107a; dans l'édition de Rome de 1605, dans le titre de l'article on lit "rei differentis", que nous corrigeons par "in-differentis", car c'est bien de l'unité d'indifférence dont il est question tout au long de l'article.

la formule “quidam Doctores moderni”, Auriol en rappelle la théorie des trois unités.²⁶ Le Docteur Subtil avait en effet distingué l’unité de la réalité singulière ou unité numérique, celle du concept universel et celle de la nature commune (en tant qu’indifférente à l’égard de la singularité et de l’universalité). L’unité numérique ou individuelle est la plus accomplie et la plus parfaite, car elle coïncide avec l’ultime actualité de la chose. L’unité du concept universel est une unité neutre, produite par l’intellect, grâce à laquelle le concept peut être prédiqué de plusieurs sujets. L’unité de la nature commune est moins parfaite que celle de l’individu, mais lui est antérieure en tant qu’elle est neutre à l’égard du singulier et de l’universel: cette unité dite d’“indifférence” est celle de l’entité qui, selon Scot, est réellement commune à plusieurs individus, dans lesquels elle est présente en étant réduite à la singularité.

Auriol qualifie cette conception de *valde pulchra et subtilis*, mais la rejette radicalement.²⁷ Sa critique tient tout entière à la thèse que l’unité spécifique n’est pas l’unité d’une réalité “indifférente” (à la singularité et à l’universalité) existant réellement et indépendamment de l’intellect (*in re extra*), car en dehors de celui-ci, il n’existe aucune réalité “indifférente”, mais seulement des réalités déterminées et particulières.²⁸ Admettre une telle communauté d’indifférence conduirait à la conséquence absurde déjà relevée, à savoir la présence de deux humanités dans chaque être humain (l’humanité “d’indifférence” et l’humanité “individuelle”), ainsi qu’à la position platonicienne de la subsistance réelle des idées. En effet—se demande Auriol –, qu’est-ce qu’une telle communauté d’indifférence? Soit il s’agit d’une réalité commune présente dans plusieurs individus qui en participeraient—et on revient ainsi à la position platonicienne—, soit il s’agit d’une réalité particulière distincte de toutes les autres, mais alors il ne s’agira plus d’une réalité “indifférente”.²⁹ Par ailleurs—précise Auriol à l’encontre

²⁶ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1, ed. Vat. VII, en particulier pp. 404 sqq.

²⁷ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 107b: “tamen videtur mihi quod non sit rationabilis ullo modo”.

²⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 107b: “Ideo pono unam conclusionem contra eam propositionem primam et est ista. Quod unitas specifica non est unitas rei indifferentis extra intellectum, cum extra illum [nihil] (*om. in textu*) sit indifferens, immo quaelibet res extra intellectum est determinata ad particularitatem, hoc tamen non obstante [*absolute in textu*] potest concipi universaliter”.

²⁹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 107a: “In oppositum est, quia quaero, quid intelligitur per illam differentiam, aut quod res una, ut sit in pluribus partibus, et tunc reddit in opinionem improbatam in praecedenti

de Scot—lorsqu’une forme est reçue dans un substrat, elle ne lui ajoute aucune différence et ne provoque aucune distinction, si ce n’est celle de son effet formel (comme lorsque la blancheur est reçue dans une surface et la rend blanche sans perdre pour autant son “indifférence” propre); or, dans le cas de l’individu humain, l’effet formel d’une telle différence individuelle (supposée ajoutée à la nature commune) ne tient pas au fait d’être un homme (ce qui correspond à la nature commune), mais à quelque chose d’extrinsèque, si bien que deux individus ne se distingueraient pas par l’humanité, mais par leur substance, à la manière dont les personnes divines partagent réellement une même nature et ne se distinguent que substantiellement—ce qui est bien évidemment inadmissible.³⁰ De surcroît, chaque réalité individuelle *est et est une* par un seul et même aspect formel; aussi, c’est par la même humanité que Socrate est un homme et cet homme-ci: il n’est donc pas nécessaire de recourir à une différence individuelle ultérieure.³¹ Auriol produit enfin un dernier argument à l’encontre de la position scotiste: chaque réalité de soi indifférente à l’égard de plusieurs peut être transférée par Dieu d’une entité individuelle à l’autre; dès lors, on peut imaginer que Dieu pourrait transférer l’humanité qui est dans un être humain dans un autre être humain, si bien que “mon humanité pourrait devenir la tienne”, ce qui est absurde.³² En réalité, il faut se demander ce qui fait qu’un individu s’approprie la nature commune qu’est l’humanité: cela doit se

quaestione; aut illa est una res particularis, et tunc distinguitur ab omni alia: ergo non est indifferens”.

³⁰ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108a: “Contra. Quando forma aliqua advenit alicui substrato indifferenti, ita quod invenit ipsum indifferens, totam differentiam intrinsecam ei relinquit, quia non tollit ab eo aliquid, quod ei inesset intrinsece, et praecise ponit effectum suum formalem circa eam. Ideo si facit differre, tantum facit differre penes suum effectum formalem; et ratio huius est, quia non causat distinctionem nisi per hoc, quod communicat suum effectum formalem, et ideo in substrato priori nullam facit differentiam, sed tantum in suo effectu formali, quem communicat: sed effectus formalis illius differentiae individualis, non est esse hominem, sed aliud extrinsecum: ergo Sortes et Plato non distinguuntur, ex hoc quod est esse hominem, et sic non distinguuntur in humanitate, sed in aliquo alio extrinseco actuali, quod est esse hypostaticum: ergo sequitur, ut prius”.

³¹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108a: “Item secundo ad idem: secundum Philosophum 9. *Metaphysice* eodem formaliter aliud est homo et hic homo et unus homo: sed Sortes est humanitate homo; ergo et hic humanitate; non ergo per talem proprietatem quam ponis”.

³² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108a: “... omnem realitatem indifferentem ad plura aliqua potest Deus transferre ab uno eorum in aliud. Hoc patet exemplo isto: quia enim materia est indifferens ad plures formas, non repugnat ei transferri ab una in aliam; sed humanitas est res extra intellectum indifferens ad proprietatem meam et tuam, per te: ergo deus potest transferre humanitatem quae

faire soit par la raison d'humanité elle-même—mais cette éventualité doit être écartée, précisément parce qu'on pose que l'humanité comme telle est indifférente—, soit par quelque chose qui s'y ajoute et qui la prive de son indifférence: mais dans ce cas, il faut bien admettre que ce qui est ainsi privé d'indifférence serait une réalité nécessairement individuée, ce qui impliquerait que la nature commune d'humanité soit déterminée et individuée avant même qu'une telle propriété ne vienne s'y ajouter.³³ Quelle que soit la perspective adoptée, il est donc évident que l'humanité en tant que "nature commune indifférente" n'existe pas dans la réalité, mais seulement dans l'intellect, qui saisit l'individuel sous une raison commune partagée par plusieurs individus. La conception scotiste pêche donc par la position d'une entité qui n'est pas réelle, mais uniquement d'ordre conceptuel. Aussi, invoquant Boèce en sa faveur, Auriol réitère sa thèse, à savoir que, puisque tout ce qui est, est un, chaque chose, par le simple fait d'exister en dehors de l'intellect, est par elle-même une réalité singulière; la recherche d'une autre cause de son individualité s'avère ainsi parfaitement superflue: "cum omnis entitas, eo ipso quod est extra intellectum, sit singularis de se, nec debeo quaerere aliam causam".³⁴

À partir de cette critique, Auriol va pouvoir préciser sa manière de concevoir l'unité spécifique. Il le fait à travers la *determinatio* de deux questions, dont les termes sont déjà significatifs de sa position: "Utrum unitas specifica sit tantum unitas similitudinaria et qualitativa" et "Utrum unitas specifica sit in actu extra intellectum". Le franciscain explique en effet que l'unité spécifique (ou unité de la nature commune universelle) n'est qu'une unité de ressemblance ou "qualitative", si bien que l'universel ne signifie pas un *hoc aliquid*, mais seulement une certaine qualité ou ressemblance, c'est-à-dire un *quale quid*.³⁵ Cette dé-réification de la nature commune n'implique pas pour autant que le concept universel qui l'exprime n'ait aucun ancrage dans la réalité: Auriol précise en effet que l'unité spécifique est présente "partim in

est sub proprietate mea ad tuam proprietatem, et per consequens potest fieri tua; et per consequens, humanitas mea potest esse humanitas tua, quod videtur absurdum".

³³ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108a: "Contra. Quaero per quid humanitas, quae est in me, appropriat sibi meam proprietatem; aut per rationem humanitatis simpliciter, et hoc non [...], ergo per aliquod additum, quod tollit ab ea indifferentiam: sed ablata ab ea differentia est individua: ergo humanitas ante adventum illius proprietatis est individua".

³⁴ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108b.

³⁵ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 108b.

re, partim in specie, partim in actu, partim in conceptu”.³⁶ Cet énoncé signifie que la réalité singulière est apte à susciter dans l’intellect une ressemblance appelée “espèce” ou “raison”;³⁷ or, à celle-ci correspond un acte intellectuel capable de saisir l’ensemble des individus qui convergent en une raison commune; un tel acte engendre un concept, et plus précisément un “concept objectif parfait”, qui n’est rien d’autre que “la chose qui apparaît objectivement à travers l’acte de l’intellect qu’on appelle concept”.³⁸ Le concept universel—signifiant la ressemblance et la convergence de plusieurs individus en une condition commune—a donc la fonction de poser l’objet dans un “être apparent objectif”. Dans ce processus de “présentation de l’objet”, l’unité spécifique ou nature commune est résorbée dans l’acte intellectuel d’abord, et dans le concept objectif ensuite: or celui-ci—comme on l’a relevé—ne renvoie pas à une *res*, mais à un *quale quid*, c’est-à-dire à une unité de ressemblance ou “qualitative”.³⁹ Aussi, chez Auriol, la nature commune, à laquelle Duns Scot attribuait une unité réelle d’indifférence, est ramenée à l’unité de ressemblance exprimée par le concept objectif, et dont la consistance réelle réside uniquement dans le fait que chaque chose se donne par sa présence à être saisie par l’intellect. Il est utile de rappeler la formulation de Pierre Auriol: “Est ergo unitas specifica in conceptu obiectivo

³⁶ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 109a.

³⁷ R. Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition...” insiste sur le fondement réel de l’universel.

³⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 109a: “Ubi considerandum est quod ille est ordo, quia res illa particularis est apta nata facere in intellectu similes impressiones et eiusdem rationis, ideo causant in intellectu speciem eiusdem rationis. Ad species autem eiusdem rationis sequitur in intellectu actus unus eiusdem rationis; sive species sit actus ille, sive non, non curo modo. Ideo individua, quae possunt communicare in una specie, communicant in uno actu. Ad unum autem actum sequitur in intellectu unus conceptus, ita quod si actus sit perfectus, et terminatus, conceptus obiectivus erit perfectus, et terminatus; et ideo quae possunt communicare in uno actu, communicant ex consequenti in uno conceptu obiectivo: conceptus autem obiectivus non est aliud, quam res apparens obiective per actum intellectus, qui dicitur conceptus”.

³⁹ Cette conception rappelle, *mutatis mutandis*, celle de Pierre Abélard: pour Abélard—dont la position ne pouvait pas être connue par Auriol—le référent de l’universel n’était pas une “chose”, mais un “état de choses” (par exemple l’état consistant dans le fait d’être un homme). Pour la problématique du référent de l’universel nous renvoyons, entre autres, aux études suivantes: A. de Libera, *La querelle des universaux...*, p. 404; J. Biard, “La notion de ‘praesentialitas’ au XIV^e siècle”, in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. D. Perler, Leiden 2001, pp. 265–282 (en particulier pp. 270 sqq.); pour Auriol: T. Suarez-Nani, “‘Apparentia und Egressus’. Ein Versuch über den Geist als Bild des trinitarischen Gottes nach Petrus Aureoli”, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 93 (1986), pp. 19–38.

formaliter, et hoc est in re, inquantum obicitur intellectui et includit intrinsece concipi”.⁴⁰ À la notion commune d’“humanité” correspond donc la présentation objective de ce que chaque individu humain est réellement dans l’être apparent d’un concept.

III. INDIVIDUALITÉ ET SINGULARITÉ

Il convient à présent de considérer de plus près la question de l’individualité. Auriol l’examine en deux étapes, dont la première consiste à se demander: “utrum individuum sit formaliter individuum per aliquod positivum pertinens intrinsece et per se ad naturam speciei”, et la seconde revient à savoir “utrum generaliter loquendo species contrahatur ad individua per aliquod additum positivum, vel privativum”.⁴¹

Dans la première interrogation on reconnaît aisément les termes de la solution scotiste du problème: selon le Docteur Subtil, l’individualité résulte en effet d’un facteur (ou “différence”) qui s’ajoute à la nature commune et la réduit à la singularité.⁴² Cette solution ne peut pas être acceptée par Auriol, qui ne reconnaît à la nature commune aucune subsistance extra-mentale (en tant que *res*) et ne peut dès lors envisager l’individuel comme résultat d’une réduction de la nature spécifique à la singularité. Aussi, déclare-t-il: “Pono intentam propositionem oppositam directe isti opinioni, quod individuum non est formaliter individuum per talem differentiam intrinsece constituentem ipsum et per se ad speciem pertinentem”.⁴³ Les motifs invoqués en faveur de cette thèse⁴⁴ obéissent à une seule et même considération, à savoir que chaque entité qui existe *in re extra*—c’est-à-dire indépendamment de l’intellect—est par elle-même une réalité déterminée et individuelle, c’est-à-dire un *hoc aliquid*.

⁴⁰ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 4, ed. Romae 1605, p. 109b.

⁴¹ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 4, ed. Romae 1605, p. 109a.

⁴² Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 6.

⁴³ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 110a.

⁴⁴ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, p. 110a: “Hanc conclusionem probo primo per motivum principale oppositae opinionis, sic: Posterius sub ratione qua posterius numquam est causa prioris in ratione qua est prius: sed proprietas illa hypostatica est posterior natura specifica individuata et particulata; ergo”; ainsi que *ibid.*, p. 111b: “Quarta ratio est ista. Illud quod est ex ratione sua aliquid communicabile, non potest esse ratio formalis, quo specie contrahitur ad hoc individuum; [...] sed quaecumque differentia individualis de se habet, quod possit esse communis, et communicabilis alteri, immo hoc habet quaecumque accidentalitas, quae est extra nihil, ut probabo; ergo etc.”.

La discussion relative à la seconde question confirme cette thèse et apporte des précisions importantes en proposant une distinction significative. La première précision concerne le sens même de la question de l'individuation: selon Auriol, en effet, ce n'est pas la même chose de se demander quelle est la cause qui produit la contraction de l'universel en une réalité individuelle désormais indivisible en parties subjectives⁴⁵ et de se demander ce qui fait qu'il est participé à l'intérieur d'une même espèce par plusieurs individus.⁴⁶ Autrement dit, la question qui porte sur le fondement de l'individualité n'équivaut pas à celle qui porte sur la raison de l'appartenance d'une pluralité d'individus à une même espèce. Cette précision implique une critique claire de la perspective universaliste, et jusqu'alors dominante, dans l'approche du problème de l'individuation: rappelons, à cet égard, que pour un Thomas d'Aquin, par exemple, la question de l'individuation revenait à celle du principe de distinction numérique à l'intérieur d'une unité préalablement donnée,⁴⁷ et que, après lui, Jean Duns Scot—malgré sa critique de la solution thomasienne—continuait à envisager l'individualité comme résultat d'un facteur réduisant la nature commune à l'individualité. Ce faisant, ces penseurs opéraient une fusion entre les deux dimensions du problème qu'Auriol s'attache au contraire à distinguer, à savoir précisément l'irréductibilité de l'individu d'une part (son indivisibilité en parties subjectives), et d'autre part l'appartenance des individus à une même espèce (le fait qu'une pluralité peut être conçue sous une raison commune). Par cette séparation, Auriol va donc plus loin que ses illustres prédécesseurs et fait preuve d'une finesse d'analyse qui apparaît notamment dans une distinction significative aussi bien au niveau de la compréhension du problème que sur le plan ontologique: il s'agit de la distinction entre l'individuel et le singulier.

Comme on vient de le voir, l'individualité implique l'indivisibilité ou l'irréductibilité en parties subjectives, c'est-à-dire le fait que chaque individu constitue comme tel et par lui-même une réalité ultime (ou

⁴⁵ Les parties subjectives sont celles qui représentent une unité propre et ultime: aussi, un individu ne se laisse-t-il pas diviser en parties subjectives; cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 48, ed. Vat. VII, pp. 412–413.

⁴⁶ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 112b: "Aliud est quaerere, per quid formaliter universale contrahitur, ut sic contractum sit indivisibile in partes subiectivas; aliud est quaerere, per quid habet participem rationem infra eandem speciem".

⁴⁷ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boethium 'De Trinitate'*, q. 4, a. 2, ainsi que T. Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie...*, pp. 35–39.

“première”, selon la perspective d’Auriol).⁴⁸ L’individualité implique cependant encore une autre condition, à savoir le fait qu’il existe d’autres réalités semblables comprises sous la même espèce, si bien que lorsque l’individu est envisagé en relation à ses semblables, il peut être considéré comme une partie du tout qu’est l’espèce à laquelle il appartient. Pour Auriol, l’individualité implique donc la réalisation concomitante de ces différentes conditions: indivisibilité, ressemblance dans l’être, participation à un tout (*indivisibilis, habere comparticipem, esse pars speciei*).⁴⁹ Or, si l’indivisibilité en soi et la distinction à l’égard des autres réalités de la même espèce figuraient, d’une manière générale, dans toutes les conceptions de l’individuation formulées jusque-là, chez Auriol ces deux conditions sont non seulement présentes, mais aussi nettement et clairement distinguées: l’indivisibilité en soi et par soi est considérée comme la dimension interne à la constitution de chaque individu, alors que la participation à un tout (l’espèce) est une dimension toujours présente, mais externe à la constitution ontologique de la réalité individuelle. En effet, à partir de sa critique de la nature commune, Auriol ne conçoit en aucun cas la participation à une espèce comme participation à une nature commune réellement existante, mais uniquement comme convenance en une notion ou concept commun: aussi, *habere comparticipem* et *esse pars speciei* signifie simplement pour l’individuel qu’il existe d’autres réalités individuelles semblables et que, avec elles, il peut être conçu sous une notion commune. Autrement dit, l’individuel n’émerge pas sur fond d’un horizon commun, mais compose cet horizon dès lors qu’il est envisagé en relation aux réalités qui lui sont semblables. L’appartenance à une espèce (*esse pars speciei*) ne signifie donc pas participation à une réalité commune, car à la ressemblance réelle entre des individus (*habere comparticipem*) ne correspond pas une nature commune extra-mentale.

Cette démarcation claire entre l’irréductibilité de l’individuel et sa distinction par rapport aux autres réalités semblables permet à Auriol de concevoir une manière particulière de subsister, à l’égard de laquelle

⁴⁸ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 112b: “Omnis res, in quantum res, est extra intellectum se ipsa ut sit indivisibilis in partes subiectivas”.

⁴⁹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 112b: “... nulla res habet comparticipem, nec est individua, nisi quae potest esse pars etiam: et totum individuum, aut indivisibile primo modo, licet in se sit indivisibile in plura talia, tamen ei non repugnat habere comparticipem; et ratio est, quia individuum non dicit totam rationem illam, sed est portio quaedam speciei. Unde individuum dicit duo, quia aliud in se indivisum, et divisum contra aliquid aliud infra illam speciem”.

une seule de ces deux dimensions suffit: il s'agit de la singularité. Le singulier partage avec l'individuel le fait de l'indivisibilité par soi, c'est-à-dire de l'irréductibilité, mais se distingue de lui car il n'admet pas d'autres réalités semblables et ne peut donc pas être envisagé comme partie d'un ensemble. La singularité apparaît ainsi comme la manière de subsister de ce qui est en soi et par soi une individualité qui n'a pas besoin de distinction à l'égard d'autres réalités semblables, car elle ne partage pas de raison commune avec d'autres entités: "Singulare autem, cui repugnat habere comparticipem, non idem est, quod individuum [...]. Illud autem, quod est singulare sic, quod ei repugnat habere comparticipem, sed in se sit indivisum, cum nihil habeat commune cum eo, a quo sit divisum".⁵⁰ Cette précision confirme l'idée que la distinction à l'égard d'autres réalités semblables (*divisio ab aliis*) est une condition qui accompagne l'individuel de manière "extérieure", si bien qu'elle n'est pas toujours requise: c'est notamment le cas des réalités singulières, qui ne vérifient pas cette condition.

Une question surgit cependant: de telles entités existent-elles? La réponse d'Auriol est positive, mais ne fait état que d'un seul cas, à savoir la réalité divine. L'essence divine, en effet, est une réalité (par soi) indivisible en parties subjectives, et qui d'autre part n'admet pas de réalité semblable: Dieu ne constitue donc pas une individualité au sens propre, mais une singularité.⁵¹ Tel serait aussi le cas—ajoute Auriol—s'il existait une rose subsistant en tant que *rosa simpliciter* et résumant en elle toute la réalité de l'espèce "rose": une telle rose subsistante serait adéquate à la multiplicité de toutes les roses possibles, si bien qu'aucune autre rose ne pourrait exister;⁵² cela dit, une telle hypothèse ne peut pas se vérifier, car elle signifierait poser l'existence réelle d'un universel.⁵³

⁵⁰ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 112b.

⁵¹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 112b–113a: "Exemplum. Divina essentia est indivisibilis in partes subiectivas, et hoc unde habet? Dico quod habet se ipsa [...]. Individuum secundo modo [hoc est singulare] est tota natura subsistens. Hoc modo repugnat, quod sint plures Dii, quia Deus est tota entitas eminenter subsistens, ita quod sua ratio adaequata est conceptui enti".

⁵² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 113a: "Hoc etiam modo, si una rosa poneretur extra subsistens, quae esset rosa simpliciter, et tota natura speciei rosae subsistens, illa adaequaret totam multitudinem possibilem rosarum, nec posset alia rosa esse".

⁵³ Pour cette même raison Auriol refuse la thèse que chaque ange forme une espèce: il considère en effet que cette thèse pose les anges comme des singularités, c'est-à-dire comme des entités non seulement irréductibles, mais aussi n'admettant aucun co-individu dans la même espèce; ce qui revient, pour Auriol, à faire de chaque ange

Individuel et singulier ne se recouvrent donc pas, car, tout en partageant la même condition d'indivisibilité, ils signifient des modalités d'existence tout à fait différentes, le premier impliquant des "co-individus", le second n'admettant aucun "co-singulier". Or, dans la perspective d'Auriol, cette distinction est capitale aussi en ce qui concerne la manière de poser le problème de l'individuation: car celui-ci ne revient pas à se demander ce qui exclut la présence de "co-individus"—et ne revient donc pas à poser la question de la singularité—, mais consiste à saisir ce qui exclut la divisibilité de l'individu en parties subjectives.⁵⁴ Nous avons là une confirmation de ce qu'Auriol porte son attention sur la raison intrinsèque d'indivisibilité et d'irréductibilité—ce par quoi il se distancie de la perspective universaliste et choisit celle qui envisage l'individu comme réalité première. Aussi, par rapport à la solution scotiste, il réitère que: "Ratio specifica, quae consistit in conceptu, non potest contrahi ad individuum, sic, quod conceptus communis contrahatur ad illud individuum signatum per aliquod additum".⁵⁵ L'individu n'est pas le résultat d'une quelconque adjonction à l'espèce ou nature commune, car celle-ci—répétons-le—n'a aucune subsistance réelle indépendamment de l'intellect qui la conçoit. À partir de là, l'altérité des individus l'emporte sur leur communauté ou ressemblance, car la première est réelle, alors que la deuxième est d'ordre conceptuel.⁵⁶

un universel subsistant à la manière des idées platoniciennes (cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 112b).

⁵⁴ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 113a: "Tunc ad propositum, per quod individuum est individuum, non quaeritur de individuo secundo modo, scilicet, per quid repugnant tali habere participem in eadem specie; sed quaeritur de individuo primo modo, quod est illud per quod repugnat tali rationi dividi in partes subiectivas".

⁵⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 113a.

⁵⁶ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114a: "Ad argumentum in oppositum bene procederet, si duo individua realiter convenirent et realiter differrent, quod non concedo. Conveniunt enim in communi conceptu tantum, et differunt realiter per rationes proprias". Dans ce même article 2 de la troisième question, Auriol démontre la vérité de sa thèse en refusant toutes les formes d'adjonction à la nature de l'espèce (quantité, matière, existence) que Duns Scot avait déjà répertoriées et critiquées: l'articulation du texte montre à l'évidence que Pierre Auriol a bâti son examen du problème en rapport à la discussion scotiste.

IV. LE PRINCIPE D'INDIVIDUATION

Y a-t-il un principe d'individuation? Cette question ne semble pas encore avoir trouvé de réponse précise, car le franciscain a privilégié jusqu'ici la démarche critique vis-à-vis de la conception scotiste. Aussi, revient-il sur ce problème et énonce la thèse suivante: "Respondeo. Pono hic tres propositiones. Prima est, quod realiter loquendo quaestio nulla est, cum quaeritur, quid addit individuum ad rationem speciei, quoniam omnis res eo quod est singulariter est [...]. Ideo quaerere aliquid per quid res, quae extra intellectum est est singularis, nihil est quaerere".⁵⁷ Anticipant la position de Guillaume d'Ockham⁵⁸—mais aussi, à plus longue échéance, celle de Francisco Suárez (*Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. V, de 1597) et celle de Leibniz (*Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, de 1663)—, Pierre Auriol signale ainsi la vacuité de l'interrogation qui porte sur un principe d'individuation, la jugeant désormais illégitime en raison de la primauté du singulier. Chaque existence extra-mentale est en effet synonyme d'une réalité individuelle qui est en elle-même et par elle-même irréductible: "Dico, quod omnis res est se ipsa singularis, et per nihil aliud, sed per illam".⁵⁹ Cette irréductibilité rend alors insensée et caduque la question d'un principe qui surviendrait comme cause de l'individualité des choses.

À partir de là, une seule difficulté demande encore à être résolue: celle qui consiste à savoir si la notion de l'individuel ajoute quelque chose au concept général sous lequel l'individu peut être conçu.⁶⁰ On remarquera que par cette nouvelle interrogation Auriol opère un renversement de perspective tout à fait significatif: non seulement l'individu ne résulte pas d'une adjonction à la nature commune, mais il faut se demander, au moins à titre d'hypothèse, si ce n'est pas la notion de l'individuel qui ajoute quelque chose à la notion générale de l'espèce.

⁵⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114a.

⁵⁸ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio)*, dist. 2, q. 6, in *Opera theologica* II, ed. S. Brown – G. Gál, St. Bonaventure, NY 1970, pp. 196–197: "...quaelibet res extra animam seipsa est singularis [...], nec est quaerenda aliqua causa individuationis". Auriol ne semble pas avoir connu les écrits d'Ockham, alors que celui-ci a vraisemblablement pris connaissance de certains écrits d'Auriol: cf. L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol", p. 501.

⁵⁹ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114b.

⁶⁰ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114b: "Tamen difficultas est, utrum [individuum] addit aliquid in conceptum".

La solution de cette difficulté fait appel à une importante distinction dans l'ordre de la connaissance. Une même chose peut en effet être conçue de deux manières: soit en elle-même, envisagée de manière absolue, soit sous une notion générale qui la considère en relation aux choses qui lui sont semblables. Le premier concept ne résulte pas du second ni, inversement, le concept général du concept de la chose prise dans sa réalité absolue: ce sont là deux notions distinctes et indépendantes de la même chose.⁶¹ Plus précisément, la notion "absolue" est celle qui rend compte d'une réalité en tant que particulière, individuelle, indivisible et irréductible, alors que la notion générale, dite "qualitative" ou "de ressemblance", rend compte d'une chose en tant qu'elle admet des "co-individus" pouvant être conçus sous une même notion commune.⁶² Aussi, à partir de la distinction clarifiée précédemment, il apparaît que la notion absolue rend compte d'une singularité dans sa dimension d'irréductibilité, alors que la notion générale ne peut être relative qu'à des individus dans leur dimension de ressemblance. En effet, le général (ou l'universel) est une notion communicable et attribuable à plusieurs, car elle n'indique pas le *quid* de la chose, mais le *quale* (le "comment") qui peut se vérifier simultanément dans plusieurs individus. C'est pourquoi, Socrate et Platon ne partagent pas le même *quid* (car ce que chacun d'eux est, est incommunicable), mais bien le même *quale*, c'est-à-dire une même modalité d'être, à savoir celle de l'être humain.⁶³ Pour cette raison, Auriol précise-t-il que "ego et tu non sumus idem, sed tamen ego possum esse talis, qualis es".⁶⁴ Ce *qualis* est précisément ce dont rend compte le concept universel, qui pour cette raison reçoit l'appellatif de "concept qualitatif". Aussi, puisque

⁶¹ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 114b–115a: "Secundo noto quod eadem res potest concipi sub duplici conceptu, uno quidem rei, ut res est absolute, et alio similitudinario et qualitativo; et hi sunt duo conceptus duplicis ordinis et omnino disparati, nec unus alium includit. [...] conceptus similitudinarius non constituitur per conceptum rei, ut res est, nec e converso".

⁶² Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 115a: "...omnis res, eo quod existit, est particularis: eo autem ipso, quo potest habere secum participem, fundat quandam conceptum similitudinarium illis". À propos du "conceptus similitudinarius" cf. Prezioso, "Il nominalismo ambiguo...", pp. 290–294.

⁶³ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 115a: "Universale est communicabile, quod est res concepta, et simillima; et hinc est, quod conceptus universalis est qualitativus. Unde quale quid est Sortes, responderetur quod homo; et ideo Philosophus, ubi arguit contra Ideam, dicit quod communitas Sortis ad Platonem non est penes quid, sed penes quale, quod pro tanto est, quia nihil est in me, quod sit in te; et tamen nihil in me, cui simillimum non possit esse in te".

⁶⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 114b–115a.

la notion d'espèce est une notion générale (ou "qualitative") et celle d'individu une notion "absolue" (ou quidditative), ces deux notions sont parfaitement distinctes et n'interfèrent pas l'une avec l'autre; par conséquent, la notion d'individu n'ajoute rien à la notion d'espèce: "quod individuum nihil omnino in conceptu addit ad conceptum speciei, sed sunt conceptus disparati et alterius ordinis".⁶⁵

L'altérité de ces concepts reproduit celle qui sépare l'ordre de l'être de l'ordre du connaître: seul l'individu appartient au premier et lui seul est par lui-même—c'est-à-dire intrinsèquement—un et irréductible. Par conséquent, même si Auriol est prêt à admettre la quantité comme facteur de division et de distinction des réalités purement quantitatives—car c'est par la quantité que deux morceaux de pain ou deux pierres se distinguent⁶⁶—, il réaffirme sans cesse que: "Individuum habet per propriam entitatem, quod sit distinctum ab omni individuo".⁶⁷ C'est pourquoi, en dernière analyse, la question d'un principe d'individuation a désormais perdu sa pertinence.

V. EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Pour conclure, nous voudrions attirer brièvement l'attention sur l'intérêt philosophique de la position d'Auriol, qui assume de manière critique la tradition précédente et l'intègre dans une solution personnelle originale. À travers sa critique de la conception scotiste de la nature commune, il fait place à la théorie de l'universel comme pur concept et montre clairement l'incommensurabilité de l'ordre du réel et de l'ordre conceptuel: de là l'incongruité d'une conception de l'individuation comme résultat d'une réduction ou d'une addition par rapport à la nature commune de l'espèce. Seul l'individuel existe à proprement parler et lui seul se donne comme une réalité première et irréductible. Nous avons vu par ailleurs que cette notion d'individualité est complétée et précisée par celle de singularité, dont la clarification permet de distinguer mieux que cela n'avait été fait jusque-là l'indivisibilité en soi de la distinction

⁶⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114b.

⁶⁶ Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114b: "Probo, quod scilicet individuum quantum habet, quod differat et fit aliud ab alio individuo comparticipante eiusdem speciei formaliter per quantitatem sic: illo differunt duo lapides actu distincti, quo differrent in potentia, si essent continuati; sed si duo lapides essent continuati differrent ad invicem praecise per quantitatem [ergo]...".

⁶⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, ed. Romae 1605, p. 114b.

par rapport à des “co-individus” : leur présence devient alors le critère distinctif de l’individualité multiple par rapport à l’unicité du singulier. Individualité et singularité/unicité ne se recouvrent donc pas : la notion de singularité, qui déploie sa valeur explicative notamment dans le cas de l’individuation des substances séparées, acquiert ainsi une valeur philosophique particulière, car elle permet de concevoir une modalité d’existence dont l’irréductibilité n’est pas synonyme d’individualité.

DUNS SCOTUS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE POSSIBLES IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT

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From a theistic perspective, if there were no God, no creatures would exist. But would creatures still be *possible*, independently from God? This becomes a crucial question when a theory of possibles meets two conditions: first, that the possibles are conceived of as independent from a relation to the divine power that can convey real existence to them, and second, that the possibles are thought to be distinct from the divine essence. Historically, Duns Scotus was the first to develop a theory of the possibles where both conditions were met simultaneously. In agreement with Thomas Aquinas, but against Henry of Ghent, he holds that creatures are possible in an absolute sense, and not only because God can make them.¹ Contrary to Thomas, but in agreement with Henry, Scotus conceives of the possibles as not coinciding with the being of the divine essence.²

* I would like to thank Sara Trudeau and Gloria Frost for helpful comments. Duns Scotus's works are cited from the following editions:

Lectura and Ordinatio: Opera omnia, ed. C. Balić et al., Editio Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1950 sqq.

Reportatio I-A: John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture Reportatio I-A*, ed. and trans. A.B. Wolter – O.V. Bychkov, 2 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY 2004 and 2008.

Reportatio I-A, dist. 36: T. Noone, "Scotus on Divine Ideas. Rep. Paris. I-A, d. 36", *Medioevo* 24 (1998), pp. 359–453.

Reportatio II-A: ms. Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, K ii 26, ff. 113ra–151vb.

Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (QQMet.), ed. R. Andrews et al., *Opera Philosophica III–IV*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1997.

¹ For Thomas, see *Summa theol.*, I, q. 25, art. 3; for Henry of Ghent, see below, note 34. A clear analysis of the distinction between potentiality (i.e. that something is possible insofar as it regards an active or passive potency) and possibility (i.e. that something is possible in an absolute sense) in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas is offered by K. Jacobi, "Das Können und die Möglichkeiten. Potentialität und Possibilität", in *Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik*, ed. T. Buchheim – C.H. Kneepkens – K. Lorenz, Stuttgart 2001, pp. 9–23.

² For Thomas's view regarding the ontological foundation of possibles in the divine essence and for Henry's claim that the possibles are distinct from the divine essence see J.F. Wippel, "The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles according to Thomas Aquinas,

There is agreement among all interpreters that Scotus attributes an important role to the divine intellect in the constitution of possibles, but ambiguity remains regarding what precise role the divine intellect has.³ Does God merely acknowledge the full range of possibility of things which would be possible even if God did not exist, so that it is only factually by the divine intellect that the possibles enjoy some being, namely intentional being? Or do the possibles depend in principle on the divine intellect as that which alone can primarily constitute the possibles as possibles?

What complicates the interpretation of Scotus's modal theory is a certain ambiguity in his terminology. In his writings, the word *possibile* may either denote the eidetic nature of possible things, or it may signify the possibility that such natures exist in reality. Accordingly the question about the origin of possibles regards two distinct but closely related issues: on one hand the problem of the origin of the eidetic character of things, and on the other hand the problem of the foundation of the modal status of non-existent things.

Interpreters agree that according to Scotus, God does not bestow the modal status on the possibles. God does not make impossible things become possible or possible things become impossible. In this sense, the possibles are independent from God.⁴ Yet as I intend to show, in light of epistemological considerations Scotus nevertheless affirms the dependence of the possibles upon God. For Scotus, the possibles are dependent on God qua eidetic natures, but not qua possibilities. Accordingly there would not be any possibles without God, for only

Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines", *Review of Metaphysics* 33 (1981), pp. 729–758, at pp. 733–735, 744–748.

³ For general accounts of Scotus's modal theory, see S. Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, London – New York 1993, pp. 140–148; C. Normore, "Duns Scotus's Modal Theory", in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. T. Williams, Cambridge 2003, pp. 129–160; P. King, "Duns Scotus on Possibilities, Powers, and the Possible", in *Potentialität und Possibilität*, pp. 175–199; L. Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*, Hamburg 1990, pp. 1–108; T. Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius*, Münster 2002 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 60).

⁴ For recent arguments to this effect, see F. Mondadori, "The Independence of the Possible according to Scotus", in *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302–2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2–4 septembre 2002*, ed. O. Boulnois – E. Karger – J.-L. Solère – G. Sondag, Turnhout 2004, pp. 313–374; R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, Aldershot 2005, pp. 69–77.

an infinite intellect can think of possibles without any presuppositions whatsoever. If eidetic natures could be originally thought of by a finite intellect, then the possibles would indeed be completely independent from God.

In the sequel, I will first discuss the historical and theoretical context of Duns Scotus's doctrine on the possibles. Next I will make some terminological clarifications with regard to Scotus's concept of the possibles. In the third section I will examine the famous texts where Scotus posits two constituents of the possibles, i.e. divine knowledge and the formal character of the possible thing. Finally I will address in its own right the problem of the dependence of the possibles on God.

I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Duns Scotus's account of the possibles is embedded in his teaching on divine knowledge. In order to understand his doctrine of the possibles, we must therefore situate it with respect to the philosophical problems which his account of divine knowledge seeks to address.

According to Aristotle, the *nous*, of which he speaks in *Metaphysics* Λ and which medieval authors identified with God's intellect, is not in potency to anything, but fully actualized by its self-knowledge (Λ, 9, 1074b15–1075a10). If this is so, how can Christian thinkers account for God's knowledge of creatures? The solutions they offered centered on this explanation: together with the knowledge of his own essence, God also knows all the ways in which His essence can be imitated by a creature. These comparisons between the divine essence and its possible imitations were identified with the divine ideas.⁵ As mere mental comparisons (*relationes rationis*), the non-existent but possible creatures have no being whatsoever, apart from the divine knowledge. In short: by means of God's knowledge of the primary object, i.e. the divine essence, God has knowledge of the secondary

⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 15, art. 2; *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, q. 2, art. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, p. 842; Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 300rB; Richardus de Mediavilla, *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, art. 2, q. 3, ed. Brixiae 1591, vol. 1, p. 314b; Aegidius Romanus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, princ. 2, q. 2, ad 2, ed. Venetiis 1521, f. 188rE; Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* IV, q. 1 (brevis), ed. M. de Wulf – A. Pelzer, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1904 (Les Philosophes Belges, II), p. 229; id., *Quodl.* IV, q. 1 (longa), *ibid.*, p. 321; Iacobus de Viterbio, *Quodl.* I, q. 5, princ. 2, ed. E. Ypma, vol. 1, Würzburg 1968, p. 64.

object, i.e. the possible creatures. Some medieval authors held more specifically that the divine ideas are the means by which God knows the possible creatures.⁶

This traditional account of divine knowledge is substantially altered by Henry of Ghent and abandoned completely by Duns Scotus. According to Henry, by knowing His essence as imitable by a creature, God not only has knowledge of the creature, but as an object of divine knowledge, the creature also has being in its own right, a being which later authors will call 'objective being'. God's essence is the exemplary cause of 'creatures as known', i.e. of the objective being of creatures. Henry identifies this 'being known' (*esse cognitum*) with the 'being of essence' (*esse essentiae*) of creatures. The 'being of essence' of a creature is equally eternal as is the divine knowledge.⁷ In this way, all possible creatures have 'being of essence' and are thus marked off from things that are not possible.⁸

Duns Scotus rejects the traditional explanation of divine knowledge in general and Henry's account in particular. In his most prominent argument against the *opinio communis*, Scotus points out that the traditional solution does not solve the main difficulty with regard to the divine knowledge of creatures. How does God have knowledge of the comparison between His essence and possible finite imitations of it? If this comparison is known by virtue of a further comparison, this will lead into an infinite regress. If it is known directly, why not admit that creatures are known directly without these relations of comparison?⁹ Among the accounts of divine knowledge that Scotus critically assesses,

⁶ Albertus Magnus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 35, art. 7, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris 1890 (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, ed. Paris. XXVI), p. 191a; Bonaventura, *In I Sent.*, dist. 35, art. un., q. 1, fund. 2 and in corp., in *Opera omnia* I, Quaracchi 1882, pp. 600a and 601a; Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 300rB; Richardus de Mediavilla, *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, art. 1, q. 2, ed. Brixiae 1591, vol. 1, p. 312a; Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl.* VII, q. 1, ed. M. de Wulf – J. Hoffmans, *Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1914 (Les Philosophes Belges, III), p. 272; Aegidius Romanus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, princ. 2, q. 3, ed. Venetiis 1521, f. 188vN–O.

⁷ Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, ed. R. Macken, Leuven 1983, pp. 30–31; *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4, ed. Parisiis 1520, vol. 1, ff. 127vQ–128rS.

⁸ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4, ed. Parisiis 1520, vol. 1, ff. 127rO–127vP. For an excellent discussion of Henry's concept of *esse essentiae* see P. Porro, "Possibilità ed *esse essentiae* in Enrico di Gand", in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel, Leuven 1996, pp. 211–253.

⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 249–250; *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 36, q. 1–2, n. 47, ed. Noone, p. 414.

he finds Henry's solution particularly unacceptable, since, according to his interpretation, Henry attributes eternal being to creatures prior to their creation.¹⁰ In Scotus's view, by virtue of his unlimited essence, God indeed has direct knowledge of creatures without having to reflect upon His own essence as imitable.¹¹ Despite God's direct knowledge of creatures, the divine intellect is not in potency with respect to the known object, i.e. the secondary object.¹² On the contrary, God knows creatures by producing their 'intelligible being' (*esse intelligibile*).¹³ It is not God's self-knowledge that leads Him to the knowledge of creatures. Creatures have intelligibility apart from the intelligibility of the divine essence and they are objects of thought apart from God's essence.

Despite his disagreement with Henry's account, Scotus further develops two of its important features. (1) Like Henry, Scotus attributes to creatures, as objects of God's knowledge, objective being (*esse intelligibile, esse obiectivum, esse cognitum*), which is distinct from the divine essence. (2) As secondary objects of the divine knowledge, non-existing creatures have an intelligible nature; and as intelligible beings, they are possible beings. They have intelligibility and possibility in their own right. Their intelligibility does not coincide with that of the divine essence, as was held by most of those who identified the divine ideas with the ways in which God views His essence as being imitable.

II. SCOTUS'S CONCEPT OF POSSIBLES

As mentioned above, one of the difficulties in interpreting Scotus's modal theory lies in the fact that his vocabulary fluctuates. The meanings of the terms 'possibility', 'potentiality', 'cause of possibility', 'possible being', 'the possible', 'to be possible', are not clearly distinguished (*possibilitas, potentialitas, causa possibilitatis, ratio possibilitatis, esse possibile, possibile, possibile esse*). A few fundamental points, however, are clearly and repeatedly stated.

¹⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 13, ed. Vat. VI, p. 276.

¹¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 35, q. un., nn. 16–17, ed. Vat. XVII, p. 450; *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 51, ed. Vat. VI, p. 266; *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 36, q. 1–2, nn. 40–46, ed. Noone, pp. 411–414.

¹² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 36, q. 1–2, nn. 11–12, ed. Noone, pp. 398–399.

¹³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 32, ed. Vat. VI, p. 258.

Scotus describes the possible as “that with which ‘to be’ is compatible and which cannot exist of itself necessarily” (*illud cui non repugnat esse et quod non potest ex se esse necessario*).¹⁴ He relates the possible to ‘logical potency’ (or logical possibility), which means that the terms of a proposition are not incompatible.¹⁵ Thus a human being is logically possible since ‘to be’ is not incompatible with ‘human being’.¹⁶ Because God knows every creature that is compatible with existence, every possible creature has intelligible being or cognized being (*esse intelligibile, esse cognitum*) in God’s intellect.¹⁷ What is intelligible and what is possible is coextensive. The objective being that creatures have as objects of divine knowledge and the possible being they enjoy insofar as they can have real existence are only formally distinct.¹⁸ When God produces the intelligible character of creatures (*intelligibilia*), He thereby also produces the possibles.¹⁹

A certain ambiguity in Scotus’s teaching on the possibles is rooted in the lack of terminological precision: when Scotus speaks of the ground of possibility, he focuses either on the origin of the intelligible character, i.e. the thing’s eidetic structure (*intelligibilia, rationes formales*),²⁰ or on the compatibility of existence with these eidetic structures.²¹

¹⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 7, ed. Vat. VI, p. 354.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 7, q. un., n. 27, ed. Vat. IV, p. 118; *QQMet.* IX, q. 1–2, nn. 18–21, in *Opera Philosophica* IV, pp. 514–515.

¹⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 36, q. un., nn. 60–61, ed. Vat. VI, p. 296.

¹⁷ Scotus identifies this intelligible being of creatures with the traditional notion of the divine idea, thus changing the meaning of this term: for Scotus, God’s idea of a stone is the stone as known by God (*lapis intellectus*) and generally the idea of a creature is the known creature as object of the divine intellect, see, e.g., Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 30, ed. Vat. XVII, p. 455; *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 40, ed. Vat. VI, p. 261; *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 36, q. 1–2, n. 57, ed. Noone, p. 419. Scotus often uses the terms *esse intelligibile, esse cognitum, esse obiectivum* interchangeably.

¹⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 93, ed. Vat. VII, p. 49.

¹⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 358–359.

²⁰ See, e.g., Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 358–359; *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 1, q. 2, nn. 80 and 93, ed. Vat. VII, pp. 43 and 49.

²¹ See, e.g., Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., nn. 6–7, ed. Vat. VI, p. 354.

III. THE CONSTITUTION OF POSSIBILITY

God produces the intelligible character (*intelligibilia*) of creatures. In this sense, God is at the origin of all possibles. Scotus even goes so far as to say that “through His intellect, God produces the possible in possible being” (*Deus suo intellectu producit possibile in esse possibili*).²² Does this mean that He produces the possibility, i.e. the modal status, of the possibles? Hardly so, since any production whatsoever presupposes that the product be possible beforehand.²³ If the possibility of the possible were in fact produced, and the possibility of this possibility, this would imply an infinite regress of produced possibilities.

In the interpretation I propose, Scotus traces the formal character or eidetic structure of the possibles back to the divine intellect. Yet God does not make a possible creature to be possible. What is produced is the *possibile* (i.e. the eidetic character of a thing). Yet its possibility is not produced apart from the *possibile*. When Scotus says that the thing’s possibility is produced by the divine intellect,²⁴ this can only mean that the possibility is incidental to the production of an *esse intelligibile*, an eidetic nature.

In order to illustrate what Scotus means by the production of the possibles, I will first show how Scotus rules out that God makes what is impossible to be possible. Next, I will examine Scotus’s view that it is not in God’s power to make a thing either possible or impossible. God’s intellect is not the sole cause of the possibles, but paradoxically the possibles themselves play a certain role in their own constitution. Third, I will examine the question of why certain things are possible and others are not, in order to shed further light on the problem.

III.1. *Valid Being* (Ens Ratum)

If something is formally impossible, nothing can make it possible. But is what is possible made to be possible without being previously impossible? Duns Scotus deals with this problem in the context of a discussion about the *ens ratum* (‘valid being’, or ‘consistent being’,

²² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 16, ed. Vat. VI, p. 359.

²³ See below, note 59.

²⁴ See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 358–359: “Si tamen res intelligatur esse possibilis antequam Deus per omnipotentiam producat, illud sic est verum, sed in illa possibilitate non est simpliciter prius, sed producitur ab intellectu divino”.

which distinguishes a possible thing from impossible objects).²⁵ An anonymous objector, who is influenced by Henry of Ghent, argues that something is said to be a valid being because it has an exemplary cause in God. In reply, Duns Scotus defines *ens ratum* in two ways: a valid being is either that which *does* in fact have an essence and existence, or that which *can* have essence and existence.²⁶ According to this second meaning, the *ratitudo* ('validity', 'consistence') is due to the thing itself. Were it not of itself a valid being, it could never become consistent by receiving a relation to God as its exemplary cause:

[M]an is of himself a valid being, because 'to be' is compatible with him formally of himself. [...] If 'to be' were incompatible with man on account of man himself, no additional relation could make 'to be' compatible with him.²⁷

Something is a valid being not because it is made so by means of an exemplary cause, but rather because its notion (*ratio*) is not contradictory.²⁸ According to this criterion, man is a valid being, while the chimera and other figments of thought are not.

III.2. *The Divine Intellect as the Cause of Possibility*

Does this mean that a valid being is independent from God? For Duns Scotus, the answer is no. Though man is a valid being of himself, rather than on account of God, he is not a valid *being* independently from God, since man is only through participation.²⁹ The human nature, by which man is a valid being, originates in the divine intellect.³⁰ Ontologically, the possible originates in God, although God does not produce its modal status. Scotus formulates the dependency of possibles on divine

²⁵ For a thorough discussion of the *ens ratum* see Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens*, pp. 45–56.

²⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 36, q. un., nn. 1 and 48, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 271 and 290.

²⁷ "[H]omo est ex se ens ratum, quia formaliter ex se non repugnat sibi esse [...] si homini de se repugnaret esse, per nullum respectum advenientem posset ei non repugnare" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 50, ed. Vat. VI, p. 291). Cf. *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 314, ed. Vat. III, pp. 190–191; *Reportatio* II-A, dist. 1, q. 2, ms. Torino, B.N.U., K ii 26, f. 115va.

²⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, pars 2, q. un., n. 319, ed. Vat. III, p. 193; cf. *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 5, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 353–354.

²⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 326, ed. Vat. III, pp. 196–197; cf. *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 30, q. 1–2, nn. 52 and 57, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 192–193 and 195.

³⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II-A, dist. 1, q. 2, ms. Torino, B.N.U., K ii 26, f. 115va.

knowledge in a famous passage that is at the core of the debate about the correct interpretation of Scotus's modal theory:

[T]he possible, in that it is the terminus or the object of omnipotence, is that with which being is not incompatible and which cannot exist of itself necessarily; the stone, produced in intelligible being by the Divine Intellect, has these features of itself formally and through the Divine Intellect principiatively; therefore, it is possible of itself formally (*ex se formaliter*), and principiatively, as it were, through the Divine Intellect (*quasi principiative per intellectum divinum*).³¹

In this text, Scotus describes the constitution of the possibles by way of two principles: the eidetic character of the thing (*ex se formaliter*), as well as God's intellective activity (*principiative per intellectum divinum*). One can interpret this formula in at least two ways, depending on which one of the two elements are considered to be prior in origin:

- (1) The possibles are remotely possible, independently from God; but only upon God's knowledge of them do they have a certain entity.³²
- (2) God produces the possibles, and only then are they of themselves possible.³³

An interpretation of the text quoted above has to take into account the context. The text is an excerpt from Scotus's examination of Henry's

³¹ "[P]ossibile, secundum quod est terminus vel obiectum omnipotentiae, est illud cui non repugnat esse et quod non potest ex se esse necessario; lapis, productus in esse intelligibili per intellectum divinum, habet ista ex se formaliter et per intellectum principiative; ergo est ex se formaliter possibilis et quasi principiative per intellectum divinum" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 7, ed. Vat. VI, p. 354, trans. King, p. 195).

³² See, e.g., S. Knuuttila, "Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. L. Honnefelder – R. Wood – M. Dreyer, Leiden – New York – Köln 1996, pp. 127–143; O. Boulnois, *Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII^e–XIV^e siècle)*, Paris 1999, pp. 439–444, especially p. 443; J. Poncius, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* II, q. 5, in *Cursus Philosophicus*, Lyon 1659, pp. 902b–907a.

³³ See, e.g., C.G. Normore, "Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature and the Contingency of the Present", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, pp. 161–174; A.B. Wolter, "Scotus on the Divine Origin of Possibility", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993), pp. 95–107; B. Mastrius, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* VIII, q. 1, art. 2, nn. 14–15, in *Cursus Philosophicus*, Venezia 1727, vol. 5, p. 22a–b; id., *Disputationes Metaphysicae* VIII, q. 1, art. 3, n. 49, p. 28a.

view that something is possible due to God's omnipotence.³⁴ This discussion is found in all three Commentaries on the Sentences in book I, distinction 43 (*Lectura, Ordinatio, Reportatio Parisiensis*). Scotus summarizes his own position: "a thing is primarily possible not by omnipotence, but by the intellect".³⁵ For Duns Scotus, the alternative is not between denying or affirming dependence of the possibles on God, but rather between seeing this dependence founded upon the activity of the divine intellect or upon God's omnipotence. This is clear from the following two passages in the *Reportatio* and the *Ordinatio*, respectively:

The first reason of the possibility in a creature is not God's active potency or omnipotence, but prior to this, the intellect is the reason of its possibility, because it is through the intellect that it is primarily constituted into intelligible being. Then I argue: whatever it is in God that primarily constitutes [the creature] into intelligible being, this is its first reason of possibility. Now, what primarily constitutes the creature into intelligible being is not omnipotence (as it is distinguished from the intellect), but the intellect. Therefore etc.³⁶

[I]t is not due to this power under the aspect of omnipotence [...] that an object is primarily possible, but through the divine intellect that produces this object primarily into intelligible being. [...] And then the thing that is produced in this intelligible being by the divine intellect in the first instant of nature, has of itself possible being in the second instant of nature, because formally 'to be' is not incompatible with it.³⁷

³⁴ Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* VI, q. 3, ed. G.A. Wilson, Leuven 1987, pp. 43–44. With regard to the cause of possibility, Henry's teaching is constant. Concerning the reason for impossibility, however, his position changes: at first, he holds that something is impossible because it cannot be made (*Quodl.* VI, q. 3, ed. Wilson, p. 47; *ibid.*, ad 2, pp. 49–50). Later he argues that something is impossible because God cannot make it (*Quodl.* VIII, q. 3, ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 304rQ).

³⁵ "[P]er omnipotentiam non habet primo res esse possibile, sed per intellectum" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 9, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 521).

³⁶ "[P]rima ratio possibilitatis in creatura non est potentia activa Dei sive omnipotentia, sed intellectus est prior ratio possibilitatis eius, quia per intellectum constituitur in esse intelligibili primo. Tunc arguo: per quodcumque in Deo constituitur primo in esse intelligibili, illud est sibi prima ratio possibilitatis; sed per omnipotentiam, ut distinguitur contra intellectum, non constituitur creatura primo in esse intelligibili, sed per intellectum; ergo etc." (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 22, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 526).

³⁷ "[P]er ipsam potentiam 'sub ratione qua est omnipotentia' non habet obiectum quod sit primo possibile, sed per intellectum divinum, producentem illud primo in esse intelligibili [...] et tunc res producta in tali esse ab intellectu divino—scilicet intelligibili—in primo instanti naturae, habet se ipsa esse possibile in secundo instanti naturae, quia formaliter non repugnat sibi esse" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 358–359).

Both of these texts emphasize the priority of the divine intellect over the divine omnipotence in the constitution of the possibles. The second text also stresses an ontological priority of the divine intellect with regard to the formal character of the possible. God's intellect produces the 'intelligible being' of a thing, consequent to which the thing is of itself possible. God does not first produce eidetic natures and then add possibility to them (as the previously mentioned objector suggests, who holds that the thing's validity is grounded in its relation of exemplarity to God), but rather the possibility is intrinsic to the eidetic natures which are produced by God.

How does this relate to Scotus's view that a valid being is not constituted by a relation to God (cf. section III.1)? Can the formal character of a thing to be produced give a criterion for its own possibility before it is produced? And if so, does God cognize that a thing is possible and only thereafter produce its intelligible being and thereby its possibility? This cannot be the case, since at the moment in which God knows that something is possible, He already has knowledge of its eidetic nature, and when He knows the eidetic nature, it is possible. To say that the possibility of something follows upon God's knowledge of it, does not solve the question of why one thing is possible (e.g., the human being), and another thing is not (e.g., the chimera). Formulated in different terms, the difficulty consists in reconciling these two affirmations while avoiding vicious circularity:

- (1) Something is possible because God knows it. (This proposition regards the *principiative per intellectum divinum*.)
- (2) God knows something as possible because it is possible. (This proposition regards the *formaliter ex se*.)

We have discussed the first statement before: it regards the origin of a thing's eidetic nature. By His knowledge of a creature, God confers on it 'intelligible being', whereby it is constituted as a possible. The second statement regards the possibility of the eidetic nature. This possibility is conferred on the thing only indirectly by God. It is intrinsic to the eidetic nature which is produced by God's knowledge. Accordingly, God cannot know something as possible if its eidetic nature is inconsistent and thus inconceivable, i.e. if it contains contradictory features, as is the case of a square circle or a chimera. Neither can He know as impossible that of which the eidetic nature is non-contradictory and thus conceivable. Therefore He cannot make a square circle to be non-contradictory and

a circle to be contradictory. This means that God does not arbitrarily establish the realm of possibility: there are not several possible sets of possibilities, but only one set, the content of which is fixed.

In what way, however, is the *ratio formalis* of the possible thing itself a criterion of its own possibility? Inverting the question may cause the answer to be more easily discerned: what is the cause of impossibility?

III.3. *The Cause of Impossibility and the Possibility a Thing Has ex se Formaliter*

According to the interpretation presented above, Scotus holds that the possibles have their possibility as something intrinsic to their eidetic nature, which is itself produced by the divine intellect. This conforms to Scotus's account of valid being (*ens ratum*): the validity of a thing (i.e. the fact that a notion is not contradictory) is not constituted by a relation of the thing to God as its exemplary cause, but it is rather consequent upon the very nature of the thing at hand. Conversely, the impossibility of something is not reduced to a relation to God or a lack thereof. Scotus refutes Henry's view in *Quodl.* VIII, q. 3, where Henry attributes the impossibility of a thing to God's inability to produce it. According to Scotus, the only reason of impossibility lies in the incompatibility of a thing with being, which Scotus attributes to the formal character of the thing at hand.³⁸ What does this incompatibility with being result from? In other words, what is the reason for the impossibility of a thing? Scotus offers us this solution:

The first impossibility results formally from the impossible thing, and principiatively from God. Though it is traced back to something principiatively, it is however not traced back to the denial of a capacity in God, but rather principiatively to the divine intellect, which originates the thing in such a being in which its components are formally incompatible, and because of the formal incompatibility, the thing composed of these is simply impossible.³⁹

³⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 5, ed. Vat. VI, p. 353. For an account of Henry's position, see P. Porro, "Duns Scot et le point de rupture avec Avicenne", in *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302–2002*, pp. 195–218.

³⁹ "Sic ergo impossibilitas prima est formaliter ex parte impossibilis et principiative in Deo; et si principiative reducatur ad aliquid, non tamen reducitur ad negationem possibilitatis in Deo: immo reducitur principiative ad intellectum divinum, principiantem illud in illo esse in quo partes illae formaliter repugnant, propter quam formalem

The *Reportatio* reiterates this point and then adds an example:

For example, white and black have their first possible being principiatively from the divine intellect. Consequently, just as they have their formal character from the divine intellect, they likewise have their incompatibility principiatively from the divine intellect. Yet they are formally of themselves such [incompatible things], independently from anything else besides them. The incompatibility of the proposition 'white is black' [...] is thus traced back to God as its positive cause, by which principiatively the formal constituents of the impossible thing are primarily endowed with possible being, and therefore the incompatibility of the whole thing [is traced back to God].⁴⁰

Duns Scotus is saying here that the incompatibility of black and white originates in God only indirectly, insofar as God's intellect produces their possible being, i.e. their eidetic natures, which are in fact mutually exclusive. Things which are composed of incompatible or contradictory features, such as the chimera or a man deprived of reason (*homo irrationalis*), cannot be thought of (not even by God) as something intelligible (*unum conceptibile*) nor, therefore, as something that can exist. The thought of such things is flawed.⁴¹ Thus impossible things do not have an eidetic nature and cannot receive one.

The question of why certain things are possible while others are not can thus be answered as follows: the possibles require no explanation with regard to why their eidetic natures are non-contradictory; it must only be asked how they originate as eidetic natures. Once the natures have been produced, their possibility is concomitant with their nature.

repugnantiam totum ex eis est simpliciter impossibile" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 17, ed. Vat. VI, p. 360).

⁴⁰ "[U]t album et nigrum primum esse possibile quod habent, ab intellectu divino habent principiative, et per consequens ab intellectu divino principiative habent suam impossibilitatem sicut et suas rationes formales, sed ex se formaliter sunt talia circumscripto quocumque alio quod est extra illa, et ideo impossibilitas huius 'album est niger' [...] reducitur ad intellectum divinum ut ad causam positivam a quo sunt primo principiative partes formales in esse possibili ipsius impossibilis, et per consequens <impossibilitas> [ms. Torino, B.N.U., K ii 26, f. 109rb] totius" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 24, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 2, pp. 527–528, punctuation modified). Cf. *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 5, ed. Vat. VI, p. 353.

⁴¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 25, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 528: "Ex hoc apparet quod ens fictum distinctum contra ens ratum, ut chimera vel homo irrationalis et huiusmodi includens contradictionem, non est aliquod unum conceptibile nisi ab intellectu errante, et quod est conceptibile ab intellectu errante ut errans est, nihil est. Nec habent talia figmenta vel contradictoria ideas in Deo nisi secundum partes illorum, quae tamen partes non faciunt per se unum nec in re, nec in intellectu".

The nature of non-composite things is unfailingly possible; more complex natures are possible if they are composed of compatible features. Why certain features are compatible, and others are not, is a primary fact that is not further explainable.⁴²

IV. THERE WOULD BE NO POSSIBLES WITHOUT GOD

Duns Scotus traces the possibles back to the divine intellect, by which creatures are primarily constituted in their *esse intelligibile* and thereby in their eidetic nature. As intelligible natures, they are also possible natures. With the production of divine ideas, which are the secondary object of God's thought, God also produces the possibles. As objects of God's thought, eidetic natures enjoy objective being. As things that can exist, the same eidetic natures are possibles.⁴³

All interpreters of Duns Scotus agree that he holds that the divine intellect constitutes the possibles by producing the divine ideas as the subjects where the possibility of something comes to light. The dispute regards the question of whether Scotus holds that the possibles are only factually or in principle dependent on the production of the divine ideas. According to the former alternative, it would be thinkable that there are possibles even under the hypothesis that God does not exist.

In this section, I will first present a number of texts that seem to suggest that the possibles are independent from God. Next, I will discuss the interpretation of Simo Knuuttila, who takes Scotus to think that the possibles are in principle independent from God. I will present some considerations that speak against Knuuttila's interpretation. Lastly, I will present an argument of Ockham against Scotus, in which Ockham confirms my interpretation of Scotus, while sharing the same philosophical concern as Knuuttila.

IV.1. *The Compatibility of Terms under the Hypothesis that God Does not Exist*

In a number of texts, Scotus appears to suggest that even under the assumption that God did not exist, there would still be possibles. Although they differ with regard to context and complexity, the most

⁴² See below, note 48.

⁴³ See above, note 18.

important features of these texts are similar: under the hypothesis of God's non-existence, incompatible notions would still be incompatible, and contradictory notions would still be contradictory; a true proposition would still be true (like the statement that a triangle has three angles), and a modal proposition would still be meaningful (like the statement "the world can be"). Interpreters who claim that Scotus detaches the possibles from any ontological foundation and that he considers them in principle independent from God see their reading of Scotus supported by these texts:

Hence that is impossible absolutely speaking, with which 'to be' is per se incompatible, and which is primarily of itself such that 'to be' is incompatible with it. And this is not the case because of a positive or negative relation to God. 'To be' would rather be incompatible with it even under the impossible hypothesis that God did not exist.⁴⁴

[W]hat is contradictory is of itself formally incompatible, and not because of a relation to an extrinsic negation. Indeed even if it were possible that God did not exist, then what is contradictory would still be contradictory. Hence absolutely speaking, it is not because of a negation or incapacity in God that a creature is impossible.⁴⁵

[I]f, to assume the impossible, God did not exist and a triangle did, it would still be the case that having three angles is traced back to the nature of the triangle.⁴⁶

Suppose that before the creation of the world not only had the world not existed, but, *per impossibile*, God had not existed but were to have begun to exist from himself, and then had been able to create the world. If there had been an intellect prior to the world that formulated 'The world will exist', this would have been possible, since the terms would not be incompatible. Yet this is not due to some principle in the possible thing or active [power] corresponding to it. Nor was 'The world will exist' now possible, formally speaking, by God's potency, but instead by the potency which was the non-incompatibility of its terms, since these terms would

⁴⁴ "Illud ergo est simpliciter impossibile cui per se repugnat esse, et quod ex se primo est tale quod sibi repugnat esse,—et non propter aliquem respectum ad Deum, affirmativum vel negativum; immo repugnaret sibi esse, si per impossibile Deus non esset" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 5, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 353–354).

⁴⁵ "Sed contradictoria habent formalem repugnantiam ex se et non ex respectu ad aliquam negationem extrinsecam. Immo si esset possibile Deum non esse, adhuc contradictoria contradicerent sibi; ergo impossibilitas simpliciter in creatura non est propter negationem aliquam vel impossibilitatem in Deo" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, dist. 43, q. 1, n. 16, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 2, p. 524).

⁴⁶ "Vel si, per impossibile, Deus non esset et quod triangulus esset, adhuc habere tres resolveretur in naturam trianguli" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, prol., q. 3, quaestiuncula 7, n. 250, ed. and trans. Wolter – Bychkov, vol. 1, p. 87).

not be incompatible even if a potency active in respect of this possible [proposition] were [not] to accompany that non-incompatibility.⁴⁷

In addition to these texts that argue from the hypothesis of God's non-existence, Scotus suggests that possibles are independent from God because they can be recognized as such by any intellect:

Why [to be something] is compatible with man, but not with the chimera, is because this is this and that is that, no matter which intellect considers this.⁴⁸

It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in detail the presuppositions and contexts of these texts.⁴⁹ My goal is merely to show that they are not incompatible with my interpretation of Scotus, according to which the eidetic nature as the subjects of possibility originate in God alone, while the intrinsic possibility or compatibility with being of these natures is not conferred on them by God. I will try to make this point in dialogue with the interpretation of Simo Knuuttila, who contradicts my reading of Scotus.

IV.2. *The Interpretation that Possibles Are Possibles Independently from God*

When relating the above examples to Scotus's account of the origin of possibles, one may conclude that his view is as follows: if God did not exist, a stone or a human being would nevertheless be possible, and a square-circle or a chimera would be impossible. According to Knuuttila's interpretation of Scotus, "possibilities qua possibilities are independent of God". Any omniscient intellect could recognize the same domain of possibility. In Knuuttila's view, logical possibilities can be

⁴⁷ "[S]icut si ante mundi creationem mundus non solum non fuisset, sed, per impossibile, Deus non fuisset sed incepisset a se esse, et tunc fuisset potens creare mundum,—si fuisset intellectus ante mundum, componens hanc 'mundus erit', haec fuisset possibilis quia termini non repugnarent, non tamen propter aliquod principium in re possibili, vel activum, sibi correspondens; nec etiam modo ista 'mundus erit' fuit possibilis—formaliter loquendo—potentia Dei, sed potentia quae erat non-repugnantia terminorum istorum, quia isti termini non repugnarent licet istam non-repugnantiam concomitaretur potentia activa respectu huius possibilis" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 7, q. un., n. 27, ed. Vat. IV, pp. 118–119, trans. King, p. 183).

⁴⁸ "Et quare homini non repugnat et chimaerae repugnat, est, quia hoc est hoc et illud illud, et hoc quocumque intellectu concipiente" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 36, q. un., n. 60, ed. Vat. VI, p. 296).

⁴⁹ These texts are thoroughly scrutinized by Normore, "Duns Scotus's Modal Theory", pp. 148–154; Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta*, pp. 209–212.

considered without any ontological status or without objective being in the divine intellect. Knuuttila construes a difference “between logical possibilities as non-existent preconditions of thoughts and beings and logical possibilities as embedded in actual thoughts or being”.⁵⁰ His interpretation culminates in this statement:

Since the content of this infinite set of necessary and possible truths and its fine structure based on the relations of logical compossibility are determined, the divine intellect only ‘actualizes’ all that can be included in it but does not influence its structure and content. It would be similarly actualized by any omniscient intellect, because the absolute totality of intelligibility can be actual only in one way.⁵¹

In short: if God did not exist, there would nonetheless be possibles which can be known as such by any intellect.

Although the reflections supporting Knuuttila’s interpretation are insightful, I do not consider this a correct rendering of Scotus’s account. For Scotus, I contend, it is precisely the divine intellect that is at the origin of the possibles, because the divine intellect alone is capable of producing the eidetic natures of creatures *ex nihilo*.

What leads Scotus to regard the possibles as fundamentally dependent on God are considerations pertaining to epistemology, rather than to modal logic. In the context of his account of the production of ideas, Scotus considers the divine intellect to be the measure of its secondary object, i.e. of the creatures He knows. Accordingly God knows creatures without presupposing the presence of their intelligible natures. Human knowledge, conversely, is measured by the object of knowledge, and hence dependent on the presence of the object.⁵² Because God’s knowledge is infinite, He is capable of cognizing an eidetic nature without presupposing anything other than Himself.⁵³ On the contrary, when a human intellect knows something, the object of knowledge must be given beforehand. As David Hume points out, a blind person cannot

⁵⁰ Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 142–143; id., “Interpreting Scotus’ Theory of Modality. Three Critical Remarks”, in *Via scoti. Metodologia ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 9–11 marzo 1993*, vol. 1, ed. L. Sileo, Roma 1995, pp. 295–303, at p. 301; id., “Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities”, p. 138.

⁵¹ Knuuttila, “Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities”, p. 137.

⁵² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 27, ed. Vat. VI, p. 256.

⁵³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 35, q. un., n. 51, ed. Vat. VI, p. 266.

think of colors, and a deaf person cannot think of sounds.⁵⁴ Scotus's account of the relation between the knower and the known is at the root of his interpretation of Augustine's doctrine concerning knowledge *in regulis aeternis*: the divine intellect constitutes the intelligibility of creatures, and for this reason creatures can be known by the human intellect.⁵⁵ As Scotus says, God gives to each intelligible object a specific kind of being: "He gives to this object this being, and to that object that being..."⁵⁶ Only because God's infinite knowledge has originally produced the eidetic natures of things is it possible for a finite intellect to conceive of these things. The human intellect is not in the position to discover the eidetic nature of a thing without any presuppositions because, as finite intellect, it is actualized by the known object. Since God Himself is, by his knowledge, the measure of the creatures He knows, He alone is able to cognize possibles without any presuppositions, and thereby produce them.

Notice that the five texts quoted above make a claim about the modal status of the possibles, not about their eidetic origin. For Scotus, the assumption that God does not exist implies that modal propositions may be true under certain conditions. A finite intellect may make true statements about possible events.⁵⁷ The human intellect can recognize the possibility of something because it recognizes that two terms are non-contradictory.⁵⁸ But a finite intellect cannot produce the eidetic nature of the terms that make up such propositions. Since a finite intellect cannot perceive the eidetic nature of a thing without being informed by it, it cannot actualize possibles on its own. Our mind is not creative as is the divine mind: humans may re-think creatures, but they cannot think of them without previous knowledge.

If God did not exist, but the universe nevertheless did exist, human beings would be capable of understanding the possibility of things on the basis of their actuality: by seeing real things, the human intellect

⁵⁴ D. Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. T.L. Beauchamp, Oxford 2000, p. 15.

⁵⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 262, ed. Vat. III, p. 160. Cf. Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta*, pp. 163–164, pp. 206–207, and pp. 89–90.

⁵⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 266, ed. Vat. III, p. 162: "Iuxta hoc etiam potest dici quod [...] videmus in luce aeterna sicut in causa obiecti in se: nam intellectus divinus producit ista actu suo in 'esse intelligibili', et actu suo dat huic obiecto 'esse' tale et illi tale, et per consequens dat eis talem rationem obiecti—per quas rationes post movent intellectum ad cognitionem certam".

⁵⁷ See above, note 47.

⁵⁸ See above, note 48.

perceives their nature and thus recognizes these things to be possible, and likewise it can understand the possibility of non-existent things, such as artifacts that do not yet exist. But this point is not pertinent to our problem. Scotus concedes the factual dependence of real creatures on God. Our inquiry, rather, concerns whether Scotus holds that the *possibles* are only factually dependent on God or whether he thinks that they are in principle dependent on Him.

IV.3. *An Objection from William of Ockham*

The interpretation presented in this paper is also the way in which William of Ockham understands Scotus: possibles are possible due to divine knowledge. But Ockham puts his finger on the most perplexing point of Scotus's account:

Furthermore I object against what is said, namely that in the first instant of nature [the thing] is produced in intelligibile being, and in a second instant it has possible being.—I consider the first instant of nature in which the intellect is prior to the intelligible being of creatures, and I ask: either in this instant the creature is possible, or it is impossible. If it is possible, it is thus possible before it is produced in intelligible being. If it is not possible, then being is incompatible with it.⁵⁹

The point Ockham makes here is that something does not begin to be possible, because if it did, it would become possible after being impossible.

A strikingly similar argument is formulated by Scotus himself. In the context of the discussion about the *creatio ex nihilo*, Scotus rejects Henry's argument that the creation of creatures presupposes their being of essence (*esse essentiae*), because presumably this being of essence sets things apart from that which is absolutely nothing and impossible.⁶⁰ Scotus says:

⁵⁹ "Praeterea, quod dicitur quod in primo instanti naturae producitur in esse intelligibili et in secundo instanti habet esse possibile, contra: accipio primum instans naturae in quo intellectus praecedat esse intelligibile creaturae, et quaero: aut in illo instanti creatura est possibilis, aut non est possibilis. Si est possibilis, ergo est possibilis antequam producatur in esse intelligibili. Si non est possibilis, igitur sibi repugnat esse" (Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent. (Ordinatio)*, dist. 43, q. 2, ed. G.I. Etzkorn – F.E. Kelley, in *Opera Theologica IV*, St. Bonaventure, NY 1979, p. 647). – Ockham refers to Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 43, q. un., n. 14, ed. Vat. VI, pp. 358–359.

⁶⁰ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4, ed. Parisiis 1520, vol. 1, f. 127rO.

[I]f the thing is not possible before it is in being of essence and if it is produced in such a being, then something is produced in some sort of being, by some sort of production, which is not possible in itself.⁶¹

Yet shortly after this, Scotus argues that the creature is in fact produced in its intelligible being without presupposing any being, even possible being:

[T]he creature is not produced in intelligible being from any being, neither [from being] simply, nor [from being] in a qualified sense, nor [is it produced] into this [intelligible] being from something in itself possible. Yet 'to be produced' is not 'to be created', because here nothing is produced in being simply, but something is produced in being in a qualified sense.⁶²

How can we make sense of the production of possibility? As stated above (section III.1), a thing is certainly not impossible before it is constituted in its possible being. But was it possible? For any intellect that can actually think the "what" of that which is possible, i.e., its eidetic nature, the possible appears to be possible. But before an eidetic nature appears to an intellect, there is no subject of the proposition "X is possible".

A comparison with Kant's first antinomy may be helpful. Kant proved both the infinity and the limitation of space and time.⁶³ He thought that there must be space beyond the limits of space. Modern physics, however, has shown that there is no space and time where there is no mass. It makes no sense to ask for a space where no object is present. By analogy, we may say: where no eidetic nature is thought of by an intellect, neither possibility nor impossibility are relevant. It makes no sense to speak of possibility where there is no "what" as the subject of possibility.

⁶¹ "[S]i res non sit possibilis antequam sit in esse essentiae, et producitur in isto esse,—igitur aliquid producitur in aliquo esse, aliqua productione, quod non est possibile ex parte sua" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 81, ed. Vat. VII, p. 43).

⁶² "[C]reatura producitur in esse intelligibili non de aliquo esse, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid, nec possibili ex parte sui in isto esse; istud tamen produci non est creari, quia non creatur aliquid in esse simpliciter, sed producitur ad esse secundum quid" (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 84, ed. Vat. VII, p. 44).

⁶³ I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A426–428/B 454–457, trans. N.K. Smith, New York – Toronto 1965, pp. 396–398.

CONCLUSION

For Scotus, God's knowledge is the origin of possibles by primarily constituting the eidetic natures of things. Yet their modal status, i.e. the compatibility (*non repugnantia*) with being of the possibles is not caused by God, but rather originates in the formal content of the possibles itself. The view that there are no possibles without God, which I attribute to Duns Scotus, refers to the fact that without God's production of divine ideas there would be no subjects that are compatible with being. It is an ill formed question to ask whether the possibles are possible before or independently of the constitution of the eidetic natures as the subjects of possibility.

When Scotus attributes the cause of possibility both to the divine intellect and to the formal character of the thing at hand, he does not think of these as two concurring causes for the production of possibility in one and the same respect. Rather, what God's intellect produces is the eidetic nature, in which possibility is inherent. The eidetic nature can be considered a criterion of its own possibility only insofar as God cannot conceive of any eidetic nature that is inconceivable and thus He cannot produce the possibility of something which is intrinsically impossible.

Unlike the divine intellect, human reason cannot conceive of intelligible objects without presuppositions. Man can either rethink the eidetic natures that God has already produced or he can combine features of these natures into new ideas, like those of a unicorn, a golden mountain, a chimera, etc. God's intellect, however, does not merely re-cognize or contemplate possible creatures, as though the possibles preceded his thinking. Instead, God knows them from nothing. Yet without that something is of itself intrinsically possible, God does not know it.

If the possibles were eidetically independent from God, then God's creative activity would not extend itself to the origination of the eidetic natures of creatures, but it would rather be confined to the mere election of those possibles to which He wishes to convey existence.

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

SCOTUS AT PARIS ON THE CRITERIA FOR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

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John Duns Scotus often aired his ideas on exactly what it took to make knowledge scientific. Indeed, it would appear that he had a special fascination for the subject. It stood at the center of his epistemology, as of course could be expected for someone whose philosophy was so deeply imbued with Aristotle's logic. 'Scientia' was the standard Latin translation for the Aristotelian '*episteme*', the paradigm towards which the great Greek philosopher had thought all acts of knowing ought to aspire. Thus 'theory of knowledge', 'theory of science' and, as we would put it, 'epistemology', were in Duns's conceptual universe all the same. Only a modern notion of 'science' as somehow odd and esoteric, part of a secret code reserved for white-jacketed specialists, would be capable of generating a distinct and generally ignored 'philosophy of science' as opposed to the 'philosophy of knowledge' every good student of critical thinking should be familiar with.

I have been claiming for some time now that if we look closely at all Scotus actually said about 'science', most especially about the criteria for it, we shall find it to be much more complicated, more *subtle*, than we might otherwise have had reason to suspect. By this I mean in particular that we find it to be more tentative, exploratory and ambiguous, and also more subject to change and rethinking throughout the course of his career, than a stereotypical representation of medieval Aristotelianism would suggest. While the Aristotelian paradigm profoundly shaped his assumptions and his whole approach, it also tempted him to be critical and to want to imagine how the same paradigm might have to be circumvented or even exceeded in the ongoing effort to get to know. That critical spirit was with Duns from the start. And I have pointed to ways in which it led him at times to advance an alternative paradigm at variance with Aristotle's, which he took as his point of departure.¹ In this essay I shall attempt to add something new by

¹ See, for instance, S.P. Marrone, *The Light of Thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden 2001, vol. 2, pp. 434–438.

arguing that this critical rethinking of 'science', apparent in Duns's works from nearly first to last, took a special turn while he was at Paris. Not that he radically changed his approach. The bones he picked with Aristotelian science were more or less the same in his Parisian lectures as they had been when he taught at Oxford. But he began to assume a noticeably different tone. At Oxford he seemed intent on drawing out the potential limitations of literal adherence to an Aristotelian canon for scientific thought. In Paris, his energies seem to have gone to show how greatly even an alternative paradigm might retain the spirit of Aristotle's original.

Five times in his writings as we have them available in print today Duns laid out the requirements for science according to a strict Aristotelian rule. All five are to be found in his commentaries on the *Sentences*, of which we have three collections or versions, one—the *Lectura*—comprising notes prepared at Oxford, another—the *Reportatio Parisiensis*—representing reports of his perhaps two-fold bachelor's lectures at Paris, and a third—the *Ordinatio*—situated somewhere in between, constituting an authorial revision for publication begun at Oxford but never quite finished and surely incorporating at least some material originating in the Paris years. Just two specific points along the way in his commentary as Scotus had evidently established an outline for it already in his very first course of lectures at Oxford prompted an examination of the scientific paradigm in formal detail. The first came in his prologue to consideration of topics inspired by the Lombard's text, where the question heading his investigation was, in some form or another, effectively: Whether theology is a science? We have this question in all three collections: *Lectura*, *Ordinatio* and *Reportatio Parisiensis*.² The second occasion to dissect the scientific ideal arose in coverage of Book III, specifically in the only query pertaining to what Duns designated as his twenty-fourth distinction. Here the question ran, with liberty for variation in wording: Whether it is possible to have at once both science and faith regarding the same revealed truth?³ Since

² In the *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39, the text asks: "...an theologia sit scientia". In *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, ed. Vat. I, p. 141, the question is: "...utrum theologia in se sit scientia...". The *Reportatio Parisiensis*, prol., q. 1, in *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A*, ed. A.B. Wolter – O.V. Bychkov, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004, p. 1, inquires with greater prolixity: "Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis possit esse per se subiectum alicuius scientiae?"

³ The *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 1, ed. Vivès XV, p. 34, reads: "Utrum [...] de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis habere simul scientiam et fidem...". The paral-

the *Lectura* has been edited only through Book II, here I offer merely the versions from the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio Parisiensis*.

On each of these five occasions, Duns presented to his reader a schema of the essentials required for Aristotelian science, purportedly drawn according to the parameters laid down by Aristotle himself in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book I, Chapter 2.⁴ The five schemas are similar, although not exactly identical. Duns plainly struggled to express himself more clearly on the essentials each time he came to examine them. As a result, he not only modified his wording on each successive examination but also recast to a degree precisely what he thought some of the requirements entailed. The latter circumstance is partly what I was referring to before when I said that Scotus changed his thinking about the criteria for science progressively over the years. I shall reveal more about the differences in some detail when I turn in a moment to analyzing specific texts. For now it suffices to say that all the schemas prescribe four fundamental properties of science construed after Aristotle's fashion. As a start, the four can be indicated by means of a single listing, representing a sort of core around which Duns's changing insights into the full implications of the Aristotelian paradigm revolved.⁵ The first property required for scientific knowledge was that it be certain, which Scotus glossed to mean that it be free from either error or doubt. The second requirement was necessity, a property throughout the five occasions variously attributed to the knowledge itself, to the object known—which was, properly speaking, a condition or state of affairs—or to both. Third came the requirement of evidence, to all appearances the most difficult property for Duns to pin down. For the purposes of this initial designation it can be associated with the stipulation that the knowledge in question arise from a cause fully evident to

lel in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, q. un., ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 446, asks: "Utrum de credibilibus revelatis stante fide potest quis habere scientiam..."

⁴ Arist., *Anal. Post.*, I, 2, 71b9–16, in the text of William of Moerbeke's revision given in *Aristoteles Latinus*, IV/1–4, ed. L. Minio-Paluello – B.G. Dod, Bruges – Paris 1968, p. 286,13–16: "Scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter, sed non sophistic modo quod est secundum accidens, cum causam cognoscere arbitramur propter quam est res, quoniam illius est causa, et non contingere hoc aliter se habere".

⁵ For the separate instances of the schema, see Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39; *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 208, ed. Vat. I, pp. 141–142; *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 13, ed. Vivès XV, p. 44b; *Reportatio Parisiensis* I–A, prol., q. 1, n. 8, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 3; and *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 16, ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 454a–b.

the intellect. Finally there was the demand that the knowledge result from discursive, and specifically syllogistic, reasoning.

On the occasions when Duns presented this basic schema while commenting on Book III of Lombard's *Sentences*, he accepted it as the valid standard. Here the question was whether the cognitive states of science and faith were compatible with respect to the same object of knowledge. He needed an indicator of science's defining characteristics. Aristotle's model filled the bill perfectly. Taking scientific knowledge as distinguished by the four properties of certitude, necessity, evidence and dependence on discursive syllogism, Scotus could respond unambiguously that, for any single intellect, faith and science were incompatible regarding the same truth. The wording of his response is almost identical in both the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio Parisiensis*: "Speaking of science in this way, it is impossible for science and faith to reside simultaneously in the same [mind] with regard to the same [piece of knowledge]".⁶

Duns's most interesting comments concerning the four elements of the schema arose in this context when he examined other states of knowing besides faith that he believed might be in harmony with faith regarding the same cognitive content. In these cases he wanted to determine how closely such other states might approach to science itself. His most poignant remarks have to do with the sort of divinely underwritten assent to the truths of the faith witnessed in the case of chosen individuals, such as the Apostles, that Scotus referred to in Augustinian language as "mountains" among the faithful.⁷ Because in these instances God, through his omnipotence, worked to induce in the knowing subject indubitable and unerring assent, the resultant cognitive state fully met the first condition of scientific knowledge: certitude. In fact, since this assent, by its immediacy, approximated more the assent to the principles of science in Aristotle's model than assent to scientific—that is, demonstrated—conclusions, it was even

⁶ This is a quotation from *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 16, ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 454b: "Et isto modo loquendo de scientia, impossibile est scientiam et fidem esse simul in eodem respectu ejusdem". Nearly the same words can be found in *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 13, ed. Vivès XV, p. 44b.

⁷ See, for example, Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 17, ed. Vivès XV, p. 455a: "Et tertio, qualis habitus fuit in montibus, ut in Apostolis recipientibus primo Theologiam".

stronger than in Aristotelian science.⁸ Yet still, the habit of knowledge produced was not, in the end, worthy of being placed on the level of scientific. The crucial problem arose with respect to the requirement of evidence. In Aristotle's paradigm, even knowledge of principles rested on evidence—the self-evidence of statements whose truth was apparent by virtue of the meaning of their constituent terms. In the case of the testimony of the 'mountains' of the faithful, God bypassed evidence and produced assent by means of his own infinite power. Without evidence, however, knowledge could not be regarded as scientific.⁹

In contrast to the foregoing loyalty to Aristotle, in the instances where the four-fold schema for science arose in Scotus's prologue to his *Sentences* commentary he took a more critical stance, open to imagining a 'science' different from and even better than that defined in accordance with the *Posterior Analytics*. The question on these occasions was whether theology might be able to attain the status of science, and the academic pressures of his position as a theologian could conceivably have worked to encourage Duns to mitigate the inflexibility of a literal Aristotelianism. Whether that was in fact the case or not, departing from the Aristotelian schema is precisely the route he chose to follow. As if to defend this liberty, Duns even began his discussion of the issue in the *Lectura* by remarking that he would be thinking of theology as 'scientific' with reference to those aspects of science that could be taken as signs of cognitive perfection ("quantum ad id quod perfectionis est in scientia").¹⁰

Viewed in this light, some of the four criteria established by Aristotle could simply be dispensed with, as impediments to perfect knowing. For the second requirement, necessity, that was at least partially the case. Calling attention to the ambiguity of this property as quickly sketched out in his summary characterization of the Aristotelian paradigm, Duns noted with regard to the theology of the blessed or of God, himself,

⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 21, ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 456b–56a, especially the concluding sentence: "Per hoc convenit [ille habitus cognoscitivus] in certitudine cum scientia...". Compare the similar treatment in *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 17, ed. Vivès XV, pp. 47b–48a, especially the phrase: "...fuit tamen certitudo illa firma, sicut est certitudo scientialis...".

⁹ On bypassing evidence, see Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 17, ed. Vivès XV, p. 47b; and *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 21, ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 456a. For the conclusion that this shortcut prevented meeting the standards of science, see *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 17, ed. Vivès XV, p. 48b; and *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III, dist. 24, q. un., n. 21, ed. Vivès XXIII, p. 457a.

¹⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39.

that it was crucial to distinguish necessity on the part of the object of knowledge from necessity on the part of the knowledge itself, residing in the knower as in a subject. In the case of human knowledge in the world, necessity could enter into cognition only as an attribute of that which was known, since the human mind was as a subject notoriously volatile, forgetting tomorrow what it knew with scientific certainty today. Thus science for humans in the world had to do with necessary conditions to be known, universal truths about essential states of affairs, like arithmetical truths or those concerning the natures of things. For God, however, or for the beatified mind looking to God as to the source of its cognition, necessity, in the sense of perpetual invariance, could attach to the knowledge itself.¹¹ God, after all, as a knowing subject was necessarily unchanging, and hence all knowledge possessed by him was necessary and unchanging as well. This same necessity then spilled over into the subjective act of knowing among the blessed, whose knowledge arose from their vision of God and the contents of his mind.¹² Theology in the divine mind or among the blessed could therefore readily include truths about contingent states of affairs, such as the Incarnation, without in any way falling short of the epistemic necessity expected of science. Indeed, such necessity, since absolute, lent even greater formal perfection to knowledge than the objective necessity of universality attached to science as commonly attained by humans in mathematics and natural philosophy.¹³

More obvious still was the dispensability of the requirement for discursive or syllogistic reasoning. In the *Lectura*, Scotus simply took the

¹¹ This point is clearest in *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 112, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 41: "Nam necessitas quae requiritur ad scientiam nostram est necessitas obiecti et non habitus, quia aliquis potest hodie habere geometriam et cras amittere eam, licet sit de necessariis. Sed necessitas scientiae divinae est necessitas habitus et non obiecti".

¹² This point is clearer in the *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 211, ed. Vat. I, p. 145, where Duns concluded that what was true of theology in God and among the blessed could be said of theology in itself: "...contingentia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere cognitionem certam et evidentem et, quantum est ex parte evidentiae, perpetuam. Hoc patet, quia omnia contingentia theologica nata sunt videri in primo obiecto theologico...".

¹³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 112, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 41: "Unde scientia necessaria et certa de contingenti est perfectior quae in se habet necessitatem, licet sit contingentium, quam illa quae in se non est perpetua, licet sit de obiecto necessario". The point is made more abstractly in *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 211, ed. Vat. I, p. 145: "Si igitur aliqua alia cognitio est certa et evidens, et, quantum est de se, perpetua, ipsa videtur in se formaliter perfectior quam scientia quae requirit necessitatem obiecti".

liberty of stating the case without any argument at all: "That science should have to rely on discursive reasoning is a matter of imperfection".¹⁴ The parallel passage in the *Ordinatio* at least made an attempt to explain the nature of the imperfection, tying it to the potentiality of the mutable human intellect, presumably an indisputable instance of cognitive inferiority.¹⁵ In any case, that theology at its best—in the divine mind and consequently in itself—would not rely on syllogisms but be, in a sense, instantaneously compelling and confirmative, though marking a departure from the Aristotelian norm for science, in no way prejudiced its epistemic excellence.

At one point in the *Ordinatio* Duns even bothered himself explicitly with drawing the obvious conclusion that so far as cognitive perfection was concerned, among the four criteria of Aristotle's schema for science, only two were requisite without exception. They were the first and the third in his listing: certitude and evidence.¹⁶ Where these two were firmly attained, nothing more could be desired, and in those instances where they were attained in greatest purity, the resultant knowledge surpassed any imaginable competitor in both prestige and authenticity. It is this attitude of Scotus's, plainly revealed in the *Ordinatio*, that has led me to maintain that he was in effect introducing an alternative to what he took to be Aristotle's paradigm for science, one that made room for properties he conceived of as characteristic of divine cognition but that might also be applied to human knowledge in special circumstances where Aristotle's specifications would stand in the way of knowing to the highest degree. This is Scotus the epistemological innovator.

So far, so good. But as I indicated at the start, I find Duns's thoughts about scientific cognition and even about the properties of Aristotle's science more tentative and ambiguous than the linear exposition I have just offered would seem to imply. I said that he always struggled to find the right words to express the four Aristotelian requirements and that in the process he sometimes reconsidered precisely what he thought some of the requirements entailed. When we look closely at these attempts at clarification and recasting of content or meaning, we

¹⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39: "...quod scientia sit per discursum et applicationem, hoc est imperfectionis...".

¹⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 208, ed. Vat. I, pp. 141–142: "...causatio scientiae per discursum a causa ad scitum, includit imperfectionem, et etiam potentialitatem intellectus recipientis".

¹⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 211, ed. Vat. I, p. 144: "Hic dico quod in scientia illud perfectionis est, quod sit cognitio certa et evidens...".

begin to glimpse areas of speculation where Duns was less sure what he believed about the limits of Aristotle and less confident in his own ideas of what might be expected of knowledge in general.

Looking at the initial listings of Aristotle's four criteria for science in just the prologues to the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, we can detect not only a certain vagueness with respect to the boundary between the third and the fourth—that is, evidence and dependence on discursive reasoning—but also some confusion about exactly what the requirement for discursive reasoning amounted to. In the *Lectura* the literal wording for the two criteria reads that they demand of science that it should be “obtained by means of the cause and evidence of the object and by application of cause to effect”.¹⁷ The text of the *Ordinatio* stipulates that, concerning science, it is required “third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it (and here I cannot decide whether Scotus means to refer to the scientific conclusion or to the evident cause) be applied to that which is known by means of syllogism or syllogistic discursive reasoning”.¹⁸ From the comments Duns makes about his lists, it is clear that when he speaks of ‘application of cause to effect’ or ‘applying by means of syllogism’ he simply intends to say that scientific cognition must arise immediately out of discursive reasoning, or as we should expect, *propter quid* demonstration, as from cause to effect.¹⁹ Our problem is that in both renditions of the third criterion the word ‘cause’ also appears. Are we to take this to stand for the *propter quid* cause implicated in the discursive reasoning stipulated by the fourth criterion, in which case the requirement is that this cause, or presumably its truth, be evident to the intellect? If so, the third criterion is curiously narrow and precise, effectively a clarification of the fourth. Or should we read ‘cause’ here to point to whatever it is that accounts for the state of knowing, as, for example, the objective datum

¹⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39: “...[scientia est cognitio] habita per causam et evidentiam obiecti et per applicationem causae ad effectum”.

¹⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 208, ed. Vat. I, p. 141: “...[scientia includit] tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum vel discursum syllogisticum”.

¹⁹ In *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39, he glosses the fourth criterion as holding “quod scientia sit per discursum et applicationem”. By the *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 208, ed. Vat. I, p. 141, the gloss has become: “...videlicet causatio scientiae per discursum a causa ad scitum”.

or data upon which the intellect founds its knowledge. In this case, we are closer to a general requirement for evidence pure and simple.

There is reason to believe that in the *Lectura* Duns was thinking of 'cause' in the first sense. Because in that instance, when he went on to remark that discursive reasoning was actually a sign of imperfection in Aristotelian science, he added that the same was true of so much of the third criterion as demanded knowledge of a cause. His words were: "But that science should be by discursive reasoning and application, that is [a mark of] imperfection; and also that it should be obtained by means of the cause is [a sign of imperfection], because in that case it would depend on precedent knowledge".²⁰ He concluded that only that part of the third criterion consisting in the demand for evidence—in his words, that science be "by means of an object in itself evident" to the intellect—needed to be retained to keep theology, and thus any science, at least as good as Aristotelian science.²¹ In the *Ordinatio*, it is likely that Duns had taken pains to eliminate this sense of 'cause' from the third requirement. There, when pointing to the deficiencies inserted into the Aristotelian paradigm because of the insistence on discursive reasoning, he limited himself to commenting on the fourth of his four criteria alone.

But the fact remains that there hung about Duns's third Aristotelian requirement, at least at some point in his thought, something of the odor of reasoning from one piece of evidence to the next. That was after all precisely the point of his complaint about the presence of 'cause' in the *Lectura* version of the third demand: it implied that scientific knowledge could be had only when there was some other knowledge preceding it from which it could somehow be deduced or inferred.²² And this would suggest that at least at that same point in his thought, Scotus was unclear in his own mind about whether Aristotle's scientific paradigm entailed only properly demonstrative reasoning or perhaps also another layer of inferential thinking below that of syllogism proper but still involving a move from this to that, an order of before and after among cognitive contents. In the latter case, removing discursive

²⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39: "Sed quod scientia sit per discursum et applicationem, hoc est imperfectionis; et etiam quod sit habita per causam, imperfectionis est, quia sic dependet ex cognitione praecedente".

²¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 107, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 39: "Theologia ergo in se quantum ad alias condiciones quae sunt perfectionis (quod sit cognitio certa, et necessaria, et per obiectum per se evidens, non per causam efficientem in intellectu), est scientia".

²² See above, note 20.

reasoning proper from the requirements for knowledge, in order to allow a better-than-Aristotelian science to emerge—as in the present instance, theology in itself—would not necessarily remove all forms of inference. Which is in fact exactly what we see in both the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* prologues.

For immediately after Scotus's listing of the four Aristotelian criteria and his discussion of the dispensability of discursive reasoning, he turned expressly to consider theology among the blessed and in the divine mind. There he was confronted with the argument that since the divine mind was instantaneously active, and thus likewise the understanding of the blessed insofar as they depended on what they saw in God, there could in such cases of knowing be no "discursus et applicatio", thus no science in the Aristotelian sense.²³ Surprisingly, instead of accepting that fact, as he had only a moment before in the case of theology in itself, Duns responded with a claim that not all ordering of cognitive contents according to priority and succession was eliminated with the exclusion of discursive reasoning proper—that is, reasoning by means of demonstrative syllogism and in time. So long as there was some order among cognitive contents, as by a priority of nature if not of time—Scotus employed the phrase "naturaliter prius cognitum et aliud posterius"—enough of a quasi-discursive structure could be retained to satisfy—at least, it would seem, in broad terms—the inferential requirement Aristotle had in mind.²⁴ Hence the odd sentence: "Thus, for discursive reasoning all that is required is that something be known naturally first and another thing following it, so that from what is known naturally first can [be deduced] in the very same instant what follows naturally".²⁵ As an example, he pointed to knowledge of the quiddity of a line and knowledge of its properties.²⁶ Presumably, whereas in human cognition the properties had to be proved of the

²³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 108, ed. Vat. XVI, pp. 39–40: "...ex hoc videtur quod sicut Deus videt omnia immediate unico intuitu, sic et sancti, et non per discursum et applicationem".

²⁴ See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 109, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 40. My analysis here relies expressly upon the text of the *Lectura*, but effectively the same argument could be made looking to the *Ordinatio*, prol., p. 4, qq. 1–2, n. 209, ed. Vat. I, pp. 142–143.

²⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, prol., p. 3, q. 1, n. 109, ed. Vat. XVI, p. 40: "[U]nde ad discursum solum requiritur quod sit aliquid naturaliter prius cognitum et aliud posterius, et ex priore naturaliter cognito potest simul tempore deducere posterius notum".

²⁶ Refer to the passages cited above, note 24.

subject by demonstration while in divine knowledge the whole complex was seized at once, in both cases the underlying epistemic reality remained the same: a scientific ordering of primary and secondary attributes. Did this not reintroduce much of the tenor of Aristotelian science just when it had appeared to be turned out the door?

You will notice that so far I have had nothing to say about Scotus's handling of these issues in the prologue to his commentary produced at Paris, the *Reportatio*. My reason is that, as I hinted before, I believe that in that commentary on this question of whether theology might be considered as scientific he turned a corner, albeit not a sharp one, on the discussion we have followed so far. I think the turn consisted primarily in his taking note of the almost hidden Aristotelianism of his otherwise clean extraction of theology from the terms of Aristotle's science—that oblique reintroduction of Aristotle I have just pointed out—and in a resultant attempt to incorporate it more formally and explicitly into his own account of science as perfect knowledge.

The turn is registered most vividly in the fact that this Parisian question, plainly reserved for the issue already prominently featured in the prologues to his earlier commentaries, on whether theology can be a science, really comprises not so much a general investigation of the matter, after the pattern of the two other prologues, as a quite particular examination of the way in which some order of the subject matter or contents of theology in itself—or, for that matter, in the divine mind—might be discovered whereby a science of theology could be shown to be in at least some loose fashion inferential.²⁷ In short, the discussion on this occasion is more a reprise of the theme touched on in the two short passages I have just referred to from the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio* prologues than a recapitulation of the entire fabric of those earlier questions.²⁸ The change in course is apparent even from the start if one observes that here the terms of the question posed at the outset of argumentation have been sharpened so as to target only a small piece of the investigative territory covered in the precedent

²⁷ In *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 56, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 19, Duns makes it clear he is posing the question about theology and the concept of God in general, not limited by the conditions of any particular conceiving mind: “Sed ultra illud verum quod dictum est de intellectu viatoris inquirunt aliqui si Deus possit concipi sub distinctis rationibus a quocumque intellectu, etiam divino. Et qualiter est istud oportet videre propter quaestionem propositam, quia quaestio non quaerit comparando Deum ad intellectum viatoris, sed absolute...”

²⁸ See the treatment above at notes 24, 25 and 26.

instances. Instead of “Whether theology is a science?” Scotus now asks: “Whether ‘God’ in the strict sense of ‘Deity’ can be the proper subject of any science?”²⁹ Most significantly perhaps, the shift reveals itself in the very tenor of the whole discussion, much more focused on technical precision, more concerned with following through at length on a single thread of argumentation, and for the first time carefully separated into formal ‘articles’ so that constituent issues can be disentangled and resolved in sequence, leading to an overall conclusion. Duns carefully designates his four sub-questions at the beginning: first, What is the nature of science?, second, What is the meaning of the ‘first subject’ of a science?, third, Whether God can be conceived by means of concepts distinct from the concept of his essence?, and fourth, Whether there is an order among these concepts, and if so, what order?³⁰

The examination of the nature of science, comprising the first of these four articles, most closely adheres to the pattern of analysis established in the earlier two prologue questions. Again Duns lists four fundamental requirements for knowledge to achieve the level of science as prescribed by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*.³¹ At first blush they resemble the four already reproduced three times in previous commentary questions. Again, when it comes to the fourth—dependence on discursive, syllogistic reasoning—he explains that this is in fact a sign of cognitive imperfection. He does, to be sure, take much greater care to specify this fourth criterion with technical precision, saying that the knowledge in question must be “knowledge of some evident posterior [cognitive content] [...] caused by [knowledge of] a prior [content] through the means of discursive syllogism”.³² But the only real novelty is that now Scotus goes beyond the simple remark that discursive reasoning is a mark of imperfection to claim explicitly that the nature of science absolutely and in itself (“per se ratio scientiae secundum

²⁹ Refer to note 2, above.

³⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 7, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 2: “Ad solutionem huius quaestionis quattuor sunt videnda. Primo, quae sit ratio scientiae. Secundo, quae sit ratio primi subjecti scientiae. Tertio, an Deus possit concipi sub rationibus pluribus distinctis a ratione essentiae. Quarto, an inter illas rationes sub quibus potest concipi sit aliquis ordo, et quis. Et tandem ex his quaestio exsolvetur”.

³¹ See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, nn. 8–14, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, pp. 2–4.

³² Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 13, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 4: “Quarta condicio, scilicet quod notitia evidentiae posterioris sit causata a priore per discursum syllogisticum...”.

se”) excludes this imperfection.³³ Here is unambiguous promotion of a science, designated by that very name, which supersedes the science of the *Posterior Analytics*.

A more significant departure appears, however, when Duns addresses the third criterion. His initial reference to this criterion, intended surely to resonate of the language of Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*, stipulates that the truth be known “in such a fashion that [the knowledge in question] derive its evident [truthfulness] from the evident [truthfulness] of some prior, necessary [piece of knowledge]”.³⁴ Glossing the same stipulation only a few paragraphs later, Duns makes use of the Aristotelian distinction between knowledge of principles, known immediately upon apprehension of the terms of the proposition, and knowledge of conclusions—according to Aristotle, an exemplary case of ‘science’ in the proper sense of the word—inferred from the principal cognition preceding it and upon which its evident truthfulness depends.³⁵ Here we are, effectively back to the circumstances of Scotus’s first exposition of the four requirements in the *Lectura*. He has, it would seem, turned back from the advance he made in the *Ordinatio*, whereby the suggestion of inference from some prior cognitive content was eliminated from the terms of the third requirement. With eyes wide open, it would appear, he has embraced the dual role of the third criterion in its earliest rendition, incorporating both evidence and an element of movement from prior known to posterior. And he has done so without recourse to the complicating, perhaps even misleading, word ‘cause’, which smacks of concerns for strictly syllogistic argument *propter quid* more properly reserved to the fourth criterion.

I believe that this is precisely what Duns did—and what he intended to do—in his prologue to the *Reportatio*. As I see it, the confirmation is provided by the body of the remaining articles: second, third and fourth. So far as concerns the second article—What is required for being

³³ The passage quoted above in note 32 continues: “...est imperfectionis, nec est de per se ratione scientiae secundum se sed tantum scientiae imperfectae...”.

³⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 8, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 3: “...cognitio [...] veri [...] quod natum est habere evidentiam ab alio necessario prius evidente...”. For Aristotle, see *Anal. Post.*, I, 2, 71b20–23, in Moerbeke’s revision, ed. Minio-Paluello – Dod, p. 286: “...necesse est demonstrativam scientiam ex veris [...] notioribus et prioribus...”.

³⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 12, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 4: “Tertia condicio est propria, distinguens scientiam ab intellectu principiorum, quia intellectus est veri habentis evidentiam ex terminis [...]. Scientia est veri habentis evidentiam ex principiis”.

the first subject of a science?—the resolution consists in a clear and detailed exposition of Duns's mature ideas on the nature of a science's first subject, with ample consideration of possible counter-arguments.³⁶ There is no need to go into the matter at present. The third article, on whether there are concepts properly referring to God other than that of his essence, comprises an extensive refutation of Aquinas, by means more immediately of Godfrey of Fontaines, on concepts of God. Scotus takes as his target a reading of Aquinas whereby all concepts of divinity—as, for instance, of the divine perfections—other than the concept of the divine essence must be founded on a relational comparison to something other than God.³⁷ For present purposes, we need only concern ourselves with Duns's positive statement of his conclusion. Deleting the denials of a need for comparison, intended directly to counter Thomas and Godfrey, the resolution proceeds: "With regard to this article, I concede that it is possible to have of God not only quidditative concepts—that is, of the essence as essence—but also others something like denominative concepts, and not only of the persons and attributes but also of absolutely all the perfections".³⁸ The work of this article is thus devoted to laying out the possibility of a diversity of concepts about God, from which one might be able to construct a multitude of statements of divine truths that would constitute the raw material for a science of theology. What is important is that in doing so the article has passed beyond the terms of his only previous exploration of the same philosophical terrain, in those two short passages in the *Lectura* and in the *Ordinatio* prologues where he talked about priority and succession of concepts in theology akin to the ordering of concepts of an essence and its properties.³⁹ Here he has taken account of God himself as the primary object. Since God, as an absolutely simple essence, has no real

³⁶ I use here the wording of the sub-question Duns (or more properly, Wolter and Bychkov) posts at the beginning of this second article (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 4): "Quid sit ratio primi subiecti scientiae".

³⁷ See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, nn. 57–58, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, pp. 19–20.

³⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 107, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 40: "Quantum igitur ad istum articulum concedo quod [...] potest in Deo haberi non tantum conceptus quiditativus sive essentiae sub ratione essentiae, verum etiam alii quasi denominativi, non tantum personalium et notionalium sed etiam omnium perfectionum simpliciter".

³⁹ Again, refer to the discussion above at notes 24, 25 and 26.

properties, he has had to find a more subtle theoretical foundation for conceptual difference.

All of which sets up the fourth, and theoretically most challenging, article. It is here that Duns must demonstrate that there can be an authentic order among the distinct concepts referring to God. At stake is the possibility of an inference-like construction of a set of truths referring to the divinity that would meet all Aristotle's demands for science, except the requirement for discursive reasoning, and that in a way which construes 'discursive reasoning' so narrowly as to leave room for a looser kind of priority and posteriority as sketched out in Duns's newly revised version of criterion three. Early on in the article Scotus categorically states his conviction that there can be such an order, in fact that such an order exists and is easily discovered: "Concerning this article I declare that there is an order among the concepts under which God can be conceived, such that the concept of essence is absolutely first and the others following it are either prior or posterior [among themselves] according to [whether they are] closer to or more distant from this [first] concept".⁴⁰ He then proceeds to offer a proof, which serves as well to show how it is that this order might be determined.

The major premise of this proof bears the brunt of the reasoning behind it. There is no better way to put this premise than to quote from the text: "Whatever things would have a real order [among themselves] if they were really distinct, [the same things] have a similar [but] conceptual order ("ordo secundum rationem") where they are distinct only conceptually".⁴¹ The point is complicated, to say the least, and not at all obvious. But Scotus tries to offer a proof for it in turn, which I leave to you to read.⁴² It is short and to the point, but to my eyes not much more than a restatement of the premise. In any event, with the major premise established, Duns proceeds to the minor premise, which is that

⁴⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 117, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 44: "Quantum igitur ad istum articulum dico quod ordo est inter rationes sub quibus Deus est conceptibilis, ita quod ratio essentiae est omnino prima et aliae sequentes rationes sunt priores aut posteriores secundum quod huic rationi sunt propinquiiores vel ab ipsa remotiores".

⁴¹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 117, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 44: "[Q]uaecumque ordinem realem habent aliqua distincta realiter, similem ordinem secundum rationem habent ubi sunt distincta tantum secundum rationem".

⁴² See the first three sentences of the proof of the minor premise at the top of *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 111, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 42.

if the persons and attributes of God were really distinct they would fall out in an order following directly upon the divine essence.⁴³ This minor is then itself proven by an extended set of reasonings, mostly by example.⁴⁴ Whereupon Duns returns to his intended conclusion, that the various concepts of God, though in fact only conceptually distinct, possess an order among themselves, the concept of essence being absolutely first.⁴⁵

A most remarkable thing happens, however, in the long confirmation of the minor. This is that Duns makes it clear he takes as unassailable the conclusion that if the distinct concepts of God, such as those of the persons or of the divine attributes, were really distinct, not only would they line up in an order, but also this order would be authentically quidditative, permitting an assertion of it that follows *propter quid*.⁴⁶ Which conclusion in turn allows him to assert, obeying the formal dictates of his greater proof, that the same persons, divine attributes and perfections, as they are in reality and thus only conceptually distinct, themselves follow an order that is—almost counter-intuitively, I would say—itself also somehow *propter quid*. Hence, the science of theology in itself, the possibility of which hangs, for Duns, on the inherent order he has demonstrated among the concepts of the divinity, is in its own way a *propter quid* science. Duns says so in no uncertain terms towards the very end of the whole question: “I have shown in the fourth article how those [concepts] pertaining to the divine essence have an order among themselves [...]. Nor is the science [concerning them] any less *propter quid*, in its own way (“*propter quid suo modo*”), following upon their conceptual order, than it would be if they were really distinct and

⁴³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 117, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 44: “Nunc autem, si realiter essent distincta personalia ab essentialibus, et essentialia inter se<, > haberent ordinem in consequendo ipsam essentiam...”

⁴⁴ See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, nn. 118–125, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, pp. 44–47.

⁴⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 117, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 44: “[E]rgo si sint distincta ratione [i.e. ea quae sunt conceptus divinitatis], habent talem ordinem secundum rationem [quod haberent realiter si realiter essent distincta]”.

⁴⁶ It slightly violates the diction, but retains the fundamental sense, to make the following elision of *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 118, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 44: “... comparando essentialia [Dei] sive perfectiones simpliciter inter se: S]i realiter distinguerentur [...] esset inter ista talis ordo realis [...]. Et ista propositio [i.e. ponens talem ordinem] esset propter quid...”.

had [among themselves] a real order [...] because *propter quid* science depends more on the order of objects according to [the conditions of] their own knowability than [as they are found] in real existence outside [the subject mind].⁴⁷

All together, what an extraordinary state of affairs. The trajectory of Duns's career had, up to Paris, led him increasingly to separate theology, as a discipline considered in itself without regard to either human or divine subject mind, from science as construed according to a strict Aristotelian reading. Once in Paris his thoughts on the matter seem to have turned back on themselves. There he advanced the argument that the gap between theology in itself and properly Aristotelian science was almost microscopic, a matter of formal technicalities. If he could not call theology a science of syllogistic discourse, so be it. It was, all the same, a science *propter quid*, or so close to *propter quid* as to make no practical philosophical difference. His reason for so claiming, as I have said, strikes me as less than convincing. His real-order-to-conceptual-order argument looks to my eyes like simply mapping the order of created reality onto the conceptual elements used to describe the divinity. In that case, I would prefer to lean more in the direction of the Thomistic understanding rejected by Duns in his third article. But that is not a matter I would insist on without further reflection.

It is worth asking, however, what other motivations might have acted on Duns, besides the internal imperative of his own ideological development, to, as I have put it, turn this corner. If I am right that he was effectively reducing the radicality by which his description of theology as well as science departed from an Aristotelian and apodictic scheme, then perhaps he was responding to the demands, or at least the expectations, of a more stereotypically Aristotelianizing audience. Was there a pressure towards Aristotelian orthodoxy in the early fourteenth-century Faculty of Theology at Paris? I alone can not say. But it might prove instructive to examine the direction Duns's thought took on other unorthodox and innovative ideas of his once he got to

⁴⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis* I-A, prol., q. 1, n. 135, ed. Wolter – Bychkov, p. 50: "...in quarto articulo [...] ostensum est qualiter illa quae conveniunt essentiae divinae habent ordinem inter se [...]. Nec est minus scientia propter quid suo modo ex ordine istorum secundum rationem quam esset si essent distincta realiter et haberent ordinem realem [...] quia scientia propter quid magis respicit ordinem cognoscibilem in cognoscibilitate quam in esse existentiae extra".

Paris. My sense is that the late Scotus backed away from a categorical affirmation of both intuition in the human intellect here below and the univocity of the concept of being. Neither move would have displeased a critic committed to Aristotle's philosophy. Did the University of Paris make the difference?

DECLARATIVE THEOLOGY AFTER DURANDUS:
ITS RE-PRESENTATION AND DEFENSE BY PETER AUREOLI

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In the prologue of his early unedited *Commentary on the Sentences*, dating from 1307, Durandus of St.-Pourçain records three traditional meanings for the term ‘theology’.¹ In a first sense, ‘theology’ is “a lasting quality in our soul that alone or principally moves us to accept as true the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and to assent to them in the way that they are handed down to us, and this reasonably”.² To understand this first meaning of ‘theology’, it helps to recall the manner of teaching in thirteenth century medieval universities. The Arts faculty was basically a preparatory faculty readying students for more important studies in theology, law, or medicine. In the first half of the century, the Arts faculty was a liberal arts faculty, dedicated mainly to the study of the classical liberal arts: the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music). By the 1250s, however, the Arts faculty, especially at Paris, became a center for the study of Aristotle’s philosophical texts. The lessons, commentaries, and questions on the Philosopher’s treatises were ‘philosophy’. In a parallel way, the lessons, commentaries, and questions concerning the texts of Sacred Scripture were ‘theology’.

¹ For an evaluation from a Thomistic standpoint of the prologue, based on the final printed edition of Durandus’s *Commentary on the Sentences*, see G. Emery, “Dieu, la Foi et la Théologie chez Durand de Saint-Pourçain”, *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999), pp. 659–699. The text for the prologue of the first redaction (= [A]) of Durandus’s *Commentarium in I Sententiarum* is the text prepared for the critical edition of the first redaction (in preparation). This text is based on all the known manuscripts (Auxerre, Bibl. Mun. 26; Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 440; Melk, Stiftsbibliothek 611; Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek Cent. III, 79; Saint-Omer, Bibl. Mun. 332; Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12330 and Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 14454). The final redaction (= [C]) of the prologue is found in Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII*, Venetiis: Ex Typographia Guerraea 1549, vol. 1, ff. 2r–13r.

² Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: “Videtur autem theologia secundum suum nomen accipi tripliciter: uno modo prout dicit habitum quo cognoscimus ea quae in sacra doctrina traduntur et ut in ea traduntur, et hoc rationabiliter”.

Despite this parallel, there are differences between philosophy, as a knowledge of what Aristotle says in his philosophical treatises, and theology, as a knowledge of what is handed down in Sacred Scripture. One difference showed up dramatically in the 1260s, when Siger of Brabant explained the method of study in philosophy: he said it consisted in searching for the meaning of the philosophers more than for the truth, “since we proceed philosophically”.³ In contrast, Thomas Aquinas, in his *Commentarium in De caelo*, argued that it is not enough simply to recite a philosopher’s position if one wanted to be a philosopher; rather, one must indicate the truth of what is discussed: “the goal of the study of philosophy is not that we may know what men have thought but rather what is the truth of things”.⁴ Durandus explains the difference between philosophy and theology, taken in the first sense of the term ‘theology’, in the following way:

If to know what is contained in the books of natural philosophy of Aristotle and any other philosophers is commonly called natural philosophy, then all the more should knowing what is contained in Sacred Scripture be called theology, since in reality natural philosophy is not to know what Aristotle and the other philosophers thought but what the truth of reality is. When the mind of Aristotle wanders away from the truth of reality then it is not science if we know what Aristotle thought; rather it would be error to follow him. Yet to know the mind of those who, inspired by the Holy Spirit, handed down the Scriptural canon is truly called theology, since their intellects never wandered from the truth of reality.⁵

In brief, argues Durandus, because of the certainty of the truth found in the Scriptures, ‘theology’, in this first sense of the term, has an even

³ Sigerus de Brabantia, *De anima intellectiva*, c. 7, ed. B. Bazán, *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva. De aeternitate mundi*, Louvain – Paris 1972, p. 101,7–9: “...quaerendo intentionem philosophorum in hoc magis quam veritatem, cum philosophice procedamus”.

⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentarium in De caelo*, I, lect. 22: “...studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum”.

⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: “Si enim scire ea quae continentur in libris naturalibus Aristotelis et quorumcunque aliorum philosophorum vocatur communiter naturalis philosophia, multo magis scire ea quae in sacra Scriptura continentur debet vocari theologia, quia naturalis philosophia non est scire quid Aristoteles vel alii philosophi senserunt, sed quid habeat veritas rerum. Unde ubi deviat mens Aristotelis a veritate rerum non est scientia scire quid Aristoteles senserit sed potius error. Sed vere theologia dicitur scire eorum mentem qui sacrum canonem, Spiritu sancto inspirante, tradiderunt, quia intellectus eorum numquam deviauit a veritate rerum”.

greater claim to its honorific title than the *opera omnia* of Aristotle have to the title 'philosophy'.

'Theology' in the first sense of the term is the reading of the Scriptures and accepting them by faith as the word of God. The Scriptures are accepted as a unit and are read so that one part of the sacred text sheds light on another part and brings understanding and guidance. The words of St. Paul to Timothy in his *Second Letter to Timothy* suggest the meaning of the word 'theology' in this sense: "But as for you, continue in what you have learned and have firmly believed, knowing from whom you learned it and how from childhood you have been acquainted with the sacred writings which are able to instruct you for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus. All scripture is inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work".⁶ Like Paul, the Fathers of the Church and the teachers of the schools might help their students relate different parts of Scripture to one another and suggest how they might best be used for training in right living. Still, the guidance and counsel for reading the Scriptures given by the Fathers of the Church and the Masters of Theology, are not the grounds for accepting the contents of the Scriptures as true. Faith is the sole or principal ground for accepting the revealed truths. As Durandus described the first meaning of 'theology', it is "a lasting quality in our soul which *alone* or *principally* moves us to accept the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and to assent to them in the way they are handed down to us, and that reasonably".⁷ In short, 'theology' in this sense is the same as faith. Teachers present some assistance, some reasonable guidance to what the Scriptures are saying and how the lessons of the Sacred Text might be lived. Yet the lessons are accepted in faith as the lessons of God, not the fruit of purely human advice or knowledge. In this context, the question "Is theology science?" would be the same as asking: "Is the firm habit of accepting the message of the Scriptures as our divinely given guide for life based on evidence that forces me to assent to it, that is, is faith science?"

⁶ *II Tim.*, 3, 14–17: "Tu vero permane in his quae didicisti et credita sunt tibi sciens a quo didiceris et quia ab infantia sacras litteras nosti quae te possint instruere ad salutem per fidem quae est in Christo Iesu. Omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata et utilis ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corrigendum, ad erudiendum in iustitia ut perfectus sit homo Dei ad omne opus bonum instructus".

⁷ Cf. *supra*, note 2.

We might examine this identification of ‘theology’ (in the first sense of the term) and faith even a bit further. For, one might try to contend that the Scriptures themselves give reasons, and thus that it isn’t faith alone that leads us to assent to all the things handed down in the sacred Books. St. Paul, for instance, in his *First Letter to the Corinthians* (15, 13–14) argues that “*if* there is no resurrection of the dead, *then* Christ has not been raised, and *if* Christ has not been raised, *then* our proclamation is vain and your faith has been in vain”. In setting up these consequences, isn’t the Apostle offering antecedents to justify them? Not precisely, explains Durandus. When something is handed down as a deduction or as a consequence, we must realize that it is not accepted because of the human deduction involved, but because the consequent is handed down elsewhere in the Scriptures as something that is directly revealed. Our resurrection, which is presented in a deductive format in *Corinthians*, is absolutely revealed in *Job* (19, 26) and in *Daniel* (12, 1–3) as well as through Christ in many places in the Gospel (e.g., *John* 11, 24–26). Such truths, presented as consequents in *Corinthians*, are held solely or principally on faith.⁸

A distinction made by St. Bonaventure in the prologue to his *Commentary on the Sentences* might further clarify Durandus’s point. When the Seraphic Doctor explains the manner in which the *Sentences* of Lombard are connected with Sacred Scripture he declares:

... This book [of Lombard] is linked to Sacred Scripture after the manner of a certain subalternation and not as a part of Scripture; and the same holds for all the books of the Fathers which were written as defenses of the faith [...]. Since, therefore, Sacred Scripture is about what is believable insofar as it is believable and this book [of Lombard] is about the believable insofar as it is made intelligible, and this qualification sets a certain limit—“for what we believe we owe to authority and what we understand we owe to reason”⁹—, it follows that just as there is a different kind of certitude in the superior form of knowledge than there is in the lower form, so there is a different mode of proceeding that is found in each. So, just as a subalternated form of knowledge, when it lacks some-

⁸ This paragraph is not found in the first redaction of Durandus, but it is found in the later printed edition (ed. Venetiis 1549, f. 2vb), nn. 12 and 15: “Quaedam etiam talium quae hic traduntur ut ex aliis deducta, traduntur alibi in Scriptura, ut absolute revelata, sicut resurrectio nostra quae concluditur ab Apostolo ex resurrectione Christi, traditur, ut absolute revelata, *Iob* 19 et *Dan.* 12, et per Christum in Evangelio in pluribus locis, et omnia talia tenentur solum, vel principaliter, per fidem proprie dictam”.

⁹ Augustinus, *De utilitate credendi*, 11, 25 (CSEL 25/1, p. 32,22–23): “Quod intelligimus igitur debemus rationi, quod credimus auctoritati”.

thing, retreats to the certitude that is found in the subalternating type of knowledge which is greater, so also when the Master does not have the certitude of reason he runs back to the certitude of authority found in the Sacred Scriptures that surpasses every certitude of reason.¹⁰

Ultimately, for Durandus, all other meanings of 'theology' will be grounded in this first meaning of the term, where 'theology' is defined as "a lasting quality of our soul that alone or principally moves us to accept as true the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and to assent to them in the way that they are handed down". All theology, for him, is thus anchored in the theology that is identified with faith.

The second traditional meaning of the term 'theology', has just been pointed out in the above citation from St. Bonaventure: "similiter et libri doctorum, qui sunt ad fidei defensionem". At times, Durandus refers to this theological effort as 'defensive theology' or 'persuasive theology'; at others, he joins them together and uses the title 'persuasive or defensive theology'. He employs yet another title when he speaks of this type of theology as a "habitus declarativus articulorum et defensivus fidei". No matter the title, he defines it as "a lasting quality of the soul by means of which the faith and those things handed down in Sacred Scripture are defended and clarified by using principles that we know better".¹¹ According to Durandus, this type of theology is justified by St. Augustine's words in Book XIV of the *De Trinitate*:

... To this science [...] [is attributed] only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not strong, however exceeding strong in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain to a blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended

¹⁰ Bonaventura, *In I Sent.*, prooem., q. 2, ed. PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1882, vol. 1, p. 11: "Liber iste ad sacram Scripturam reducitur per modum cuiusdam subalternationis, non partis principalis; similiter et libri doctorum, qui sunt ad fidei defensionem. Quoniam igitur sacra Scriptura est de credibili ut credibili, hic est de credibili ut facto intelligibili, et haec determinatio distrahit—nam quod credimus debemus auctoritati, et quod intelligimus, rationi—hinc est, quod sicut alius modus certitudinis est in scientia superiori et inferiori, ita alius modus procedendi. Et sicut scientia subalternata, ubi deficit, redit ad certitudinem scientiae subalternantis, quae maior est, sic etiam, cum Magistro deficit certitudo rationis, recurrit ad auctoritatis certitudinem sacrae Scripturae, quae excedit omnem certitudinem rationis".

¹¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Secundo modo accipitur theologia pro habitu quo fides et ea quae in Scriptura traduntur defenduntur et declarantur ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus".

against the impious, which last the Apostle seems to call by the special name of knowledge.¹²

Taken in this second sense, when we ask whether theology, thus understood, is science or not, we are actually asking: Can we have at the same time regarding the same object faith and science? We are not asking “Is faith science?” but “Are faith and science compatible?”

‘Theology’ has also traditionally a third meaning, and he tells us that this third meaning is the more common one in his day. He describes it as “a lasting quality of the soul by means of which it deduces further things from the articles of the faith and the sayings of Sacred Scripture in the way that conclusions are deduced from principles”.¹³ He gives this third meaning of ‘theology’ the title ‘deductive theology’. Deductive theology differs from declarative theology in so far as the latter focuses on the principles themselves and how they are supported and defended, whereas deductive theology looks to the conclusions that can be drawn from the principles.

If we now ask the question “Is theology science?” in regard to deductive theology, we in fact are asking: “Are the conclusions of deductive theology truly known (*scitae*), i.e. are they evident, and not just believed (*creditae*)?”¹⁴ For Durandus, only the last two questions, those concerning declarative and deductive theology, are worth examining. In the present article, we will only deal with the question according to the second meaning of the word ‘theology’. Thus, the question we will be considering is: “Are faith and science compatible?” or more

¹² Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, p. 424,59–67): “...Huic scientiae [...] illud tantummodo <tribuitur> quo fides saluberrima quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. Qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum, hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare vocabulo scientiam videtur Apostolus”.

¹³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: “Tertio modo accipitur theologia communius—nescio tamen si verius—pro habitu eorum quae deducuntur ex articulis fidei et ex dictis sacrae Scripturae sicut conclusiones ex principiis”.

¹⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: “Accipiendum autem tertio modo theologiam, sicut communiter accipitur, scilicet, pro habitu eorum quae deducuntur ex articulis fidei et ex dictis sacrae Scripturae sicut conclusiones ex principiis, sic quaerere utrum theologia sit scientia est quaerere utrum ex articulis fidei possit aliquid demonstrative concludi quod sit vere scitum”.

specifically: "Can we have at the same time regarding the same object faith and science?".¹⁵

DURANDUS ON DECLARATIVE THEOLOGY

If we look at the terms 'faith' and 'science' according to their formal definitions, we see that faith is based on authority and science is based on evidence. As such, Durandus explains, they are compatible, since authorities can also have confirming reasons. Of course, if you have an evident demonstration, then you do not have to depend on any authority. This case, however, only excludes the necessity of having a supporting authority; it does not deny the compatibility of authority and reasons. It really is a case of arguments or reasons as confirming the authority. Certainly, authorities can have confirming arguments, i.e. persuasive, albeit not demonstrative, arguments.¹⁶

The situation is different, however, if we go beyond the formal definitions of faith and science that permit compatibility and move on to some particular theological considerations that involve special contents in our considerations of faith and science. If we turn, for instance, to the matters that Christian faith deals with—such as the Trinity and the Incarnation—we tread on different ground. In regard to these cases, Durandus attempts to show two things regarding the basic principles or premises of Christian faith. First, he contends that believers in their present earthly existence have faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation in such a way that they cannot have science in the proper sense of having evidence that can guarantee such truths. This, he argues, is due to the condition that such truths are not demonstrable. You cannot present evidence for their truth that would command a person's assent. Such

¹⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Ex his duobus modis ultimis tractabitur quaestio. Primo, utrum de eodem possit esse fides et scientia".

¹⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Quantum ad primum articulum distinguendum est de fide, quia possumus loqui de ea vel secundum eius generalem et formalem rationem, et sic nihil prohibet quin de eodem possint esse simul in eodem homine fides et scientia, vel secundum specialem materiam de qua est fides et de qua specialiter loquuntur theologi. Et quia talis materia non est demonstrabilis aut simpliciter aut saltem viatori, non propter rationem formalem fidei sed propter conditionem materiae de qua est fides et propter statum viae, ideo cum tali fide non stat scientia in viatore [...]. Constat quod sicut stat auctoritas cum ratione concordante auctoritati, sic assensus per auctoritatem cum assensu per rationem, licet habenti rationem demonstrativam non sit necessaria auctoritas, ita quod demonstratio bene excludit necessitatem auctoritatis, sed non compossibilitatem".

truths are certainly not demonstrable to someone in the present life. Natural things that are more familiar to us cannot be employed to command our assent to the theological realities of the Trinity or the Incarnation. This is the situation not only with people who lack the gift of faith. It is true also for those who have faith.¹⁷

Secondly, Durandus tries to show that no one (not even St. Paul in his rapture to the third heaven, nor the prophets or writers of the Sacred Scriptures) in the present state of earthly existence can have clear evidence for such truths as the Trinity or Incarnation. Analogies do not provide evidence that commands assent. Analogies only confirm what we assent to because of our faith.¹⁸

To establish his first point, that the Trinity and the Incarnation cannot be demonstrated by using arguments based on analogies, Durandus tries to establish three things: 1) we cannot demonstrate such articles of the faith as the Trinity and the Incarnation; 2) we cannot demonstrate or argue through evidence that such truths do not include impossibilities; and 3) we cannot establish demonstratively, that is based on evidence, that arguments against the Trinity and the Incarnation can be refuted.¹⁹

¹⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A]: "Primum patet, quia si articulus posset demonstrari, aut hoc esset a priori et per causam aut a posteriori et per effectum. Non primo modo, quia articulus Trinitatis causam non habet. Articulus autem Incarnationis, et quidam alii, licet causam habeat, illa tamen causa quoad articuli existentiam actualem est voluntas divina, quae secundum se ignota est nobis. Ergo articuli non possunt demonstrari a priori. Item, nec a posteriori sive per effectum, quia effectus ducit in cognitionem causae secundum illud quod ab ea procedit. Sed nullus effectus apparens nobis procedit a Deo nisi secundum illud quod est unum et commune cuilibet personae in Trinitate, scilicet, secundum rationem scientiae, potentiae, et voluntatis, ut infra patebit. Et nullus potest nos ducere in cognitionem Dei quantum ad distinctionem personarum sed solum quantum ad unitatem essentiae et attributorum essentialium. Omnes autem articuli includunt articulum Trinitatis aliquo modo sicut articuli pertinentes ad humanitatem Christi includunt distinctionem personae Filii ab aliis, sicut esse incarnatum, passum, resurrexisse, et huiusmodi; quare etc."

¹⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A]: "Si autem accipiat fides secundum aliqualem specialem materiam de qua est, utpote fides articulorum de qua loquuntur theologi, sic dicendum est primo quod puri viatores de talibus sic habent fidem quod de eis non possunt habere scientiam proprie dictam, non propter formalem rationem fidei sed propter conclusionem quae modo non est demonstrabilis aut simpliciter aut huic, scilicet, viatori, et hoc ex naturalibus, supposita etiam fide".

¹⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Quantum autem ad primum ostenduntur tria. Primum est quod non potest demonstrari quod sic sit sicut dicit articulus. Secundum est quod non potest demonstrari quod articulus nihil impossibile includat. Tertium est quod rationes adductae contra articulum non possunt solvi sic quod scientifice constet de eorum solutione".

First of all, he contends that we cannot demonstrate, that is, show with the type of evidence that would force our assent, such articles of faith as the Trinity and the Incarnation. Such articles of the Christian faith cannot be demonstrated either *a priori* (from a cause) or *a posteriori* (from effects). The Trinity cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, i.e., starting from knowledge of the cause of the Trinity, since the Trinity has no cause. The Incarnation cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, even though it has a cause, since the cause is the divine will which on its part is unknown to us. Neither can we demonstrate such articles of the Creed *a posteriori*, that is, beginning from effects and arguing back to their cause. The reason why is that effects are known according to the way they proceed from their cause. Effects of God's activity, however, proceed according to what is common to the three persons, i.e., knowledge, power and will. So, no creature as an effect of God tells us about God according the distinction of persons but only according to the unity of the divine essence and essential attributes, not personal properties. Furthermore, since all the articles of the Creed include the Trinity in some way, e.g., the Incarnation pertains to the humanity of Christ, which is united to the Son, the Incarnation presupposes the distinction of persons, then the articles dealing with Christ's incarnation, suffering, death and resurrection also presuppose the distinction of persons.²⁰

Neither can we, according to Durandus, demonstrate that such truths do not include impossibilities. From what was said just above, we should realize that we cannot demonstrate *a priori* or from a cause that the articles of faith do not include contradictions. That the Trinity or the Incarnation or other supernatural truths do not include contradictions thus must be shown by examining the effects of God's creative power.

Creatures as we experience them, however, seem to give the opposite message, showing more the possibility that such revealed truths include contradictions rather than the impossibility. For instance, it seems in the case of creatures that it is impossible that supposit be distinguished from one another by relations; rather they seem to be distinguished in an absolute way—which is very different than what is presented in the case of the Trinity of persons. Likewise, in the case of creatures a complete substantive nature constitutes a proper supposit, and such a

²⁰ Cf. *supra*, note 18.

nature cannot subsist in another supposit; yet the Incarnation presents the opposite claim. The same happens in regard to other articles of the faith, so from these instances it is clear that creatures show more the impossibility of the articles of the Creed, not their possibility.²¹ Leaning on the authority of Gregory the Great, Durandus argues that the merit of faith consists in the difficulty of accepting it.²² Now, if it could be shown that the articles of the faith are possible, then there would be no, or at least little, difficulty in accepting them, since if it could be shown that something can be done, it is not very difficult to accept that the possibility has been actualized.

Thirdly, Durandus contends that not all the arguments brought against articles of the faith can be refuted in a clear and scientific way. Arguments against the faith, of course, can be faulty in their logic or faulty in their content. If they involve a logical fallacy, then whoever is well-trained in the discipline contained in the *Sophistical Refutations* of Aristotle would be able to demonstrate the fault of the argument.

This is not the case, however, when we move from the formal aspects of the argument to its content. If, for example, one were to argue: "There is always a distinct nature in distinct supposits; but in the divine persons the nature cannot be distinct; therefore the supposits cannot be distinct"; there is no logical fault.

The fault, then, is in the false assumption of the proposition "There is always a distinct nature in distinct supposits". It supposes that the proposition referring to all supposits is universally true, whereas it only holds true in regard to creatures. However, the argument can only be refuted by rebutting the universal proposition by showing that this is the case with creatures but that it does not hold in regard to the divine

²¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Secundum patet, scilicet, quod non potest demonstrari quod articulus nihil impossibile includat, quia talis demonstratio, cum non posset esse a priori et per causam, propter illa quae dicta sunt prius, sumeretur ex his quae apparent in creaturis. Sed apparentia in creaturis magis videtur concludere impossibilitatem articuli quam possibilitatem; ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia in creaturis apparet quod impossibile est supposita distingui per relationes sed necessario distinguuntur per aliqua absoluta, cuius oppositum ponitur in articulo Trinitatis".

²² Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Hoc lumine, id est, hac notitia, sunt illuminati maiores qui habent fidem docere et defendere. Nec oportet eos esse illuminatos aliquo lumine in quo articuli sint intellecti vel sciti, ut alii ponunt, quia ad ea quae sunt fidei non potest adduci cogens ratio ne tollatur meritum fidei, nam secundum Gregorium: 'Fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet experimentum'". Cf. Gregorius Magnus, *XL Homeliarum in Evangelia*, II, hom. 26, n. 1552; PL 76, col. 1197.

persons. As was said above in the first point, nonetheless, we cannot demonstrate or show clearly and scientifically that in the Trinity there are three persons but only one nature or essence.

According to Durandus, then, it is clear that when we consider faith concretely in terms of the special material that is spoken of in the articles of the Creed, faith and scientific knowledge cannot exist at the same time in the same person in regard to the same thing, since it cannot be demonstrated to a wayfarer that things are as the article of faith says they are. Neither can it be shown that an article of faith is possible. Finally, arguments brought forth against an article of the faith cannot be refuted demonstratively. In searching for authorities to back him up, Durandus declares that it is about faith in this context that we should accept the words of St. Paul in his *Letter to the Hebrews* (11, 1): "Faith is the argument for things unseen". St. Augustine²³ likewise tells that "Faith is to believe what you do not see", and Thomas Aquinas,²⁴ referring to Aristotle's *Ethics*, warns that we can only achieve the kind of accuracy that our subject matter allows.

The perspective which dominates Durandus's discussion is the theme of the cause of assent. If the assent is caused by evidence, the assent is necessary. A truth that is evident must be accepted by all. Revealed truths are not evident: no one is forced to assent to them. Faith is the assent that believers give to the truths of the faith. An act of faith is a free act: a believer accepts the truths of the faith, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, not because they are evident, but because they are revealed by God, the First Truth. From the perspective of assent, all human efforts to demonstrate supernatural truths, or attempts to prove their possibility, or endeavors to refute attacks on them fall short. In the Prologue of the final printed redaction of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Durandus repeats these denials of the causal efficacy of proofs to produce assent to divine revelation. He even extends his catalogue of wasted efforts by arguing that some wrongly pretend that the Apostles and those who saw Christ performing miracles and raising the dead

²³ Augustinus, *In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus* CXXIV, tract. 40, n. 9 (CCSL 36, p. 355,8–9); *Sermo* 43, 1, 1 (CCSL 41, p. 508,6).

²⁴ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super I Corinth.*, c. 1, lect. 3: "Unde sermones secundum materiam sunt accipiendi, ut dicitur in primo *Ethicorum*. Tunc autem maxime modus aliquis docendi est materiae incongruus quando per talem modum destruitur id quod est principale in materia illa, puta si quis in rebus intellectualibus velit metaphoricis demonstrationibus uti, quae non transcendent res imaginatas, ad quas non oportet intelligentem adduci, ut Boethius ostendit in libro *De Trinitate*".

received evidence of his divinity and of the truth of his teachings.²⁵ Among other arguments, Durandus once again appeals to Gregory's words in his *Sermon on the Octave of Easter*: "Faith has no merit when human reason bases itself on experience".²⁶ The assent of the Apostles and those who saw Christ performing miracles was based on faith.

Durandus, in dealing with declarative theology as science, takes 'science' in the strict sense of demonstration. 'Science' in the demonstrative sense is only science when it provides the evidence that forces assent. For Durandus, declarative theology does not provide such evidence, so it is not science. If we look more carefully at his first definition of 'theology', where it is identical with faith, and look at his description of the primary meaning of theology, which is the foundation for all theology, including declarative theology, he says: "It is a lasting quality in our soul that alone *or principally* moves us to accept as true the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and to assent to them in the way that they are handed down". In specifying 'alone *or principally*', Durandus seems to leave space for a positive role for declarative theology. Yet, in both his early and late prologues, he places the accent on faith *alone* as the cause of the assent.

PETER AUREOLI ON DECLARATIVE THEOLOGY

Peter Aureoli gives no direct sign of reading the first redaction of Durandus's prologue to Book I of the *Sentences*, though some of the sources of his *Scriptum in I Sententiarum* and his later *Reportatio*, such as Gerard of Bologna, do cite Durandus's early prologue.²⁷ However, Aureoli is famous as the defender of declarative theology. His form of it was challenged by Gregory of Rimini and imitated, despite some

²⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [C], prol., nn. 46–47, ed. Venetiis 1549, f. 5ra.

²⁶ Cf. *supra*, note 22.

²⁷ Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 1, ed. P. de Vooght, *Les Sources de la doctrine Chrétienne*, Bruges 1954, p. 270: "Circa primum, dicunt aliqui quod theologia potest tripliciter accipi. Uno modo, prout dicit habitum quo cognoscimus ea quae in sacra scriptura traduntur. Alio modo, ut dicit habitum quo fides et ea quae in scriptura traduntur, defenduntur et declarantur ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus; [...] Tertio modo, ut dicit habitum eorum quae deducuntur ex articulis fidei et ex dictis sacrae scripturae sicut conclusiones ex principiis". Aureoli does refer to Durandus directly in *Scriptum*, dist. 5. See above, p. 27.

particular criticisms, by Peter of Candia.²⁸ Most of his elaborate *Scriptum* must have been completed during his years teaching at Toulouse, since a finished illuminated copy of it dedicated to Pope John XXII was completed in May 1317. His *Reportatio* on all four books of the *Sentences* was produced in Paris in 1316–1318, so his *Scriptum* antedates the *Reportatio*. Here we will focus on his *Scriptum* re-presentation and defense of declarative theology, quite likely the most elaborate treatment of declarative theology written in the Middle Ages.²⁹

Aureoli, like Durandus, traces the grounding of declarative theology back to Book XIV of the *De Trinitate*³⁰ of St. Augustine, where Augustine instructs his readers to pursue “only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not strong, however exceeding strong in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain to a blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended against the impious, which last the apostle seems to call by the special name of knowledge”.

Declarative theology, as portrayed by Aureoli, presupposes faith. Peter distinguishes the habit of declarative theology from a metaphysical habit. He admits that in the study that takes place in the theology faculty one can learn many things. One can gain demonstrative knowledge of God and of truths related to the divine that is based on necessary propositions that are known by natural means. This form of knowledge is metaphysical, not purely or properly theological. Such a metaphysical habit does not presuppose faith. Metaphysical arguments would force the intellectual assent of any philosopher or pagan, and thus cannot be a theological habit, because a theological habit presupposes faith. This is what St. Augustine taught in his letter *Against the Epistle of Fundamentus*:³¹ “I profess the catholic faith and through this faith I presume that I can come to a sure knowledge”. To assure that no one

²⁸ Cf. S.F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year ‘History’ of the Theologian’s Role”, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), pp. 156–190.

²⁹ For a detailed analysis of the four causes and Aureoli’s theology, see S.R. Streuer, *Die theologische Einleitungslehre des Petrus Aureoli*, Werl 1968.

³⁰ Cf. *supra*, note 12.

³¹ Augustinus, *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti*, 14 (CSEL 25/1, p. 210,14–16): “Ego namque catholicam fidem profiteor, et per illam me ad certam scientiam perventurum esse praesumo”.

interprets the words of Augustine to mean that this sure knowledge will come, but only in heaven, he adds the specification that Richard of Saint-Victor provides at the beginning of Book I of his *De Trinitate*.³² "They should not despair of arriving at knowledge when they have made the effort, even while they have felt themselves strong in the faith". A Scriptural justification for this interpretation, according to Richard of Saint-Victor, is found in one of the translations of *Isaiah* 7, 9: "Unless you will have believed, you shall not understand".

Aureoli returns to the text of Augustine's *De Trinitate* and continues his reflection on the words: "...to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended against the impious, which last the apostle seems to call by the special name of knowledge (*scientia*)". It is at this point in his presentation of declarative theology that Aureoli tells us what he means by 'declarative'. "Every habit that makes something to be imagined better by the intellect without producing any assent is a declarative habit".³³

We have added the phrase 'makes something to be imagined without producing assent', so that it might be clear that the theological habit is only a declarative one and in no way causes assent. Now a habit generated by theological study of the kind we have indicated does what was stated. For that a man does not clearly grasp or imagine some truth which he believes most firmly can arise from four sources. First, because he does not grasp the meaning of the terms. Secondly, because there are arguments against what he believes and these confuse his intellect and prevent him from stating what he believes. Thirdly, because he lacks examples, confirming arguments, or analogies related to what he believes. For such things help one to imagine well the things he holds, as the Commentator declares in Book IV of the *Physics*: that it was the custom of Aristotle to use rhetorical examples in cases where it was hard to imagine the realities that he was speaking about. Fourthly, when the believer does not have probable reasons for what he believes. For, although he believes something to be true by a command of the will, nonetheless, he does not have any help from the intellect and so he does not grasp or conceive well what he believes if he does not have probable arguments. On the other hand, that theological habit, in regard to what he believes to be true, which brings forth an explanation of terms, and offers reasons that overcome objections, and provides examples, and confirming arguments that are probable, and

³² Richardus de Sancto-Victore, *De Trinitate*, I, 4; PL 196, col. 892.

³³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 112, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1952, p. 164: "Omnis enim habitus qui facit aliquid imaginari melius per intellectum absque omni adhaesione est habitus declarativus".

helpful analogies—such a habit will be one that makes the believer imagine in a better and clearer way the things he believes, and yet it will not be what makes him believe, since he most firmly would already hold these things by faith. Therefore, such a habit is only declarative.³⁴

‘Declarative’, for Aureoli, then, means ‘brings understanding’. He finds that this is the meaning of *intelligentia* and *lumen* in Augustine’s *De Trinitate* and in the *De Trinitate* of Richard of Saint-Victor.³⁵ ‘Declarativa’ in his treatise contrasts with ‘adhaesiva’; it brings understanding, not assent. ‘Theologia’ in its proper sense is a *habitus declarativus*.

When it comes to specifics regarding what brings understanding, Aureoli goes back to the items listed above³⁶ that cause misunderstanding for the believer: 1) he does not grasp the meaning of the terms in the expressions related to faith; 2) he is confused by the arguments of those who criticize the truths of faith; 3) he lacks examples and analogies that could help him to better grasp the realities he believes in; 4) he does not have helpful philosophical arguments to support or confirm

³⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, nn. 112–113, ed. Buytaert, pp. 164–165: “Additur quoque quod absque omni adhaesione faciat imaginari melius, ut appareat quod est tantum declarativus talis habitus et nullo modo adhaesivus. Sed habitus generatus ex huiusmodi theologico studio facit quod dictum est: quod enim homo aliquam propositionem non clare imagnetur aut capiat, quam tamen credit firmissime esse veram, oriri potest ex quatuor.

Primo quidem quia termini non capiuntur. Secundo vero quia in oppositum sunt rationes, intellectum involventes et impediennes ne possit componere quod credit. Tertio quoque quia non sunt exempla, manuductiones et similitudines ad illud quod creditur; talia enim faciunt bene imaginari, ut Commentator testatur, IV *Physicorum*, quod mos erat Aristotelis uti exemplis rhetoricis in locis difficilis imaginationis. Quarto vero, cum non sunt probabiles rationes ad illud; enim illud credatur esse verum ex imperio voluntatis, non tamen bene capitur aut concipitur ductu intellectus, si deficiunt probabiles rationes. Per oppositum igitur habitus ille, qui ad propositionem quae vera esse creditur, adducit terminorum explicationem, rationem involventium dissolutionem et exempla, et manuductiones rationum probabilium, adminicula et inductiones, talis inquam erit melius et clarius credita faciens imaginari, et tamen absque hoc quod faciat adhaerere, cum prius per fidem firmissime tenerentur. Ergo talis habitus erit mere declarativus”.

³⁵ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, nn. 127–128, ed. Buytaert, p. 169: “Quod autem sit intelligentia et lumen, ad quod Sancti per studium Scripturarum conantur, apparet quidem primo ex dictis Augustini, qui ait, IX *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, quod ‘Trinitatem quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit, si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat’ [...]. Secundo vero idem apparet ex dictis Richardi de Sancto Victore, qui ait in I libro *De Trinitate*, in prooemio, quod ‘in fide esse nos convenit, a qua omne bonum firmamentum et fundamentum capit. Sed, sicut in fide totius boni inchoatio, sic est in cognitione consummatio. Feramur itaque quibus gradibus possumus, et properemus ex fide ad cognitionem’”.

³⁶ Cf. supra, note 34.

his belief. The positive effort of his teaching is to find remedies that will overcome the causes of misunderstanding and in a positive way produce understanding of the realities that theologians accept because of their faith.

Aureoli argues that this search for some understanding of the realities of the faith is what theologians have been practicing down through the ages:

Furthermore, whoever has some intellectual habit that is distinct from the habit by which one assents to a believed truth, has a habit distinct from the faith that he has concerning that truth [...]. Now, a believer who has arguments of the kind we have spoken about, and solutions to the doubts concerning Christian beliefs and all the other things we have mentioned in this regard, has some acts in regard to the things that he believes that are distinct from the assent that he gives, for such a habit is said in some way to be one by which he understands what he believes, and gives a justifying reason for those things that are in him by faith, and he knows how the faith is to be defended against those who attack it, and how it is to be strengthened in the minds of pious believers, following the authoritative statement of Augustine. Such a person knows how 'to speak wisdom among those that are perfect', as the Apostle boasts, and he has eyes that are well practiced in distinguishing what is good from what is evil. And he enjoys many other acts that are not found in those who are people of simple faith, insofar as they are people of simple faith. Therefore, such a believer has some other habit that is distinct from faith, by means of which he with facility can carry out these other acts [mentioned by Augustine]. Furthermore, from such arguments and others of this kind we either acquire something or nothing. If we acquire nothing, then it is a waste of time to study the earlier Church writers and Augustine, and the other teachers who have tried to go from creatures to some understanding of the things that must be believed, as is clear from the complete text of the *De Trinitate*. If, however, something is acquired, then it is something that is permanent, and then it will be a habit; or it will be something transient, and then it will be an act. But from frequent acts a habit is formed. Therefore, it is necessary from the study of theology that some habit that is different and distinct from faith is produced.³⁷

³⁷ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, nn. 94–95, ed. Buytaert, p. 160: "Praeterea, quicumque habet actum aliquem intellectus alium ab assentire circa creditam veritatem, habet alium habitum a fide circa illam [...]. Sed fidelis habens penes se huiusmodi deductiones et dubiorum solutiones et cetera huiusmodi, habet aliquem actum circa huiusmodi credibilia alium ab assentire reductum ad suam potestatem, quoniam talis dicitur quodammodo intelligere quae credit, et est paratus reddere rationem de ea quae in ipso est fide, et scit qualiter fides contra impios defendatur, et in mentibus piorum roboretur, secundum sententiam Augustini. Talis etiam sciret loqui 'sapientiam inter perfectos' sicut Apostolus gloriatur, et habet exercitatos oculos

A proper theological habit, then, does not make one adhere to the truths of the faith. In employing non-demonstrative, that is, probable arguments, these arguments do not cause assent. If probable arguments caused any assent, then it would make the theologian cling to a truth of the faith as an opinion, since probable arguments only produce opinion. To pursue such a habit would be to pursue something not worthwhile, since opinion includes within its nature the fear that what you hold might be wrong. It would, in Aureoli's judgment, be foolish to develop such a habit through study, since it would not perfect the faith but would make it less perfect.³⁸

TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR AUREOLI'S DECLARATIVE THEOLOGY

Both Peter Aureoli and Durandus of St.-Pourçain link declarative theology to St. Augustine's opening chapter of Book XIV of his *De Trinitate*. In seeking knowledge, we should pursue "only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened".³⁹ Durandus, in both redactions of the prologue to Book I, also discusses deductive theology and describes it as "the habit of those things which are deduced from the articles of faith as conclusions derived from principles". In both redactions in the very same words, he tells us:

ad discretionem boni et mali, et multos alios actus experitur, quos non experitur simplex fidelis, quantumcumque polleat fide. Ergo talis habet aliquem habitum alium et distinctum a fide, quo facilius exit in actus istos.

Praeterea, ex talibus deductionibus et ceteris huiusmodi aut acquiritur aliquid aut nihil; si nihil, igitur vanum est studium sanctorum, Augustini, et omnium doctorum qui conantur ex creaturis conscendere ad intellectum aliquem credendorum, ut patet in toto libro *De Trinitate*. Si vero acquiritur aliquid, aut illud est permanens, et illud erit habitus, aut aliquid transiens, puta actus; sed ex actibus frequentatis habitus generatur. Ergo necesse est ex studio theologiae aliquem habitum a fide alium et distinctum causari".

³⁸ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 96, ed. Buytaert, pp. 160–161: "Secunda propositio est quod huiusmodi habitus non est adhaesivus, nec aliquem assensum causans in intellectu respectu credibilium veritatum. Si enim aliquem assensum causaret, et esset habitus adhaesivus, esset opinio, quod omnino dici non potest, tum quia nimis esset indignus habitus theologicus, tum quia opinio includit essentialiter formidinem et sic sequeretur quod habitus theologicus fidelem faceret formidare circa veritates, de quibus fidelis simplex nullatenus formidat. Stultum etiam esset talem habitum per studium comparare, cum non perficeret fidem, sed magis imperficere. Et ideo dicendum est quod talis habitus nullum assensum causat".

³⁹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, p. 424,59–61): "...illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima [...] gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur".

As we said before, 'theology' more commonly is taken in this sense at the present time. However, I do not know if this is more truly the case. The reason why I say this is because those things which certain theologians claim are deduced theoretically from the articles of the faith are much more put forward to support or confirm (*declarandum*) the articles of the faith.⁴⁰

Without naming him, Durandus accuses Thomas Aquinas, and those who follow him on the path of what they call deductive theology, of really practicing declarative theology under the guise of deductive theology. They do so when from the fact that the article of the Trinity posits that in God there are three persons and one essence, they imagine they deduce as a conclusion that the distinction of persons is due to relations and not to something absolute. Likewise, from the fact that the article of faith posits that the Son of God is man, they deduce that he has true flesh and not a fantasy form of flesh as the Manicheans hold. In fact, however, these claims are advanced more to support and clarify the article of faith: for, we say that the distinction of persons takes place through relations rather than through something absolute so that we can sustain how the article can be true. If the distinction of persons took place through absolutes, it would necessarily follow that this would take place either through the divine essence, and then the divine essence would be multiplied, or through something added to the divine essence, and then there would be composition in God. What is taking place here is that in order to deal with the Trinity, which according to human reason is obscure and doubtful, we sustain it to some degree as possible and adduce the above explanation to support the article, not principally to deduce something from the article. Likewise, when we say that the Son of God has true flesh we are in fact attempting to explain how the article which posits that the Son of God is to be understood, namely that He is true man and not just a man according to appearance. This is also the method that Christ Himself used when he wanted to make clear the article of faith dealing with His resurrection. *Luke's Gospel* (24, 39) records His words: "Handle me, and see, for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have". Certainly he

⁴⁰ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol.: "Sic enim, ut dictum fuit prius, theologia sumitur communius nunc—nescio tamen si verius. Quod pro tanto dico, quia ea quae quidam dicunt deduci ex articulis speculative magis adducuntur secundum veritatem ad sustinendum vel declarandum articulum". This is found also in the final redaction, ed. Venetiis 1549, f. 5r.

could have concluded: "I have truly risen, therefore I have true flesh". But that is not what he did. Rather he did the opposite: to clarify the article of the faith concerning His resurrection He brought forth what was said concerning the truth of His flesh. Durandus continues and tells us that in the same way it could be deduced from the fact that the Son of God is true man that He has true flesh. These are not great insights of philosophy; in fact to treat them as formal deductions is perhaps to beg the question and go around in circles. Durandus contended that such arguments are brought forth to bring some understanding and support to the articles of the faith, a form of declarative theology.

Peter Aureoli presents the same case even more forcefully and notes specifically that he has Thomas Aquinas in mind. Thomas and his followers are wrong in thinking the articles of the Creed are the first principles of our theology, meaning that we use them as principles to deduce further conclusions. Peter argues that no science starts with principles that need to be demonstrated but rather starts with first principles. Still, it is certain that Aquinas in his *Summa*, and in general it is the case for all doctors of theology: they formulate questions that deal with articles of the faith. They ask whether God is only one or are there three persons in God or is the Incarnation possible? Now these are questions concerning articles of faith and they are questions looking to be answered, clarified and determined by arguments. So, the articles of the faith are not premises leading to conclusions. They are conclusions supported by confirming argument.⁴¹

Furthermore, Peter argues that when you study the *De Trinitate* composed by St. Augustine, you develop a certain type of theological habit. It is clear that in the whole book he makes an effort to bring understanding and support for this article of the Creed: God is three and one. He tells us this when he recalls that "all the Catholic interpreters of the divine books, both the Old Testament and the New Testament, whom I have been able to read, who wrote before me about the Trinity,

⁴¹ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 24, ed. Buytaert, p. 139: "Primo quidem in hoc quod ait articulos fidei esse principia nostrae theologiae. Hoc nimirum stare non potest: nulla enim scientia procedit ad principia concludenda, sed potius concludit ex ipsis. Sed certum est quod iste Doctor, in *Summa* sua, et universaliter omnes doctores theologi, formant quaestiones de articulis fidei, et ad eas dissolvendum, declarandum et concludendum procedunt, ut cum quaeritur: Utrum Deus sit tantum unus, vel: Utrum in Deo sit trinitas personarum; vel: Utrum Incarnatio sit possibilis, et huiusmodi. Ergo articuli fidei non sunt principia in theologia nostra, immo magis conclusiones".

which is God, had this purpose in view: to teach in accord with the Scriptures that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constitute the divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality".⁴² Such a theological habit, as is clear from his words, does not proceed from the articles as principles but aims more at confirming or arguing on behalf of the articles themselves.

Again, that Christ was born of the Virgin Mary is an article of faith; and that the Holy Spirit was spoken of by the prophets is another article. If you read Augustine's book *Against Faustus*,⁴³ it is easy to see that he tried to establish both these articles with his arguments. So, in this work he did not deduce further truths from these articles but attempted to argue in support of these very articles.

Finally, in the *First Letter of Peter* (3, 15), those who have developed the skills to do so, "should always be ready to render an account for those things that are in us by faith and hope". The theological skills or habits should thus be used to deal with the articles that are in us by faith—for which theologians have developed the proper habit to provide rational support.⁴⁴

Pulling all the aforesaid elements together, Peter Aureoli judges that we are forced to hold that all the study of theologians should be to bring to the articles of faith as conclusions arguments that support their acceptance by faith and defend them against attack and distortion.

⁴² Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 25, ed. Buytaert, p. 139: "Praeterea, ex studio libri *De Trinitate* compositi ab Augustino acquiritur theologicus habitus; sed certum est quod ipse in toto libro procedit ad declarandum istum articulum: Deus est trinus et unus, sicut ipsemet dicit primo *De Trinitate*, capitulo 4, quod 'omnes qui ante' ipsum 'scripserant de Trinitate, quae Deus est, divinorum librorum veterum et novorum catholici tractatores hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdem substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem'; ergo habitus theologicus ex articulis fidei tamquam de principiis non procedit, sed magis ipsos declarare intendit". Cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, I, 4, 7 (CCSL 50, pp. 34,69–35,6).

⁴³ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 26, ed. Buytaert, p. 139: "Praeterea, Christum esse natum de Maria Virgine est articulus fidei; Spiritum quoque Sanctum per Prophetas fuisse locutum est articulus alius; et tamen hos duos Augustinus probare nititur contra Faustum, ut patet in libro Augustini contra eundem hereticum. Ergo libri theologici non procedunt ex articulis sed magis ad eos". Cf. Augustinus, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum libri XXXIII* (CSEL 25/1, pp. 249–797).

⁴⁴ Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 28, ed. Buytaert, p. 140: "Praeterea, *Prima Petri*, capitulo 3, dicitur de habentibus theologicum habitum quod debent esse 'semper parati ad satisfactionem omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae in nobis est fide et spe'. Ex quo apparet quod habitus theologicus tractat de articulis de quibus fides est, non tamquam de principiis, sed sicut de his de quibus ratio ab ipso reddi debet".

In his judgment, it was for this purpose that the *Book of the Sentences* gained its place of honor, that the *quaestiones* formulated by the teachers down through the ages were disputed, that the fundamental treatises of the Fathers were written and the expositions of the Scriptures were delivered. All of these works were responses to the plea of the one who was considered by the medieval theologians to be the founder of declarative theology, St. Augustine, when he asked his followers “to pursue the kind of knowledge by which our most wholesome faith, which leads to eternal beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened”. Augustine, and all the sacred teachers down through the ages, pursued this kind of knowledge, and they never claimed that they were demonstrating properly theological truths. Aureoli’s treatise is his effort to set the record straight.

INTUITION, ABSTRACTION AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF A SCIENCE OF GOD: DURANDUS OF ST.-POURÇAIN,
GERARD OF BOLOGNA AND WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

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INTRODUCTION

In order to come to a better assessment of the historical significance of Ockham's doctrine of the *duplex notitia incomplexa*, it may be useful to compare it with similar doctrines which have been developed by authors who have possibly or actually influenced Ockham. This paper presents a comparison between Ockham and two thinkers who have written slightly before him about the topic of intuitive and abstractive cognition: namely, Durandus of St.-Pourçain, in the first redaction of his *Commentary* on the first book of the *Sentences* (ca. 1306),¹ and Gerard of Bologna, in his *Summa* (ca. 1313–1317).² I will restrict my comparison to some key points.

I. FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITION OF DOUBLE COGNITION

First of all, we have to be aware of the following: although the topic at stake is an epistemological one, all the above mentioned authors treat it at first within the framework of a theological discussion. The distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition is the main conceptual

¹ My analyses will focus on the first question of the Prologue, using the transcription done by Stephen Brown. I would like to thank Stephen Brown for having provided me the materials I have used to write this paper.

² Cf. Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 1–2, in P. de Vooght, *Les sources de la doctrine chrétienne d'après les théologiens du XIV^e siècle et du début du XV^e avec le texte intégral des XII premières questions de la Summa inédite de Gérard de Bologne (1317)*, Bruges 1954, pp. 270–287. This edition contains some errors and must therefore be used cautiously. On Gerard of Bologna (c. 1240–1317), the first Carmelite who became Master in theology at the University of Paris (1295), see B.M. Xiberta, *De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931, pp. 74–110, and C. Schabel, "Early Carmelites between Giants. Questions on Future Contingents by Gerard of Bologna and Guy Terrena", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 70 (2003), pp. 139–205.

means by which these authors answer the question of the possibility of having evident knowledge—or true science—about the truths of sacred doctrine. Durandus and Gerard give a negative answer to this question, while Ockham gives a positive one, not without formulating important qualifications though. The negative answer given by Durandus is developed in three stages. First he sets out an opposing opinion with its arguments. He then continues on by providing three arguments which support his own position. Finally, he ends with solutions that are aimed at overcoming the arguments in favor of the opposite opinion.

Without specifying his opponents, Durandus thus summarizes their position. He declares that they define³ the *duplex cognitio* as follows: an intuitive cognition is a cognition of a present thing which is apprehended according to its actual and real existence; an abstractive cognition is a cognition of an absent thing or a non-existing thing which is apprehended according to its quiddity, leaving apart present, past or future being.⁴ Who is the author of this distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition which is reported by Durandus? We might think that Durandus is referring to the position of Henry of Ghent.⁵ Is there any such definition of a *duplex cognitio* in Henry's *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*? In the relevant articles of this work,⁶ I have found three instances of epistemological distinctions, but these do not fit the distinction presented by Durandus, despite some similarities. The first epistemological distinction drawn by Henry is between the cognition by which is known the *what it is* of a thing and the cognition by

³ Durandus writes: "Opinio in summa talis est: dicunt quod [...] secundum eos...".

⁴ Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol., q. 1, ed. S. Brown, forthcoming: "Opinio in summa talis est: dicunt quod de Deo et de rebus aliis potest haberi duplex cognitio, scilicet intuitiva et abstractiva. Intuitiva cognitio, secundum eos, est quae habetur de re praesente secundum suam actualement et realem existentiam, sicut vel aliquis videt colorem in pariete vel rosam sibi praesentem realiter. Abstractiva vero est per quam cognoscitur res solum quantum ad suam quidditatem quae abstrahit ab esse, fuisse et fore, sicut cognoscitur rosa absens vel quae omnino non est".

⁵ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, ed. Parisiis 1520, repr. St. Bonaventure, NY 1953.

⁶ Which are: the second question of the first article ("Utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire sine diuina illustratione"), the first question of the sixth article ("Utrum theologia sit scientia") and the first question of the twenty-second article ("Utrum Deum esse sit cognoscibile ab homine"). These questions are to be found respectively in ff. 3v–8v, ff. 42r–43r and ff. 129v–130r of the edition cited in the preceding note.

which is known the truth of a thing.⁷ So here Henry is talking about the difference between simple cognition, by which the intellect grasps the quiddity of a thing, and complex or composed cognition, by which the intellect makes a judgment about a thing. It can be worth noting that in this passage Henry uses the expression *duplex cognitio* which occurs in Durandus's *Commentary*. The second epistemological distinction drawn by Henry is between science in its broad sense, that is, every certain cognition of the truth, and science in its strict sense, that is, a certain cognition of the truth which arises from the evidence of things.⁸ The third distinction drawn by Henry is between two ways of knowing that a thing exists: the first way is by the thing itself, that is, from the evidence of its existence to a person who sees it directly; the second way is by deduction, by means of which the existence of a thing which is not seen directly is inferred from another thing which is seen directly.⁹ As we can see, none of these three epistemological distinctions fits the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition reported by Durandus. But there are some similarities. Indeed, the first alternative of the third distinction and the first alternative of the first distinction in Henry are respectively comparable to the definitions of

⁷ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*..., art. 1, q. 2, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 4vC: "Cognitione igitur intellectiva de re creata potest haberi duplex cognitio. Vna qua praecise sci<tur> siue cognoscitur simplici intelligentia id quod res est. Alia qua scitur et cognoscitur intelligentia componente et diuidente veritas ipsius rei".

⁸ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*..., art. 6, q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 42vB: "Dicendum igitur quod notitia aliqua appellata scientia dupliciter. Vno modo stricte, alio modo large. Large appellatur scientia quaelibet notitia certa veritatis. [...] Stricte vero appellatur scientia non quaecunque certa notitia, sed solummodo eorum quorum veritas intellectui ex rei euidencia apparet".

⁹ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa*..., art. 22, q. 1, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 130rL: "Dicendum quod dupliciter contingit scire rem aliquam esse. Vno modo per seipsam ex euidencia existentiae suae apud scientem, ad modum quo scit ignem esse ille qui videt ignem praesentem oculis. Hoc modo apud intellectum sciuntur prima principia scientiarum per se nota, quae sine medio se offerunt nostrae cognitioni. [...] Alio autem modo contingit scire rem aliquam esse non per se ex rei euidencia, sed per medium notius deducens via ratiocinatiua ad illud cognoscendum tanquam ignotius ex colligantia existentiae vnus ad existentiam alterius, quorum vnum ex rei euidencia videt per seipsum, alterum vero non visum per se ex rei euidencia, <sed> per illud visum per se tanquam per medium cognitione collatiua cognoscit, ad modum quo aliquis scit ignem esse in domo qui videt oculis suis fumum exeuntem de camino, quo modo etiam sciuntur conclusiones in demonstrationibus per sua principia". In his *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 14 ("Utrum articulus fidei possit demonstrari"), Henry sets out a distinction between seeing ("*videre*") and understanding ("*intelligere*") which amounts to the third distinction I just exposed. Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 14, ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 325rK.

the intuitive and the abstractive cognition quoted by Durandus.¹⁰ On the other hand, there is actually in Duns Scotus such a definition of intuitive cognition according to presence and existence.¹¹ Moreover, this definition leads to one of the major differences between Scotus and Ockham in epistemology. Indeed, against Scotus, Ockham claims that intuitive cognition considers as much non-existence as existence, since the intellect can judge, on the basis of this cognition, either that a thing exists, when it exists, or that a thing does not exist, when it does not exist. Therefore, according to Ockham, intuitive cognition can happen even though its object is not actually existing.¹² The reason why Ockham diverges on this point from Scotus and the supporters of the position reported by Durandus is that Ockham thinks that the intuition of a non-existing thing is not something contradictory, so God can produce it by means of His absolute power, whereas Ockham's opponents either consider that the present existence of the object known belongs to the very notion of intuitive cognition, or think according to the strict realm of what is naturally possible.

II. ABSTRACTIVE COGNITION AS THE BASIS FOR A SCIENCE OF GOD

Once we have in mind the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, the question can be addressed whether the wayfarer can have access to a cognition of God upon which a theological science would be built up. On this point, Durandus will argue against the supporters of the position he reports. According to them, the wayfarer can not have an intuitive cognition of God, since this cognition is beatific and a blessed "viator" is a contradiction in terms. However, to have an abstractive

¹⁰ As Stephen Brown has said to me, Henry might be the remote source of the distinction reported by Durandus, since Durandus later speaks of "sequaces eius", i.e. followers of the author of the position he summarizes.

¹¹ We should say, and this is enough for our present purpose, Scotus as he is exposed by Ockham.

¹² Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio)*, prol., q. 1, in *Opera theologica* I, ed. G. Gál – S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, NY 1967: "Et ita notitia intuitiva, secundum se et necessario, non plus est existentis quam non existentis, nec plus respicit existentiam quam non-existentiam, sed respicit tam existentiam quam non-existentiam rei" (p. 36); "Ideo dico quod notitia intuitiva et abstractiva se ipsis differunt et non penes obiecta nec penes causas suas quascumque, quamvis naturaliter notitia intuitiva non possit esse sine existentia rei, quae est vere causa efficiens notitiae intuitivae mediata vel immediata [...]. Ex istis sequitur quod notitia intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, potest esse de re non existente" (p. 38).

cognition which grasps perfectly the divine quiddity is compatible with the terrestrial human condition.¹³ Ockham is in the wake of this position when he asserts that the wayfarer can have a distinct abstractive cognition of the divine essence. Indeed, Ockham writes:

...concludo quod notitia deitatis distincta est communicabilis viatori, manenti viatori, quia sola intuitiva repugnat viatori. Igitur si abstractiva potest fieri sine intuitiva, sequitur quod abstractiva notitia distincta deitatis potest esse in viatore, manente viatore.¹⁴

The reason why Ockham concludes that a distinct abstractive cognition of the divine essence is possible for the wayfarer is that he assumes the following principle: whatever the object of cognition is, intuitive and abstractive cognition are separable from one another, since there is no essential connection between them. That amounts to saying that intuitive cognition is nothing more than an external cause towards abstractive cognition. And since God can do immediately by Himself everything He does ordinarily by means of external causes, Ockham concludes that God can produce an abstractive cognition in the human intellect, without the object of this cognition being previously grasped by an intuitive cognition.¹⁵ Therefore, according to the divine absolute power, it is possible for the wayfarer to know distinctly the divine nature by an abstraction which presupposes no intuition at all.

Against the point of view shared by Ockham and the followers of the author of the position reported by Durandus, the latter thinks that a perfect abstractive cognition of the divine essence can not be conveyed to the "viator". He provides three arguments to support his position. The first one sharply underlines the difference between Durandus and Ockham with regard to the topic here at stake. The argument goes as follows: every abstractive cognition necessarily presupposes an

¹³ Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol., q. 1, ed. Brown: "Primam cognitionem, scilicet intuitivam, non potest habere viator de Deo in via, quia talis cognitio est beatifica et contradictionem implicat quod purus viator sit beatus, quia iam non esset viator sed comprehensor. Sed secundam cognitionem, scilicet abstractivam, potest purus viator habere de Deo cognoscendo perfecte eius quidditatem et ea quae quidditati conveniunt, sicut esse trinum in suppositis et huiusmodi quae fide tenemus".

¹⁴ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, p. 49. See also *ibid.*, p. 72: "...dico quod notitia distincta deitatis sub propria ratione deitatis est possibilis intellectui viatoris. Ista tamen non est beatifica, nec omnis notitia obiecti infiniti et beatifici sub ratione beatifica est beatifica, sed tantum intuitiva, quae non est intellectui viatoris possibilis, sed tantum abstractiva".

¹⁵ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, pp. 48–49.

intuitive one from which it is deduced; yet, for the wayfarer, there is no prior cognition from which an abstractive cognition of God could be deduced: therefore, it is impossible for an abstractive cognition of God to be conveyed to the wayfarer.¹⁶ Here we come onto the core of the dispute: against the position which will be supported by Ockham, Durandus believes that intuitive and abstractive cognition are related to each other by a necessary connection. This opinion prevents Durandus from acknowledging the possibility for the wayfarer to have an abstractive cognition of the divine essence without having an intuitive one. Ockham raises the same opinion as a doubt towards his own doctrine: since the intuitive cognition of the divine essence is not conveyable to the wayfarer, the abstractive cognition will not be either, given that the second one presupposes and does not come without the first one.¹⁷ Ockham replies as follows:

...concedo quod omnis notitia abstractiva alicuius rei naturaliter acquisita praesupponit notitiam intuitivam eiusdem. Cuius ratio est quia nullus intellectus potest naturaliter adquirere notitiam alicuius rei nisi mediante illa re tamquam causa partiali efficiente. Sed omnis notitia ad quam necessario coexistitur existentia rei est intuitiva; igitur prima notitia rei est intuitiva. Tamen Deus potest causare notitiam abstractivam et deitatis et aliarum rerum sine notitia intuitiva praevia, et ita notitia abstractiva deitatis est communicabilis viatori.¹⁸

Unlike Durandus and many other philosophers of his time, Ockham conceives the world as a collection of absolute things, that is, a world in which each and every thing can subsist separately and can be defined exclusively by itself, independently of any other thing. In such a universe, relations between things are not something real which exists besides things themselves. Therefore, relations do not make any difference with regard to essential definitions of things. The foundation from which this conception stems is the principle of absolute divine power, according to which two absolute things which are related in the actual order could exist separately if God wanted it so. This is why, according

¹⁶ Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.* [A], prol., q. 1, ed. Brown: "...non videtur possibile quod talis cognitio de Deo possit communicari viatori. Quod probatur primo sic: impossibile est cognitionem abstractivam cuiuscumque rei esse primam, sed necessario sequitur aliam priorem ex qua deducitur. Sed in puro viatore non praecedit aliqua cognitio ex qua cognitio abstractiva de Deo possit deduci. Ergo impossibile est quod cognitio abstractiva de Deo communicetur viatori".

¹⁷ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, p. 57.

¹⁸ Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, p. 72.

to Ockham, an intuition without its existing object and an abstraction without any prior intuition are possible.

III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER OF FACT AND POSSIBILITY

In his own *Summa*, Gerard of Bologna copies literally the section of Durandus's *Commentary* where the latter reports the opinion which includes the distinction between *intuitiva* and *abstractiva cognitio* and the thesis according to which the wayfarer can have an abstractive quidditative cognition of God.¹⁹ Gerard sides with Durandus when he claims that this opinion does not seem possible to him. He says he has already shown it in two quodlibetal questions²⁰ and, given these questions, he puts forward three arguments against the above mentioned opinion, arguments which are taken, as he says, from other authors ("aliorum").²¹ The three arguments or reasons, "quas aliqui adducunt contra positionem predictam", as he writes,²² are actually the literal copy of Durandus's arguments.²³ Yet, Gerard goes further than just writing them down: since he considers that they are only "quite likely", he puts forward three reasons against them. The first one is interesting with regard to Ockham's thought. The major premise of Durandus's argument states that every abstractive cognition necessarily presupposes an intuitive one from which it is deduced. According to Gerard, this major premise is true as a matter of fact ("de facto"), but it does not follow that God could not produce the opposite, which is an abstractive cognition which would not presuppose an intuitive one.²⁴ Therefore, Gerard thinks that Durandus's argument is powerless to prove the impossibility of an abstractive cognition of the divine quiddity for the wayfarer.

¹⁹ Cf. Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. de Vooght, p. 279,4–15. Like Durandus, Gerard does not give the identity of the source of this opinion. He is content with writing the following: "Consequenter tractanda est secunda opinio que talis est. Dicunt aliqui quod [...]. Quod sic ostendunt [...] ut dicunt..." (*Ibid.*, pp. 278,40–279,9).

²⁰ I am currently working on a critical edition of all the quodlibetal questions by Gerard of Bologna which concern the theory of knowledge.

²¹ Cf. Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. de Vooght, p. 280,12–14.

²² Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. de Vooght, p. 281,15–16.

²³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 427–428.

²⁴ Cf. Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. de Vooght, p. 281,16–19: "Sed tamen ad primam posset solvi sic dicendo quod maior est vera de facto. Sed ex hoc non habetur quin Deus posset facere oppositum, videlicet quod cognitio abstractiva non praesupponeret intuitivam..."

The distinction which is drawn by Gerard between what actually happens and what could happen by means of the divine power opens a path of thought which will be deeply explored by Ockham when he makes a distinction between what God causes by His ordained power and what God could cause by His absolute power. Within the natural order, Ockham conceives the epistemological process as a causal sequence within which every abstractive cognition is the mediate or immediate effect of an intuitive cognition which, in turn, is caused by its actually existing object. However, when Ockham assumes the viewpoint of the absolute divine power, he acknowledges that each cognitive element of this causal chain could be immediately produced by God rather than by the secondary cause which usually produces it. Hence, the possibility of the intuition of a non-existing thing or the possibility of an abstractive cognition without any prior intuition.²⁵

To come back to Gerard, it is worth pointing out the following: if he considers that Durandus's arguments are not demonstrative, he agrees however with Durandus about the thesis which is to be established, that is, the impossibility of having an abstractive cognition of the divine essence for the wayfarer. Therefore, Gerard opposes the trend of thought which will be followed by Ockham in the wake of the position reported by Durandus and he sides with the latter, but with different arguments. Gerard presents one of these arguments that he claims to be hard to refute. The argument goes as follows: nothing can be known without knowing what belongs to its definition ("ratio"); yet, the actual existence of God belongs to the definition of the divine quiddity: therefore, the divine quiddity can not be known by abstraction without its actual existence being known by intuition.²⁶ If the abstractive cognition of the divine essence includes necessarily the intuitive cognition of God in His actual existence, as Gerard claims, then such a cognition is not convey-

²⁵ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, pp. 38–39 (*Ideo dico* and *Ex istis sequitur*), pp. 48–49 (*Circa tertium*), p. 61 (*Ad primam probationem*), p. 72 (*Ad ultimum*); *Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum* (*Reportatio*), q. 12–13, in *Opera theologica* V, ed. G. Gál – R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, NY 1981, pp. 258–261 (*Sic igitur patet*), p. 263 (*Ponendo*), pp. 276–277 (*His visis dico ad primam quaestionem*); *Quodlibet* I, q. 13, in *Opera theologica* IX, ed. J.C. Wey, St. Bonaventure, NY 1980, p. 73 (*Secundo dico quod*), p. 76 (*Ad primum*); *Quodlibet* VI, q. 6, ed. Wey, pp. 604–607.

²⁶ Cf. Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, art. 2, ed. de Vooght, p. 282,20–23: "...nichil potest cognosci quin cognoscatur id quod est de ratione eius. Sed de ratione quidditatis Dei est actualis existentia eius. Ergo non potest cognosci quidditas Dei abstractive quin cognoscatur actualis existentia intuitive".

able to the wayfarer, since the intuition of the divine being is impossible for the “viator”, as it is granted by all our authors. The argument of Gerard is based on two theses: the identity of essence and existence in God, and the impossibility of grasping actual existence other than by means of an intuitive cognition. As far as I know, Ockham does not discuss this argument made by Gerard. However, he could have objected that actual existence, besides being intuitively grasped by our intellect, can also be intellectually known by us in an abstractive way of knowing,²⁷ insofar as our intellect has the simple concept of actual being, which uniformly signifies each and every thing that actually exists, including God. In this case, granted that the thesis of the identity of divine essence and existence is true, we can think, following Ockham, that it is possible for the wayfarer to have an abstract concept of the divine essence which includes the notion of actual being, without any intuitive cognition being involved in this concept, contrary to what Gerard claims in the conclusion of his argument.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have restricted myself to a short doctrinal study. What remains to be done is a survey about the historical channels by which the doctrines of Durandus and Gerard could have been conveyed to Ockham. Thus the following question: Did Ockham know directly or indirectly the works of his two predecessors? Furthermore, I have limited my study to a comparison of the doctrinal points which seemed to me especially relevant in order to point up the very principles of Ockham’s thought with regard to the topic I have decided to discuss. There are other doctrinal similarities and differences between our three authors which are not less interesting, even if they are less fundamental. Another study could be devoted to these doctrinal issues.

²⁷ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Ordinatio*, prol., q. 1, ed. Gál – Brown, p. 37.

ON THE TRAIL OF A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE:
DURANDUS OF ST.-POURÇAIN VS. THOMAS WYLTON ON
SIMULTANEOUS ACTS IN THE INTELLECT

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In 1962, Prospero T. Stella published editions of a series of three questions collectively entitled “Quaestiones de libero arbitrio” and composed by Durandus of St.-Pourçain probably while he was regent master in theology at Paris holding the French Dominican chair in 1312 or 1313.¹ Of the three questions in the treatise only one will concern us here: the third, in English translation “whether there can be at once in the same free power several acts of understanding or of willing, of which one is the effective source of the other”.² Durandus’s short answer to this question is: no, there can in fact be one and only one intellectual or voluntary act at a time. Not everyone agreed with Durandus’s point of view on this issue, and one of the great services that Stella provided in his 1962 article was to edit a direct response to Durandus’s question composed by the English secular theologian Thomas Wylton. With the exception of Stephen D. Dumont’s article from 1998 “New Questions

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NB: I do not necessarily respect the orthography of any text I use. Throughout the article (including appendix) I use the following conventions: <x> = I add x; [x] = I delete x; \x/ = x in mg.; * = lectio incerta; CCSL = Corpus Christianorum, series latina.

¹ P.T. Stella, “Le ‘Quaestiones de libero arbitrio’ di Durando da S. Porciano”, *Salsianum* 24 (1962), pp. 450–524. Durandus’s text is on pp. 471–499.

² “Tertio quaeritur utrum in eadem potentia libera possint simul esse plures actus intelligendi vel volendi, quorum unus sit principium effectivum alterius”. The other two questions in the treatise are: “Quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia, habitus, vel actus” (vs. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* I, q. 1); “Quaeritur utrum potentia pure passiva possit esse libera libertate arbitrii”.

by Thomas Wylton”,³ the debate between Durandus and Wylton and its aftermath has, to my knowledge, remained unstudied in the forty years since it was uncovered by Stella. In the first part of this paper I’ll briefly present main arguments of these two scholars on this issue. In the second, longer part of the paper I want to sketch some contexts in which this debate between Durandus and Wylton surfaces, focusing most on the issue of our enjoyment (*fruitio*) of God, in which there was considerable and varied reaction to Durandus’s view in particular. Thus, this article is an exercise in map-making: I’m following the trail of this philosophical debate, connecting some as yet unconnected dots, although by no means in an exhaustive fashion. With that caveat, we can turn first briefly to Durandus, then to Thomas Wylton.

Durandus’s argumentation for the view that there cannot be more than one act in the intellect at any one time is complex and lengthy. I cannot do it justice in the space available. But I won’t be doing it an injustice to say that the major principle behind Durandus’s view is that each and every intellectual act is totally impossible with each and every other intellectual act, and so two cannot be in the same intellect at the same time.⁴ Just as it is plainly absurd to say that two contrary accidents, hot and cold, white and black, can be in precisely the same subject at precisely the same time in precisely the same way, so it is with intellectual acts. In some cases, according to Durandus, this is easy to see: we cannot think contradictories, *x* and $\sim x$, at the same time;⁵ Durandus merely generalizes the principle: every intellectual act

³ *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 9 (1998), pp. 341–379. In addition, see my forthcoming article “Mental Propositions before Mental Language”, in *Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l’âge classique*, ed. J. Biard et al., Leuven, forthcoming.

⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ed. Stella, p. 491,37–41: “Sub quocumque genere est invenire differentias et impossibiles species; species sub eodem genere disparatae sunt impossibiles, quia inter omnes est aliqua contrarietas, licet adeo non perfecta, ut patet de albo et nigro et coloribus mediis. Sed inter intellectiones est dare contrarias et impossibiles. Ergo pari ratione omnes aliae intellectiones sunt impossibiles”. For literature on Durandus, see below, note 17.

⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ed. Stella, p. 495,4–8: “...qui ponit quod plures species possunt simul esse, potest hoc dicere aequaliter de omnibus speciebus. Sed nullus potest hoc dicere de actibus intelligendi, quia actus plures, quibus opinamur contradictoria, non possunt simul esse; et pari ratione idem videtur de omnibus aliis actibus”. Durandus makes a connection between this view and his view of (sensible) species more generally: “Patet ergo quod plures species non possunt simul esse in eadem parte medii” (ed. Stella, p. 494,48).

is impossible with every other one, and hence no two can be in the same intellect at the same time. As Durandus says: “acts of intellection are the types of forms that in-and-of themselves are incompatible”.⁶ And this is the point of a statement Durandus makes by appealing to Algazali: just as Algazali says that the same body cannot take on diverse shapes at the same time, neither, according to Durandus, can the same intellect be informed by diverse intellections at once.⁷ Now, Durandus is by no means alone in his view: even stalwart foes of his like the Dominicans Hervaeus Natalis and John of Naples will subscribe to the view that the unaided human intellect cannot have more than one act at once. Moreover, they will use precisely this principle about the impossibility of contrary accidents as their main justification.⁸ Thus, it seems to be the case that this view—that the intellect (and the will) can have one and only one act at any given moment—was truly the *common* view, as it was called by one of its staunchest defenders, John Baconthorpe,⁹ and one of—if not *the*—earliest critics of the view: Thomas Wylton.¹⁰

⁶ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ed. Stella, p. 495,30–31: “...actus intelligendi sint quaedam formae secundum se habentes repugnantiam...”.

⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ed. Stella, p. 492,46–47: “Tertio, patet idem ex dicto Algazalis in Metaphysica sua, qui dicit quod corpus non potest simul figurari diversis figuris, sic nec intellectus diversis intellectionibus”. As far as I can tell this argument is brought up by other scholastics exclusively in connection with descriptions of Durandus’s position, so it appears to have been closely associated with Durandus’s view (see e.g. Peter Auriol, below, note 26; Francis of Marchia, below, note 51; cf., however, Thomas Aquinas, below, note 22).

⁸ Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 16, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 143vb: “...intelligere plura ut plura dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ex parte intellectus, ita quod ipsa pluralitas ponatur ex parte intellectus, et sic intelligere plura ut plura est intelligere pluribus actibus intelligendi vel pluribus mediis, et hoc est impossibile fieri naturaliter propter hoc quod omnes (omnis *ed.*) actus intelligendi qui habent esse in intellectu creato naturaliter sunt eiusdem generis, nec se possunt simul compati circa eundem intellectum...”. For John of Naples’s view, see the text below, note 24. On these Quodlibets and their authors, see R.L. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330”, in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden 2007, pp. 401–491.

⁹ Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 2, § 4, ed. Cremonae 1618, p. 50bC: “Si [...] intenderent dicere quod essent simul tamquam duo actus simul elicti in uno intellectu, hoc est dicere contra communem opinionem quae dicit quod intellectus non potest intelligere plura ut plura simul...”.

¹⁰ Dumont (“New Questions...”, p. 369) gives the following quotation from a question probably from the prologue of Wylton’s *Sent.* Commentary and found in Tortosa, Archivo Capitular ms. 88, ff. 62vb–74va (see on this question also below, note 16):

Wylton takes a very different approach to the problem: he starts from the reasoning intellect and works backwards; that is to say, Wylton argues that we can only explain the fact that the intellect works in the way it actually does if we grant that it can have many acts at once.¹¹ Thus, Wylton concentrates on propositions and their relation to terms and on conclusions and their relation to premisses, i.e. on scientific knowledge and its construction. Wylton asks what the relationship is among the various intellectual acts taking place. Two examples of the type of argumentation Wylton employs will suffice. The first example goes as follows: the difference between demonstrative syllogisms and other types of syllogisms is that not only do the premisses in a demonstrative syllogism necessarily entail the conclusion, but also the premisses themselves are both necessary. The only way, then, that you could *know* that you had demonstrative knowledge, according to Wylton, was if you had actual knowledge not only of the premisses in relation to the conclusion—one intellectual act—but also at the same time actual knowledge that the two premisses were in themselves necessary—two further intellectual acts.¹² You have to know, then, something actively

“Unde nego illud communiter acceptum pro principio, quod intellectus non potest simul intelligere distincta sub propriis rationibus”.

¹¹ W. Senko has published a considerable number of texts by Wylton dealing with the intellect and intellectual cognition. See W. Senko, “Tomasza Wiltona, Quaestio disputata de anima intellectiva”, *Studia Mediewistyczne* 5 (1964), pp. 3–190 (Latin text: pp. 77–190); also, id., “La quaestio disputata de Anima intellectiva de Thomas Wilton dans le MS 53/102 de la Bibliothèque du grand séminaire de Pelplin”, in *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter*, ed. P. Wilpert, Berlin 1963 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2), pp. 464–471. Some of the more interesting aspects of Wylton’s theory of the intellect have been dealt with in Z. Kuksewicz, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l’intellect chez les averroïstes latins des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, Wrocław 1968, pp. 176–201; and J.-B. Brenet, *Transferts du sujet. La noétique de Averroès selon Jean de Jandun*, Paris 2003, *passim*.

As Dumont (“New Questions...”, pp. 367–368, notes 60–61) notes, Senko’s edition of Wylton’s question on the possibility of simultaneous acts in the intellect (ed. Senko, in “Tomasza Wiltona...”, pp. 121–131) is based on only one of the two extant manuscripts containing the question, whereas Stella’s earlier edition (ed. Stella, in “Le ‘Quaestiones...’”, pp. 506–517) is based on both witnesses; hence Stella’s edition is to be preferred.

¹² Thomas Wylton, *Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul*, ed. Stella, p. 507,36–44: “In hoc convenit syllogismus dialecticus cum demonstratione, et etiam omnis syllogismus non peccans in forma: quod necessaria est habitudo principiorum ad conclusionem. Sed hoc addit demonstratio super syllogismum in communi: quod requirit principia non solum necessaria in inferendo conclusionem, sed cum hoc quod in se sint necessaria. Et si aliquis sciat actualiter aliquam conclusionem necessario, contra praedictum Doctorem, simul sciet se scire illam. Necesse est ergo quod pro tempore pro quo scit actualiter illam conclusionem, non solum cognoscat principia

about the premisses themselves, not just about their relation to the conclusion. The upshot is clear: since we know that we have some demonstrative knowledge, we must be able to have more than one intellectual act at a time.

The second example: the intellect when composing or dividing a proposition, according to Wylton, must actively understand at once both predicate and subject under their own proper concepts or else it wouldn't know whether the proposition it was forming was true or false.¹³ Thus, composing man and animal, the intellect would only know that the proposition 'man is an animal' was true when it understood both man and animal simultaneously, and hence had at least two acts in the intellect at once. In fact, Wylton claims that in a proposition the intellect has a comparative act, which "comprehends in itself the two simple [acts], through which the intellect understands each of the extremes, and it compares the extremes to each other under their proper concept (*sub propria ratione*)".¹⁴ Thus, parallel to Wylton's argumentation in the first example, here you have to know something actively about each term and not just their relation to each other, and this requires having more than one intellectual act at once.

Basically, then, the thrust of Wylton's arguments against Durandus is that if it were impossible for us to have more than one act in the intellect at a time, then we could never have scientific knowledge, because we could build up neither propositions out of terms nor arguments out of propositions. Further, in reply to the basic principle underlying Durandus's view—that intellectual acts are just the sort of things that are impossible in a single intellect at one time—Wylton denies it to be true. According to him, we can indeed understand even

sub habitudine ad conclusionem, sed quod cognoscat principia in se esse vera; aliter pro tunc non sciret se scire illam conclusionem".

¹³ Thomas Wylton, *Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul*, ed. Stella, p. 508,18–24: "...dividens et componens aliqua ad invicem (invicem = in invicem *ed.*) extrema sub propriis rationibus, sicut ea componit, sic ea cognoscit. Quod probatur statim, quia aliter nesciret si vere componeret vel false. Sed componens hominem cum animali, componit extremum cum extremo sub propriis rationibus extremorum; et eodem modo dividens hominem ab asino, dividit hominem sub propria ratione ab asino sub propria ratione. Ergo pro illo instanti cognoscit utrumque sub propria ratione. Et si hoc, hoc erit per diversas intellectiones..."

¹⁴ Thomas Wylton, *Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul*, ed. Stella, p. 511,24–26: "Iste autem actus comparativus comprehendit in se duos simplices, per quos intellectus cognoscit utrumque istorum extremorum, quae ad invicem comparat sub propria ratione eorum".

contradictories at the same time and by two distinct intellectual acts; we just can't *assent* to the truth of them both at once,¹⁵ since that would clearly involve a contradiction.

In the rest of this paper I want to look at some aspects of the way that this philosophical debate played out in the early fourteenth century. Specifically, I'm going to discuss briefly two areas in which Durandus's ideas regularly crop up, and Thomas Wylton's occasionally: first, theology as a scientific discipline, and then angelic communication. Then I'll look in more depth at a further area in which this debate played a major role: our supernatural enjoyment (*fruitio*) of God.

That this debate has ramifications for the question of the scientific status of theology seems obvious. As mentioned before, Wylton basically claims that Durandus's theory rules out the possibility of a science in the Aristotelian sense, and if this were the case theology could not be in any sense a scientific discipline. Indeed, it was in part with the help of Wylton's reply to Durandus that in his article "New Questions by Thomas Wylton" Dumont was able to elegantly assign to Wylton a question entitled "An in lumine naturali ex rebus sensibilibus possimus scientifice aliqua investigare de Deo"; here Wylton gives the same argumentation against the view that the intellect cannot have two acts at once as he did in his treatise against Durandus's question. Moreover Dumont was able to show that the question most likely came from the prologue to Wylton's *Sentences* commentary, the place where the scientific nature of theology was traditionally discussed.¹⁶ Durandus too pulled this issue into the prologue of his *Sentences* commentary while discussing the scientific nature of theology, and it is interesting in this regard that Durandus doesn't discuss this topic directly in the prologue to the *first* version of his *Sentences* commentary (made public

¹⁵ Thomas Wylton, *Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul*, ed. Stella, p. 513,4–8: "Modo, licet intellectus possit simul intelligere utrumque contrariorum vel contradictoriorum (contradictorium *ed.*), scilicet cognoscendo quid fingitur per utrumque praeter contradictionem, et per unum actum, secundum istum doctorem, et per duos secundum me, tamen impossibile est quod intellectus unus simul assentiat veritati utriusque contradictoriorum".

¹⁶ Dumont, "New Questions...", pp. 366–367, 380. As Dumont notes there, the question "An in lumine naturali ex rebus sensibilibus possimus scientifice aliqua investigare de Deo" is found in ms. New Haven, Yale University Library, Beinecke General 170, ff. 14rb–18ra (incomplete); and in ms. Tortosa, Archivo Capitular 88, ff. 62vb–74va (complete).

around 1307 or 1308—i.e. before his debate with Wylton),¹⁷ but in the prologue to the third version of his *Sentences* commentary (made public after 1317) he not only mentions it and offers a few arguments, but he even says explicitly that “several acts of understanding cannot exist at once in the same intellect according to the course of nature (*secundum cursum naturae*), as has been proven elsewhere”—a clear reference to the third question of his *De libero arbitrio*.¹⁸ So, Wylton’s response to Durandus definitely appears to have made Durandus aware that his view had consequences for his ideas about theology as a scientific discipline as well as that it was something that needed to be defended. Durandus’s prologue is one part of his *Sentences* commentary that undergoes fairly radical changes from the first version to the third version, and a detailed analysis of those changes, also with the debate between Durandus and Wylton in mind, would be a real contribution.

A second area in which our debate surfaces is in discussions of angelic communication. Once again, Dumont in the article mentioned above lays a foundation for trailing our philosophical debate concerning simultaneous acts in the intellect. Dumont draws attention to the fact

¹⁷ At several points, however, Durandus does make statements like: “Et ideo quaerere utrum theologia sic accepta sit scientia est quaerere utrum de eodem simul possit haberi fides et scientia”, so the question here is whether faith and scientific knowledge are compatible simultaneously, but it does not directly concern whether the intellect can entertain two acts simultaneously. Cf. note 18 below. (Many thanks to Stephen Brown for making available to me his edition of Durandus’s prologue to the first version of his *Sentences* commentary). On Durandus and the three versions of his *Sentences* commentary, see especially J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster 1927 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, XXVI), which is updated on the basis of more recent research in the two introductions in C. Schabel – R.L. Friedman – I. Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents”, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), pp. 183–300, and the literature referred to there.

¹⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, nn. 23–25, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 3rb–va: “Accipiendo autem sic scientiam et opinionem, possunt vere scientia et opinio simul esse in eodem homine de eadem conclusione secundum actum, vel saltem secundum habitum. Circa hoc videndum est primo de actibus, qui sunt nobis notiores, et postea de habitibus. De actibus autem dicendum est quod si ponantur esse diversi secundum rem, [simul esse] non possunt simul esse, quia plures actus intelligendi non possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu secundum cursum naturae, ut alibi probatum fuit. Scire autem est quidam actus intelligendi, et opinari similiter. Ergo quando scire et opinari sunt plures et distincti actus, tunc non possunt esse simul in eodem intellectu, neque de eadem conclusione neque de diversis, et hoc modo non contingit unum et eundem hominem simul scire et opinari neque idem neque diversa” (emphasis mine). Durandus is dealing here with the issue of “utrum fides et scientia possint simul esse in eodem homine[m] de eadem conclusione” (ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 3ra, n. 19).

that in his *II Sentences*, dist. 10, the English Carmelite John Baconthorpe rehearses much of the debate between Durandus and Thomas Wylton, and even gives lengthy verbatim quotations from Wylton's response to Durandus.¹⁹ Baconthorpe basically takes Durandus's side in the debate saying: "our intellect cannot have many intellections at once by cognizing many things as many things",²⁰ and giving rebuttals of quite a few of Wylton's more formidable arguments. Baconthorpe claims, for instance, that in the formation of a proposition, the act by which the proposition is formed contains virtually the acts of the terms—the terms are not actually known. In a like manner with syllogistic knowledge: the premisses are known virtually when the conclusion is actually known. Thus, for Baconthorpe, the fact that the terms are virtually contained in the act of forming a proposition safeguards our ability to compose and divide correctly, and the fact that the premisses are virtually contained in the act of knowing the conclusion safeguards syllogistic knowledge. For Baconthorpe, Wylton was simply mistaken to insist that preserving scientific knowledge required the intellect to have more than one act at a time—indeed, there can only be one act at a time.²¹

If Baconthorpe defended Durandus against Wylton in the context of angelic communication, Durandus certainly also had his detractors. Durandus—typically for him taking his principles to their ultimate

¹⁹ Cf. Dumont, "New Questions...", p. 368, note 62; Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In II Sent.*, dist. 10, q. un. ("utrum homo vel angelus possit simul intelligere plura ut plura"), art. 1, ed. Cremonae 1618, pp. 527b–533b; Baconthorpe replies to Wylton in art. 2 (*ed. cit.*, pp. 533b–535a).

²⁰ Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In II Sent.*, dist. 10, q. un., art. 2, § 1, ed. Cremonae 1618, p. 533bC: "Quod intellectus noster non potest habere simul plures intellectiones cognoscendo plura ut plura. Ubi circa hoc teneo quod possibile est habere actualem cognitionem conclusionis sine actuali cognitione principiorum, et hoc actu distincto et simul".

²¹ Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In II Sent.*, dist. 10, q. un., art. 2, §§ 2–3, ed. Cremonae 1618, pp. 534aE–535aA: "Si iterum accipiatur cognitio principiorum in habitudine ad conclusiones in illo actu, qui est scire, tunc dico quod isti non sunt duo actus specificè distincti seu numero sed sunt unus actus virtualiter continens principia et conclusiones, sicut definitio virtualiter continet genus et differentiam, quia est de utraque in habitudine ad invicem..."

...quando quaeritur an actus intellectus componentis et dividendis sit unus unitate simplicis intelligentiae aut compositionis [...] actus componendi et dividendi possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo ut sibi invicem succedunt in ordine discursus intellectivi et sic non sunt simul nec proprie componunt nec sunt unus actus; alio modo ut ambo continentur virtualiter in cognitione scientifica, quae est cognitio conclusionis, sicut cognitio confusa virtualiter continetur in definitiva. Et sic componunt ad invicem, et sunt simul, quia sunt idem actus numero sed solum diversi secundum gradus in eodem actu..."

conclusion—reasoned that, if the human intellect cannot have two distinct acts at once, then neither can the angelic intellect. This, however, appeared to many to go against Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas held that for angels to communicate, the speaking angel had to will to form out of its own private concepts, i.e. concepts hidden from all other angels, a concept that was communicable to other angels.²² Claude Panaccio has dubbed this the Thomistic “duality thesis”: pure thought must always be formed into significative language, even if in the case of angels this significative language is also pure thought.²³ Now, Durandus correctly sees this duality thesis as requiring the angelic intellect to entertain two concepts simultaneously: the one concept private, the second communicative, and in the third version of his *Sentences* commentary he argues against Hervaeus Natalis’s Thomistic view precisely on this basis. Again, Durandus was just being, as he often is, very consistent with his basic principles: intellects for Durandus simply can’t have two acts at once. But by applying this basic principle to angels, and denying the Thomistic view on the matter of angelic communication, Durandus opened himself up to criticism from his Dominican confrères:

²² E.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 107, art. 5 (“Utrum locutionem unius angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant”): “...conceptus mentis unius angeli percipi potest ab altero per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa ordinari aliquid ad unum et non ad alterum, et ideo potest conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci et non ab aliis. Et sic locutionem unius angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque aliis, non quidem impediende distantia locali, sed hoc faciente voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est”. Cf. also *Summa theol.*, I, q. 107, art. 1; similar statements in *De veritate*, q. 9, art. 4; less developed in *In II Sent.*, dist. 11, q. 2, art. 3. It should be noted that Aquinas, at e.g. *Summa theol.*, I, q. 85, art. 4 (“Utrum possimus multa simul intelligere”), argues that the human intellect cannot understand at once many things as many things (e.g. through different acts), and even uses a form of the argument that Durandus says he takes from Algazali (see above, note 7). For literature on Aquinas on these issues, see note 23 below.

²³ See C. Panaccio, “Angel’s Talk, Mental Language, and the Transparency of the Mind”, in *Vestigia, Images, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century)*, ed. C. Marmo, Turnhout 1997, pp. 323–335, esp. pp. 324–327; id., *Le Discours Intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham*, Paris 1999, pp. 219–225. For Durandus’s discussion, see the third version of his *Sentences* commentary at *In II Sent.*, dist. 11, q. 2 (“Utrum angeli proficiant in cognitione per mutuam locutionem”), ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 151ra–vb. For more on angelic communication and language, see T. Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, Paris 2002; on Aquinas on angelic communication, particularly pp. 185–207. In a recent article dealing with the same complex of problems, Harm Goris has called into question Panaccio’s Thomistic duality thesis at least in the Angelic Doctor’s later works; see “The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech. The Development of Thomas Aquinas’s Thought on How Angels Communicate”, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11 (2003), pp. 87–105, esp. pp. 103–104, note 54.

for instance, in his III *Quodl.*, q. 15, probably dating from 1318 or later, the Italian Thomist John of Naples, discussing the question whether a created intellect could understand many things at once, agreed with Durandus that the human intellect could not have two acts at once, but tried to show that under certain circumstances angelic intellects could because of the “greater effectiveness with which they understand”.²⁴ Not only Dominicans were critical of this aspect of Durandus’s theory: John Baconthorpe, otherwise Durandus’s defender, holds that angels can have more than one intellectual act at a time,²⁵ and the French Franciscan Peter Auriol also responds in this context to arguments given by Durandus. Auriol maintains that, if the human intellect were not joined to a body, it would, like an angel’s intellect, be able to understand many things at once. For Auriol, the reason the human intellect cannot have more than one intellectual act at a time is because our intellects must always make use of a material phantasm—and precisely because of the phantasm’s materiality this can only take place one act at a time.²⁶ So,

²⁴ Ioannes de Neapoli, *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 (“Utrum intellectus creatus possit simul multa intelligere”), ms. Napoli, Bibl. Naz. VII.B.28, ff. 68vb–69ra: “Quia angelus est magnae efficaciae ad intelligendum sic quod intelligendo aliquam rem, intelligit eius accidentia et alia ad quae habet habitudinem secundum quod huiusmodi, idcirco intelligendo se intelligit caelum et motum eius ad quem est determinatus per suam naturam (secundum philosophos) vel ex divina ordinatione (secundum theologos) [...]. Et est simile per omnia de anima humana nisi quod non potest simul se et alia intelligere sicut angelus, nec intelligendo se simul intelliget perfecte et distincte alia ad quae habet habitudinem”. I intend to publish several unedited questions of John of Naples bearing on these subjects in a separate study.

²⁵ Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In II Sent.*, dist. 10, q. 1, art. 3, ed. Cremonae 1618, p. 535bE: “Sed sine assertionem dico quod angelus potest intelligere plura ut plura simul cognoscendo utrumque distincte et proprie cognitione qua cognoscuntur res in proprio genere”.

²⁶ Petrus Aureoli, *In II Sent.*, dist. 11, q. 3, art. 3 (“Utrum Angeli possint simul intelligere actu omnia quarum habent species”), ed. Romae 1605, p. 139aC and bD–E: “Aliqui enim arguunt ex similitudine, quia sicut impossibile est idem corpus diversis figuris figurari, sic videtur quod impossibile est quod idem intellectus sit sub diversis perfectis assimilationibus respectu diversorum obiectorum, quae sunt diversae intellectiones. Sed haec ratio non probat, quia impossibile est esse plures species simul in intellectu, cum species sit similitudo obiecti [...] intellectus noster non potest plura simul intelligere, non ex natura intellectus in se, sed ex ratione qua coniunctus est in corpore, et ligatur cum potentia corporali, videlicet cum phantasmate, nihil enim intelligimus quod actu non phantasiemur, repugnat autem phantasmati phantasmari simul plura, [tum] quia utitur corporeo organo ac spiritibus quos contingit debilitari cum fuerint circa plura; talis autem potentia fatigabilis est, et corrumpi potest non solum ab excellenti sensibili sed a multiplicata operatione. Alia autem locum non habent in angelo. Ergo”. That Auriol is here replying to Durandus seems assured by the reference to Durandus’s use of Algazali; cf. above, note 7.

the issue of angelic communication was one on which Durandus had a mixed reception.

Thus, in the early fourteenth century in discussions of theology as a science and of angelic communication, Durandus's view, and to a lesser extent Wylton's, played a significant role. I want to devote the remainder of this paper to examining another area in which the issues between Durandus and Wylton played an important role: our enjoyment, our *fruitio*, of God.

This topic requires a little bit of explanation. In his *I Sentences*, dist. 1, Durandus raises the following question: "It is asked whether the object of enjoyment is God alone or whether it could be something else".²⁷ Durandus argues here for quite a controversial view: that the immediate object of enjoyment is *not* God but rather an act through which God is attained or reached (*attingitur*) by us; God is the sole *remote* object of our enjoyment.²⁸ Now, this sounds like a pretty strange position, but Durandus gives an example that helps explain what he means: the pleasure that I take in wine is not founded in the wine itself, the pleasure that I take in wine is founded in the use of the wine, in the act of tasting it. In fact, there is some sense to this: unless I collect wines with no thought to drinking them, then at the very least most of the enjoyment that I receive from the wines that I do enjoy comes through drinking and tasting them, and Durandus argues that the act of tasting the wine is in fact a more immediate object of enjoyment than is the wine itself. According to Durandus, our enjoyment of God mirrors this quite exactly: enjoyment is pleasure about God and thus the immediate object of enjoyment is not God but the act by which I attain God.²⁹ God is the remote object of my enjoyment of God. The big

²⁷ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2 ("Quaeritur de obiecto fruitionis, utrum illud sit solum Deus vel possit esse aliquid aliud"), ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 14ra–15va (in the first version of his *Sentences* commentary, this is in *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1: "Circa primam distinctionem quaeritur primo quo sit fruendum", in e.g. Melk, Stiftsbibliothek 611 (130), ff. 20vb–23va).

²⁸ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 4, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14ra: "Responsio: dicenda sunt duo: primum est quod immediatum obiectum fruitionis non est Deus, sed aliquis actus quo Deus a nobis attingitur. Secundum est quod obiectum fruitionis remotum est solum Deus".

²⁹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 7, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: "Immediatum obiectum amoris concupiscentiae non est res subiecto distincta concupiscente. Sed fruitio, cum sit delectatio de Deo et in Deo habito, est quidam amor concupiscentiae. Ergo immediatum obiectum fruitionis vel delectationis non est Deus, cum sit res a nobis subiecto distincta, sed aliquis actus, quo a nobis attingitur vel habetur. Utraque praemissarum patet. Et primo maior inductione et syllogismo. Inductione

idea behind this view—which Durandus makes explicit—is that when I enjoy something distinct from me, I need to internalize it through some cognitive act in order to enjoy it in the first place. We can only enjoy an object really distinct from us (as Durandus puts it: *res subiecto distincta*) by reason of the act by which it is conjoined to us—and it is this act which is the immediate object of our enjoyment.³⁰ Because God is distinct from us, he can't be the immediate object of our enjoyment but only through the act by which we attain him. Thus, our act of attaining God is the immediate object of our enjoyment or *fruitio*; God is the remote object.

Now, this is a major position of Durandus's, one that he repeats in both the third book and in the fourth book of the *Sentences*.³¹ And it was provocative. Many contemporary theologians attack Durandus on what we could characterize as theological grounds—arguing basically that we enjoy *God*, we don't enjoy our attainment of or our conjunction with God.³² Another groups of authors, however, attack

patet: diligo vinum dilectione concupiscentiae. Numquid immediatum obiectum istius dilectionis est vinum? Certe non—sed usus vini, qui est actus gustativus vel gustandi. Non enim diligo vinum immediate, sed gustare vinum, et idem est in omnibus aliis”.

³⁰ E.g. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 8, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 14rb: “Illud amatur amore concupiscentiae, quod est bonum vel perfectio, quam nobis volumus vel amicis. Sed res subiecto distincta numquam est bonum nostrum nisi ratione actus quo nobis coniungitur, sicut nutrimentum, puta panis aut vinum, numquam esset nobis bonum nisi ratione actus quo nobis coniungitur, cum comedimus aut bibimus, et ipsa coniunctio est bonum nostrum immediatum. Ergo res subiecto distincta a concupiscente non est immediatum obiectum amoris concupiscentiae”.

³¹ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In III Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 2 (“Utrum spes sit virtus theologica”), ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 260ra–va; *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 5 (“Utrum Deus posset esse immediatum obiectum dilectionis”), ed. Venetiis 1571, ff. 418ra–vb.

³² I can mention as a non-exhaustive list of representatives of this group of theologians the following: Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 1, q. 2, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1952, pp. 389–391; Landulphus Caracciolo, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1: “... opinio dicens quod visio beatifica est obiectum fruitionis male dicit, quia illud quod vult voluntas propter aliud non est obiectum fruitionis; sed si voluntas vellet visionem, hoc esset solum propter ostensionem* obiecti beatifici; ergo non erit obiectum fruitionis, non enim voluntas* delectatur in visione, sed in ipso viso, nec visio habet quod sit beatifica nisi propter rem visam ultimate et terminative” (ms. Wien, ÖNB lat. 1496, f. 16va with marginal notation: “contra Durandum et Thomam”); Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio)*, dist. 1, q. 4, in *Opera theologica I*, ed. G. Gál – S. Brown, St. Bonaventure, NY 1967, pp. 439–445; Adamus Wodehamensis, *Lectura secunda in I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 6, § 7, ed. R. Wood – G. Gál, St. Bonaventure, NY 1990, pp. 308–312 (Durandus's arguments are presented in Peter Auriol's words); Thomas de Argentina (Thomas of Strasbourg), *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1564, repr. Ridgewood, NJ 1965, f. 19va–b. In a recent article, Severin Kitanov has examined a range of issues touching on fruition, and reactions to Durandus's view crops up on several occasions: “Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure

Durandus's position on grounds that relate to his idea that we cannot have two acts in the intellect at once, and what they objected to specifically is that Durandus's view requires that enjoyment is a *reflexive act*. Durandus, when describing his position on supernatural enjoyment, raises an objection against it: if enjoyment doesn't have God as its immediate object, but rather the cognitive act by which we attain God, then enjoyment will be a type of reflexive act, the act of knowing that I know God, as opposed to a direct act, the act of knowing God.³³ Durandus is absolutely unrepentant: he admits that this is indeed the case—in fact, *any* form of enjoyment where we have to attain the thing that we enjoy through a cognitive act is a reflexive act, since it involves knowing that we have the thing we are enjoying.³⁴ So, the view that the act of enjoyment is a reflexive act is an integral part of Durandus's theory of our enjoyment of God.

In the third of his questions *De libero arbitrio*, the one on the impossibility of simultaneous acts in the will or intellect, Durandus brings up the status of reflexive acts. It's only natural that Durandus discusses the topic here, since in a reflexive act we would indeed seem to have a good example of two acts existing in the intellect at the same time. In a reflexive intellectual act, I know that I know *x*, so I would seem to be required both to have the act of knowing *x* and simultaneously to have the act of knowing that I know *x*. Durandus doesn't believe this to be the case at all: for him, a reflexive act and the direct act it is based upon is all one act, the act of knowing that I know or knowing that I have known e.g. a rose. It's easy to see, claims Durandus, that a reflexive act is one simple act when it's a case of my knowing that I *have known* a rose—here, the “my having known a rose” is simply a

in Hell. Four Franciscan Masters on the Relationship between Love and Pleasure, and Hatred and Displeasure”, *Traditio* 58 (2003), pp. 285–340, at e.g. pp. 330, 336–337.

³³ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 20, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 15ra: “Sed contra hoc arguitur quod voluntas nullo actu suo nec desiderio nec delectatione potest ferri nisi in illud quod est cognitum obiective. Si ergo fruitio non habet Deum pro immediato obiecto, sed cognitionem vel visionem Dei, sequitur quod ad fruendum necessarium est quod non solum videamus Deum, sed etiam cognoscamus nos videre Deum. Et ita fruitio non sequitur actum simplicem quo videmus Deum, sed reflexum quo videmus nos videre Deum”.

³⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 21, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 15ra–b: “...delectatio quam beati habent de Deo supponit non solum actum simplicem quo cognoscimus Deum, sed et reflexum quo cognoscimus nos videre Deum—et idem est de omni delectatione quae est respectu eorum quae non habentur nisi quia cognoscuntur, ita quod in his habere non sit aliud quam cognoscere (et ratio dicta fuit prius, nec oportet repetere)”.

memory of a past act (*recordatio actus praeteriti*), and not an actual present act. So, for Durandus, there is clearly only one act here.³⁵ Nor are there several acts when I know that I know the rose—as Durandus sees it, the reflexive act and the direct act upon which it is based are the *same*. What Durandus seems to suggest is that we automatically have reflexive acts *whenever* we have direct acts; this is the source of our memories, he appears to say. I want to quote this, because it seems an interesting and unusual theory:³⁶

It is not the case that when I cognize that I cognize a rose there are two [intellectual] acts; rather there is one. This is because no act of understanding, at least no perfect one, is concealed from the intellect, because cognition existing in a cognizer cannot be concealed from him, although

³⁵ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *De libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ad 5, ed. Stella, pp. 496,45–497,36: “Dicimus enim reflexionem esse quando aliquis intelligit se intelligere vel (vel *om. ed.*) intellexisse rosam, et quaerimus tunc utrum sint simul plures actus intelligendi. Ad quod dicendum quod non. Istud est clarum quando aliquis intelligit se intellexisse rosam, quia ille actus est sola recordatio actus praeteriti, qui prius fuit et modo non est; alioquin non esset praeteritum, nec eius esset recordatio. Et si dicatur quod praeter actum illum praeteritum, adhuc sunt duo actus, scilicet quo nunc cognosco rosam et alius quo recordor me prius cognovisse rosam (*resam ed.*), non valet, quia ex praesentia rosae, mihi qualitercumque repraesentatae, consurgo non solum in cognitionem eius, sed etiam in cognitionem cognitionis prius de ea habitae, et sic unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, propter quod cadunt sub uno actu, ut prius probatum fuit. *Quando autem cognosco me cognoscere rosam, nec tunc sunt duo actus, sed unus. Nullus enim actus intelligendi, saltem perfectus, latet intellectum, quia cognitio inexistens in cognoscente non potest ipsum latere, quamvis hoc non discernamus semper ad plenum. Et hoc patet quia recordatio non potest esse nisi alicuius praecogniti; sed de omni actu quo aliquid cognoscimus, saltem perfecte, etiamsi pro tunc non discernamus nos cognoscere, potest esse recordatio; ergo omnis talis actus fuit non solum cognitio, sed etiam cognitus, nec cognitus alio actu quam se ipso [...].* Nec video quomodo possit esse verum quod aliqui dicunt quod in tali reflexione sunt duo actus, quorum unus est ibi non ut cognitio sed solum cognitus, scilicet actus rectus, alius est ibi ut cognitio non ut cognitus, scilicet actus reflexus. Illud non videtur posse stare, quia sicut impossibile est in aliquo subiecto esse albedinem, et illud non sit formaliter album per albedinem, sic est impossibile quod aliquis actus cognoscendi sit in intellectu et intellectus non sit cognoscens formaliter per illum, et sic est ibi ut cognitio et non solum ut cognitus. Ad formam igitur rationis dicendum quod quando intelligo me intelligere rosam, non est ibi nisi unicum potentiale obiectum, scilicet rosa, sub cuius habitudine cognoscitur quidquid intelligibili reflexione cognoscitur. Non enim seorsum cognosco rosam vel obiectum, et seorsum cognosco me cognoscere, nisi plus addatur, quia impossibile est quod ego cognoscam me cognoscere aliquid aliud quam cognoscere vel rosam vel aliquid tale, quod est principaliter terminans actum cognitionis per modum obiecti. Quidquid aliud cognoscatur, cognoscitur sub habitudine ad principale obiectum et per eundem actum, propter rationes superius factas, et ideo eodem actu quo cognosco rosam, cognosco me cognoscere rosam; non est ibi nisi unum principale obiectum” (The italicized part of the passage is translated in the main text below).

³⁶ For the Latin, see the italicized part of the passage in note 35 above.

we do not always recognize this fully. And this is clear, because a memory can only be of something known previously; but there can be a memory about every act through which we cognize something, at least when we cognize perfectly, even if at the time we do not recognize that we cognize. Therefore, every such act was not only a cognition, it was also cognized, and it is cognized by no other act than itself.

The only way that we can form our memories is by being aware, i.e. reflexive, about our direct acts, so when we cognize something well enough, we can have a memory about it, and hence we automatically—Durandus seems to suggest unconsciously—have reflexive knowledge about it. In this case, the direct act and the reflexive act are one and the same act, since there can be only one act in the intellect at any one time. In short: we have memories because every direct act is also a reflexive act and the reflexive act is the awareness of the direct act upon which memory itself is predicated. More generally, for Durandus, reflexive acts do not in any way break the general rule about there being only one act in the intellect at a time. In line with this interesting theory, moreover, Durandus claims that there is only one principal object of a reflexive act—the object of the direct act.³⁷ When I understand that I understand God, the principal object is God.³⁸ Durandus is explicit that I don't cognize an object, and then separately cognize my cognizing that object: this is all part and parcel of one act with one principal object. As John Baconthorpe pointed out in his *Sentences* commentary, this last bit about the one principal object helps Durandus to argue that God is *not* removed from our enjoyment of God. In our enjoyment of God, God is indeed the remote object, and my act of knowing God the immediate object, and yet, according to Durandus, God is nevertheless the *principal* object.³⁹

³⁷ See the last lines of the quotation in note 35 above.

³⁸ Although Durandus does not seem to say this explicitly in his treatment of our enjoyment of God in his *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, nevertheless, the view can be deduced from several of his statements there; e.g. *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 19, ed. Venetiis 1571, f. 15ra.: "Augustinus [...] dicit quod res quibus fruendum est sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, non quidem excludendo actum quo haec cognoscuntur, cum prius dixerit quod illae res quibus fruendum est nos beatos faciunt. Efficimur autem beati Deo obiective, ipso autem actu quo Deum videmus sumus beati formaliter. Sed hoc fit propter principalitatem obiecti respectu actus".

³⁹ Cf. Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, art. 2, § 1, ed. Cremonae 1618, p. 48aD: "Et ne argumenta quae sunt contra aliam opinionem concludant contra eos, dicunt quod actus reflexus habet pro obiecto non ipsum actum rectum, qui est aliquid creatum, sed habet pro obiecto ipsum primum obiectum principale".

This view of Durandus's—that our act of enjoying God is a reflexive act with God as the remote, but principal, object—provoked a flurry of rebuttals right around 1312 or 1313 when he was also penning his *Quaestiones de libero arbitrio*. A group of questions with the approximate title “*utrum beatitudo sit actus rectus aut reflexus*”, whether beatitude is a direct or reflexive act, bear testimony to this reaction to Durandus's theory. Indeed, one of the pieces of evidence that Dumont in his article “New Questions by Thomas Wylton” used in order to show the notoriety of the debate between Durandus and Wylton was Prosper de Reggio Emilia's presentation of that debate in his *I Sentences*, dist. 1, q. 3—the title of that question is “*Utrum beatitudo sit actus rectus vel reflexus*”.⁴⁰ Along with Prosper's question, I list below three other questions from the period 1312 or slightly after that deal at length with precisely this aspect of Durandus's theory: the secular theologian John of Pouilly's *Quodlibet* V, q. 7 from 1312; the Carmelite Guy Terrena's *Quodlibet* I, q. 14 from 1313; and the Dominican Peter of Palude's *Quodlibet*, q. 6 probably from 1314 or 1315. In addition, John Baconthorpe, here as often a valuable witness to contemporary debates, gives a fine historical survey of the discussion in his *I Sentences*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1–2 from the mid 1320's.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Dumont, “New Questions...”, pp. 368–369. Prosper's *Sentences* commentary is contained in the first part of the important manuscript Vat. lat. 1086, and is well known for its chatty descriptions of academic debates in the period 1311–1314; the second part of the manuscript contains, besides Prosper's own *Quodlibet*, short descriptions of many contemporary philosophical and theological views—it was with the help of this latter part of the manuscript that Durandus's and Thomas Wylton's questions on the possibility of simultaneous acts in the intellect were identified. See on Prosper, the manuscript, and its contents, A. Pelzer, “Prosper de Reggio Emilia, des Ermites de Saint-Augustin, et le manuscrit latin 1086 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane”, *Revue neoscholastique de philosophie* 30 (1928), pp. 316–351; id., *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae Codices manu scripti recensiti. Codices Vaticani Latini*, vol. 2, pars prior: *Codices 679–1134*, Città del Vaticano 1931, pp. 654–683; P. Glorieux, “A propos de Vatic. lat. 1086. Le personnel enseignant de Paris vers 1311–14”, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 3 (1933), pp. 23–39; W.J. Courtenay, “Reflections on Vat. lat. 1086 and Prosper of Reggio Emilia O.E.S.A.”, in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2*, pp. 345–357 (see also the articles mentioned below in note 42).

⁴¹ In addition to these five treatments, I can mention the somewhat later Cologne-based Dominican theologian Henry of Lübeck, who in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 23 (“*Utrum in intellectu possint esse plures simul actus ut actus*”) dating from 1323 quotes extensively and verbatim from Durandus's question about the possibility of simultaneous acts in the intellect. See on Henry, his *Quodlibeta*, and this view my “Dominican Quodlibetal literature...”, pp. 466–473.

Prosper de Reggio Emilia, *I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 3: "Utrum beatitudo sit actus rectus vel reflexus" (ms. Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1086, ff. 79ra–81va).⁴²

John of Pouilly, *Quodl.* V, q. 7: "Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in actu recto aut reflexo" (e.g. ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15372, ff. 158rb–160va). Debated 1312, according to P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibetique*, Kain 1925, pp. 223–228.⁴³

Guy Terrena, *Quodl.* I, q. 14: "Utrum actus reflexus quo intelligo me intelligere Deum sit idem cum actu recto quo intelligo" (ms. Città del Vaticano, Borghese 39, ff. 55rb–56ra). Debated 1313 according to Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibetique*, pp. 169–174.⁴⁴

Peter of Palude, *Quodl.* q. 6: "Utrum actus reflexus et actus rectus different realiter" (ms. Toulouse 744, ff. 101ra–105rb). Probably debated sometime between 1314 and 1316 (Peter was made master on July 13, 1314 and Hervaeus Natalis probably reclaimed the French Dominican chair at Paris in 1316).⁴⁵

⁴² In addition to the views of Durandus and Wylton, Prosper mentions (f. 80ra) those of Radulphus Brito and Francis Caracciolo (Franciscus de Carotiis). On Francis, the Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1309–16, see P. Glorieux, "François Caracciolo, chancelier de l'Université de Paris", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 33 (1966), pp. 115–136; id., "Duns Scot et les Notabilia Cancellarii", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 24 (1931), pp. 3–14. On the important secular philosopher (and later theologian) Radulphus Brito, see S. Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito. The Last of the Great Arts Masters, or: Philosophy and Freedom", in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. J.A. Aertsen – A. Speer, Berlin – New York 2000 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 27), pp. 231–251; W.J. Courtenay, "Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 76 (2005), pp. 131–158.

⁴³ Wouter Goris and Martin Pickavé pointed out to me that this question of Pouilly's was examined in some detail in two articles by J.P. Muller, "La thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle", in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la Scolastique médiévale*, Louvain 1947, pp. 493–511; id., "Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 15 (1948), pp. 152–170. In the section of John of Pouilly's question that Muller examined, Pouilly was replying to the Dominican theologian John of Paris (d. 1306), whose view on theological enjoyment bears some similarity to Durandus's. A transcription of Pouilly's question from the BNF ms., and a study of several theories of reflexive acts in the context of questions of fruition and beatitude, are found in the MA-Thesis of Thomas Jeschke of the University of Cologne's Thomas-Institut "Die Debatte um die reflexive Gottesschau bei Johannes Baconthorp" (University of Cologne, 16.2.2005).

⁴⁴ This question is edited in the Appendix below. For more information on Guy and his Quodlibetal questions, see C. Schabel, "Carmelite Quodlibeta", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. Vol. 2*, pp. 493–544.

⁴⁵ As Muller, "Les critiques...", p. 169, note 44, notes, Palude deals with the same issues in his *IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 3 ("Quod <beatitudo> consistit in actu recto non reflexo", ed. Venetiis 1493, ff. 231rb–va, located on the Gallica website of the Bibliothèque

John Baconthorpe, *I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1–2: “Utrum fruitio nostra sit circa ultimum finem?” (ed. Cremonae 1618, pp. 46a–51b). Completed after 1325 (cf. C. Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini”, in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden 2002, p. 253).

What was at issue in these discussions? We can take the Carmelite theologian Guy Terrena’s treatment as an example.⁴⁶ After presenting Durandus’s view in unmistakable detail (§ 4), Guy proceeds to give a series of arguments all designed to show that the direct act of understanding God and the reflexive act of understanding that I understand God cannot be the same act. Thus, argues Guy (§ 6), one and the same act cannot be both true and erroneous; yet, I can have a true direct act (I know that Socrates is sitting, when Socrates is indeed sitting), but a false reflexive act about the same object of knowledge (I believe that I know that Socrates is sitting, when in fact I don’t believe that I know it).⁴⁷ So, direct and reflexive acts cannot be the same. The same type

ationale de France <<http://gallica.bnf.fr/>>, f. 231rb): “Prima <conclusio> de unitate actus recti et reflexi in via, quia quando non sunt simul, tunc realiter differunt, sicut quando intelligo me intellexisse et quando volo me voluisse, quia impossibile est quod illa duo quorum unum totaliter* est corruptum, aliud autem totaliter est salvum, sint una res, quia ens differt a non ente, et quae sunt unum re simul generantur et simul corrumpuntur [...] horum autem primus esse desiit, secundus est actu. Ergo etc. Item, unus est bonus, puta actus quo nunc penitet, alius malus, scilicet ille de quo penitet. Quando autem sunt simul, tunc sunt unus actus numero, ut quando intelligo me intellegere et volo me velle ex unitate principalis obiecti, sicut velle finem et aliquid propter finem, et sic sunt unus actus numero. De hoc tamen dictum est plenius libro I, dist. 1, q. 1”. Clearly it will be important to examine Palude’s unedited *I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, since in the passage quoted here Palude is adopting elements of Durandus’s view (“ex unitate principalis obiecti”) while modifying it (reflexive acts with a past act as the direct act are two distinct acts, while a reflexive act with a concurrent act as direct act are the same act). On Palude’s *Sent.* commentary, see the Introductions to Schabel, Friedman, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude...” (cit. above, note 17), and the literature referred to there. Further (as Muller notes, *loc. cit.*), two other questions in Palude’s lone *Quodlibet* are perhaps of relevance to this debate: q. 9 (“Utrum beatitudo proprie consistat in actu reflexo”; ms. Toulouse 744, ff. 110rb–111va) and q. 11 (“Utrum beatitudo patriae consistat in actu reflexo”; ms. Toulouse 744, ff. 113ra–18vb).

⁴⁶ Section numbers in parentheses refer to the edition of Guy’s text found in the Appendix to this article.

⁴⁷ Although I have some doubts about the possibility of our being mistaken as to the cognitive status of our reflexive acts, nevertheless Guy’s general point seems to be valid, since I can certainly have an erroneous direct act (I know that Socrates is sitting, when in fact he’s standing) and a veridical reflexive one (knowing or believing that I know that Socrates is sitting). This more plausible model of the phenomenon Guy is describing also appears to be more in line with the passage from Aristotle’s

of argument applies to scientific knowledge and opinion (§ 5), if e.g. the direct act were mere opinion but the reflexive act were scientific. Further, there is an argument from separability (§ 7): Guy claims that when two things are really the same, then the one cannot exist without the other; but this is patently not the case for a direct and a reflexive act, where I can have a direct act without a reflexive act—for instance I can understand that I live, without my understanding that I understand that I live. As we've seen, Durandus would simply disagree with this. Thus, Guy is convinced that Durandus was wrong to think that the direct and reflexive acts are the same. But—and I want to stress this—Guy doesn't reject Durandus's general principle about there being only one intellectual act at a time: Guy says that reflexive acts are special cases. For Guy (§§ 10–11), the direct act is the *per se* and direct object of the reflexive act; the object of the direct act is only *ex consequenti* the object of the reflexive act. Thus (§ 9), because the direct act and a reflexive act based upon it have an intrinsic connection with each other, on account of the fact that the direct act is the reflexive act's direct object and hence that the reflexive act can't exist without the direct act, in this special case we can indeed have two acts in the intellect at once. But Guy stresses: only in this special case—without the type of special intrinsic connection that exists between a direct act and a reflexive act based on it, our intellect is limited to one act at a time (§ 9).

And this seems to be the case with all of the responses to Durandus mentioned above: they do not deny the basic principle that Durandus adheres to, i.e. that the will or intellect cannot have more than one act at once. All of these thinkers appear to generally agree with this view. What they object to is merely a part of Durandus's theory: reflexive acts pose a problem for philosophers who maintain that the intellect can have only one act at a time. Durandus gives one answer to that problem, while Guy, John of Pouilly, Peter of Palude, and John Baconthorpe give others. They agree on the big issue—the intellect in most cases can have only one act at a time—but they disagree on a smaller one: i.e., given this, how do you explain reflexive acts? None of them, in other words, agreed with Thomas Wylton, even though they had disagreements with Durandus.

Nicomachean Ethics quoted by Guy (§ 6) about people who “when in a state of opinion do not hesitate, but think they know exactly” (*The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, NJ 1984, vol. 2, p. 1811). Christian Rode and Jörn Müller discussed this issue with me and I'm grateful for their comments.

As far as I can tell, you have to wait until around 1319 or so to find someone at Paris who gives Durandus's view in some detail and then proceeds to take Wylton's position in the debate and argue that there can be many acts simultaneously in the intellect or will.⁴⁸ In dist. 1 of his *Sentences* commentary, probably composed at Paris between 1319 and 1323, the Italian Franciscan Francis of Marchia raises the question "whether the created will of the wayfarer by the same act wills the end and that which is to the end".⁴⁹ If Marchia's discussion is ostensibly about the will willing ends and means, it is in fact a substantial discussion of precisely the question of whether we can have more than one act in the intellect at once. And this discussion proceeds along Wyltonian lines, working off of a consideration of propositions and how they are formed out of terms, and of syllogisms and how they are formed out of premisses. Like Wylton, Marchia asks what the relationship is among the various intellectual acts taking place here.

With regard to propositions, Marchia asks whether the intellect apprehends the extremes of the proposition by numerically the same act by which it apprehends the proposition as a whole, or whether it does so by diverse acts.⁵⁰ He brings up an anonymous view, which is on a very general level unmistakably Durandus's, arguing that there can be only one act in the intellect at any one time.⁵¹ Marchia's presentation

⁴⁸ I need to stress here the words "at Paris"—it seems quite likely that William of Ockham had defended the possibility of multiple simultaneous acts of the intellect at Oxford in 1318 or perhaps slightly earlier in the lectures he held on *II Sent.*, esp. q. 17 ("Utrum actus rectus et reflexus sint idem"; *Opera theologica* V, e.g. pp. 390–391, 392–393). For the dating of these lectures, see *Opera theologica* V, p. 26*.

⁴⁹ Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13): "Utrum voluntas creata viatoris eodem actu velit finem et illud quod est ad finem" edited in *Francisci de Marchia Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex Commentario in librum Sententiarum*, ed. N. Mariani, Grottaferrata 1997, pp. 526–541 (I have checked several of Mariani's readings against his main manuscript, Vat. Chigi. lat. B VII 113). For more on Marchia's views in this question, see my "Mental Propositions before Mental Language" (cit. above, note 3).

On Marchia and his *Sentences* commentary, see R.L. Friedman – C. Schabel, "Francis of Marchia's Commentary on the *Sentences*. Question List and State of Research", *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (2001), pp. 31–106, and the literature referred to there. More generally on Marchia, see C. Schabel, "Francis of Marchia", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2001 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/francis-marchia/>>.

⁵⁰ Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13), ed. Mariani, p. 525, 20–22: "Utrum intellectus eodem actu numero quo apprehendit compositionem propositionis apprehendat extrema propositionis vel diversis actibus".

⁵¹ In at least one of the manuscripts containing the text, the words "opinio Durandi" are incorporated into the actual text, and this would seem to be a fairly solid basis for

of this view can be summarized as follows: in the instant in which a proposition is understood, there is one and only one act of the intellect, this single act containing virtually, not actually, the acts of understanding the terms—in fact, the two acts of the terms cease to exist when the proposition is formed out of them. Crucial here is *virtual containment*: according to this theory, the simpler acts that form the basis for a more complex act of understanding, e.g. terms of a proposition versus the proposition itself, are contained “virtually” in the more complex act, and hence we only have one act in the intellect at any one time.⁵² It is this more developed version of Durandus’s theory that Marchia uses as a starting point for the presentation of his own solution to the problem of whether the intellect can have more than one act at the same time. Marchia gives a variety of arguments against the view, but he himself

the attribution. This is in the *Reportatio* version of the question (I *Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1 = q. 12) as found in ms. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 3071, f. 10ra. Moreover, in the *Scriptum* version (ed. Mariani, p. 526,36–40), Marchia mentions without attribution the Algazali quotation that Durandus used (cf. above, note 7).

⁵² Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13), ed. Mariani, pp. 525,23–526,35: “...est una opinio quae ponit quod intellectus primo seorsum diversis actibus apprehendit (apprehendat *ed.*) praedicatum et subiectum propositionis, postea, ultimo instanti quo debet intelligere propositionem, format quendam actum tertium continentem in virtute perfectionem compositionis et extremorum (compositionem et extrema *ed. et ms.*), et in isto instanti actus praecedentes desinunt (*ed.*: diffiniunt) esse [...], ergo mediante unico actu continente virtualiter perfectionem illorum plurium potest <intellectus> intelligere distincte propositiones et terminos [...]. Igitur unico actu intelligit totum”.

Although it may indeed be Durandus himself that Marchia is here criticizing (see above, note 51), nevertheless further research is needed in order to determine whether it is not some more nearly contemporary scholar whom Marchia is in discussion with, since when Marchia challenges the view directly he repeatedly uses the phrases “per te” and “tu dicis” (this is, of course, not conclusive). I would offer just one possibility. I have found the term “virtual containment” used in this context in only one thinker, and he is a thinker who could indeed have debated Marchia on the matter in the flesh: the English Carmelite theologian John Baconthorpe. Baconthorpe read the *Sentences* at Paris probably in 1319/20 or 1320/21, i.e. at precisely the time Marchia was there—so they could easily have debated the issue. Noticeable in footnote 21 above, where Baconthorpe presents his ideas on the relation in the intellect between propositions and the terms that form them and between conclusions and the premisses that lead to them, is the use of variations on the term “virtual containment”: one act by which the conclusion is grasped contains virtually the principles leading to the conclusion; one act by which the proposition as a whole is grasped contains virtually the terms of the proposition. I can’t find this terminology in Durandus, or anyone else for that matter, except Baconthorpe when he’s describing his own position. But Marchia uses this terminology again and again. So, Baconthorpe at least presents a possibility for further research into this text and the Parisian debate on simultaneous acts in the intellect and will.

lays special weight on a critical examination of “virtual containment”, and here I want to briefly present Marchia’s critique.⁵³

If propositions virtually contained their terms, Marchia insists, this would rule out our ability to form two contradictory propositions—‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Socrates is not wise’—because according to Marchia, contrary acts cannot *virtually* contain terms that are identical in kind (*specie*—Marchia clearly includes this qualification because the acts virtually contained are not strictly the same (numerical identity), but merely of the same type (identical in kind)). The intellectual acts corresponding to the propositions ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Socrates is not wise’, would each virtually contain intellectual acts identical in kind, because they each contain *terms* that are identical in kind (Socrates, wise). Marchia considers virtual containment like this to be impossible. He appears to understand virtual containment on the model of the relation between a cause and its effect: a cause virtually contains its effect.⁵⁴ Thus, Marchia claims, maintaining that two contrary intellectual

⁵³ I plan to return to Marchia’s view on the foundations of scientific knowledge in a future publication, and there I will deal with, among other things, syllogistic knowledge.

⁵⁴ For some evidence for this claim, see below and also Marchia’s description of virtual containment in *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 22, q. 2 (= q. 43; “Utrum dicta de Deo positive convenient sibi formaliter”) in Marchia’s determination of the question (ed. Mariani, esp. pp. 405–406).

Marchia’s explicitly “causal” notion of virtual containment is at least on the surface distinct from a more “epistemological” notion found in e.g. Duns Scotus, in which (for instance) the object of a scientific habit contains virtually all the truths of that science (e.g. *Ordinatio* I, prol., p. 3, q. 1–3, n. 142, ed. Vat. I, p. 96,4–10) or the subject of a *per se secundo modo* proposition virtually contains the predicate, and the premisses of a syllogism contain virtually the conclusion (e.g. *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, VI, q. 1, n. 40 = *Opera philosophica* IV, pp. 15,19–16,5). I have never found Marchia appealing to the epistemological notion of virtual containment (although there is much Marchia still unedited), whereas Scotus does indeed use the causal notion; see e.g. T. Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilitäten bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius*, Münster 2002 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 60), *passim* (see index; on p. 49, note 72 and p. 286, note 98, the causal aspect of virtual containment is stressed); more generally on Scotus on scientific knowledge, see R. Hofmeister Pich, *Der Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus*, Inaugural-Dissertation, Universität zu Bonn, 2001; most recently and most explicitly, D. Demange, “‘Object premier d’inclusion virtuelle’. Introduction à la théorie de la science de Jean Duns Scot”, in *Duns Scot à Paris 1302–2002*, ed. O. Boulnois – E. Karger – J.-L. Solère – G. Sondag, Turnhout 2004, pp. 89–116. Nevertheless, on either one of these views of virtual containment, causal or epistemological, positing that the proposition virtually contains the terms would seem to be putting the cart before the horse, since what is virtually contained is in some way extracted or brought forth

acts could virtually contain intellectual acts of the same kind is tantamount to maintaining that contrary forms could directly bring about the same type of effect in the same matter (*formae contrariae possent per se et directe in eundem effectum specie respectu eiusdem passi, quod est impossibile*)—heat and cold, for instance, both producing fire in a piece of wood. Clearly this is not possible. Marchia's view, then, would seem to be that if contrary intellectual acts, i.e. acts corresponding to contradictory propositions, were to virtually contain acts identical in kind, then these contrary acts would produce in the same intellect those same virtually contained acts.⁵⁵ Since this is impossible, Marchia denies that virtual containment can explain how we can use the same terms to produce contradictory propositions.⁵⁶ Moreover, it seems even clearer that the terms of a proposition cannot virtually contain the proposition itself, since, again, the same terms can be used in contradictory propositions—so the capacity for generating the propositions goes beyond the terms themselves. Thus, neither the proposition can virtually contain

from that which virtually contains it—thus, if anything, the terms, which exist before the proposition formed out of them, must virtually contain the proposition, not the reverse (as Marchia's opponent contends). Thanks to Stephen D. Dumont and Stephan Meier-Oeser for suggestions on how to understand "virtual containment".

⁵⁵ Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13), ed. Mariani, p. 530,171–94: "...cum tu dicis quod intellectus in ultimo instanti format quendam conceptum tertium, continentem in virtute perfectionem duorum conceptuum praecedentium—contra: videtur quod hoc sit impossibile primo <sic>: conceptus contrarii non possunt continere virtualiter eundem conceptum specie. Patet, quia tunc formae contrariae possent per se et directe in eundem effectum specie respectu eiusdem passi, quod est impossibile. Sed conceptus propositionis affirmativae et conceptus propositionis negativae, sicut conceptus contrarii actus affirmandi et negandi, sunt actus contrarii. Ergo isti actus non possunt continere virtualiter respectu eiusdem intellectus eundem actum specie; sed notitia terminorum propositionis affirmativae et negativae est eiusdem speciei, [notitia] quia termini utriusque propositionis sunt idem et actus affirmandi et negandi sunt contrarii. Ergo isti actus non possunt continere virtualiter notitiam terminorum praecedentium. Ergo actus quo intellectus in ultimo instanti intelligit propositionem non continet virtualiter perfectionem actuum praecedentium.

Quod declaro secundo sic. In ultimo instanti quo intellectus debet formare propositionem, intellectus potest formare indifferenter propositionem affirmativam vel negativam; et si format propositionem affirmativam, tunc ille actus, per te (*ed.*: parte), continebit virtualiter <perfectionem> duorum actuum praecedentium; et si format negativam et non affirmativam, iste actus, per te (*ed.*: parte), continebit virtualiter perfectionem duorum actuum praecedentium. Et illi actus praecedentes sunt determinatae speciei, et conceptus propositionis affirmativae et negativae sunt contrarii. Ergo idem actus specie continebitur virtualiter in duobus actibus contrariis—quod est impossibile".

⁵⁶ There is the further problem that the intellect doesn't form terms out of propositions, but rather vice-versa (see above, note 54); Marchia brings this out in other parts of his treatment (e.g., ed. Mariani, p. 529,143–64, p. 531,207–30).

the terms nor the terms virtually contain the proposition. For Marchia, concepts or acts virtually containing each other explains nothing about how propositions are formed out of terms.⁵⁷

Thus, Marchia's own solution is to reject virtual containment and to opt for fully distinct acts for each of the terms in a proposition as well as for the act of composition (or division) by which they are formed into the proposition. On his view, the terms are contained in the proposition "materially" or "dispositively", since they are what the proposition is composed of. This, as far as Marchia is concerned, will deal with the problem of contradictory propositions. His solution reads:

I say therefore that the intellect in the final instant has three acts, two simple acts with respect to the terms and one with respect to the composition, and [this last act] presupposes by an order of nature the simple acts, because just as on the part of the object [of cognition] there are three in an order, two terms and a third composition presupposing them, and not vice-versa, and these three [acts] exist simultaneously (*simul duratione*), although they have an order of nature, so on the part of the intellect there are three acts: two with respect to the terms and a third act with respect to the composition, and these acts exist simultaneously (*simul duratione*), but they have an order of nature, and just as the composition of the terms does not virtually contain the terms, but only materially, so the concept of the composition does not contain virtually the concept of the terms, but only materially and dispositively.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13), ed. Mariani, p. 532,245–255: "...compositio non continet virtualiter terminos, nec termini continent virtualiter compositionem. Probatio: quia compositio non continet virtualiter extrema. Sed compositio propositionis est quaedam habitudo terminorum praedicati et subiecti. Ergo compositio non continet virtualiter terminos. Nec e converso. Probatio: quia eadem materia non continet virtualiter formas contrarias. Sed super eosdem terminos fundantur compositiones contrariae, quia super eosdem terminos fundatur compositio affirmativa et negativa, quae sunt contrariae. Ergo termini non continent virtualiter compositionem nec continentur virtualiter ab ea. Ergo nec actus continet virtualiter actum. Ergo nec conceptus propositionis continet virtualiter conceptum terminorum".

⁵⁸ Franciscus de Marchia, *Scriptum super I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 7 (= q. 13), ed. Mariani, pp. 531,230–532,239: "Dico ergo quod intellectus in ultimo instanti habet tres actus, duos actus simplices respectu terminorum et unum respectu compositionis, qui praesupponit ordine naturae illos simplices, quia sicut ex parte obiecti sunt tria per ordinem, duo termini et compositio tertia (*ed.*: tria) praesupponens, et non e converso, et ista (*ed.*: ita) tria sunt simul duratione, licet habeant (habeat *ed.*) ordinem naturae, ita ex parte intellectus sunt tres actus: duo respectu terminorum, et tertius respectu compositionis, et isti actus sunt simul duratione, sed habent ordinem naturae, et sicut compositio terminorum non continet virtualiter terminos, sed solum materialiter, ita conceptus

For Marchia, then, a proposition is composed of two simple acts, which are the terms, plus an act of composition, all three of these acts existing at once, but with a logical ordering between them, since the terms act like matter with respect to the formal act of composition.

With Francis of Marchia, we have an out-and-out rejection of Durandus's view, and this rejection proceeds along Wyltonian lines by examining terms and propositions, premisses and conclusions. Nor is Marchia's rejection of Durandus a completely isolated instance: Gregory of Rimini in the mid-1340's will reject Durandus's opinion in the same context of a discussion of our enjoyment of God, only on slightly different grounds.⁵⁹ So, if the past was with Durandus and his "common opinion", it seems as though the future was brighter for Wylton. But I hope that in this paper I have managed to show that this is a significant debate with wide-ranging ramifications and that it deserves more of our attention.

compositionis non continet virtualiter conceptum terminorum sed tantum materialiter et dispositive". Cp. this to the view of Thomas Wylton in note 14 above.

One interesting aspect of Marchia's theory is that his notion of the proposition is clearly more like that of John Buridan, who held propositions to be composed of three elements (subject, predicate, copula), than that of Peter of Spain, with his two-part theory of the proposition (subject, predicate). See on Buridan's view, e.g., A. Maierù, "Mental Language and Italian Scholasticism in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries", in *John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300–1700*, ed. R.L. Friedman – S. Ebbesen, Copenhagen 2004, pp. 33–67, esp. pp. 41–43; P. Pérez-Ilzarbe, "John Buridan and Jerónimo Pardo on the Notion of 'Propositio'", in *John Buridan and Beyond*, pp. 153–181, esp. pp. 154–156. Thus, it is worthwhile noting that, although Marchia does not appear to have devised a theory of mental language, nevertheless this view of his (and hence the discussion that we have been tracing in this article) seems to be a fairly important element in the eventual creation of a workable theory of mental language—although there was some resistance to a "compositional" account of mental language from, e.g., Gregory of Rimini (see S. Meier-Oeser, "Mental Language and Mental Representation in Late Scholastic Logic", in *John Buridan and Beyond*, pp. 237–265, esp. pp. 246–248; Maierù, "Mental Language...", pp. 39–41).

⁵⁹ Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura in I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 3, ed. D. Trapp – V. Marcolino, in *Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum*, vol. 1, Berlin – New York 1981, pp. 201–208.

APPENDIX

Guy Terrena, *Quodlibet* I, q. 14 (ms. Città del Vaticano, Borghese 39, ff. 55rb–56ra)⁶⁰

<1> Circa tertium, quod est utrum actus reflexus quo intelligo me intelligere Deum sit idem cum actu recto quo intelligo, [et] arguitur quod sic, quia videns non est beatus nisi in actu quo videt Deum. Sed beatus non est nisi videat se videre, quia non quiescit appetitus videntis <nisi videat se videre>. Ergo actus videndi Deum et quo videt se videre necessario est unus.

<2> Contra: actus rectus et reflexus non est unus actus, sicut nec motus rectus et reflexus.

<3> Respondeo: primo videndum est utrum sit unus et idem actus. Secundo videndum an in illo consistat beatitudo.

<Articulus primus>

<4> Circa primum: dicunt quidam⁶¹ quod idem est actus rectus et reflexus, quia impossibile est quod duo actus intelligendi sint in intellectu simul. Sed actus rectus et reflexus sunt simul, quia actus quo intelligo lapidem est idem cum actu quo intelligo me intelligere lapidem. Ergo non sunt distincti actus. Unde ponunt⁶² quod sicut <in> moventibus*, et “motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt”, motus autem est in nobis, igitur “movetur non alio motu quam se ipso”, sic actus intelligendi non intelligitur alio actu quam se ipso.

<5> Istud non est rationabile, nam si idem sit actus rectus et reflexus cognoscendi, idem erit actus cognoscendi opinativus et scientificus. Consequens falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet,

⁶⁰ Those familiar with the manuscript from which this question comes know that it is saturated with errors; thus, despite Chris Schabel having done me the kindness of checking my transcription and despite considerable massaging of the text since then, there may still be kinks. For symbols used, see the asterisk footnote at the beginning of the article.

⁶¹ Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *De libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ad 5, ed. Stella, pp. 496–497 (cf. supra, note 35).

⁶² Cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *De libero arbitrio*, q. 3, ad 5, ed. Stella, p. 497, 14–17: “Motus enim localis quo aliquod mobile formaliter movetur, movetur ad motionem mobilis, quia motis nobis moventur ea quae sunt in nobis; et tamen non movetur alio motu quam se ipso. Similiter cognitio per quam intellectus cognoscit obiectum, ipsa cognoscitur non alia cognitione quam se ipsa”.

quia opposita essent in eodem: certum et incertum de veritate. Consequentia probatur, nam /55va/ aliquis potest evidenter scire quod arguit ex probabilibus et non necessariis, et tunc scit quod assentit huic conclusioni per medium probabile, et sic cognoscit et scit se opinari. Igitur, cum considerat opinabile, est actus opinativus, et <cum> scit se opinabile considerare, qui est actus reflexus, <est actus scientificus>, et <sic> actus opinativus <et actus scientificus> esset unus actus, si rectus et reflexus esset unus.

<6> Praeterea, idem actus non est verus et erroneus. Sed actus rectus est vel esse potest verus, puta quod Sortes sedet intelligo, actus autem reflexus potest esse erroneus, puta si credam me scire Sortem sedere vel aliquid tale, prout Philosophus dicit VII *Ethicorum*⁶³ quod quidam opinantium non dubitant sed estimant certe scire. Ergo actus rectus et reflexus non sunt idem.

<7> Praeterea, quodcumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, impossibile est quod unum sit et aliud non sit. Sed non existente actu reflexo potest esse actus rectus, ut possum intelligere me vivere absque hoc quod intelligam me intelligere me vivere. Non enim est necesse quod si intelligam obiectum quod intelligam actum quo obiectum attingitur, alias qua ratione oporteret, intelligendo lapidem, intelligere me \intelligere/ lapidem, eadem oporteret <intelligere> me intelligere me <intelligere> lapidem, et sic in infinitum—quod nullus experitur. Ergo non oportet quod, si intelligam obiectum, quod intelligitur <quod intelligam> obiectum. Ergo non idem actus rectus et reflexus.

<8> Praeterea, quodcumque aliquid habet rationem tantum quo et nullo modo rationem quod per se, tunc non oportet quod alio quam se ipso sibi conveniat actus quem dat. Ergo si⁶⁴ relatio respectu actus referendi se habet per se ut ratio quo et non ut quod per se, non alio refertur quam se ipsa; si autem per se referretur ut quod, oporteret quod alio referretur. Sed actus intelligendi non solum habet rationem quo aliquid attingitur per intellectum, immo ut quod, quia habet rationem per se intelligibilis, cum per se habeat rationem entis. Ergo aliquo alio actu intelligitur. Et hoc plane dicit Augustinus, XV *De trinitate*, cap. 13,⁶⁵ ubi ait: “Verum, scita in unoquoque genere reperiuntur in infinitum tendere. Qui enim dicit ‘scio me vivere’, unum aliquid se scire

⁶³ Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* VII, 3, 1146b25–26.

⁶⁴ Ergo si] ut *ms.*

⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XV, 12, 21 (CCSL 50A, pp. 491,35–492,40).

dicit. Proinde si dicat 'scio me scire me vivere', duo sunt. Iam vero hoc quod scit haec duo tertium scire. Sic potest addere quartum et quintum et innumerabilia, si sufficiat". Patet ergo secundum Augustinum quod aliud est scire me vivere et aliud scire me scire, et quod tales actus sunt plures multiplicabiles in infinitum, et hoc non esset nisi /55vb/ actus rectus et reflexus essent distincti actus.

<9> Praeterea, ratio aliorum—secundum illos⁶⁶ qui ponunt quod plures actus intelligendi <non> sunt simul vel esse <non> possunt—nullam habet difficultatem, istud enim⁶⁷ de actibus qui non habent aliquam habitudinem seu connectionem non videtur <verum> mihi: quia, cum in actu intelligendi, secundum Augustinum, attentio requiratur, et non possit haberi ad plura nisi illa aliquam connectionem et habitudinem habeant, non poterit intellectus pluribus actibus intelligendi informari nisi inter se habeant connectionem. Et quia actus intelligendi connectionem habet ad suum obiectum, ita quod non potest esse actus intelligendi nisi sit actu simul duratione obiectum sub illa ratione qua dicitur ab intellectu, sed actus rectus est obiectum actus reflexi (puta 'intelligo me intelligere lapidem' habet pro obiecto 'intelligo lapidem'), ita quod secundus, scilicet reflexus, requirit primum actum actu, aliter non esset verus, quia ita dicitur ab intellectu; unde in proposito non est inconueniens quod intellectus simul informetur pluribus actibus quorum unus est obiectum alterius. Quare prima ratio non valet.

<10> Secunda nihil valet, seu declaratio positionis, quia motus non habet rationem mobilis per se, sed actus intelligendi habet rationem per se intelligibilis. Et ideo dicendum quod actus rectus et reflexus non sunt unus, nam actus quorum obiecta sunt per se distincta sunt distincti. Sed actus rectus est per se obiectum—cum per se ad eam terminetur—actus autem reflexi, actus enim⁶⁸ reflexi <obiectum> per se et directe est actus rectus, quia per se non terminatur ad rem sed ad actum, ut 'intelligo me intelligere lapidem' actus terminatur ad actum directe, licet ex consequenti ad lapidem. Ergo sunt distincti actus.

<11> Praeterea, causa dans speciem effectui non est idem cum effectui. Sed actus rectus est causa dans speciem actui reflexo, quia actus reflexus, puta 'intelligo me intelligere', specificatur ex actu primo, puta 'intelligere lapidem' vel 'leonem'. Ergo non idem. Nec valet dicere quod

⁶⁶ I.e. Durandus; cf. supra, § 4.

⁶⁷ Enim] tamen *ms.*

⁶⁸ enim] autem *ms.*

<non> specificatur, quia tunc ‘intelligo me intelligere lapidem’ et ‘intelligo me intelligere me <intelligere> lapidem’ essent unus actus, quia unius rationis, eo quod plura unius rationis simul esse non possunt (ut supra in quadam quaestione fuit visum secundum Augustinum), tales sunt plures. Igitur actus reflexus directe et immediate specificatur ab actu re[fe]cto, sed originaliter a re et obiecto actus recti a quo effective causatur tam actus rectus quam reflexus.

<Articulus secundus>

<12> Ex praedictis /56ra/ patet secundum. Nam <in> illo actu consistit beatitudo per quem immediate attingitur divina essentia, quae est obiectum beatificum, et non per actum reflexum. Ergo beatitudo consistit in actu recto et non reflexo.

<13> Praeterea, beatitudo—ut patet per Augustinum, *De civitate Dei*⁶⁹—habet pro obiecto Deum. In illo igitur actu erit beatitudo cuius per se obiectum est Deus, non res creata. Sed actus reflexi, ut dictum est, obiectum est per se actus rectus. Ergo in actu reflexo non consistit beatitudo. Ergo in actu recto.

<14> Sciendum tamen quod, quamvis [quod quamvis] in videndo Deum sint possibiles actus rectus et reflexus in nobis, quia tamen divina essentia omnium intelligibilium est repraesentativa, poterit videns divinam essentiam in divina essentia videre et se et actum videndi. Ergo Deum videt quia divina essentia est repraesentativa tam videntis quam actus videndi quo eam videt. Sed tamen tunc non videtur actus videndi per actum reflexum, sed magis <per> expressionem obiecti visi, scilicet divinae essentiae, in qua clare exprimitur actus videndi, sicut si in speculo exprimeretur visio videntis sicut exprimitur imago eius, tunc ita videretur videndo speculum visio videntis sicut eius imago et non per actum reflexum.

<15> Ad rationes. Ad primam dicendum quod essentialiter est beatus per hoc quod videt Deum, licet concomitanter⁷⁰ ad hoc faciat videre se videre sicut etiam delectatio, securitas, et talia.

⁶⁹ Forsitan, e.g., Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XII, 1 (CCSL 48, p. 355,22–29): “Beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est adhaerere Deo; quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intellegenda, quod est non adhaerere Deo. Quam ob rem si, cum quaeritur, quare illi beati sint, recte respondetur: Quia Deo adhaerent; et cum quaeritur, cur isti sint miseri, recte respondetur: Quia non adhaerent Deo: non est creaturae rationalis uel intellectualis bonum, quo beata sit, nisi Deus”.

⁷⁰ concomitanter] concomitantur *ms.*

PROPOSITIONS AND THEIR MEANING

LE SIGNIFIÉ PROPOSITIONNEL SELON JEAN DUNS SCOT ET GAUTHIER BURLEY

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INTRODUCTION

Les phrases pourvues d'une valeur de vérité—les propositions—ont-elles un signifié propre? Et, le cas échéant, de quelle nature est ce signifié propositionnel? Ces questions peuvent être retracées à travers l'histoire de la philosophie. On peut rappeler ici le *pragma* aristotélicien, l'*axioma* stoïcien, ou encore le *dictum* et l'*enuntiabile* des latins. Toutes ces notions ont en commun de renvoyer à des corrélats, lesquels, pour être propres aux propositions, n'appartiennent pourtant pas à la sphère linguistique: de même que les noms et les verbes renvoient à des choses qui ne sont ni des noms ni des verbes—par exemple: des personnes, des lieux, des sentiments, mais aussi des actions ou des états—, de même, les philosophes qui acceptent des signifiés spécifiquement propositionnels posent que les combinaisons de noms et de verbes renvoient à des objets qui, d'une part, ne sont pas eux-mêmes des propositions, et, de l'autre, se distinguent des objets auxquels renvoient les noms et les verbes—par exemple: des faits, des situations, des états de choses ou encore des fragments du “discours” divin. Certains, comme Ockham ou Holkot, ont nié que les propositions nécessitent une sémantique distincte de celle des expressions simples: selon eux en effet la sémantique des termes épuise celle de toutes leurs combinaisons. De fait, il s'agit là d'une manière élégante et efficace d'évacuer la difficulté. Mais y a-t-il vraiment une difficulté? Et si oui, quel bénéfice philosophique retire-t-on de l'affronter?

Dans ce qui suit, je m'intéresserai à deux fervents défenseurs de l'existence d'un signifié propre aux propositions—Jean Duns Scot et Gauthier Burley. Je montrerai *tout d'abord* comment Scot et Burley articulent leurs sémantiques propositionnelles et pourquoi ils la jugent non-éliminable; j'avancerai *ensuite* quelques raisons pour faire de Scot la source de Burley en cette matière; *enfin*, je proposerai une interprétation non-externaliste de ce qui, chez Scot et Burley, termine la chaîne de signification propositionnelle, à savoir, et respectivement, la *compositio rerum* et la *propositio in re*.

I. LA SÉMANTIQUE PROPOSITIONNELLE DE JEAN DUNS SCOT ET GAUTHIER BURLEY

Pour la plupart de médiévaux—mais nous verrons que Burley fait exception—une *propositio* est une expression linguistique particulière, comprise sous la catégorie générale de “signe”, et dont la différence spécifique est l’aléthicité, c’est-à-dire la propriété de posséder une valeur de vérité. De cette caractérisation sommaire, on peut tirer un questionnaire en trois points que se doit de traiter toute théorie de la proposition: 1. qu’est-ce qu’une proposition? 2. que signifie une proposition? 3. qu’est-ce qui rend une proposition vraie ou fausse? Ma présentation de la sémantique propositionnelle de Scot et Burley consistera à donner une réponse à ces trois questions pour chacun de ces auteurs.

I.1. *Jean Duns Scot*¹

a) Qu’est-ce qu’une proposition? Selon Scot, qui suit en cela presque littéralement Thomas d’Aquin tout en se réclamant de Boèce, le sujet du *De interpretatione* est un son vocal articulé signifiant par soi que quelque chose est ou n’est pas le cas, car, dit-il, qui interprète veut aussi exposer quelque chose, et exposer quelque chose ne peut se faire que par une expression *complexe*—sous-entendu: suffisamment complexe pour affirmer que quelque chose est ou n’est pas le cas.² Cela dit, une proposition peut être soit écrite, soit vocale, soit mentale, ces trois niveaux étant ordonnés puisque les propositions extramentales sont subordonnées aux propositions mentales: le *De interpretatione* a pour objet premier les propositions mentales, car le travail que le logicien

¹ Dans ce qui suit, je m’appuierai sur les textes suivants de Duns Scot: *Quaestiones in primum et secundum librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* (= QPh1 et QPh2) et *In duos libros Perihermeneias operis secundi quaestiones* (= QPh3), env. 1295, ed. G. Etzkorn – R. Green – T. Noone, in *Opera Philosophica* II, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004; *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (= QMP), env. 1300, ed. R. Andrews – G. Etzkorn – G. Gál – R. Green – F. Kelly – G. Marcil – T. Noone – R. Wood, in *Opera Philosophica* III et IV, St. Bonaventure, NY 1997.

² Ioannes Duns Scotus, QPh3, proem., n. 2: “Liber iste, qui dicitur Perihermenias, dicitur proprie liber De interpretatione, nam ‘interpretatio (ut vult Boethius super principium huius) est vox articulata significans aliquid per se’ esse vel non esse. [...] Si tamen in definitione interpretationis ponatur ‘vox articulata aliquid per se significans’, sic est interpretatio quid commune voci complexae et implexae. Sed quia interpretans vult aliquid exponere, et nihil exponi potest per simplicem dictionem, ideo nomina et verba sunt magis partes interpretationis quam interpretationes”.

fait sur les propositions extramentales, il ne le fait qu'en vertu des propositions mentales.³

b) Que signifie une proposition? Si toute proposition est un signe, toute proposition aura un signifié. Scot conçoit la signification des propositions comme une chaîne dont certains termes ne sont que signe ou que signifié, alors que d'autres sont à la fois signes et signifiés: une proposition écrite signifie une proposition vocale, laquelle signifie une proposition mentale, laquelle signifie à son tour le signifié ultime des propositions, ce que Scot appelle une *compositio rerum*.⁴ Notons que si, selon Scot, les propositions extramentales sont subordonnées aux propositions mentales, il ne s'agit pas d'une subordination identique à celle que l'on trouve chez Ockham puisque pour ce dernier il n'y a pas de relation de signification entre les mots et les concepts.

Arrêtons-nous un instant sur le signifié propositionnel ultime et tâchons de préciser la nature de cette *compositio rerum*. Trois points importants sont à souligner: il faut tout d'abord remarquer que la *compositio rerum* est le résultat d'un acte intellectuel de composition: il ne s'agit pas d'une entité donnée quelque part et que nous pourrions nous contenter de simplement saisir, mais bien de quelque chose que nous produisons en exerçant l'une de nos facultés mentales; ensuite, le mode d'être de la *compositio rerum* est celui de l'objet connu dans

³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPh1*, q. 1, n. 1: "Cum nulla pars logicae sit de voce ut de subiecto sicut dictum est in principio Praedicamentorum quaestione prima, quia omnes passionēs subiectorum in logica eis aequaliter inessent, nulla voce exsistente. Ergo enuntiatio potest hic convenienter poni subiectum, et hoc 'enuntiatio in mente', quia illa causatur ex secunda operatione intellectus"; et *ibid.*: "Quia quae hic determinantur, propter ipsam [*scil.* enuntiationem in mente] determinantur, puta primo de partibus eius integralibus, ut puta de nomine et verbo; secundo de eius genere, quod est oratio; deinde quid est ipsa, et de divisione eius in suas primas species; et consequenter de eius proprietatibus, oppositione scilicet, habitudine, et ceteris huiusmodi. Si autem istae proprietates insint enuntiationi in voce, hoc non est per se primo, sed in quantum illa est signum enuntiationis in mente".

⁴ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPh3*, q. 1, n. 10: "...oratio nec vera nec falsa dicitur quantum ad eius primum significatum; quia sic dicendo 'homo est animal', quantum ad primum eius significatum, non significat primo hominem in re esse animal; sed est primo signum huius quod est signum huius quod est hominem esse animal in re, ut ipse intellectus. Illud autem quod primo significatur est alterius signum"; et *QPh1*, q. 2, nn. 5-6: "...in hac oratione scripta 'homo est animal' primo uniuntur voces, quia illae primo significantur; sed non propter hoc est haec oratio scripta falsa. Videtur ergo dicendum ad illud quod, quantumcumque per idem multa significantur quorum unum significatur in quantum est signum alterius, si illud in oratione componatur cum alio, non est compositio signorum sed significatorum ultimorum, quae non sunt signa. Et per enuntiationem prolatam non significatur compositio specierum sed rerum, sicut nec per orationem scriptam significatur compositio vocum sed rerum".

le sujet connaissant, autrement dit, le signifié propositionnel possède un être objectif dans l'âme: il ne s'agit pas d'une *compositio rerum ut existunt*, mais bien d'une *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*; enfin, la *compositio rerum* se distingue non seulement des phrases écrites et parlées, mais aussi, d'une part, des propositions mentales proprement dites—lesquelles sont composées de similitudes ou *species* des choses—et, de l'autre, des choses en elles-mêmes, c'est-à-dire, des choses *ut existunt*:

Ad illud de compositione et divisione dico quod compositio non est ipsarum specierum sed rerum, non tamen ut existunt sed ut intelliguntur. Et ideo dicitur esse veritas et falsitas circa compositionem et divisionem intellectus, quia illa compositio causatur ab intellectu et est in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente, non autem ut accidens in subiecto. Et ita concedo de partibus compositionis, quia sunt in intellectu simplici ut cognitum in cognoscente; et isto modo sunt res in intellectu, non species solae.⁵

c) Qu'est-ce qui rend une proposition vraie ou fausse? Il y a manifestement chez Scot une principe de vérification (ou *truth-making*) des propositions, c'est-à-dire qu'il existe une entité en vertu de laquelle une proposition vraie est vraie. Appelons, à la suite d'Alain de Libera, une telle entité un vérificateur.⁶ Quelle est l'entité qui rend vraie une proposition vraie? La réponse que donne Scot à cette question met son lecteur devant une difficulté. En effet, Scot affirme, d'un côté, que ce qui rend vraie une proposition vraie est son signifié ultime—et nous savons maintenant qu'il s'agit d'une *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*. Une proposition est vraie lorsqu'elle est conforme à son signifié ultime, fausse lorsqu'elle ne l'est pas.⁷ D'un autre côté, Scot insiste sur le fait que ce qui importe pour la vérité propositionnelle est l'état de la réalité extramentale, un *sic esse vel non esse in re*.⁸ Or nous venons

⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPh1*, q. 2, n. 9.

⁶ Cf. A. de Libera, *La référence vide. Théories de la proposition*, Paris 2002, pp. 93–155.

⁷ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPh1*, q. 2, n. 4: "... intelligendum quod veritas et falsitas non sunt in signo nisi per significatum. Veritas enim est conformitas eius cum significato, et difformitas falsitas. [...] omnis igitur veritas cuiuscumque propositionis referenda est ad res, quia illae sunt ultimo significatae et non signa".

⁸ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPh3*, q. 1, n. 12: "Ad ultimum dico quod ad veritatem orationis requiritur esse rei extra animam, quia res ipsa est mensura intellectus. Intellectus enim non dicitur verus, nisi propter sic esse in re; si enim oratio significaret hoc quod est in intellectu, ut passionem unam esse aliam, procederet ratio [*scil.* quod haec est vera 'Sortes est' Sorte non existente]. Sic autem non significat, quia est esse rei,

de voir que le signifié propositionnel ultime, la *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*, se distingue précisément des choses en elles-mêmes, les choses *ut existunt*. Les propositions vraies ont-elles deux causes de vérité, l'une dans l'âme, et l'autre en-dehors de l'âme? Le problème est d'autant plus dérangent qu'il semble aller de soi que ce dont doit dépendre la vérité ou la fausseté des propositions ne peut être quelque chose de purement mental; en effet—et Scot insiste sans cesse sur ce point—lorsque nous formons des propositions, ce n'est pas de nos états mentaux dont nous parlons, mais bien du monde extramental. La difficulté disparaît à mon sens si l'on considère qu'il existe une relation de fondation entre le signifié propositionnel ultime (la *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*) et la réalité extramentale (le *sic esse vel non esse in re*). Le signifié ultime d'une proposition vraie est lui-même conforme à un état de la réalité extramentale—plus précisément, la *compositio rerum* effectuée par l'intellect est fondée dans les choses extramentales et les relations qui, dit Scot, existent virtuellement entre elles.⁹ Par suite, une proposition fautive est celle dont le signifié ultime n'est pas fondé dans un état de la réalité extramentale. La proposition 'Sortes est asinus' est fautive parce que la *compositio rerum* qu'elle signifie n'est fondée sur aucune relation existant dans les choses extramentales. La proposition 'Sortes est homo' est vraie pour la raison inverse.

En résumé, le dispositif propositionnel de Scot—j'appelle dispositif propositionnel l'ensemble des entités requises pour expliquer le fonctionnement sémantique d'une proposition—le dispositif propositionnel de Scot, donc, comprend cinq niveaux, ou, si l'on veut, trois niveaux plus deux: nous avons des propositions écrites, vocales et mentales—c'est le schéma boécien de la *triplex oratio*; puis nous avons la réalité extramentale, les compositions de choses en tant qu'elles existent (*ut existunt*) ou le *sic esse vel non esse in re* et enfin les compositions de

sed significat signum huius quod est 'hoc esse hoc'. Ideo ad veritatem, vel falsitatem sermonis oportet sic esse, vel non esse in re".

⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QMP*, VI, q. 3, n. 51: "Nota, sicut dictum est, quare complexum est verum. Quia complexionem, quae est a ratione, praecedit naturaliter identitas extremorum, vel alia habitudo virtualiter inclusa in ipsis, cui actum rationis conformari ut mensurae est ipsum verum esse"; et *ibid.*, n. 48: "...obiectum simplex, quod est significatum conceptus simplicis, nullum esse habet aliud quam in conceptu. [...] Obiecta conceptus complexi, quae sunt extrema, aliud esse habent quam ut sunt in conceptu complexo; et prius naturaliter in se, ut simplicia sunt, secundum quod esse prius mensurant illum conceptum complexum—cui 'esse priori' conceptum complexum conformari est verum esse, difformari est falsum esse—hoc 'esse' est habitudo inclusa virtualiter in extremis ante naturaliter quam extrema comparentur a ratione".

choses en tant qu'elles sont intelligées (*ut intelliguntur*). Le bénéfice philosophique essentiel d'une telle théorie est la mise à distance du signifié propositionnel ultime par rapport au plan des choses existant *hic et nunc* dans la réalité extramentale. Cela permet aux propositions vraies portant sur des situations passées ou même futures d'être dotées, au moment de leur énonciation, d'une *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*, laquelle, comme nous l'avons vu, est à la fois le signifié ultime et la cause de vérité des propositions. Ainsi la théorie de la proposition de Scot lui permet-elle par exemple de défendre la thèse selon laquelle la proposition 'Caesar est homo' est vraie *Caesare non existente*.¹⁰

I.2. Gauthier Burley¹¹

a) Qu'est-ce qu'une proposition? Le traitement de cette première question occupera la plus grande partie de notre brève reconstruction de la théorie burleyenne de la proposition. Comme la plupart des médiévaux, Burley reprend à son compte la définition de la proposition donnée par Boèce en deux endroits du *De topicis differentiis* (PL 64, 1174B et 1177C): une proposition dit Burley—et il parle ici d'*enunciatio*—est un discours dans lequel se trouve le vrai ou le faux: "oratio in qua est verum vel falsum".¹² Une telle définition n'est toutefois pas compatible

¹⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *QPhI*, q. 8, n. 6: "...possunt tales propositiones [scil. 'Caesar est homo, Caesare non existente'] concedi esse verae, quia ad veritatem propositionis affirmativae sufficit unio extremorum. Hoc enim solum significat propositio affirmativa; sed sic est in proposito; in intellectu enim subiecti per se includitur intellectus praedicati"; et *ibid.*: "...ad necessitatem propositionis sufficit necessaria concomitantia extremorum, ita quod posito uno ponitur alterum, licet neutrum necessario existat".

¹¹ Pour une approche de la théorie de la *propositio in re* dans une perspective de systématisation de l'*ordo significationis*, cf. la contribution de S. Meier-Oeser dans le présent volume. Les textes de Burley cités dans cette section sont les suivants: *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* (= *QPh*), 1301, ed. S.F. Brown, *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), pp. 200–295; *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum* (= *QAPo*), av. 1307, ed. M.C. Sommers, Toronto 2000; *Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias* (= *CM*), env. 1310, ed. S.F. Brown, *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), pp. 45–134; *Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (1337), Venetiis 1497, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967: *Liber Predicamentorum*, (= *LPraed*), et *Liber Perihermenias*, (= *LPh*).

¹² Gualterus de Burley, *CM*, 1.6: "Haec enim est definitio enunciationis: 'oratio in qua est verum vel falsum'. Et Philosophus utens magna brevitate simul innuit divisionem orationis et definitionem enuntiationis. In hoc enim quod dicit 'enunciativa non omnis' innuit quod oratio dividitur in enunciativam et non enunciativam; per hoc quod dicit 'in qua est verum vel falsum' ponit definitionem enunciationis. Oratio enim dividitur in enunciativam et non enunciativam, sed solum enunciativa est praesentis speculationis, quia ipsa sola significat verum vel falsum".

avec l'usage que fait Burley de la notion de proposition non seulement dans la suite de ce même commentaire, mais également dans ses autres textes, antérieurs et postérieurs. En effet, une *oratio* est un discours; or le trait le plus marquant de la théorie de la proposition de Burley consiste précisément en cela qu'il étend la notion de proposition au-delà de la sphère du discours, mais aussi, et cela est particulièrement remarquable, au-delà de la sphère des signes.

La partie demeurant constante du dispositif propositionnel burleyien à travers son évolution entre 1301 et 1337 est exceptionnellement limitée, puisqu'elle ne concerne que les propositions écrites et vocales, c'est-à-dire les propositions extramentales qui sont indubitablement des signes. Les interventions originales de Burley ont lieu au niveau de la proposition mentale. J'en donnerai maintenant un bref récapitulatif en considérant les différents textes dans leur ordre chronologique.

En 1301, Burley affirme deux choses pour le moins surprenantes de l'*enunciatio in mente*: *premièrement*, une proposition mentale se compose de choses extramentales; *deuxièmement*, une proposition mentale n'est pas un signe.¹³ Notons que le dispositif propositionnel de 1301 ne comprend pas de proposition mentale au sens usuel de l'expression:

¹³ Gualterus de Burley, *QPh*, 3.55: "Ad quaestionem dicendum quod enunciatio est triplex: quaedam in voce, et illa est oratio prolata, et quaedam in scripto et quaedam in mente. [...] Oratio prolata sive enunciatio prolata componitur ex vocibus prolatis. Enunciatio scripta componitur ex litteris scriptis. Et enunciatio in mente componitur ex illis quae intellectus intelligit esse eadem sive sint voces sive res extra"; et *ibid.*, 3.553: "Circa enunciationem in mente sciendum quod ista componitur ex rebus quas intellectus asserit esse eadem et diversa. Si enim intellectus asserat voces esse easdem, talis enunciatio componitur ex vocibus. Et si asserat res extra animam esse easdem, talis enunciatio componitur ex rebus extra animam. Unde cum voces prolatae significant passiones animae, ut communiter dicitur, et passiones animae significant res extra, oportet concedere quod tandem sit deveniendum ad aliquid quod sic est significatum quod non significans. Cum igitur ista enunciatio prolata 'homo est animal' significat aliquid—sit illud A. Aut A significat aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil, tunc A est propositio in mente. Si aliquid, sit illud B, et quaerendum est de B eodem modo sicut prius. Si B nihil significet, sed sic significetur quod non significat, B est propositio in mente. Si B significet aliquid erit processus ad infinitum. Unde breviter: illud quod significetur per propositionem prolatam sive significetur mediate sive immediate, dum modo sit tale quod non significat aliquid aliud ulterius, illud voco propositionem in mente"; et *ibid.*, 3.554: "Uterius est intelligendum quod propositio in mente non componitur ex rebus compositione reali sicut domus componitur ex lignis et lapidibus, sed solum est ibi compositio intellectualis quae fit ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit aliqua esse eadem et diversa. Unde Commentator, IV *Metaphysicae*, commento ultimo: 'Entia vera, cuiusmodi sunt propositiones, facta sunt ab intellectu quando divisit ea ab invicem aut composuit ea ad invicem'. Ex quo patet quod in propositione secundum esse in mente non est nisi intellectualis compositio".

selon Burley en effet, l'*enunciatio in mente* n'est pas un complexe de concepts, mais de choses.

Avant 1307, soit dans ses *Questions sur les Seconds analytiques*, le *Doctor planus* distingue entre une proposition *proposita tantum*—elle n'est pas signe, mais seulement signifié—, une proposition *proponens et proposita*—elle est à la fois signe et signifié—et une proposition *proponens tantum*, laquelle n'est que signe.¹⁴ Deux changements notables se sont produits par rapport aux *Quaestiones* de 1301: premièrement, le dispositif propositionnel comprend maintenant une proposition mentale au sens usuel de l'expression—c'est la *propositio proponens et proposita*—laquelle est composée de concepts;¹⁵ deuxièmement, la proposition composée de choses—c'est la *propositio proposita tantum*—est explicitement située dans l'intellect et Burley lui attribue un être objectif ou *esse obiectivum*.¹⁶

En 1310 environ, soit dans le *Commentaire* dit moyen du *Perihermeneias*, Burley franchit un pas supplémentaire: il divise explicitement la proposition mentale en deux types distincts, les propositions mentales subjective et objective. A propos de cette dernière, la proposition mentale objective, Burley précise que l'on peut parler de *propositio in re*. Voici le texte en question:

Ad istud dicendum quod in intellectu est duplex propositio: una quae efficitur ab intellectu et habet esse subiectivum in intellectu, et talem propositionem vocat Philosophum ens verum. Alia est propositio quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu. Unde loquendo de ista 'homo est animal' secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: sic uno modo efficitur ab intellectu ex hoc quod intellectus asserit hominem et animal esse idem; alio modo ista 'homo est animal' habet esse obiectivum in intellectu solum.

¹⁴ Gualterus de Burley, *QAPo*, 2.49: "...dicendum quod sicut propositio potest accipi materialiter ex quibus componitur, sic eodem modo syllogismus. Nam quaedam est propositio proposita tantum, et illa propositio est propositio passive dicta; et quaedam est propositio proponens tantum; et quaedam est propositio prop<on>ens et proposita. Propositio primo modo dicta componitur ex rebus compositione intellectuali et non compositione reali; et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signato. Propositio secundo modo dicta componitur ex vocibus significativis; et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signo. Propositio tertio modo accepta componitur ex conceptibus".

¹⁵ Gualterus de Burley, *QAPo*, 2.49: "Propositio tertio modo accepta [*scil.* proponens et proposita] componitur ex conceptibus".

¹⁶ Gualterus de Burley, *QAPo*, 2.53: "Ad ultimum dicitur negando istam consequentiam 'componitur ex rebus, ergo est res extra animam', quia ista compositio non est compositio realis, sed intelligibilis sive intellectualis. [...] Unde syllogismus demonstrativus compositus ex rebus nec habet esse in anima subiective nec esse extra animam subiective, sed solum esse obiective".

Et alia est propositio quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu et alia quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu. Sub aliis verbis: possumus dicere quod quaedam est propositio in re et quaedam in intellectu, appellando illam propositionem quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu propositio in re et aliam quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu propositio in intellectu.¹⁷

Notons que la *proposito in re* ou proposition mentale objective est une espèce du genre “proposition mentale” et que la clause ‘in intellectu’ n’est pas simplement déterminante, mais bien modifiante. Pour le dire en des termes quelque peu exotiques pour les médiévaux, s’il est possible qu’une voiture *rouge* roule sur des routes et transporte des passagers, mais que cela est absolument hors de portée d’une voiture *mentale*, cela tient au fait trivial qu’à la différence d’une voiture rouge, une voiture mentale *n’est pas* une voiture. Il en va de même pour les choses: une *res in intellectu* n’est pas une *res*.

En 1337 enfin, Burley revient sur sa théorie de la proposition dans deux textes: le *Liber Praedicamentorum* et le *Liber Perihermeneias*. Dans le premier, après avoir rappelé qu’il reprend ici des idées développées auparavant par lui-même, Burley distingue à nouveau quatre niveaux propositionnels: il y a des propositions écrites, des propositions prononcées, des propositions composées de concepts et des propositions composées de choses;¹⁸ dans le second, il dérouté son lecteur en annonçant quatre types de propositions tout en en dénombrant finalement

¹⁷ Gualterus de Burley, *CM*, 1.26.

¹⁸ Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. 15vb: “Ad illud dubium recole me dixisse et in scriptis reliquisse, quod intellectus potest facere propositionem ex quibuscumque, quia intellectus potest asserere illa esse eadem vel diversa, quia propositio non est aliud quam compositio aliquorum per intellectum ad invicem ut propositio affirmativa, aut divisio aliquorum ab invicem ut propositio negativa. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest componere ad invicem aut dividere ab invicem possunt esse partes orationis, et per consequens esse subiecta vel predicata. Sed intellectus potest ad invicem componere res asserendo illas esse easdem et potest dividere res ab invicem asserendo illas non esse easdem, potest etiam intellectus componere voces et conceptus ad invicem. Et ideo aliqua propositio componitur ex rebus extra animam, aliqua ex vocibus, aliqua ex conceptibus”; et *ibid.*, f. 16ra: “Est enim talis ordo in significando secundum philosophum primo perihermeneias: littere scripte significant voces prolatas, et voces prolatae passionem anime, et passionem anime id est conceptus anime significant res. Unde sicut in isto ordine est dare primum significans scilicet litteram scriptam, ita est dare ultimum significatum, quod sic significatur quod ulterius non significat. Et illud non potest esse conceptus. Ergo est res, distinguendo rem contra vocem et conceptum. Ergo in rebus est aliquid compositum, cuius subiectum est res et predicatum similiter, quod dicitur propositio in re”.

cinq:¹⁹ il y a des propositions *in scripto*, *in prolotione*, *in mente* et *in re*, mais, ajoute Burley, la proposition *in mente* est double, puisqu'il existe une proposition mentale subjective et une proposition mentale objective. Il existe une incompatibilité manifeste entre tous les textes examinés précédemment et cette ultime formulation de la théorie. En effet, jusqu'ici, la *propositio in re* a toujours été présentée—explicitement ou implicitement—comme une espèce de proposition *in mente*, en l'occurrence, comme une proposition possédant un être objectif dans l'intellect. Or il semble maintenant que la *propositio in re* soit distinguée de toute espèce de propositions mentales.

Comment comprendre cela? Conformément au principe de charité herméneutique, il faut admettre que notre auteur est cohérent, et, par suite, qu'il ne se contredit pas. Quelles sont les possibilités qui s'offrent à nous? Il en existe sans doute plusieurs, mais je me bornerai à esquisser celle que je crois la meilleure: Burley fait un usage équivoque de l'expression 'propositio in re' et il ne le fait ni par hasard, ni par erreur. Je m'explique: si l'expression 'propositio in re' désigne tantôt une proposition mentale objective, tantôt un complexe de choses extramentales, c'est que la proposition mentale objective est une entité mentale *fondée* sur une entité extramentale—Burley utilise à diverses reprises l'expression 'percipere veritatem extra'.²⁰ Aucune proposition n'est entièrement composée en-dehors de l'âme, dit Burley; toutefois il *peut* correspondre à une proposition vraie un complexe réel entièrement composé en-dehors de l'âme.²¹ Bref, l'équivoque sur l'expression

¹⁹ Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. 43rb: "Sciendum quod propositio habet esse quatuor modis: scilicet in scripto, in prolotione et in mente et etiam in re ut visum est superius in isto libro. Propositio in mente est duplex quia quedam habet esse subiective in mente et talis propositio componitur ex conceptibus et quedam est propositio habens esse obiective in intellectu et huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus et ex partibus habentibus solum esse obiective in intellectu..."

²⁰ Gualterus de Burley, *CM*, 1.61: "Intelligendum quod multae sunt species orationis, quoniam homo per intellectum non solum percipit veritatem rei sive identitatem vel diversitatem rerum sed etiam homo per intellectum habet aliqua ordinare et dirigere"; et *ibid.*, 1.27: "Unde dico quod res significata per istam 'homo est animal' non dependet ab intellectu nec etiam veritas istius rei; immo ista esset vera etsi nullus intellectus consideraret. Et ista similiter 'chimaera est chimaera' esset vera etsi numquam aliquis intellectus consideraret. Istis tamen sic se habentibus in re correspondent propositiones in intellectu quas intellectus efficit ex hoc quod percipit tales veritates extra".

²¹ Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. 16rb: "Dico ergo quod nulla propositio est composita ex rebus totaliter extra animam quia formale in tali propositione est in mente vel in intellectu. Materialia autem sunt extra animam. Unde cum propositio sit triplex, quaedam in prolotione, quaedam in conceptu et quaedam significata per propositionem in conceptu que potest dici propositio in re, propositio primo modo dicta, scilicet pro-

‘propositio in re’ s’explique et se justifie à la fois par le fait qu’elle exprime de manière forte la relation de fondation existant entre une proposition mentale objective et le complexe réel extramental sur lequel elle est fondée. Considérons maintenant brièvement les deux autres points de notre questionnaire.

b) Que signifie une proposition? Burley conçoit la signification propositionnelle comme une chaîne dont le terme, le *significatum quod non aliquid ulterius significat*, est une *propositio in re*.²² Une telle conception de l’*ordo significationis* conduit notre auteur à parler, comme Scot avant lui, de signifié ultime (*significatum ultimum*) de la proposition.

c) Qu’est-ce qui rend une proposition vraie ou fausse? La *propositio in re* occupe ici aussi le devant de la scène. La nature exacte de son rôle doit toutefois être soigneusement précisée. D’une part, dit Burley, il faut qu’il existe quelque chose dans la réalité extramentale qui corresponde ou soit proportionné à une proposition vraie;²³ de l’autre, il existe des propositions manifestement vraies auxquelles ne correspond rien dans la réalité extramentale *au moment de leur formation*, par exemple, la proposition ‘Caesar est Caesar’ prononcée après l’an 44 avant notre ère. Dans ce cas, dit Burley, l’entité

positio in prolotione, est totaliter extra animam et talis propositio totaliter componitur ex vocibus que habent esse extra animam. Propositio vero composita ex conceptibus est totaliter in intellectu. Et compositio composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectum”; et *ibid.*, 16va: “Sed dubium est, an ipsi copule existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum quod copule existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis vere ad invicem correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet idemptitas extremorum vel idemptitas eorum, pro quibus extrema supponunt, divisioni vero vel negationi copule in propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt. Sed copule existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis false adinvicem nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema ut patet de copula huius propositionis ‘homo est asinus’”.

²² Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. 15vb: “Quod autem propositio possit componi ex rebus probatur quatuor modis. Et primo sic: in omnibus significantibus et significatis et ordinatis in significando est devenire ad ultimum significatum, quod ita significatur quod ulterius non significat. Aliter esset processus in infinitum in essentialiter ordinatis contra Philosophum”.

²³ Gualterus de Burley, *LPh*, f. 58rb: “Sed utrum sit aliqua propositio composita ex rebus extra animam dictum est supra in principio libri praedicamentorum. Supposito vero quod non sit aliqua propositio in re composita ex rebus, ut communiter dicitur, est dubium quid ex parte rei correspondeat veritati et falsitati propositionis in mente et in prolotione. Oportet enim quod ei correspondeat aliquid in re per quod tunc dicamus quod verum est quod propositio in mente et in prolotione est vera, quia sic significat sicut est in re. Ad hoc igitur quod propositio sit vera oportet quod sit in re sicut propositio significat et per consequens veritati propositionis in mente et in voce et in scripto correspondet aliquid proportionale”.

qui rend vraie une telle proposition n'est pas un complexe existant dans la réalité extramentale, mais un complexe dont le mode d'être est distinct de l'existence actuelle. Burley parle alors d'un être "maximalement transcendant" ou encore d'un être "commun à tout ce qui est intelligible".²⁴ Autrement dit, une proposition vraie empiriquement vérifiable *hic et nunc* est rendue vraie par un complexe réel extramental distinct de la *propositio in re* ou proposition mentale qu'est son signifié ultime. En revanche, une proposition vraie qui n'est pas empiriquement vérifiable *hic et nunc* est rendue vraie par un complexe seulement intelligible ou transcendant et dont j'incline à croire qu'il se confond avec le signifié ultime de cette proposition. Bref, dans tous les cas de figure, la *propositio in re* est le signifié propositionnel ultime, mais dans certains cas—comme celui de la proposition 'Caesar est Caesar'—la *propositio in re* cumule les fonctions de signifié ultime et de vérificateur.

En résumé, le dispositif propositionnel de Burley comprend cinq niveaux: les propositions écrite, prononcée, mentale subjective (composée de concepts), mentale objective (composée de choses objectivement présentes dans l'intellect) et les complexes réels extramentaux. L'expression 'propositio in re' désigne la plupart du temps une proposition mentale objective, toutefois, en vertu de la relation de fondation qui existe entre une proposition mentale objective et le complexe extramental correspondant, il arrive également que Burley renvoie à un tel complexe extramental au moyen de l'expression 'propositio in re'. Le bénéfice philosophique d'une telle théorie est évident: elle permet de développer et de maintenir une conception correspondantiste de la

²⁴ Gualterus de Burley, *LPh*, f. 58rb: "Et si dicatur quod est affirmativa vera quando non est talis identitas quia hec est vera 'Caesar est Caesar' et tamen non est aliqua identitas, similiter negativa potest esse vera sine tali diversitate illorum pro quibus supponit subiectum et predicatum, ut patet. Ista enim est vera 'Caesar non est Plato' et tamen Caesar et Plato non sunt diversa cum non sint entia et idem et diversum sunt differentie entis. Dicendum quod Caesare corrupto identitas est Caesaris ad Caesarem, sed illa identitas non existit, sed est identitas rationis. Et idem Caesarem [sic] idem Caesari identitate quae non est nec oportet quod idem et diversum semper sint differentie entis maxime transcendentis quod scilicet est in intellectu. Unde sic potest dici, quod ens dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ut est commune omni intelligibili, alio modo idem est quod existens. Sic idem et diversum dicitur uno modo ut sunt differentie entis transcendentis, alio modo ut sunt differentie entis in effectu, hoc est in actu existentis"; pour d'autres passages de Burley dans lesquels apparaît la notion d'*ens maxime transcendens* ou d'*ens commune omni intelligibili*, cf. Gualterus de Burley, *De puritate artis logicae, Tractatus longior*, ed. P. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, NY 1955, p. 59; *De ente*, ed. H. Shapiro, *Manuscripta* 7 (1963), pp. 107–108; *Tractatus de formis*, ed. J.D. Scott, München 1970, p. 46.

vérité dans tous les cas de figure et pourvoit toutes les propositions vraies de corrélatifs objectifs.

II. SCOT COMME SOURCE DE BURLEY

Il existe une série remarquable de parallèles entre les théories de la proposition de Jean Duns Scot et de Gauthier Burley. Considérons les six points suivants:

- *premièrement*, les dispositifs propositionnels de Scot et de Burley comprennent un nombre identique de niveaux, à savoir cinq;
- *deuxièmement*, les deux dispositifs comprennent, en aval de la proposition mentale au sens usuel du terme, un niveau mental que l'on pourrait qualifier d'intentionnel (c'est le niveau du signifié ultime des propositions, la *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur* de Scot et de la *propositio in re* de Burley) et un niveau extramental réel (c'est le niveau des vérifacteurs des propositions—la *compositio rerum ut existunt* de Scot et la *propositio in re* dans son acception ambiguë pour Burley);
- *troisièmement* et en conséquence, la dissociation de la proposition mentale en une proposition mentale subjective et une proposition mentale objective telle que nous l'avons trouvée chez Burley est de fait présente chez Scot lorsque celui-ci distingue des complexes de *species* et des complexes de *res ut intelliguntur* dans l'âme;
- *quatrièmement*, la conception de la signification propositionnelle comme étant une chaîne aboutissant à un signifié ultime composé de choses existant objectivement dans l'intellect est présente chez Scot avant de se retrouver chez Burley;
- *cinquièmement*, chez Scot comme chez Burley, le signifié ultime des propositions est une entité soumise à une double dépendance: d'une part, son existence dépend d'un acte mental—il ne peut y avoir de *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur* ni de *propositio in re* sans l'activité d'un intellect; d'autre part, ces deux entités sont, comme leurs noms l'indiquent, dépendantes des choses—il ne peut y avoir de *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur* ni de *propositio in re* s'il n'y a pas de *res*. Ces deux traits communs en font des entités à la fois mentales, accidentelles et objectivement fondées dans la réalité extramentale;
- *sixièmement*, Scot et Burley opèrent tous deux une dissociation féconde entre existence en acte d'une entité *x* et signification en acte

de x par une proposition: la *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur* et la *propositio in re* ne sont pas mécaniquement liées à l'existence ou à la non-existence actuelle de choses extramentales. Elles ne sont pas ce que nous appellerions aujourd'hui en anglais des *supervenient entities*.

Quant à ce qui sépare les dispositifs propositionnels de Scot et Burley, il faut faire état de la différence fondamentale suivante, laquelle concerne la portée de la notion de proposition. En effet, alors que Scot utilise le terme 'propositio' exclusivement pour parler de signes linguistiques (écrits, vocaux ou mentaux), Burley transgresse ce cadre traditionnel et étend l'usage de la notion à des complexes de choses existant soit objectivement dans l'intellect, soit subjectivement hors de lui. Cette manière de faire sera reprise par certains logiciens: on peut mentionner ici l'auteur de la *Logica ad rudium*,²⁵ le *Pseudo Campsall* dans sa *Logica valde realis contra Ockham*,²⁶ mais aussi et surtout, plus tard, John Wyclif et sa théorie de la prédication réelle.²⁷

²⁵ *Logica ad Rudium*, II, 5–9 (ed. L.M. de Rijk, *Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica 'Ad rudium'*, Nijmegen 1981, pp. 59–60): "Et hic est unum dubium utrum aliqua propositio, sive aliquod complexum, componatur ex rebus existentibus extra animam. Et videtur michi posse dici probabiliter quod sic. Primo quia virtus sensitiva, ut distinguitur contra intellectivam, format aliquod complexum de sensibilibus [...]. Ergo virtus sensitiva, ut distinguitur contra intellectivam, format aliquando aliquod complexum de sensibilibus, et per consequens tale complexum componitur ex rebus sensibilibus extra animam existentibus. [...] Preterea. Eius est primo complexum cui primo et propter se assentitur; non enim assentio termino nisi propter rem. Ergo complexum primo est ipisus rei. Preterea. Voluntas primo diligit rem. Ergo primo intelligit eam, qui nichil amat nisi cognitum, secundum Augustinum. Si ergo primo intelligit eam, ex ea debet primo formare complexum".

²⁶ *Pseudo-Campsall, Logica valde realis contra Ockham*, c. 13 (ed. E.A. Synan, *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, vol. 2, Toronto 1982, p. 116): "Ante, enim, quam ista propositio 'sortes est homo' formetur in mente, vere est in re—non quod isti termini, vel iste voces in re precedant, sed una propositio correspondens. Sicut, enim, vni propositioni in voce correspondet vna propositio in mente—non quod iste propositiones in mente precedant, sed precedit una propositio que significat idem et pro eisdem verificatur de quibus verificatur propositio vocalis et pro tanto dicitur quod propositio formata in voce prius formatur in mente—ita propositioni in mente correspondet et precedit propositio in re, a veritate cuius propositionis dependet veritas propositionum mentalium et vocalium, et licet in veritate ita sit, tamen, propositio ista nobis latet nec innotescit nisi per propositiones mentales vel vocales".

²⁷ Ioannes Wiclefus, *De universalibus*, 1 (ed. I.J. Mueller, Oxford 1985, p. 27, 157–160): "...diligenter est notandum de triplici praedicandi manerie, scilicet de praedicatione formali, de praedicatione secundum essentiam et de praedicatione secundum habitudinem. Talis autem praedicatio principaliter est ex parte rei". Pour une présentation parallèle de la triple division de la prédication réelle, cf. Ioannes Wiclefus, *Purgans errores circa universalialia*, c. 2, in S.H. Thomson, "A lost chapter of Wyclif's Summa de

III. UN "EXTERNALISME" HEURISTIQUE

Avant de conclure considérons brièvement la question délicate de savoir de quelle nature est la *propositio in re*, cette entité qui est à la fois le signifié ultime, le corrélat objectif et, parfois, le vérificateur d'une proposition.²⁸ Posé en ces termes, le problème semble relativement simple: la réalité extramentale, c'est-à-dire *les choses* tout court, sont idéalement placées. En effet, nos énoncés portent la plupart du temps sur des *choses* et, en ce sens, les *signifient*; de plus, on dira d'un discours qu'il est vrai s'il est conforme ou adéquat aux *choses* sur lesquelles il porte; enfin, les *choses* existant hors de tout intellect et donc hors de tout sujet, elles feront parfaitement l'affaire comme corrélatifs objectifs des propositions. Pour toutes ces raisons, Gauthier Burley appelle le signifié propositionnel ultime une proposition *in re*—une proposition *dans les choses*.

Mais pourquoi appelle-t-il ce signifié ultime une *propositio*? La raison de ce choix est la suivante: tout ce qui peut entrer dans une composition intellectuelle—c'est-à-dire tout ce qui peut être élément d'un composé réalisé par l'intellect—tout cela peut également être le terme d'une proposition, dit Burley. Or, poursuit le *Doctor planus*, l'intellect est en mesure de composer les unes avec les autres des choses extramentales. Par suite, rien ne s'oppose à ce que l'on appelle 'propositio' un complexe de choses extramentales. Bref, le signifié propositionnel ultime burleyen est appelé 'propositio' parce qu'il s'agit d'un composé réalisé par l'intellect et il est qualifié comme étant 'in re' parce que cela lui confère le degré d'objectivité requis par les notions de signification et de vérité.

ente", *Speculum* 4 (1929), pp. 339–346. Pour deux exposés excellents de la théorie de la prédication de Wyclif, cf. A. Conti, "Logica intensionale e metafisica dell'essenza in John Wyclif", *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 99 (1993), pp. 159–219 (pp. 210–218) et P.V. Spade, *Introduction*, in Ioannes Wiclefus, *On Universals*, trad. par A. Kenny, Oxford 1985, pp. xxxi–xlvi.

²⁸ Dans une étude publiée en 2000 ("Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 68 (2001), pp. 155–221) je proposais de comprendre la *propositio in re* comme étant une entité hybride, flottant pour ainsi dire entre le mental et l'extramentale. J'ai aujourd'hui révisé ce jugement. Ce n'est pas faire justice à un penseur de la trempe de Burley que de lui attribuer des entités dépourvues d'une identité stable. En conséquence, on trouvera ici une lecture de la *propositio in re* respectant la formulation suivante du principe du tiers exclu: ou bien une entité est dans l'intellect, ou bien elle n'y est pas, et cette alternative épuise toutes les possibilités. Pour une analyse plus détaillée des positions de Scot et Burley ainsi que de leur relation, cf. L. Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif*, Paris 2007.

Tout lecteur de Burley se pose alors la question suivante: comment faut-il comprendre l'affirmation selon laquelle l'intellect est en mesure de composer les unes avec les autres des choses extramentales? Burley soutient-il que l'intellect a la capacité d'agir dans le monde extramentale comme le font, par exemple, les mains d'un artisan? Certes non, et il insiste sur ce point: le complexe qu'est une *propositio in re* est *intellectuellement* composé, alors que le complexe qu'est, par exemple, une maison, est *réellement* composé. S'il existait une *propositio in re* comme 'corpus est anima intellectiva', il ne s'agirait pas d'un homme, et ce, même si un homme est bien composé d'un corps et d'une âme intellectuelle. L'homme est un composé réel, la *propositio in re* 'corpus est anima intellectiva', un composé intellectuel.²⁹

Cette différence constitue un indice fort pour ne pas comprendre l'expression 'propositio in re' en son sens littéral: il n'y a pas, dans la nature, à côté des villes, des voitures et des arbres, des propositions composées par l'intellect. Cette constatation conduit à adopter une lecture de l'expression 'propositio in re' comme étant une expression dont la fonction est essentiellement *heuristique*. Il ne s'agit pas de la description précise et exacte de quelque chose, mais d'une *expression* particulièrement bien choisie, exprimant à la fois l'*objectivité* du signifié propositionnel et la relation de *dépendance* dans laquelle il se trouve par rapport à l'intellect et aux choses. Bref, la clause 'in re' n'est pas une indication de lieu—la théorie de Burley n'est pas externaliste—, mais de dépendance: une *propositio in re* est un complexe mental objectivement fondé dans les choses. C'est la raison pour laquelle je propose de comprendre la *propositio in re* comme étant un *contenu cognitif* ou encore un *objet intentionnel*.

CONCLUSION

En guise de conclusion, deux points peuvent être soulignés. Le premier est simplement récapitulatif: une analyse des réponses apportées par

²⁹ Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. 16va: "Ad aliud cum dicitur quod aliqua propositio esset homo quia aliqua propositio componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, est dicendum quod ex hoc non sequitur quod aliqua propositio sit homo. Et cum dicitur omne quod componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva esse homo, dicendum quod omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione reali est homo, tamen non oportet quod omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione intellectuali sit homo".

Scot et Burley aux trois questions portant sur la nature, la signification et la vérification des propositions montre que Burley dépend de Scot dans sa théorie de la proposition, et en particulier pour ce qui est de sa conception du signifié propositionnel ultime, autrement dit, de la fameuse *propositio in re*. Si tel est le cas, il faut bien admettre que la cote d'originalité de Burley doit être revue à la baisse et sa théorie ne doit en aucun cas être lue comme étant externaliste: la *propositio in re* n'est pas un fait ou une situation, mais une entité mentale objectivement présente dans l'intellect, un objet immanent ou encore, intentionnel.

Le second point, plus spéculatif, rejoint les réflexions proposées ici-même par S. Meier-Oeser.³⁰ S'il fallait désigner un *analogon* de la *propositio in re* dans la philosophie moderne et contemporaine, où faudrait-il le chercher? Je suis en accord avec Meier-Oeser quant au champ de recherche—la philosophie dite “autrichienne”—, mais je ne le suis pas jusqu'au bout, à savoir jusqu'à la suggestion de retenir les *Sachverhalte* tels que les présente Wittgenstein dans le *Tractatus*, et ce pour la raison suivante: la *compositio rerum ut intelliguntur*, comme la *propositio in re* sont des entités mentales, c'est-à-dire localisées dans l'esprit et dépendantes d'un acte mental; autant de propriétés qu'elles ne partagent évidemment pas avec les *Sachverhalte*. Existe-t-il de meilleures candidats? Les platoniciens ou platonisants comme Bolzano, Meinong, Frege ou Reinach sont à éliminer pour les mêmes raisons—si le troisième monde est quelque part, ce n'est certainement pas dans la sphère mentale. C'est à mon sens dans une troisième direction que les recherches ont le plus de chances d'aboutir: on trouve en effet dans la tradition issue du premier Brentano, des théories des *contenus de jugements* qui ne tombent ni dans le réalisme naïf, ni dans le platonisme. On peut penser ici à des auteurs comme Brentano lui-même, mais aussi au premier Husserl, mais aussi à Anton Marty et à Kasimir Twardowski. Terminons par un exemple tiré de l'un des textes les plus célèbres de ce dernier auteur. Dès les premières lignes de son traité de 1894 intitulé *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, le logicien polonais renvoie aux Scolastiques et distingue d'emblée l'acte mental de représentation ou de jugement, son objet transcendant (*Gegenstand*) et son contenu immanent (*Object*). Je cite Twardowski dans la traduction française de Jacques English que je modifie légèrement:

³⁰ Cf. S. Meier-Oeser, “Walter Burley's *Propositio in re* and the Systematization of the *Ordo Significationis*”, pp. 503–504.

C'est l'une des propositions de la psychologie les mieux connues, et qui n'est certes contestée par personne, que chaque phénomène psychique se relie à un objet immanent. [...] Ce fait, mentionné par les scolastiques, et même déjà plus tôt par Aristote, a été, à une époque très récente, estimé selon toute son importance par Brentano [...]. On a, sur le fondement de cette relation à un objet immanent, particulière aux phénomènes psychiques, pris l'habitude de distinguer acte et contenu en chaque phénomène psychique...

Toutefois, poursuit Twardowski, il faut prendre garde à une ambiguïté présente dans la notion de contenu d'un acte mental, car

on a à distinguer l'objet <transcendant> vers lequel se dirige pour ainsi dire notre acte de juger de l'objet immanent <ou intentionnel> ou encore du contenu de la représentation.³¹

Il ne peut évidemment être question ici d'une identification *simpliciter* entre l'objet intentionnel ou immanent du jugement tel que l'introduit Twardowski et la *compositio rerum* de Scot ou la *propositio in re* de Burley. Je crois toutefois que nous avons là non seulement un possible et fécond domaine de recherche, mais aussi un véritable terrain sur lequel faire se rencontrer penseurs médiévaux et contemporains.

³¹ K. Twardowski, *Sur la théorie du contenu et de l'objet des représentations*, in E. Husserl – K. Twardowski, *Sur les objets intentionnels*, trad. par J. English, Paris 1993, pp. 87–88.

WALTER BURLEY'S *PROPOSITIO IN RE* AND THE
SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE *ORDO SIGNIFICATIONIS*

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Walter Burley's so-called doctrine of *propositio in re* with which he is trying to give an account of the ultimate *significatum* of a written or spoken assertive sentence is one the most famous semantic theories of the early 14th century and the most infamous and notorious one as well. No wonder, for a *propositio in re*, according to Burley, is composed of extramental things rather than of words, or, to be more precise and seemingly even more paradoxical: it is a proposition, the *copula* of which is in the mind whereas its noun and predicate are extra-mental things.

The dubious prominence of this doctrine is based not least on the curious consequences in the objections that were brought up against it. For if a proposition was composed out of things it would follow, for instance, as already Richard of Campsall notices, that a proposition and a beer mug were composed of the same: "Sequeretur quod propositio et stannum componerentur ex eisdem—quod non videtur esse verum", as Richard sharply remarks.¹ Furthermore it would follow that a bird could fly between the subject and the object, or that, as in the late 14th century William Penbygull says, the subject could eat the predicate ("subiectum potest comedere praedicatum"), or else it seems to follow that the proposition "the tail of a lion is the head of a dragon" would turn out to be—not only semantically but in reality—a chimera. The list could go on ad libitum. Obviously these consequences come close to and perhaps even provide the model for the well known "quaestio subtilissima an chimera in vacuo bombinans posset comedere secundas intentiones" (the "most subtle question whether a chimera, buzzing through the void, could eat second intentions") with which François Rabelais in his *Gargantua et Pantagruel* used to satirise the alledged subtleties of scholastic disputations.

¹ Richardus de Campsale, *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum* 2.11, ed. E.A. Synan, *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, vol. 1, Toronto 1968, p. 52.

Even if we don't have to take such objections too seriously—for quite a number of these “knock-down” arguments² are provided by Burley himself—we have to ask how such a seemingly strange theoretical entity came into the world and what its *raison d'être* may be?

I. FROM *PROPOSITIO MENTALIS* TO *PROPOSITIO IN RE*.
A SKETCH OF THE DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN BURLEY

Burley, as far as is known, is concerned in at least the following five writings with that theory of proposition which is best known—and in a way concealed—under the title *propositio in re*:

- Quaestiones in lib. Perihermeneias³ (~ 1302) = QLPer
- Quaestiones super lib. Posteriorum⁴ (~ 1307?) = QLPost
- Commentarius in lib. Perihermeneias (comment. medius),⁵ (~ 1310?) = CM
- Liber Praedicamentorum (1337) = LPraed
- Liber I Perihermeneias (1337)⁶ = LPer

Laurent Cesalli has shown that there are three stages in Burley's development of the idea of a *propositio in re*⁷ so that what is denoted by this expression is by no means a monolithic doctrine but rather “une même théorie de la proposition en évolution”.⁸ Even if these stages in some respect seem to be stages of expressing the theory of *propositio in re* rather than conceiving it there is a certain development to be noticed:

1. In QLPer which represents the first stage in the development of his doctrine Burley, without using the expression *propositio in re* already,

² Cf. E. Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham”, *Vivarium* 34 (1996), pp. 192–230, at p. 213.

³ Ed. by S.F. Brown, “Walter Burley's ‘Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias’”, *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), pp. 200–295.

⁴ *Walter Burley. Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum*, ed. M.C. Sommers, Toronto 2000.

⁵ Ed. by S.F. Brown, “Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's ‘Perihermeneias’”, *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), pp. 42–134.

⁶ Both texts are printed in Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, ed. Venetiis 1497, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967.

⁷ Cf. L. Cesalli, “Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley”, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 68 (2001), pp. 155–221.

⁸ Cesalli, “Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley”, p. 195. Cf. already Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley...”, p. 193.

introduces a tripartite distinction of *propositio scripta*, *propositio vocalis*, and *propositio mentalis*. Different to the traditional understanding, the *propositio mentalis* is conceived as being composed of things rather than of concepts. This composition which is described as an intellectual rather than a real composition is effectuated by an assertative mental act (*assertio*).⁹ The mental concepts which one would expect to be the proper components of a mental proposition are missing completely in this context. This is changing with the QLPost where, by leaving out the *propositio scripta*, Burley differentiates between 1) *propositio proponens tantum*, i.e. *propositio vocalis*, 2) *propositio propens et proposita* which is composed of mental concepts, and 3) *propositio proposita tantum* which is composed of things and different from the other two, is characterized as a *propositio passive dicta*.¹⁰

2. In CM, representing the second stage, Burley is offering a quaternary of propositions. Besides the written and spoken ones he now is dividing between two kind of mental propositions, a *propositio mentalis subiectiva* and a *propositio mentalis obiectiva*. Whereas the former one is composed of mental concepts the latter one which, as Burley now

⁹ Gualterus de Burley, *QLPer* 3.553 sq.: "Circa enunciationem in mente sciendum quod ista componitur ex rebus quas intellectus asserit esse eadem et diversa. [...] Ulterius est intelligendum quod propositio in mente non componitur ex rebus compositione reali sicut domus componitur ex lignis et lapidibus, sed solum est ibi compositio intellectualis quae fit ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit aliqua esse eadem et diversa".

¹⁰ Gualterus de Burley, *QLPost* 2.49: "Ad aliud principale, quando quaeritur 'aut syllogismus demonstrativus componitur ex vocibus, aut ex conceptibus, aut ex rebus', dicendum quod sicut propositio potest accipi materialiter ex quibus componitur, sic eodem modo syllogismus. Nam quaedam est propositio proposita tantum, et illa propositio est propositio passive dicta; et quaedam est propositio proponens tantum; et quaedam est propositio propens et proposita. Propositio primo modo dicta componitur ex rebus compositione intellectuali, et non compositione reali; et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signato. Propositio secundo modo dicta componitur ex vocibus significativis; et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signo. Propositio tertio modo accepta componitur ex conceptibus".—It is true, Burley in *QLPer* has presented the very same distinction by using the terminology of "enunciatio enuncians", "enuncians et enunciata" and "enunciata tantum", respectively. Here, however, this position was discarded on grounds of his denial of the existence of concepts in the sense of mental images caused by the act of intellection; cf. *QLPer* 3.542: "Quod propositio componitur ex conceptibus in anima; [...] apparet falsum, quia sic per actum intelligendi esset aliquid causatum in anima differens ab illa actione quod satis improbatum est prima quaestione"; cf. *QLPer* 3.8: "Rationes quae probant quod enunciatio non componitur ex conceptibus concludunt verum, quia sicut prius probatum est, in intellectu non sunt aliqui tales conceptus formati per actum intelligendi, qui conceptus sunt similitudines rerum".

says, can be named also *propositio in re*, is composed of extramental things.¹¹

3. In the third stage of the development of his doctrine (LPraed and LPer), Burley is showing himself to be still more generous by offering now five kinds of propositions: Besides the written, spoken and the two kinds of propositions in the mind¹² there is “in rebus [...] aliquid compositum, cuius subiectum est res et predicatum similiter, quod dicitur propositio in re”.¹³

Whereas Burley is defending throughout these writings the same thesis, viz. that, as Cesalli puts it: “Il y a un x tel que x est une proposition et x se compose de choses extramentales”, the sense of x is subject to remarkable variations. In QLPer it is characterized as *propositio mentalis*, in CM as *propositio mentalis obiectiva*, and in LPraed and LPer as “état des choses” (Cesalli).¹⁴

The question about the *raison d'être* of the doctrine of *propositio in re* is connected with some other problems: How to explain the severe modification of the traditional notion of a *triplex oratio*? Why are the mental concepts missing in QLPer? Why do they appear in all later

¹¹ Gualterus de Burley, CM 1.26: “...in intellectu est duplex propositio: Una quae efficitur ab intellectu et habet esse subiectivum in intellectu, et talem propositionem vocat Philosophus ens verum. Alia est propositio quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu. Unde loquendo de ista ‘Homo est animal’ secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: Sic uno modo efficitur ab intellectu ex hoc quod intellectus asserit hominem et animal esse idem; alio modo ista ‘Homo est animal’ habet esse obiectivum in intellectu solum. Et alia est propositio quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu et alia quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu. Sub aliis verbis: Possumus dicere quod quaedam est propositio in re et quaedam in intellectu, appellando illam propositionem quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu propositionem in re et aliam quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu propositionem in intellectu”. When Burley is stressing here that the “res significata per istam ‘Homo est animal’ non dependet ab intellectu nec etiam veritas istius rei; immo ista esset vera etsi nullus intellectus consideraret” (CM 1.27), it is clear that, at least implicitly, this distinction is already to be found in QLPer, where he states that “propositiones aliquae semper erunt verae et semper erant verae, verumtamen nulla propositio semper habuit esse”, which means that the truth of a proposition spoken or thought is independent from its actual being but rather depends on the things being the way the proposition claims, so that “non valet ‘Haec propositio est vera’, igitur ‘haec propositio est’” (QLPer 3.62).

¹² Gualterus de Burley, LPraed, f. h1rb: “Sciendum quod propositio habet esse quattuor modis scilicet in scripto: in prolatione: in mente et etiam in re, ut visum est superius in isto libro. Propositio in mente est duplex. [...] quaedam habet esse subiective in mente. Et talis propositio componitur ex conceptibus. Et quaedam est propositio habens esse obiective in intellectu. Et huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus”.

¹³ Gualterus de Burley, LPraed, f. c4ra.

¹⁴ Cf. Cesalli, “Le réalisme propositionnel de Walter Burley”, p. 193.

presentations of the theory? These and similar questions are to be answered and the development of the doctrine is to be understood—as the title of this paper indicates—against the background of that process which I call the systematization of the *ordo significationis* and which perhaps, more precisely, would be characterized as the systematization and modification of the *ordo significationis*.

II. THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE *ORDO SIGNIFICATIONIS*

What is meant by the *ordo significationis* and its systematization?¹⁵ The *ordo significationis*—which I shall call in the following for the sake of shortness ‘OS’—is the developed version of what Boethius called the “ordo orandi”,¹⁶ that is the coordination of those four elements mentioned in the introductory notes of Aristotle’s *Peri hermeneias*. In this passage which is “the common starting point for virtually all medieval theories of semantics”,¹⁷ Aristotle tells us—or rather seems to tell us—about the four elements of linguistic signification and the relations between them; that is—according to the common interpretation as it is underlying the translation given by Ackrill—the written marks (*scripta*), the spoken words (*voces*), the affections of the soul (*passiones animae*, *conceptus*) and the actual things (*res*).¹⁸

This *ordo* can be read in both directions: from right to left it represents an ontological order which is characterized by the fact that from the elements mentioned in each case the one on the right ontologically

¹⁵ The table on page 505 intends to visualize some of the main points of what is following.

¹⁶ Boethius, *In librum Peri Hermeneias, editio secunda*, in *Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii commentarii in librum Aristotelis ‘Peri Hermeneias’*, vol. 2, rec. C. Meiser, Leipzig 1880, p. 20.

¹⁷ J. Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind*, Leiden 1989, p. 8.

¹⁸ Aristoteles, *Peri hermeneias* 1, 16a1–8; cf. Arist. Latinus, *De interpretatione—Translatio Boethii*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges – Paris 1965 (Aristoteles Latinus, II/1–2), p. 5,3–9: “Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et adfirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio. Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae [Aristotle: *symbola*], et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eadem, sic nec eadem voces; quorum autem hae primorum notae [Aristotle: *semeia*], eadem omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eadem”; cf. Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, 16a3–8, transl. J.L. Ackrill, Oxford 1963: “Now spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken words. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual thing—are also the same”.

preceeds the one on the left. So: If there would be no things, there would be no concepts, and if no concepts, no spoken sounds and so on. If read semantically, from left to right, the *ordo orandi* determines the direction of linguistic signification: written characters signify spoken words, whereas spoken words primarily signify mental concepts and, by means of the latter, secondarily denote the things.

I call 'systematization of the OS' that long process of conceptual work on the introductory sentences of *Peri hermeneias* through which an increasing uniformity was given to the system of the four elements of linguistic signification. In Boethius's translation we can see already a first step of systematization of the *ordo* and the relations between its four elements. For whereas Aristotle characterizes these relations by the three notions of *symbola*, *semeia*, and *homoiomata*, Boethius translates "symbola" and "semeia" identically as "notae" (signs), thus reducing the three notions to the conceptual pair of *nota* and *similitudo* (see table on p. 505, lines 1 and 2). A second step of systematization, then, was taken in the mid-thirteenth century, when the *passiones animae* or mental concepts began to be described as signs so that the Boethian pair of *notae* and *similitudines* was further reduced to the single notion of sign (*signum*), with the result that the entire *ordo* regarding its relations (see table, R1–3) now is uniformly described by the notion of sign (table, line 3). This is concisely expressed by Antonius Andreas who in his *Scriptum in Peryhermeneias* is claiming: "Written expressions, vocal expression, concepts in the soul and things are mutually coordinated according to the notion of sign and significate".¹⁹ This homogeneous chain of signification gave reason to replace the Boethian "ordo orandi" terminologically by expressions like "ordo in significando",²⁰ "ordo significationis"²¹ or "ordo signorum",²² all three of which are to be found in Burley.

¹⁹ Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum in Peryhermeneias*, ed. Venetiis 1508, f. 63va: "...littere, voces, passionnes anime et res sunt adinvicem ordinata secundum rationem signi et significati, quia littere significant ipsas voces, et voces anime passionnes, passionnes anime autem significant ipsas res".

²⁰ Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, *Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis*, ed. A. Gambatese – S. Brown, in *Opera philosophica* II, St. Bonaventure, NY 1978, p. 347; Gualterus de Burley, *LPraed*, f. c4ra.

²¹ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Peryermenias* I, 2, in *Opera omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. I, 1, Roma – Paris 1989, p. 9a; Gualterus de Burley, *CM* 1.1.

²² Gualterus de Burley, *LPer*, f. k3va: "Talem igitur ordinem signorum assignat hic Aristoteles, scilicet passionnes anime hoc est similitudines rerum existentium in anima significant res extra, et nomina et verba prolata significant passionnes anime...".

III. THE *ORDO SIGNIFICATIONIS* AND THE *MAGNA ALTERCATIO*

Even if the OS, spelled out as a straight end-to-end chain of signification going from the written words via the spoken words and the mental concepts to the things, is obviously too neat to be adequate in all respects, it seems that it was just the suggestive force of uniformity which caused the prominency, plausibility, and attractiveness of the OS. For in contrast to all textual evidence the view that concepts were not only *similitudines* but also *signa rerum* was introduced by authors like Nicholas of Paris, Roger Bacon, Lambert of Auxerre, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton and others not *against* the Aristotelian doctrine but *as* the Aristotelian doctrine.²³ Hence the OS, unified by the notion of sign, was generally seen as the genuine teaching of Aristotle, too, and thus provided the basis of most of the semantic discussions of the late 13th and early 14th centuries.

Even those authors referred to it or felt obliged to somehow arrange with it whose semantic theory did not, after all, fit with it offhand. Thomas Aquinas and some of his followers did not accept the mental concepts to be signs in the proper sense, so that, according to them, the chain of signification was interrupted between its third and fourth element. In contrast, Scotus and others did not accept the concepts to be the immediate and proper significate of the vocal expressions, so that, according to this view, the chain of signification was blocked somehow between its second and third element. The common reaction, however, was not to dismiss the OS but to develop conceptual and terminological strategies of harmonizing the semantic views with it.

Whereas Thomist authors recurred to the formula “*voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus*” in order to give an account of the semantic relations between the last three elements of the OS,²⁴ the proponents of

²³ Cf. S. Meier-Oeser: *Die Spur des Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin – New York 1997, p. 80.

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas: *Expositio libri Peryermenias* I, 2, in *Opera omnia*..., p. 11a: “...non [...] potest esse quod [scil. voces] significant immediate ipsas res, ut ex modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus, unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem. Vnde Platonicus posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ydeam hominis separatam; set, quia hec secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotilis, set est in solo intellectu, ideo necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod res significant intellectus conceptiones immediate, et eis mediantibus res”. Cf. Thomas Sutton, *Commentary on the Categories*, cit. after: A.D. Conti, “Thomas Sutton’s Commentary on the ‘Categories’ according to MS Oxford, Merton College 289”, in *The*

a direct signification of things (as, for instance, Roger Bacon, Robert Kilwardby, and Siger of Brabant) had to answer differently. And so had Duns Scotus, too, whose semantic theory is of focal importance for Burley's conception of the *propositio in re*.

Scotus main intention in his early *Quaestiones in librum Perihermenias* is to develop a position that mediates between the two alternatives of the *conceptus*-theory of signification (holding that "voces significant conceptus") on the one hand and the *res*-theory of signification (holding that "voces significant res") on the other. Scotus shows that the simple form in which the focal question of the *magna altercatio* is commonly put, namely "Utrum [vox] sit signum rei vel conceptus"²⁵ or "Utrum nomen significet rem vel speciem in anima"²⁶ falls short of differentiations needed to answer it correctly. Taken literally and without any further qualifications both answers are incorrect. At the same time, however, both answers are true if understood with the adequate qualifications.

For to say that "voces significant res" is true if and only if "res" is understood in the sense of "res ut intelligitur". On the other hand, to say that "voces significant passiones" is true if and only if "passio" or "conceptus" is understood in the sense of "res ut intelligitur", too.²⁷ Even if to understand "passio" or "conceptus" in the sense of "res ut intelligitur" may at first seem to be a rather violent interpretation, it nevertheless is historically well-founded. For all former representatives

Rise of British Logic, ed. O. Lewry, Toronto 1985, pp. 173–213, at p. 190: "...iste liber [...] est de vocibus simplicibus in quantum significant res mediantibus simplicibus conceptibus. [...] voces significant conceptus et mediantibus ipsis significant res, quarum sunt conceptus".

²⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 27, q. 1–3, n. 83, ed. Vat. VI, p. 97.

²⁶ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 2, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* II, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004, p. 47.

²⁷ Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 2, ed. R. Andrews et al., p. 56: "...dicitur quod res primo significatur, non tamen secundum quod exsistit [...], sed secundum quod per se concipitur ab intellectu [...]. [...] dicitur quod per speciem vel passionem vel conceptum, vel quodcumque aliud in aliis auctoritatibus, significatur 'res ut intelligitur', ad denotandum quod 'res ut exsistit' non significatur". Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias*. In *librum primum*, q. 1, ed. R. Andrews et al., in *Opera Philosophica* II, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004, p. 139–140: "Dicendum, sicut dicit Aristoteles, quod nomen primo significat passiones animae, id est, conceptiones intellectus. [...] Unde nomen significat passionem intellectus, id est, rem ut concipitur. [...] Ad omnes auctoritates dico quod Aristoteles et Boethius intelligunt per 'passiones', non similitudinem quae est in anima, sed rem prout consideratur ab anima, id est illud in cuius notitiam ducitur intellectus per species".

of the *res*-theory of signification, as for instance Roger Bacon and Ps.-Robert Kilwardby, insisted on such an interpretation of “conceptus” in order to give a response to the challenge of those authorities who, like Priscianus, seemed to favour a *conceptus*-theory of signification.²⁸

Scotus, however, is offering still another way of making his *res-intellecta*-theory of signification compatible with the *conceptus*-theory. The concepts are signified by spoken words not as *accidentia* in the soul but only insofar as they are signs. Hence, according to the principle of semantic transitivity (“signum signi est signum signati”) the signification goes further to the things.²⁹ This theoretical device guarantees that things and concepts are signified by the *vox* through one and the same act: “Vox est significans rem et similitudinem eodem actu, quia eodem actu est vox signum signi in quantum signum et signati eius”.³⁰ It is true, this principle of semantic transitivity was not invented by Scotus, we find it, for instance, already in Lambert of Auxerre. But it is a point so focal for Scotus’s semantic theory that still in the 17th century it is known as the “celebrated rule of Scotus” (“celebris regula Scoti”).³¹

²⁸ Roger Bacon, *De signis*, ed. K.M. Fredborg – L. Nielsen – J. Pinborg, “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s *Opus Maius*. ‘De signis’, *Traditio* 34 (1978), pp. 75–136, at pp. 134–135: “Si obiciatur per Priscianum quod nihil aliud est esse partem orationis quam mentis conceptum significare, sed pars orationis, in quantum huiusmodi est signum ad placitum, ergo vox significat conceptum mentis ad placitum et ita habitum et speciem apud mentem, dicendum quod hoc quod dico conceptum mentis in illa auctoritate non sumitur secundum quod est accusativi casus huius nominis substantivi ‘conceptus’, sed huiusmodi adiectivi substantivati ‘conceptus’, et sic conceptum idem est, quod res concepta et intellecta in quantum huiusmodi”. Cf. Ps.-Robert Kilwardby: “The Commentary on ‘Priscian Maior’ ascribed to Robert Kilwardby”, ed. K.M. Fredborg et al., *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 15 (1975), p. 137: “...dicendum quod quando tu dicis quod omnis pars orationis significat mentis conceptum secundum Priscianum, dico quod ‘conceptum’ potest dupliciter considerari: vel prout est secunde declinationis, et sic est adiectivum, et tunc ‘conceptum’ idem est quod ‘res concepta’; alio modo potest sumi ‘conceptum’ prout est quarte declinationis, et sic est substantivum”.

²⁹ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 2, ed. R. Andrews et al., p. 51: “Ad quaestionem [scil. ‘Utrum nomen significet rem vel speciem in anima’] dicitur quod species intelligibilis immediate significatur per vocem. Sed illa dupliciter consideratur: aut in quantum est quid in se, scilicet accidens informans animam; aut in quantum repraesentat rem. Primo modo non significatur, propter rationes ad oppositum, sed secundo modo. Cum autem omne signum signi in quantum signum sit signum significati, sequitur quod vox significans similitudinem in quantum est signum rei, significat etiam ipsam rem, sed mediate, quia scilicet immediate significat illud quod est signum rei in quantum est signum”.

³⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 2, ed. Andrews et al., p. 52.

³¹ Cf. Conimbricenses, *Commentaria in universam Aristotelis dialecticam*, Köln 1607, vol. 2, p. 33; Balthasar Tellez, *Summa universae philosophiae*, Lisboa 1642, p. 79b.

These conceptual and terminological devices introduced by Scotus to reconcile his semantic view that the vocal expressions denote the things insofar as they are intellected with the standard form of the OS are seminal for the theory of a *propositio in re*. What we see here is, I think, characteristic for the late 13th and early 14th century. The notions of *res* and *conceptus* are split up. “Res” can mean “res existens” as well as “res ut intelligitur”. “Conceptus” can mean the act or quality in the soul as well as—if taken in the passive sense—“res intellecta”. As I have tried to show in the table (lines 4 to 6), this results in a semantical, though not ontological, commingling of the two spheres of concepts and things.

IV. THE PROPOSITIONAL REINTERPRETATION OF THE OS

As is clear by this, conceptual elaboration of the OS was not complete with the uniform description of the relations as sign relations. The further theoretical development which is set on since the 1270s does not concern the relations between the four units or elements of the OS but rather the interpretation of the units themselves. The quaternary of elements of the OS embodies two important conceptual triplets. For the three elements on the right, i.e. the *voces*, *conceptus*, and *res* are structurally organized along the lines of the prominent ‘semantic triangle’ according to which signs refer to things by means of concepts³² (table, line 8).

More implicitly and covertly, however, it embodies another conceptual triplet which is of special importance for the logical and semantic theories of the 14th century. For if we take the three elements on the left, we have what Boethius mentions as the semantic doctrine of Porphyry and the Aristotelians, i.e. the doctrine of a *triplex oratio* distinguishing between three levels of speech: besides—or rather at the foundation of—written and spoken discourse there is a mental speech (*oratio mentis*) in which thought is performed³³ (table, line 9).

³² Boethius, *In Periherm.*, ed. sec., rec. Meiser, p. 24,33.

³³ Boethius, *In Periherm.*, ed. sec., rec. Meiser, p. 29,17–21: “...Peripatetici rectissime posuerunt tres esse orationes, unam quae scribi possit elementis, alteram quae voce proferri, tertiam quae cogitatione conecti unamque intellectibus, alteram voce, tertiam litteris contineri”; *ibid.*, p. 36,10 sqq.: “Porphyrius [...] tres posuit orationes, unam quae litteris contineretur, secundam quae verbis ac nominibus personaret, tertiam quae mentis evolveret intellectus”.

To see the doctrine of the *triplex oratio* as being embodied in the OS, however, presupposes a reading of the underlying passage in Aristotle's *Peri hermenias* which conspicuously differs from the traditional view as well as from Ackrill's translation. The *triplex oratio* is generally seen in the way Boethius presented it, that is, as a theory developed by Porphyry and the late ancient Peripatetics but not as a genuine doctrine of Aristotle. For, at a first look, Aristotle in the introductory notes seems to speak of spoken or written words and concepts, but not of *oratio*. The contention, however, that at a second, closer look this may be otherwise marks the starting point of a further step in the process of systematizing and developing the OS. This step which seems to have been taken since around 1270 may be characterized as the propositionalist reinterpretation of the OS (see table, line 7).

Does Aristotle, as it is commonly held and as it is expressed in modern translations, really simply claim that "spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken words"? The authors of the late 13th and early 14th century doubted this—and I think they were right. It is true that Aristotle in the third sentence is speaking of *grammata* (*litterae*) and *phonaí* (*voces*). In the second sentence, however, he uses the expressions "ta en te phone" and "graphomena"—"ea quae sunt in voce" and "ea quae scribuntur". Why? Already Thomas Aquinas assumed that this is not without reason. For speaking not just of "voces" but rather of "those which are in the voice" Aristotle, as Thomas holds, wants to refer to all logico-semantic elements mentioned in the very first sentence of the text ("Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et adfirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio"). Even if Aquinas does not make much out of it, he clearly sees that the beginning of *Peri hermeneias* can be read as claiming the existence of a *triplex oratio*.³⁴ Even more outspoken regarding this point are Scotus³⁵ and Antonius Andreas, claiming that

³⁴ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Peryhermenias* I, 2, in *Opera Omnia*..., p. 10a–b: "Vtitur autem hoc modo loquendi ut dicat: 'ea quae sunt in uoce', et non: 'uoces', ut quasi continuatim cum predictis loquatur: dixerat enim dicendum esse de nomine et uerbo *et aliis huiusmodi*; hec autem tripliciter habent esse: uno quidem modo in conceptione intellectus; alio modo in prolatione uocis; tercio modo in descriptione litterarum; dicit ergo: 'ea quae sunt in uoce'; ac si dicat: nomina et uerba *et alia consequentia*, que tantum sunt in uoce, sunt note..." (italics mine).

³⁵ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 1, ed. Andrews et al., p. 44: "...enuntiatio potest hic convenienter poni subiectum, et hoc

...Aristotle uses the expression 'those which are in the voice' instead of saying 'the vocal expressions' in order to show that the noun and verb, the enuntiation and oration which he has mentioned before, have a multiple being: in one way in what is written, in another way in the mind, and still in another way in the vocal sound. So the meaning [of this passage] is that the noun and verb and the others mentioned before insofar as they are in the voice signify the passions of the soul.³⁶

No less explicit, of course, is Burley.³⁷ What these authors clearly have seen is that if one reads the phrase "ea quae sunt in voce" of the second sentence such that it does not only mean as much as "spoken words", but that it rather refers to the noun and the verb as well as to all of what is mentioned in the first sentence (*nomen, verbum, negatio, affirmatio, enuntiatio* and *oratio*), and if one does in the same way with the formula "earum quae sunt in anima...", then one gets an interpretation according to which not only the written marks, spoken words and concepts but also the written, spoken and mental "oratio" are put into relation by Aristotle.³⁸

'*enuntiatio in mente*', quia illa causatur ex secunda operatione intellectus. Quia quae hic [*scil. in De interpretatione*] determinantur, propter ipsam determinantur, puta primo de partibus eius integralibus, ut puta de nomine et verbo; secundo de eius genere, quod est oratio [...]; et consequenter de eius proprietatibus, oppositione scilicet, habitudine, et ceteris huiusmodi. Si autem istae proprietates [*scil. oppositio, habitudo etc.*] insint enuntiationi in voce, hoc non est per se primo, sed in quantum illa est signum *enuntiationis in mente*" (italics mine).

³⁶ Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum in Peryhermeneias*, ed. Venetiis 1508, f. 63va: "Notandum quod Aristoteles utitur hoc modo loquendi 'ea quae sunt in voce' et non dicit 'ipse voces' ad ostendendum quod nomen et verbum, enuntiatio et oratio de quibus praedixit habent multiplex esse: unomodo in scripto, aliomodo in mente, aliomodo in voce et prolotione. Est ergo sensus quod nomen et verbum et cetera praedicta ut sunt voces prolatae significant animae passiones, sicut litterae sunt signa vocum. Per haec autem tria dat intelligere 4, scilicet res quae sunt causae passionum animae".

³⁷ Gualterus de Burley, *LPer*, f. k3rb sq.: "Dicit igitur philosophus quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce hoc est in prolotione sunt notae passionum animae, hoc est conceptuum animae quae sunt similitudines rerum. Et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce hoc est nomina et verba scripta significant nomina et verba prolata. Talem igitur ordinem signorum assignat hic Aristoteles, scilicet passiones anime hoc est similitudines rerum existentium in anima significant res extra, et nomina et verba prolata significant passiones anime. Et istud non solum est verum de nominibus et verbis quae sunt partes enunciationis, sed etiam est verum de ipsa enunciatione. Nam enuntiatio prolata significat orationem in mente quae est quaedam passio mentis et enuntiatio scripta significat enunciationem prolatam".

³⁸ That such a reading is in accordance with Aristotle becomes evident by comparing the very beginning with the very end of the text, where Aristotle again is taking up the formula of "ea quae sunt in voce" but now explicitly is speaking of affirmations and negations in the *phone* as signs of those in the *dianoia* (Aristoteles, *De int.* II, 14, 24b1-2): *Translatio Boethii*, ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 37,12-13: "...sunt autem hae quae

The connection between the propositional reinterpretation of the OS and the concept of a *propositio in re* appears already in the context of modist grammar. The modist grammar (*grammatica speculativa*) develops, by some sort of conceptual extrapolation of the OS, the commonly accepted Aristotelian claim (*De interpretatione* 1, 16a3–9) that mental concepts, just as things, are the same for all men further to the thesis of a universal grammar based on the structural analogy between the “modes of being” (*modi essendi*), the “modes of understanding” (*modi intelligendi*), and the “modes of signifying” (*modi significandi*).

The result of this approach is a system of correspondances according to which the structure of universal grammatical features is an image of the structure of reality. As a counterpart of the Boethian theory of a *triplex oratio* some modist grammarians, like Johannes Dacus and Martinus de Dacia, developed the notion of a *triplex constructio*, that is a triple syntax (see table, line 10). Connected to the focal shift from “oratio” to “constructio” there is a shift in the perspective to the elements of OS. Whereas the theory of *triplex oratio* refers to the parallelism of its first three elements, that is, of written, spoken and mental speech, the concept of a *triplex constructio* is referring to the latter three elements, underlining the parallels between the vocal, mental, and a real construction or syntax (*constructio vocalis, mentalis, realis*).³⁹

sunt adfirmationes et negationes in voce notae eorum quae sunt in anima...”; cf. *De int.* II, 14, 23a32–33: *Translatio Boethii*, ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 34,4–8: “Nam si ea quae sunt in voce sequuntur ea quae sunt in anima, illic autem contraria est opinio contrarii, ut ‘omnis homo iustus’ ei quae est ‘omnis homo iniustus’, etiam in his quae sunt in voce adfirmationibus necesse est similiter se habere”. Sedley has argued that for Aristotle as well as for Plato and the Stoics “the primary signifier is the sentence, and individual words are considered only secondarily, in so far as they contribute to the sentence’s function” and drew from there the conclusion, that *Peri hermeneias*, commonly taken as the key text of word semantics, is “the most seriously misunderstood text in ancient semantics” (cf. D. Sedley, “Aristotle’s ‘De Interpretatione’ and ancient semantics”, in: *Knowledge through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices*, ed. G. Manetti, Amsterdam 1996, pp. 87–108, esp. pp. 87–88). At least some scholastic authors, however, have interpreted Aristotle’s determination of the subject of his work as given in the introductory sentences in accordance with Sedley’s view.

³⁹ Cf. Ioannes Dacus, *Summa grammatica*, in *Opera*, vol. 2, ed. A. Otto, Hauniae 1955 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, I, 2), pp. 248–249: “Constructio est triplex: quaedam enim est realis, cuius principia sunt modi essendi; alia est mentalis, cuius principia sunt modi intelligendi; alia est vocalis, cuius principia sunt modi significandi. [...] modi essendi [...] sunt principia constructionis realis [...], ab ipsis accipiuntur modi intelligendi, qui principiant constructionem mentalem, et per consequens modi significandi, qui principiant constructionem vocalem...”. Cf. Martinus de Dacia, *Modi significandi*, in *Opera*, ed. H. Roos, Hauniae 1961 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, II), p. 88: “Est enim quaedam constructio rerum, quaedam conceptuum,

Along the lines of the internal logic of the OS, in the system of *triplex constructio*—just like in the *triplex oratio*—the former element in each case refers to and depends on the latter ones. This conception does not only foreshadow the idea of a transidiomatic mental grammar or mental syntax (*constructio mentalis*), which especially Ockham will elaborate later on, but also the projection of grammatical features and of propositionality on to reality (*constructio realis*) as we have it in Burley's theory of the *propositio in re*.

The shift from the non-propositional interpretation of the OS to a propositional account is accompanied by a change of the core problems that have to be solved. It was commonly accepted that the spoken sounds, if not immediately, at least primarily are denoting the things. On the presupposition of a propositionalist understanding of “*ea quae sunt in voce*”, however, this determination obviously becomes undetermined. For if “those which are in the voice” are not only simple terms but propositions, that is, if they are not only simple signs but complex signs, an analogous differentiation on the side of the significates is needed. For it is clear that propositions are not signs of things—But of what else, then? (table, line 7). The non-propositional approach to signification is concerned especially with the two questions: 1) what is the ultimate foundation of all signification (common answer: the concepts) and, 2) what is signified by spoken or written expressions respectively (for which there is quite a number of different answers). In contrast to this, the core problems of the propositional approach to the OS are, first, what is predicated over which, or, in other words, what is it that is composed by the copula (*scripta, voces, conceptus* or *res*), and second, what is the ultimate *significatum* of propositions, which is tantamount to the question: what is it that makes a proposition true (or false)?

My point is that the way Scotus responds to these questions provides the basis for Burley's theory of the *propositio in re*. Just as there has to be a primary signifying entity (i.e. the concept) in order that there can be signification at all, there has to be, according to Scotus, an *ultimatum significatum* in order that there can be truth (or falsity) in propositional signification. It is true, a proposition can be made of *scripta, voces* or *conceptus* respectively. But none of these will be true or false, that is,

quaedam dictionum, et hoc est quod consuevit dici, quod constructionum quaedam est realis, quaedam mentalis, quaedam vero rationalis sive sermocinalis”.

will be a proposition in the proper sense, until the chain of signification finally comes to an end in an ultimate signified which is not the sign of anything further.⁴⁰ What makes a proposition true or false, in other words, what makes a proposition to be a proposition in the full sense is nothing but its *ultimum significatum*.⁴¹

This is precisely the rationale for Burley's emphasis on the necessity of breaking the *processus ad infinitum* in signification which is one of the basic arguments Burley produces in favour of the *propositio in re*.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias. In librum primum*, q. 1, ed. Andrews et al., p. 143: "Sicut ordinans dictiones scriptas ad invicem, ut istas 'homo est animal', non dicit hanc vocem 'homo' esse hanc vocem 'animal', sic nec ordinans hanc vocem 'homo' cum hac voce 'animal' dicit speciem significatam per illam 'homo' esse speciem significatam per istam vocem 'animal'. Cuius causa est, quia non ordinantur haec ad invicem affirmando unum de alio, in quantum sunt res, sed ut signa sunt aliorum; sicut litterae significant voces in quantum voces sunt signa specierum, sic voces significant species in quantum species sunt signa rerum. Ideo *absolute affirmatio vel negatio non est antequam deveniatur ad rem, quia ante illud, quidlibet de quolibet enuntiatur ut solum signum de signo. Signum autem in quantum signum nec verum nec falsum dicitur, nisi in comparatione ad significatum*" (italics mine).

⁴¹ Cf. Antonius Andreas, *Scriptum in Peryhermeneias*, ed. Venetiis 1508, f. 65vb: "...veritas et falsitas non sunt in signo nisi per significatum. veritas enim in signo est conformitas ad significatum: et diffinitas est falsitas: compositio ergo speciei ad invicem in quantum illae sunt signa rerum non est indicanda vera vel falsa nisi ex significatis, id est ex rebus vel a rebus. Omnis ergo veritas cuiuscunque propositionis referenda est ad res, quia illae sunt ultima significata [*corr. ex: ultimo significare*], et non sunt signa aliquorum aliorum".

⁴² Cf. Gualterus de Burley, *QLPer*, 3.553: "...cum voces prolatae significant passionem animae, ut communiter dicitur, et passionem animae significant res extra, oportet concedere quod tandem sit deveniendum ad aliquid quod sic est significatum quod non significans. Cum igitur ista enunciatio prolata 'Homo est animal' significat aliquid—sit illud A. Aut A significat aliquid aut nihil. Si nihil, tunc A est propositio in mente. Si aliquid, sit illud B, et quaerendum est de B eodem modo sicut prius. Si B nihil significet sed sic significatur quod non significat, B est propositio in mente. Si B significet aliquid erit processus in infinitum. Unde breviter: *Illud quod significetur per propositionem prolatam sive significetur mediate sive immediate, dummodo sit tale quod non significat aliquid aliud ulterius illud, voco propositionem in mente*" (italics mine); *QLPost*, 11.49: "...sicut quaedam propositio est significans aliam propositionem, sicut propositio prolata significat propositionem in mente et quaedam est propositio quae est sic significata quod ulterius non significat aliam propositionem, quia sic esset processus in infinitum"; *LPraed*, f. c3vb–c4ra: "Quod autem propositio possit componi ex rebus probatur quatuor modis. Et primo sic: in omnibus significantibus et significatis et ordinatis in significando *est devenire ad ultimum significatum, quod ita significatur quod ulterius non significat. Aliter esset processus in infinitum in essentialiter ordinatis contra Philosophum*. Sed propositio in scripto significat propositionem in voce, propositio in voce significat propositionem in conceptu, scilicet propositionem compositam ex conceptibus. Quero tunc aut propositio composita ex conceptibus sit ultimum significatum, scilicet quod ulterius non significat, aut significat aliquid ulterius. Non est dare primum, quia conceptus ex quibus propositio componitur in mente significant. Igitur tota propositio composita ex conceptibus significat. Cuius enim

V. THE *PROPOSITIO IN RE* AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE
PROPOSITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OS

Thus, as a general thesis, I want to claim, first: that the concept of the *propositio in re* understood as a *compositio rerum* corresponding to a propositional *compositio signorum* is based on the systematized form of OS determined by the principle of semantic transitivity (“signum signi est signum signati”) in combination with the propositional account of the OS. The *scripta*, *voces*, and *conceptus*, respectively, are composed with each other only insofar as they are signs. But just as, according to the principle of semantic transitivity, the *signum signi* properly is the sign of the *ultimum signatum*, the composition of signs refers to a composition of the *ultima significata*. The roots of this concept of *propositio in re* understood as a *compositio rerum*, which is my second thesis, are to be found already in Scotus. For Scotus, in some sort of a propositionalist extrapolation of the principle of semantic transitivity, lays down as a general rule:

Whenever by one and the same sign a plurality of entities is signified out of which one entity is signified insofar as it is a sign of the others, then, if the former sign is composed with another in a sentence, [what is signified] is not a composition of signs but rather a composition of ultimate significates which are not signs (‘non est compositio signorum sed signatorum ultimarum, quae non sunt signa’), and what is signified by the spoken sentence is not a composition of species but of things, just as what is signified by a written statement is not a composition of sounds but of things.⁴³

In order to call this *compositio rerum* a *propositio in re* nothing more is needed than to allow the term “propositio”—just as it was widely accepted in regard to the whole intentional vocabulary of “passio” or

partes significant, et ipsum totum significat. Quero tunc de illo quod significatur per propositionem in mente compositam ex conceptibus: illud non potest esse simplex, quia partes propositionis significant incomplexum, et illud quod significatur per totam propositionem est complexum” (italics mine).

⁴³ Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias*, q. 2, ed. Andrews et al., p. 54: “Videtur ergo dicendum [...] quod, quantumcumque per idem multa significantur quorum unum significatur in quantum est signum alterius, si illud in oratione componatur cum alio, non est compositio signorum sed significatorum ultimarum, quae non sunt signa. Et per enuntiationem prolatam non significatur compositio specierum sed rerum, sicut nec per orationem scriptam significatur compositio vocum sed rerum”.

“conceptus”,⁴⁴ “significatio” or “intentio”⁴⁵—to be taken in a passive sense, that is, as a *propositio proposita* in contrast to a *propositio proponens*. And this is precisely what Burley did right from the beginning.⁴⁶ The same twofold meaning is effective in Burley’s use of the term “compositio”, too. On the one hand, taken as *compositio in mente* it denotes the mental act of composing whereas, on the other hand, taken as *compositio in re* it is not an act of composing but rather something composed (*aliquid compositum*), or, in other words, not a statement about things but rather a state of things.

Burley’s theory of the *propositio in re* is connected with the systematized OS, such that the development of his doctrine can be described as an increasing convergence toward the concept of a unified OS. Burley did not find his semantic theory on the OS right from the start. On the contrary, in his early QLPer he is showing a strong reservation against the OS; mainly on two reasons, both of which concern the notion of *concept* or *passio animae*.

The first reason is the pronounced arbitrariness of signification Burley is advocating by emphasizing the “libera potestas imponentis” (CM 1.15) like no one else before Buridan (except Roger Bacon). The “chain of signification” as it is implied in the OS seems to fix the spoken words to the denotation of the concepts which Burley holds to be incompatible with the arbitrariness of vocal signification. Any word immediately denotes what the imposer assigns it to: “Vox potest significare quidlibet quod placet imponenti; si enim oporteret imponentem imponere nomen

⁴⁴ Besides Scotus (note 27), Bacon, and Ps.-Kilwardby (note 28) see Radulphus Brito, *Super arte veteri questiones subtilissimi*, ed. Venetiis s.a., f. 17rb: “...cum dicitur, philosophus dicit, quod voces sunt note passionum anime, dico [...] quod passio dicitur dupliciter, uno modo pro re intellecta vel pro intellectione rei. Modo voces sunt signa passionum id est rerum intellectarum et non passionum id est conceptuum”.

⁴⁵ Already in the 12th century Thierry of Chartres has pointed to the fact that “significatio apud Latinos potest accipi active et passive, scilicet pro significante et pro significato” (*Lectura in Boethii lib. De Trinitate* IV, 20, ed. N.M. Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius*, Toronto 1971, pp. 192–193). According to Robert Kilwardby, too, “significatio” can be taken as “actus et forma significantis” as well as “ipsum significatum”; cf. O. Lewry, “R. Kilwardby on Meaning. A Parisian Course on the ‘Logica vetus’”, in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. J.P. Beckmann et al., Berlin – New York 1981 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1), pp. 376–384, at p. 379. The same holds for “intentio”, cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Quodlibeta*, ed. Venetiis 1520, repr. 1966, f. 238vb: “...intentio accipitur dupliciter: aut pro ipsa operatione intendente: et sic est actus rationis [...]: aut pro obiecto a tali operatione intento”.

⁴⁶ See supra, note 10.

passioni nomen non significaret ad placitum".⁴⁷ The second reason is his strong animadversion against the Thomist view of the mental concept as some sort of an intramental *idolum* produced by the act of cognition which he took over almost verbatim from William of Ware.⁴⁸ This may explain why the early Burley, taking the *conceptus* as a synonym for the Thomistic *idolum*, doesn't allow the *propositio mentalis* to be composed of concepts. In his later writings, however, now accepting the concept of "concept", Burley is constantly appealing to the OS.⁴⁹

On grounds of my two theses, namely that, first, the concept of *propositio in re* is based on the systematized form of the OS and, second, that certain roots of the *propositio in re* are to be found already in Scotus, the fact that Burley was not the only reader of Scotus seems to imply that the theory of *propositio in re* should be found in other Scotist or Franciscan authors, too. And this is precisely what is the case.⁵⁰ And on the grounds of the first thesis we should expect that

⁴⁷ Gualterus de Burley, *QPH* 1.71: "Breviter dicendum quod aliqua vox significat rem extra animam immediate, et aliqua passionem immediate, et aliqua utrumque immediate ut si sit aequivocum ad rem et passionem rei. Unde vox potest significare quilibet quod placet imponenti; si enim oporteret imponentem imponere nomen passioni nomen non significaret ad placitum"; cf. *CM* 1.14: "Si igitur oportet vocem primo significare passionem animae, tunc vox non significaret ad placitum".

⁴⁸ Cf. *QLPer* 1.5 sqq. with Guillelmus de Waria, *In I Sent.*, dist. 27, q. 3, ed. M. Schmaus, in id., *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, Münster 1930 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXIX, 1), pp. *258 sqq.

⁴⁹ See supra, notes 20 sqq., 37, 42.

⁵⁰ Cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Tractatus primi principii complexi*, ed. Venetiis 1517, f. 28rb: "...dico, quod sicut *propositio est in re: ita est affirmatio vel negatio*. Est autem intelligendum quod ista omnia quae sunt dicta sunt ipsius syllogismi. Affirmatio et negatio possunt sumi quatuor modis. videlicet aut pro illis quae sunt in signo visibili, scilicet quae scribuntur. Aut pro illis quae sunt in voce tamquam in signo audibili: quorum sunt signa illa quae scribuntur. Aut pro illis quae sunt in mente: quorum sunt signa illa quae sunt in voce. Aut pro illis quae sunt in re: quorum signa sunt illa quae sunt in mente: et istis solis attribuuntur illa quae de principiis formaliter dicuntur: cetera autem per analogiam ad ista"; cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Passus super librum Perihermenias*, ed. Venetiis 1517, f. 21ra: "...oratio sumitur quadrupliciter: Primo quidem pro illa quae est in scripto [...]. Secundo modo pro illa quae est in vocali verbo [...]. Tertio modo pro illa quae est in rationali anima [...] et sic oratio est secundus actus rationis qui vocatur compositio et divisio. Quarto modo pro illa quae est in reali subiecto: idest in re extra"; Ps.-Richard of Campsall, *Logica contra Ocham*, 13.11, ed. E.A. Synan, *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, vol. 2, Toronto 1982, p. 117: "...proposicioni in mente correspondet et precedit *proposicio in re*, a veritate cuius proposicionis dependet veritas proposicionum mentalium et vocalium, et licet in veritate ita sit, tamen, *proposicio* ista nos latet nec innotescit nisi per proposiciones mentales vel vocales"; *ibid.*, 35.14, ed. Synan, p. 206: "...magis vere et magis proprie est *predicacio in re* quam in voce vel conceptu; a veritate, enim, *predicacionis*, que est in re, dependet veritas *predicacionis*,

comparable theories are to be found outside the school of Scotus as well. Which indeed is verified by authors like Hervaeus Natalis and Franciscus de Prato.⁵¹

Hervaeus, in his *Tractatus de verbo*, is advocating the conception of a propositional *complexum in re* in the theoretical context of the question whether the *verbum mentis* refers to incomplex objects only, or whether there is a *verbum complexorum*. According to a first “videtur quod” it seems that there can be no such mental word of the complex, for the *verbum* is formed with regard to the object of the intellect. In the object of the intellect, however, i.e. in the *res extra*, there isn't any complexity. The *complexio* or *compositio* rather belongs to the verb “est” and thus is only in the mind. Hervaeus, however, holds that along the lines of the OS there must be, just as there is a *conceptus complexus* corresponding to the *enuntiatio*, a *complexum repraesentatum* corresponding to the complex concept.⁵² So, even if in the external thing as such there is no other complexity than the ontological composition of

que est in voce vel conceptu”; Ioannes Tinctoris, *Dicta tinctoris super Summulas Petri hyspani*, ed. Reutlingen 1486, f. B4rb: “...triplex est oratio scilicet mentalis vocalis et scripta cui potest addi *fundamentalis in re*. [...] *fundamentalis est illa que componitur extremis fundamentalibus in rebus ipsis repertis*” (italics mine).

⁵¹ Cf. Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*, ed. C. Rode, Wiesbaden 2002, pp. 20–21, p. 23: “Quintum corollarium est, quod propositio obiectiva sit obiectum complexum ex duobus obiectis, quae sunt praedicatum et subiectum, quae componunt et integrant propositionem obiectivam”; cf. William Milverley, *Compendium de quinque universalibus*, in John Sharpe, *Quaestiones super universalia*, ed. A. Conti, Firenze 1990, p. 160: “Praedicari a parte rei est realiter esse, sicut universale de suo singulari, et realiter inesse, sicut accidens praedicatur de suo subiecto. Praedicatio a parte terminorum non est proprie praedicatio nisi quia signum praedicationis a parte rei”. Cf. A. de Libera – B. Mojsisch, “Satz. II. Mittelalter”, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 8, Basel 1982, cols. 1184–1186.—Much later Carolus Bovillus still is speaking of a “propositio realis”, cf. *Liber substantialium propositionum*, n. 2, in id., *Liber cordis; Liber proprie rationis; Liber substantialium propositionum; Liber naturalium sophismatum...*, ed. Parisiis 1523, f. 65r: “Propositionis termini, sunt duo: subiectum unum, alterum vero praedicatum. Quemadmodum rei naturalis substantiam, natura in geminas portiones, materiam et formam dispicitur: quarum altera, id est materia, alteri subest: reliqua vero ut forma, alteri praeest: ita et *propositionem* sive nominalem sive *realem*, mens ex geminis partibus et extremis pro suae ratiocinationis exordio conflat” (italics mine).

⁵² Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 20ra: “...videtur quod complexorum non sit verbum: quia formatur verbum solum de obiecto intellectus, sed in obiecto intellectus quod est *res extra* non est aliqua complexio: quia complexio sive compositio que pertinet ad hoc verbum ‘est’ est solum in mente, ergo non potest esse aliquid complexum de quo formetur verbum [...]. Contra: signis respondent signata nisi signa sint falsa. ergo enuntiationi quae est signum conceptus complexi respondet aliquis conceptus complexus: et similiter conceptui complexo aliquid *complexum repraesentatum* per ipsum” (italics mine).

matter and form or of substance and accidents there is some complexity with regard to its *esse obiectivum* in the intellect insofar it is one and the same thing that is signified by the subject and predicate term.⁵³ This is not far from the position held by Burley in CM except for the fact that Burley felt it necessary to bring the *propositio obiectiva* in contact with reality as the ultimate “truth-maker”⁵⁴ or rationale for the truth of any proposition. This probably is the reason for Burley’s referring to a “in rebus [...] aliquid compositum” in LPræd and LPer. For also a *propositio obiectiva* in the sense of a “Satz an sich” (Bolzano) cannot function, in itself, as a final “truth-maker”, because it is true just insofar as it is conformed to the way things really are.

Burley’s theory of *propositio in re* is, as Theo Kobusch has already shown,⁵⁵ not that singular as it may seem at first sight; and I think not that strange either. For taking into account the distinction between the active and passive understanding of the term “propositio”, the core thesis of Burley’s doctrine can be spelled out such that any proposition of the form “S is p”—independently of whether it is actually expressed or not—is true if and only if S *really* is p.

Is Burley, then, at least to blame for having given his theory of the ultimate foundation of propositional truth such a mistakable name as the *propositio in re* obviously is? The answer is no. He rather seems to have taken it over from other authors. I don’t know whether the *Passus* and the *Tractatus primi principii complexi* of Franciscus de Mayronis in which we even find astonishing expressions like “affirmatio in re” are predating Burley’s CM where the term *propositio in re* is used for the first time. In any case they are much earlier than the late writings of 1337 where Burley exposes his theory explicitly under that title. But

⁵³ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de verbo*, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, f. 20rb: “...in re extra quae est obiectum intellectus non invenitur aliqua complexio secundum esse quod habet in singularibus: nisi vocetur complexio compositio materiae et formae: vel subiecti et accidentis: vel partium quantitativarum: tamen *secundum esse quod habet in intellectu obiective convenit sibi esse complexio inquantum idem re est: quod significatur per praedicatum et subiectum* sub diversis tamen rationibus quarum convenientiam significat enunciatio: quae secundum acceptionem intellectus duo quaedam componibilia sunt: sicut convenit in affirmativis: vel et diversa sicut convenit in negativis” (italics mine).

⁵⁴ For a discussion of Burley’s doctrine of the *propositio in re* on the background of the modern notion of “truth-makers”, see: A. de Libera, *La référence vide. Théories de la proposition*, Paris 2001, pp. 99–155.

⁵⁵ T. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache*, Leiden 1987, pp. 345–346.

independent from this the expression *propositio in re* does not stem from Burley but was, in the form of “*oratio in re*”, introduced by Richard of Campsall. That there is a close connection between Burley and Campsall has been shown already by Claude Panaccio who, comparing Burley's and Campsall's discussion of the various positions concerning the question about the components of a proposition, notices (with reference to QLPer 3.554): “C'est là, chronologiquement, la première apparition chez Burley de sa fameuse doctrine de la *propositio in re*”.⁵⁶ But whereas Burley does not use this expression prior to CM, Campsall in his *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum*,⁵⁷ dating well before 1306, is speaking already of “*oratio in re*”⁵⁸ and “*oratio composita ex rebus*”.⁵⁹

A final remark: Several times already Burley's theory of the *propositio in re* has been paralleled with modern theories of the “states of affairs” or “*Sachverhalte*” which is perfectly right in principle. In this context Burley's doctrine is mostly referred to Bolzano's notion of “*Sätze an sich*”, to analogous concepts of the Brentano school, or to Frege's notion of thought (“*Gedanke*”). Here, however, I think we should differentiate. For the modern theories just as the medieval ones offer quite a number of closely interrelated but yet in some respect different conceptions. So, as I see it, it is Franciscus de Prato's notion of *propositio obiectiva* and the tradition of the *complexe significabile* (Adam Wodeham, Gregory of Rimini etc.) which is anticipating Bolzano's “*Sätze an sich*” or Frege's notion of thought, whereas, if we are looking for a modern counterpart of Burley's theory, we come much closer to the notion of the *propositio in re* in Wittgenstein's theory of “*Sachverhalt*” as it is given in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* opening with the claim: “Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge” (*Tractatus* 1, and 1.1). “Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten” (*Tractatus* 2). Thus, where truth is at stake, the *Tractatus*-world just like the Burley-world is constituted of

⁵⁶ C. Panaccio, *Le discours interieur. De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham*, Paris 1999, p. 244.

⁵⁷ Richardus de Campsall, *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum* (cf. supra, note 1).

⁵⁸ Richardus de Campsall, *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum*, 2.03, ed. Synan, p. 50.

⁵⁹ Richardus de Campsall, *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum*, 2.05, ed. Synan, p. 51.

something of which propositions can be images (in contrast, Bolzano would never have admitted the real world to be made up of “Sätzen an sich”). Whereas Bolzano, Frege and the advocates of the *complexe significabile* are projecting propositionality onto a sphere or a “third realm” of propositional content the early Wittgenstein, Burley and the modist proponents of a “constructio realis”—the latter two arguing along the lines of the systematized OS—are projecting propositionality onto the real world.

The Systematisation of the *Ordo Significationis* (OS)

	I	R1	II	R2	III	R3	IV
1 Aristotle	(ta graphomena) (litterae) written	symbola	(ta en te phone) (voces) spoken	semeia	(conceptus) (passiones) thought	homoiomata	(res) things
2 Boethius		notae		notae		similitudines	
3 ~1250 +		signa		signa		signa	
4					conceptus (subiective)	conceptus (obiective) (res intellecta)	res ut intellecta
5					passio / conceptus		
6						res	
7 ~1270 +	propositio scripta		propositio vocalis		propositio in mente		???
8			'semantic triangle' (voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus)				
9	triplex oratio						
10 Modistae			constructio vocalis	triplex constructio: constructio mentalis			constructio realis

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